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 FOREWORD 
 
 
The book that you hold in your hand contains the papers of an International Scien-
tific conference which was organised for the 70th anniversary of the Foundation of 
the Transdanubian Research Institute, the predecessor of what is now officially 
known as the Transdanubian Research Department. The “idea” of the conference 
was actually formulated decades ago, since in the Transdanubian Research Insti-
tute the celebration of anniversaries was and remains a tradition. The current 
anniversary, however, is crucial for several reasons. Both external and internal 
factors indicate that the conference in Pécs on the 27th and 28th of June 2013 will 
not simply be a statement of the state of art but also a milestone in the life of the 
organisation. 
We are facing serious challenges. Historically speaking, the institute and its 
staff have always been managing transformations of a systemic and institutional 
nature. We are, in fact, a study in institutional complexity. TRI was for a number of 
years linked to the Centre for Regional Studies (CRS), a research organisation 
founded in response to the growing importance of the field within the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences (HAS). Since the merger in 2012 of CRS with the Institute for 
Economic Research and Institute for World Economics, TRI has now become a 
department within the new HAS Centre for Economic and Regional Studies. We as 
yet do not know what the outcomes of this merger will mean for our work and 
internal responses to the new situation will be on the future agenda. In addition, 
the consequences of the global financial crisis that began in 2008 have deeply 
affected Hungary and those concerned with research and development, such as our 
institute and its staff. Models of R+D financing are changing while higher education 
and the financing of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences are being reformed. These 
changes will have serious impacts on the functioning of our department which 
obtains a full half of its resources from public funds.  
The area where our institute is located, the region of South-Transdanubia, is 
one of the less prosperous in Hungary. Integrated within this region, TRI/TRD has 
a long history of collaborating with local actors and our work has been an im-
portant and sustained contribution to the development of South-Transdanubia. A 
number of our research projects have dealt directly with the problems and oppor-
tunities facing South-Transdanubia and defining strategies to address these issues. 
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For 70 years now our institute is situated in the city of Pécs, the relationship with 
which was also established by a Co-operation Agreement in 2012.  
Presently, the Transdanubian Research Department hosts 22 researchers and 
10 research assistants. More than half of the researchers are economists, but we 
can also find among them geographers, sociologists, scholars of law and political 
scientists. The institute has always paid special attention to the training of rising 
generations of researchers of regional science and most of our current researchers 
in fact started and developed their scientific careers in our Institute. Some 
research professors emeritus and other leading researchers have worked 40–50 
years in our institute while more than two-thirds of the staff have been members 
of the institute for more than 20 years. The remaining third joined the team within 
the past five years. Since this year, 2013, we again have a member of the Academy 
amongst our ranks as well as five doctors of science and nine doctors of philoso-
phy. Among the junior staff we gave seven PhD student colleagues, and a number 
of colleagues who participate as lecturers in the Hungarian and international 
higher education.  
The research directions of the institute are fairly diverse, which in fact is not 
really surprising considering the age and professional profiles of the research staff 
and the fact that diversity is almost necessary in a workshop of regional research. 
A is stable research directions for long time are: the exploration of reasons, oppor-
tunities and trends of regional development especially in Central-East-Europe and 
South-East-Europe; research on environment protection and sustainability, dif-
ferent aspects and scales of economic development, the exploration of the inter-
connections of the settlement system and its development trends as well as re-
search on governance and management. 
The 50th anniversary of the foundation of TRI and the international conference 
titled “European Challenges and Hungarian Responses in Regional Policy” organ-
ised on the occasion of the anniversary were a turning point in the life of the insti-
tution, which was facing a generational change after the change of the regime in a 
country searching new directions of integration. Due to the new research direc-
tions formulated and evolved over the years, numerous international co-opera-
tions and research networks developed by the institute’s leading researchers and 
personal relationships have been established.  
One proofs of this is the present volume and the international conference for 
which our invitations were accepted by our partners, contacts, friends from vari-
ous countries of Europe. Our goal is not a secret: we would like to start a “new era” 
in the institute’s life – as it happened 20 years ago – with the help of this event and 
representatives of regional research groups. Besides the celebration of the 70th 
anniversary, laying the groundwork for this would be the aim of this conference.   
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Even the title of the conference, “Territorial Cohesion in Europe”, indicates that 
the basic research direction of our research organisation remains focused on the 
region and things regional. During the conference and in the volume composed of 
the selected presentations, we will to discuss the following issues: theoretical 
questions of regional science; regional development and regional policy in Europe 
in particular in the Central and Eastern European countries and the Balkans; fac-
tors of regional competitiveness; aspects, interpretations and measurement of 
territorial cohesion; trends and new methods of governance; European cohesion 
policy and its finance; the urban–rural relations and development. 
These presentations also reflect the turn that is taking place today in the area of 
territorial cohesion. We should no longer think in terms of the East and West and 
new and old member countries. The geography and the content of European terri-
torial cohesion can be interpreted in a more nuanced manner. We would like to 
contribute to a more differentiated and targeted European and national cohesion 
policy with our research revealing deeper and more complex interconnections.  
The volume in your hand contains the presentations of various approaches and 
interpretations of territorial cohesion which often conflict with one another. How-
ever, there is a certain point in common, namely the linkage between the authors 
and the organizer, the celebrating Transdanubian Research Institute and its staff.  
I am confident that this event will generate many meaningful debates and new 
research directions, and indicate research directions for the new generation. 
Through maintaining and extending institutional and personal relations we can 
contribute to forming a stronger research community of international regional 
studies. The Transdanubian Research Department would like to remain an es-
teemed member of this community. Thanks to all the organisers and participants 
for their personal activity in supporting the success of this effort. 
Pécs, 4 June 2013 
Cecília Mezei 
Head of department 
Transdanubian Research Department 
 THE TRANSDANUBIAN RESEARCH INSTITUTE: 
A CENTRE IN THE “PERIPHERY”  
Ilona Pálné Kovács 
Intoduction 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the relationship between spatial policy, science 
policy and the territorial division of power in Hungary in the context of the 70-year 
history of the Transdanubian Research Institute (TRI) founded 1943 in the city of 
Pécs. The history, the research activities and the mission of the institute have been 
shaped within this threefold context. TRI has always been highly responsive to dif-
ferent strands of scientific thought and trends in spatial development. At the same 
time, it has been exposed to the spatial and science policies of the respective 
governments. 
The Institute has existed in the dimensions of centre and periphery, not only in 
a geographical but also in an abstract sense, having gone through specific devel-
opment cycles, periods of flourishing and decline. At the beginning, under the 
heading of regional research, research activities focused on concrete geographical 
regions (Enyedi 1987). Since then the Institute (now officially a “research de-
partment”) has become a nationally and internationally acknowledged “atelier” for 
regional studies in the boadest of the term. In other words, it has moved from the 
geographic and research “periphery” to the “centre” of debate on regional transfor-
mations, regional policy and spatial planning in Europe. 
The History of the Institute 
The Foundation of the Institute: National and Regional Identity-building in the 
Shadow of Geopolitical Ambitions (1943) 
The history and the circumstances of the Institute’s foundation, the choice of name 
and the definition of its mission all have their special relevance (Horváth 1995). 
The choice of location and the shaping of TRI’s profile were symbolic within a 
context of interwar national consolidation and the promotion of national and re-
gional identity. As a result, it was not development policy as such but much more 
national and foreign policy considerations and implications that dominated the 
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foundation of the Institute. German geopolitical and imperial aspirations were, of 
course, an overall political concern. But also local issues, such as the elimination of 
Pécs university in 1941 were important. The revoking of university status pro-
voked protective reactions from local intellectuals and in general from the political 
opposition. Thus, the idea of founding the Institute was based on the objective 
reasoning that both the region and the development of science justified the crea-
tion of an independent research organisation. The official initiative for TRI’s crea-
tion was submitted to the Upper House of Parliament by Baranya County Council. 
The drafters of the initiative identified the Institute’s mission as historical research 
of the territory, society, economy of Transdanubia in order to contribute to the 
strengthening of its identity and to exploit future development potential. In 1942, a 
delegation from Pécs visited the Prime Minister and the Minister of Culture, but did 
not manage to win support for the initiative at that time (Babics 1968). 
The Institute was ultimately founded by the new Minister of Culture in 1943, 
but it lacked sufficient financial resources for its operation from the very begin-
ning. The resources provided were just enough for the founding director’s salary 
and the monthly rent of a small room, “furnished” with useless furniture from an 
almshouse (Rúzsás 1964). Thus the first director, Pál Zoltán Szabó, visited the 
counties and towns of South-Transdanubia to invite them to assist in launching the 
Institute. 
The Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) was founded in 1825 when Count 
István Széchenyi offered his yearly income for this purpose, and his example was 
then followed by other aristocrats and commoners. Széchenyi did this in a remark-
able parliamentary speech delivered in Hungarian, rather than German, which was 
highly unusual at the time. His motivation for this “unorthodox” gesture was to 
make a statement in favour of the cultivation of the Hungarian language and 
promotion of national identity. We can therefore state that the relationship of the 
progressive elite at the time to science was explicitly national, or at least based on 
a strong feeling of regional identity.  
After 1945, this “identity protecting” role also assumed an policy assisting one; 
it was thus formulated in the first director’s programme: “the economic recon-
struction of Transdanubia requires scientific management” (Szabó 1945). 
Integration into the Institutional System of the HAS: Stabilisation and Imperatives of  
Adaptation (1955) 
The stabilisation of the Institute in 1955 took place when TRI  joined the HAS re-
search institute network, based on a centralised science policy approach, in effect 
the “Soviet model”, although borader international scientific influences also im-
pacted on this process.  
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Integrated into the Academy, the TRI could broaden its disciplinary scope, but 
the geographical focus remained the territory of Transdanubia. The former ambi-
tions of supporting identity gradually diminished, since this was not a priority 
under the rule of a strongly centralised and authoritarian political regime. Re-
searchers escaped from direct political influence, perhaps consciously, by moving 
towards natural sciences, physical geography, local history and ethnographic 
research. The Institute could not remain unaffected by the policy requirements of 
the time and the ideological pressures that accompanied them. Hence, research 
projects were launched dealing with the economy, the history of industry, mining 
and the settlement system in the region. As one of historian pointed out, the 
specialising theoretical and methodological knowledge of science was coupled 
with complex applied knowledge in the service of the particular region (Rúzsás 
1964, p. 29). 
The research profile of the small TRI team (the staff increased to 20 between 
1943 and 1968 and included five geographers, six historians and one ethno-
grapher) was shaped not only with regard to external requirements, but also by 
the researchers’ various interests. These mosaic-like disciplinary approaches could 
not form a common profile. The presence of a number of disciplines (social and 
physical geography, ethnography, history) did not in itself create preconditions for 
true interdisciplinary research. Therefore, the Institute remained an organisational 
framework of individual performance rather than that of joint, collective research. 
The geographical framework of research was adjusted to the traditional public 
administrative borders of the county and within those borders to its geographic 
and ethnographic landscapes, since, as János Kolta argued, due to the country's 
small territory, the creation of Soviet-type large administrative/economic units 
was not possible (Rúzsás 1964, p. 25). 
The Institute as the Workshop of a New Discipline (1973) 
The assignment of Ottó Bihari, professor of constitutional law, to director in 1973 
launched a new era in the Institute’s history. In the 1970s the spirit of of reform 
efforts within State Socialism could be sensed in Hungary. Remaining within the 
limits of Marxist–Leninist ideology but softening the exclusiveness of the unified 
and centralised state and the command economy, demand materialised for 
territorial development policy in the interest of improving efficiency and spatial 
effectiveness. This of course entailed decentralisation. The relative independence 
of scientific life also contributed to a change of profile. 
The new director wanted TRI to become the national basis of fundamental 
research in regional development, with increased staff and an interdisciplinary 
composition. Being a professor of law, he achieved that regional research would be 
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considered more than just an analysis of the region, and he integrated administra-
tive, management and governance aspects too within an interdisciplinary research 
framework. The former disciplines supplemented by management science and 
sociology finally were linked with each other and thus common interdisciplinary 
research replaced the former parallel activities. This was a novelty in science 
methodology, but beyond this it also had science policy and political significance, 
namely that a provincial institute would assume a top position within a national 
ranking. Although the size of TRI did not reach the desired 30 researchers, it was 
still able to embed itself within national scientific life and to attract attention to a 
new research direction. 
Challenges of the Network Model and the Systemic Change (1983) 
Due to the early death of Ottó Bihari, György Enyedi was appointed as new director 
in 1983. As a representative of regional studies of European stature – which by 
then had been explicitly recognised – György Enyedi brought organisational 
innovation to the Institute by founding the Centre for Regional Studies (CRS) in 
1984 and joining it with the the TRI and two further research units located in other 
towns. Although the aspect of “on the spot” research was preserved, research 
programmes started to pay more attention to the European mainstream. Alongside 
its own specific research, TRI contributed to a change of paradigm in spatial policy 
during the systemic transformation, in the course of which the Academy succeeded 
in preserving its network of research institutes (Glatz 2002). 
Following the collapse of the State Socialist system at the beginning of the 
1990s, both the central government and the local governments had to face 
challenges of unknown proportions and they had to perform completely new tasks. 
For this reason applied research issues became reinforced at the Institute which 
took part in assisting national legislation, planning and local strategy building. 
Released from the former ideological and philosophical constraints, research at-
tention increasingly turned to western democracies and their scientific achieve-
ments. For many researchers this was the first opportunity to spend longer 
periods in western countries or attend conferences there. 
Nevertheless, the operating conditions did not really support the expansion of 
working spaces and horizons. Following the retirement of director György Enyedi1, 
Iván Illés became the new director general in 1991. Due to cuts in resources 
provided by the Academy of Sciences, the Institute had to change its strategy again 
and started to launch vigorous fundraising activities. Beyond financial stability it 
                                                                        
1 Fortunately, György Enyedi made good use of his domestic and international reputation for 
the benefit of the Institute until his death in 2012. 
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also wanted to ensure tight co-operation with its main “sponsors”, the central and 
local governments. These activities enabled it to enlarge its network to other 
towns (CRS had 9 departments during its heyday) and to deepen the spatial em-
beddednes of its research activities. CRS finally reached critical size needed to 
represent the ideas of regionalism and decentralisation, not only geographically by 
its network, but also in the principles of its functioning. TRI maintained its 
independence as part of the network, and collaboration with the other depart-
ments was advantageous in both professional and organisational terms. As a 
symbol of consolidation of the decentralised network model, TRI received again an 
independent and new director in the person of Gyula Horváth in 1992. 
European Accession and the Impact of European Cohesion Policy (1997) 
Stabilisation and researchers’ responsiveness to new scientific challenges allowed 
the Institute to take a crucial part in professionally preparing for European acces-
sion and in disseminating the principles of European Cohesion Policy. Convincing 
the political elite to accept the new spatial scale, i.e. the (NUTS 2) region, proved to 
be especially important. These “Europeanisation” projects became a new charac-
teristic and topics responding to challenges deriving from EU membership (re-
gional decentralisation, innovation, competitiveness) featured prominently in the 
research profile. The establishment of educational frameworks for regional science 
was very successful: these ranged from educating regional development experts 
for postgraduate degress, to launching bachelor and master training and to in-
augurating doctoral programmes in regional science. As regional development 
started to become an increasingly fashionable public policy due to the possibility of 
acquiring European resources, the number of “regionalists” began to grow. The 
Hungarian Regional Studies Association was founded, the Regional Science Com-
mittee was set up within the HAS, and following the University of Pécs, other 
universities also established regional science departments and programmes, with 
different disciplinary emphasis. In the pluralising institutional context the TRI 
became competitive, especially in theoretical, public policy and institutional re-
search. Technical advice for market based local development projects became less 
accentuated and the Institute joined several international research consortia 
(framework programmes, INTERREG, ESPON, etc.). 
Organisational Integration a New, Changing Science Policy Environment (2012) 
Having enjoyed greater demand for its research, the CRS and, within it, the TRI, 
was able to preserve their stable financial situation compared with other academic 
institutes for a relatively long time. The extended network with bigger staff was 
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mainly covered from own resources while subsidies from the Academy was 
decreasing continuously. However, dependence on project incomes finally under-
mined stability because the workload of the scientific staff unavoidably hindered 
their personal scientific career. Recently external intervention forced changes in 
the inner workings of the Institute. The entire network of research institutes of the 
Academy was reorganised into larger research centres in 2011–2012. The CRS 
network became a part of a larger one, and the TRI lost its status as an institute, 
and became a department (TRD). 
The growing number of management tiers and the loss of independence cause 
inevitable difficulties and are sources of conflicts. The centralised organisational 
management model now being put in place seems rather alien to us and does not 
befit a research institute dealing with regional studies. The management staff had 
to be changed. As a result, the dynamism of the Institute has been challenged, but 
this is not only due to the organisational and personal changes or the worsening 
budgetary conditions. Namely, the government in power since 2010 has centrali-
sed not only the institutional network of the Academy, but also the whole govern-
ance of the country. Regional science itself has been questioned in political circles 
and, to say the least, the positions of regionalism have significantly weakened.  
The anniversary conference of the TRI, now demoted to TRD, has been or-
ganised amidst these organisational developments and concerns. The aim of the 
organisers is explicit: they wish to continue their activities in the conviction that 
regional science is a vital field of research. Regional studies is vital because it is 
clear that society, the economy, governance systems and in fact all human activi-
ties are embedded and function within space. Regional research of their interde-
pendence is indispensable. 
Spaces and Scientific Fashions as Reflected in Research Activities  
Analysing the topics of the Institute’s research activities, we can identify a number 
of paradigmatic shifts, scientific vogues as well as policy imperatives concerning 
the role of space and time dimensions. At the beginning, “space” was rather the 
terrain of research while the dimension of analysis was “time” – as was identity, 
having just been  released from the grip of German “scientific imperialism” after 
1945 (Rúzsás 1964, p. 16). It is highly instructive to quote from the programme of 
the Institute’s first director about the mission of TRI: “As a geographer I have 
presented papers on the development of Transdanubian towns and I could always 
display the determining role of Hungarians in the historical development of towns” 
(Szabó 1945, p. 5). Among the research carried out we can find topics relating to 
industrial history, regional ethnography and economic geography (Babics 1959). 
In the first decades the geographic framework of research activities was mainly the 
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landscape, as well as natural geographic and linguistic characteristics. In response 
to political expectations, research in geographical history and on settlement net-
works was gradually strengthened, assisting the delimitation of municipal districts 
and the development programmes in the mining district of the Mecsek Mountains 
(Babics 1968). Aspects of economic efficiency were considered and various disci-
plines jointly analysed different areas in a complex way, realising theoretical and 
methodological innovation within more complex regional research settings (Babics 
1968, p. 79). 
Cautious approaches involvling market economy perpectives on regional 
dynamics resulted in a shift, or so to say a modernisation of regional research 
techniques and, more generally, in the perception of space. Agglomeration re-
search in the regional around Pécs began to question the then existing hierarchical 
and county-centred, uniform administrative model typical of state socialist 
practice (Bihari 1979). Attraction zones and interrelationships within settlement 
networks became a new focus of research interest as these were (and are) not 
primarily shaped by public administration, but much more by economic relations, 
services, infrastructure, transportation and of course human mobility (Faragó – 
Hrubi 1985). Thinking in urban districts and central places was also stimulated by 
official regional policy alongside the National Settlement Development Concept 
adopted in 1971. The social and spatial inequalities deriving from concentrating 
development resources in the towns were not ignored either. The problems of 
peripheries and rural areas were analysed mainly by sociologists, admitting that 
there was no recipe for “catching up” and that mass migration could not really be 
stopped (Enyedi 1980, Hantó – Kárpáti 1982, Kovács 1985). 
At the end of the 1970s, research programmes on economic spatial connections 
were launched. Quoting Friedmann, Gyula Horváth, then junior researcher, called 
attention to the significance of districts shaped by relationships of economic actors 
(Horváth 1981, p. 68); János Rechnitzer elaborated a special methodology (Balance 
of Sectoral Relationships, BSR) for the description of territorial economic structure 
(Rechnitzer 1981). It was paradoxical that simultaneously with these research 
activities spatial processes were still unfolding within the constraints of the 
planned economy and the spatial structure of public administration within the 
limits of the centralised one party-state.  
The systemic change, and with it the market economic (moreover “wild capi-
talist”) circumstances, radically rearranged Hungarian space. Economic restructur-
ing resulted in dramatic polarisation, areas of crisis emerged, not only in the 
traditional eastern rural regions, but also in the former industrial and urban dis-
tricts. Managing industrial depression, understanding and influencing the spread 
of capital and innovation became basic research topics, as di the analysis of rural 
areas falling into deep poverty. “Crisis and the way out”, the title of the first village 
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conference organised by TRI in 1991, was very characteristic of this new research 
wave (Kovács 1991). Interest in cities and urban zones decreased somewhat, even 
though the Institute prepared one of the first complex urban development con-
cepts for Pécs in 1996. The profile of the institutes of the CRS was strongly shaped 
by the regions they were located in. The institute in Budapest was concerned with 
the capital city and its agglomeration (industry, international functions etc.), the 
institute in Győr researched clusters and innovation, the departments in the Great-
Plain turned their attention mainly towards rural and agricultural areas. The 
decline of South-Transdanubia, with Pécs as its centre, started at this time and the 
need for development policy intervention shifted the interest of researchers in TRI 
towards public development policy issues.  
There was also a marked change of paradigm in spatial approach when 
European Union accession became a clear political reality. Aspiring to the “Europe 
of Regions”, regionalisation developed into a kind of public policy trend in Hungary 
as well. European regional policy became an important research focus, and the 
conference entitled “European Challenges and Hungarian Responses”, organised 
on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of TRI, was a symbolic overture in this 
regard (Hajdú – Horváth 1994). Several lecturers who participated then are 
present at this 70th anniversary conference.  
The delimitation of NUTS 2 regions was based on a paradigm of modernisation 
and competitiveness. TRI participated in the conceptual development of Euro-
peanisation and regionalisation through its strong research traditions in and 
thorough knowledge about South-Transdanubia. It is therefore understandable 
that in the Hungarian context South-Transdanubia was called the “cradle of 
regionalism”; here was elaborated the first regional development strategy based 
on notions of regional competitiveness (Faragó 1994, Horváth 2006). The geo-
graphical scale determined the research topic, though it might as well have hap-
pened the other way around. Competitiveness, adaptation to European Cohesion 
Policy and innovation became priority research areas, concluding that conditions 
for regionalisation were not yet ripe.  
Due to EU enlargement, the western scientific community showed special inter-
est in the new member states. As a result of this, the Institute joined a number of 
EU Framework Programme research projects dealing with learning and adaptation 
processes of the new member states (ADAPT, G-FORS, EUDIMENSIONS). However, 
the representation of the scientific mainstream proved inadequate for imple-
menting domestic regionalisation successfully, despite the fact that a number of 
national strategic documents, concepts and even public administrative reform con-
ceptions had advocated regionalism for almost two decades. Paradoxically, the 
dynamism of region-building slowed down after European accession and territo-
rial and spatial processes did not lead to territorial cohesion. The first volumes of a 
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series (2003–2012, edited by Gyula Horváth) introducing the regions of the 
Carpathian Basin were published, including the volume on South-Transdanubia 
(Hajdú 2006), but the characteristics of NUTS 2 regions were reflected neither in 
the spatial structure nor in social identity (Pálné Kovács 2009).  
Top-down regionalisation efforts generated some changes in other dimensions 
of spatial structures as well. The scale of urban attraction districts “returned” in 
the form of the so-called micro-regional movement, serving as a frame for mu-
nicipal collaboration in local economic development (Mezei 2004, Finta 2004), and 
in providing public services (Somlyódyné Pfeil 2003). The role of cross-border 
relationships and frontier regions also became more accentuated. The Institute 
joined projects within the ESPON network, emphasising the necessity of research 
on urban networks, participated in research on European macro regions (Gál – Lux 
– Illés 2013) and started to expand its interest in the Balkans as well (Horváth – 
Hajdú 2011). 
Thus the Institute’s spatial approach followed major regional scientific trends, 
while its empirical research in South-Transdanubia developed comparisons bet-
ween European and domestic spatial processes. In this context the question arises 
why South-Transdanubia and Hungary has fallen behind western European trends 
in the past 20 years. This question can hardly be answered in this paper; the most 
we can deal with here is to investigate how far governance and Hungarian public 
policy have affected the shaping of spatial processes and the Institute’s research 
activities themselves.  
Politics and Spatial Research 
Governance is an important and gradually upgrading interpretation framework for 
spatial processes. The “regionalist” aspect is how governance influences the deve-
lopment of regions.  
A “developer” state intervening into regional processes must unavoidably 
tackle the optimisation of the spatial dimension. One of the important elements of 
European governmental reforms in the past decades was reorganisation of the 
spatial scale of public administrative units (municipal consolidation, regionalism), 
which was usually accompanied by some version of decentralisation. During the 
past two decades Hungary proved to be an excellent field for analysing questions 
like how space and governance correlate, what are the consequences of reforms of 
or interventions into territorial governance and what are the appropriate circum-
stances for achieving the reform targets.  
As described above, similarly to other Central and Eastern-European countries, 
the Hungarian regional reform was mainly motivated by the aim of accessing 
European structural funds. Hungarian failure can be explained primarily by the 
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lack of real intention of the respective governments to decentralise, and therefore 
the development policy target and the political interest conflicted with each other. 
The Hungarian political elite having inherited centralised state traditions refuses 
to share its power, it is not at all convinced that decentralised governance could 
not only reinforce legitimacy but also strengthen the efficiency of the state. Basi-
cally only a narrow circle of regionalists has kept the issue of territorial decentrali-
sation on the agenda. 
We are going to describe here how this ambivalence appeared in the applied 
research of TRI or in other words in its relationship to power. As the history of the 
Institute showed collaboration with political actors was a necessity from the 
beginnings and not only for financial reasons. From the very start TRI had a mis-
sion of providing professional assistance for the local decision-makers (primarily 
by preparing development plans); moreover, in some epochs the Institute was also 
involved in central governmental decisions and legislation. Our professional con-
viction has ever been that decentralised governance is indispensable for efficient 
development policy and for dealing with territorial inequalities. Territorial 
development namely has to be based on the resources of the given territory. This 
approach has been inherited by generations of researchers, partly due to locally 
based research and “peripheral existence”, and far preceding the now fashionable 
place-based approach. 
The Institute took significant part in the elaboration of territorial administra-
tive reforms, even if there was no full agreement in the optimal geographical scale 
of territorial decentralisation between researchers and politicians. The debate of 
“county versus region” unfolding in the middle of the 1990s was not really on the 
borders or the scale and it was not merely based on rational or scientific argumen-
tation. The political elite at the time of legislation during the systemic change rep-
resented almost uniformly the opinion that the reinforcement of local inde-
pendence was the primary task and so the counties were consciously weakened. 
The Institute sided with the county governments in this debate, and organised the 
so-called county-conferences every year, although researchers agreed that munici-
palities had received significant sphere of movement for the first time in their his-
tory. Our empirical and theoretical research supported both municipal public ad-
ministration and planning (Csefkó – Pálné Kovács 1993). 
On studying the European Cohesion Policy and preparing for European acces-
sion, it became evident that medium-tier governance has a basic significance from 
the aspect of both the decentralisation of power and development policy. For this 
reason, the necessity, or rather, the expedience of defining regions larger than the 
county, became evident within public policy. The Act on Regional Development 
passed in 1996 was largely based on the recommendations of the Institute and 
with its enactment the delimitation and later the institutionalisation of the NUTS 2 
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regions was accomplished. The new regions were seen as logical spatial contexts 
for addressing economic challenges of competitiveness, innovation and modernisa-
tion. In the minds of many Hungarian regionalists, the counties represented past 
traditions, paternalism and political narrow-mindedness.  
In all honesty, we at TRI  probably lacked a complex approach and objective 
distance necessary for interdisciplinary research at the time. Our research served 
rather a programmatic mission, while the precise analysis of social and economic 
contexts was not carried out as it should have been. Therefore, the top-down 
regionalisation processes could not rely on truly complex empirical argumenta-
tions. However, this is not the only explanation for the failure of regionalisation in 
Hungary, and it does not have much to do with regionalisation which with the new 
government itself has  become an instrument of centralisation. We could cynically 
say that regional research has stopped being trendy and that this “Institute of the 
periphery” has been pushed to the periphery of political interest. Decentralisation 
has remained an unexploited governance instrument in Hungary for increasing 
trust, strengthening democracy and improving efficiency. Also it seems that poli-
tics shows no interest in the “services” of science in shaping governance models.  
Recent changes in public policy and governance models are characterised by a 
complete ignorance of territoriality. The extreme loss of self-government positions, 
the nationalisation of the majority of local public services, the exaggerated growth 
and centralisation of bureaucratic state administration and the mayors’ exclusion 
from parliamentary decisions all indicate a serious deficit in the relationship of 
local society and the central government.  
The Institute has not yet responded to these shocking changes with compre-
hensive research, but it has raised questions unavoidable for evaluating them. One 
of our research projects, for instance, financed by the National Scientific Research 
Fund, OTKA, seeks to answer the question whether the political, public guarantees 
of decentralised governance are still available in Hungary at all. In the framework 
of another project within the State Reform Operational Programme we are 
analysing the opportunities and chances of spatially optimising local government 
performance in their remaining public service functions. 
Future Chances 
As a periphery of both Hungary and the EU, the South-Transdanubian region has 
been in a permanent crisis during the past two decades. Resulting from the closing 
down of mining operations and the crisis of heavy industry, the region has had to 
face the difficulties of restructuring. Its position was further worsened by the 
Yugoslav war and the lack of motorway. Unfortunately, neither pre-accession 
funds, EU regional operational programmes, the European Capital of Culture pro-
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gramme, nor the meanwhile accomplished motorway have been able to bring 
about significant changes. 
At the beginning of 2013, preparations for the next programming period were 
launched; therefore professional advice for local plans and ideas should be wel-
come. It is not really our aim to help in this regard with new forms of policy 
entrepreneurship, catchy project ideas or attractive slogans gleaned from the EU’s 
new Cohesion Policy. Our most important task is that of evaluating regional 
development policy and its performance in the past and to identify local resources 
for sustainable development. It is also extremely important to assist in renewing 
development policy decision-making and its institutional system, identifying actors 
and partners, supporting and catalysing partnership regimes. This all the more as 
former local governance was not able to attract partners, local governments did 
not seek to reinforce their development and planning capacities, and project 
management left no scope for unfolding local creativity. As a result, Hungarian 
development actors are once again unprepared for a new programming period 
because organisational learning has failed.  
TRI must first of all be able to preserve its professional and scientific integrity, 
and its fundamentally basic research profile in line with the international stand-
ards of regional science, which means we cannot renounce collaboration in basic 
research. Actually we can assist in shaping national regional policy on the basis of 
our basic research outcomes. Fortunately, the Institute’s position in international 
scientific life, especially by serving as a bridge between eastern and western 
scholars in regional science, provides ideal opportunity for basic research, and the 
number and qualification of the research staff (20 researchers 75% of whom have 
scientific degrees) are guarantee for the continuation and also the renewal of 
traditions. 
Furthermore, we shall establish a new type of partnership with the decision-
makers of the region. It is not direct planning and programming, and not out-
sourced applied research that can contribute to developing the periphery, but 
much more the emergence of active “development regimes” which we can assist 
with our knowledge and networks. A “place-based” reform of the former pater-
nalistic development policy, based on external public (EU) resources, would 
require a new partnership strategy of  local governments even if the current 
government model leaves them only a narrow scope of action. Nevertheless, at the 
periphery of national power and regional development dynamics, only spatially 
and sectorally open knowledge-based networks have a chance to survive. Although 
the Transdanubian Research Institute recently lost its organisational independen-
ce and its original name, the Transdanubian Research Department still exists as a 
knowledge centre and its professional and intellectual traditions can serve as an 
example of successful decentralised development.  
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THE CHALLENGES OF EU COHESION 
POLICY 
 RESCALING THE EUROPEAN STATE 
Michael Keating 
Scope of the Paper 
The paper summarize some arguments developed in my book Rescaling the Euro-
pean State (Oxford University Press, in press). It seeks to link arguments about 
spatial rescaling in social and political geography with political science approaches 
to territorial government. The chapters follow the thematic headings of: Theory; 
History; Function; Politics; Institutions; Interests; Policy; Norms; Dynamics. 
The Territorial State 
Modernist social science relies heavily on the idea of the integrated territorial state 
but the reasoning on which this is founded is not always consistent. There is a re-
current argument that modernisation entails territory giving way to function as 
the dominant principle of social organisation; yet the end product is a rigidly de-
fined territorial unit, the “nation state”. The division between International Rela-
tions (which has tended to reify the territorial state) and Comparative Politics 
(which has tended to downplay territory) has enabled scholars to avoid facing this 
contradiction. Another inconsistency concerns the term “nation-state”, used by 
some (notably in IR) to denote the sovereign state, while for others it refers to the 
coincidence of the nation (a cultural and sociological category) with the state (a 
juridical category). These contradictions are exposed as the state is under chal-
lenge, losing both functional capacity and its unquestioned normative supremacy. 
The End of Territory? 
In the late twentieth century, another wave of modernist theory predicted the end 
of territory (Badie 1995) (along, in some versions, of time and of history). This was 
linked to ideas of space-time compression under the impact of new technology, of 
global economic integration, and to the triumph of one set of hegemonic values. In 
practice, what was happening was a re-territorialisation, the reconfiguration of 
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society, economy and polity at new territorial levels, sub-state1; supranational; and 
transnational (crossing states). 
Geographers have recognized these processes but are divided on how to con-
ceptualize territory (or, as they tend to say, space) (Pike 2007). One conception is a 
closed, topological (or “territorial”2) one, with fixed boundaries, which can be 
mapped. The other is the open or “relational” one, in which particular locations or 
activities are linked through global chains and thus detached from their immediate 
environment. The global city-region thesis draws on this type of thinking. Some 
scholars (of whom I am one) argue that this is a false dichotomy and the degree to 
which a territory is bounded or open is an empirical question. Territories are not 
merely topographic entities but sociological ones, given meaning by the activities 
that they enclose, which may be more or less territorially anchored and inter-
dependent. The choice of the two perspectives on territory is also a conceptual 
one, depending on the question being asked. 
Functional Change 
Rescaling is partly driven by functional change, notably in the economy, with eco-
nomic change responding to new spatial logics at all levels, a phenomenon known 
as the “new regionalism” (Keating 1998).3 Functional rescaling can also be seen in 
culture and welfare. There is also a rescaling of political community, drawing on 
new and revitalised territorial identities.  
These functional changes influence but do not determine the configuration of 
new territorial institutions. The choice of the “right” level depends on what one 
wants out of territory, as we have seen, for example, in the arguments between 
consolidationists and public choice theorists about the optimal way of organising 
local government. Interests and power are also at stake. 
Governance to Government 
There are, however, tendencies to institutionalise territories at new scales. On the 
one hand, states seek new spaces for regulating functions that have escaped their 
control. On the other hand, oppositions and social movements seek to politicise 
these new spaces, to democratise them and to broaden the political agenda. Key 
                                                                        
1 We cannot say “sub-national” here as that begs the question of what level constitutes the 
nation (for example Spain or Catalonia).  
2 Here we encounter a familiar type of terminological confusion. Political scientists tend not 
to talk of space but of territory, but we can hardly talk of a non-territorial conception of 
territory. 
3 There is another, largely unrelated, new regionalism in International Relations. 
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levels here are the European one; the meso or regional one; and the metropolitan 
or city-region level.  
The choice of level, the boundaries of territory and the institutional configura-
tion of it are all subject to political and social contestation. There is a tendency to 
resolve these issues and produce legitimate outcomes through the political process 
and the constitution of governments. So we see a halting tendency towards Euro-
pean government; to elected regional governments; and to metropolitan institu-
tions. If governance is seen as a system of non-hierarchical, plural and interacting 
institutions based on functional speciality, then what we are seeing at all these 
levels is a move from governance to government – and not for the first time in 
history (Goetz 2008). This contrasts with the more common proposition in social 
science that we are moving from government towards governance (Bellamy – 
Palumbo 2010). Yet, these spaces remain, in comparison with the classical nation-
state, loosely bounded and contested. There is also internal contestation for 
control and advantage, a staple theme of political science but one often neglected 
in governance approaches. 
Politics 
The nationalisation thesis holds that political alignments will deterritorialise 
within state boundaries, with competition spreading evenly throughout (Lipset – 
Rokkan 1967, Caramani 2004). This has held in many countries, but it may be be-
cause parties are able to make differentiated appeals. Elsewhere territorial parties 
have strengthened. The theme of inter-regional competition has encouraged politi-
cians to make catch-all appeals to cross-class and inter-sectoral territorial 
interests. Demands for territorial autonomy have grown in many countries (Ger-
many being an exception). Yet there is a consistent paradox in that electors often 
prefer uniform policies. Electors value national welfare states but seek territorial 
advantage where they can. 
Interests 
In the 1980s, Italian scholars wrote of regioni senza regionalismo (Pastori 1981) 
and the “paradox of the regions” (Le Galès – Lequesne 1997) to refer to the fact 
that regional government had not been accompanied by a territorialisation of so-
cial and economic representation. I have conducted a study of peak interest groups 
in between two and four regions each in six countries (the UK, France, Italy, Spain, 
Germany and Belgium). These are business groups (large and small); trades 
unions; farmers; and environmentalists. The results are complex and many 
variables are at play, the main ones being economic interest; ideology; the strength 
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of regional government and the extent to which they can impose a territorial 
boundary on policy systems; and territorial identities, which may affect members 
of groups or provide legitimacy for territorial institutions. I examined the following 
dimensions: 
 organizational, the extent to which groups have a regional structure and 
power relationships within it; 
 cognitive, the territorial framework which groups use to articulate their de-
mands and the extent to which territory itself is constituted as an interest; 
 relational, the relationships with governments at all levels and among 
groups. 
To summarise, big business appreciates the new importance of territory for de-
velopment but fears capture by territorial interests (including environmental, 
separatist and left-wing interests) so prefers corporatist institutions in which it 
has a guaranteed role, focused on development in the narrow sense. Small business 
depends more on public goods produced by regional government and is often 
closer to popular sentiment. It tends to be more regionalist. Trades unions are 
cross-pressured. They look to new spatial levels for opportunities for influence, 
which they have lost in national corporatist exchanges or at the work place. They 
seek to expand the regional agenda and bring a stronger social dimension. Some 
are ideologically more centralist. Others support regional government but are 
cross-pressured by their simultaneous defence of the national welfare state. Un-
ions are affected by strong identity sentiments and movements, which influence 
their members directly. Generally, unions have moved from preferring corporatist 
structures at the regional level to support for elected government. 
Rescaling, together with CAP reform, has served to fragment agricultural 
interests. New interests, including ecological farmers and neo-ruralists, together 
with many small farmers, favour the regional level as a way of undermining corpo-
ratist management of the sector by large farmers and agri-businesses in partner-
ship with the states and the European Commission. Ecologists tend to be close to 
territory, to support regionalism, and to value the European level, where they can 
obtain binding regulations applicable all the way down. They, and some farming 
interests, are also part of broader coalitions for the defence of traditional cultures 
and ways of life. 
There are varying experiences of territorial social dialogue. It would be an 
exaggeration to talk of regional corporatism, since regions are loosely-bounded 
spaces and some groups have the ability to venue-shop among levels. There are, 
however, many instances of regional concentration. This is not just a matter of co-
operation in addressing common problems but of political competition. Regional 
governments seek territorial social dialogue as a form of legitimation. There are, 
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however, tensions between these forms of functional representation and elected 
regional politicians.   
Both conceptions of territory are useful here, to map the enclosure of space but 
also the capacity of some actors to escape it and venue-shop among levels. Much of 
regional politics hinges on this. 
Policy 
I have mapped the extent of regional policy making along five dimensions: de-
velopment; distribution; allocative efficiency; ecology; and polity-building. Regions 
are concerned with all five and all are contested (including the meaning of alloca-
tive efficiency). This cuts across traditional theories of federalism according to 
which allocative and development policies are/can be devolved, while distribution 
should be state-wide. There are significant variations in regional activity and 
priorities on all dimensions. Particularly important are differences in the way that 
public services are delivered, and the patterns of beneficiaries of public services. 
While welfare states remain essentially national, regional welfare regimes are 
growing up alongside them. It is often hypothesised that regional decentralisation 
will produce a “race to the bottom” as regions cut taxes, regulations and social 
overheads in order to compete. There is in practice little evidence of this but a 
complex pattern which includes a race to the top, a race to the middle, and policy 
learning and adaptation. 
Norms 
New conceptualisations of territory open new ways to address two normative 
issues: that of self-government; and that of social solidarity. Territorial self-
government has been regarded as difficult since groups so rarely correspond per-
fectly with territories. Modern understandings of group identities (or “ethnicity”) 
are predominantly constructivist, showing how boundaries are created and re-
created. New understandings of territory also have a constructivist bent, focusing 
on the sociological content of territory and on territory- (region- or nation-) 
building. This provides new means for reconciling groups with spaces as they may 
become mutually constitutive. The open conception of territory also presents 
possibilities for partially-territorialised solutions to self-government claims. 
Many people have feared that the erosion of the territorial state from above and 
below and the opening of boundaries will allow powerful groups to disengage from 
national welfare compromises, which, along with weakened affective identity at 
the state level, will entail a loss of social solidarity both within and between terri-
tories. The old territorial bargain, under which transfers to poorer regions came 
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back to wealthy ones in the form of orders for their products, no longer holds. A 
similar argument is made in relation to states within the European single market 
(Bartolini 2005). Yet even if there is a loss of solidarity at the state level, this does 
not necessarily entail an absolute loss of solidarity as emerging spaces may be 
more or less solidaristic. Inter-territorial solidarity has also largely survived be-
cause of its institutional entrenchment. Survey evidence shows continued support 
for state-level solidarity in principle but there is increasing resistance in wealthy 
regions (Henderson et al. 2013).  
Dynamics 
Creation of new levels of government brings into being new actors and ensures 
that the structure of territorial government is always at issue. The territorial dis-
tribution of power is henceforth not an issue that can be settled once and for all, 
but a component of regular politics. Hence there are permanent debates about it, 
complicated by the multiplication of veto players.  
One issue that has nowhere been resolved is that of inter-territorial distribu-
tion. Regional devolution has converted implicit territorial transfers4 into more 
transparent, intergovernmental grants. States have sought to meet these pressures 
by sequential concessions, while rarely been able to bring them all together within 
a grand bargain.  
The economic crisis has had asymmetrical effects on territorial politics and 
government. Some Spanish regions have sought refuge in the state, asking to give 
back powers (a phenomenon known, curiously, as devolución) while some Italian 
regional governments have effectively collapsed. Stronger, wealthier, or resource-
rich regions, on the other hand, have sought more autonomy, especially where this 
is combined with distinct identities and successful region or nation-building pro-
jects over recent decades. Catalonia, the Basque Country, Flanders and Scotland 
are obvious examples. Nationalists in these territories have generally moved from 
demanding autonomy or asymmetric federalism, to putting independence ex-
plicitly on the agenda. Yet, when they define their independence projects, they all 
put them in a broader context, embracing European integration and seeking to 
maintain multiple functional links with the host state. These seem to represent 
demands, not for the proliferation of nation-states within Europe, but for a re-
definition of the territorial state itself. There is no constitutional formula out there 
to encompass this, although there is a literature in legal and political theory about 
new forms of post-sovereign authority. 
                                                                        
4 Which arise because of the uneven territorial impact of inter-personal transfers, or because of 
path-dependent spending commitments.  
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 THE NEW EU REGIONAL POLICY:  FOSTERING 
RESEARCH AND INNOVATION IN EUROPE1 
Wolfgang Streitenberger 
Introduction 
The strong public interest in the opportunities offered by EU structural funds for 
research and innovation is not surprising: These funds are the most important 
financial instruments of the EU’s regional policy. The EU currently allocates 36% of 
its budget for it. But before dealing with the role of research and innovation in 
regional policy, it could be helpful to briefly recall how it works. Below it will be 
shown how its principles have entered into force over the years. 
General Features and History of EU Regional Policy 
The goal of EU regional policy is to strengthen the economic, social and territorial 
cohesion of the EU. All other EU policies and all national and regional policies also 
have to contribute to territorial cohesion. Thus “cohesion” and “cohesion policy” 
are not exclusive tasks of the EU, but are the responsibilities of several political 
levels. At European level cohesion policy consists of the European Social Policy 
with the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Policy with its 
two “structural” funds, the European Fund for Regional Development (EFRD) and 
the Cohesion Fund. Thus regional policy is not identical with, a historical develop-
ment which added layer to layer, policy to policy, and fund to fund. Already the EU 
founding fathers worded the vision for today’s cohesion policy in the Treaty of 
Rome in 1957: “The Community shall aim at reducing the disparities between the 
levels of development of the various regions”. 
In the early days of the European regional policy, the Regional Fund financed 
only national projects prepared exclusively by member states which had to apply 
for European support at project level. Thus the European influence was little. New 
                                                                        
1 This paper was submitted for publication on 4 April 2013, thus before any final decision 
about the future EU cohesion/regional policy (2014–2020) has been made by the EU Par-
liament and the EU Council. Thus it is based on the proposals made by the EU Commission 
when submitting the Legislative Package for Cohesion/Regional Policy in autumn 2011. 
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member states like Greece, Portugal and Spain came with increased regional 
disparities. In the 1980s EU funding was a key to catching catch up to EU average. 
Regional policy was designed to offset the burden of the single market for the 
less-favoured regions in the EU and to make their economies more efficient. In 
1988 four key principles were introduced which should be mentioned here be-
cause they are still characterising the EU’s regional policy and also the next pro-
gramming period: 
 concentration: focusing on the poorest regions; 
 partnership: involvement of regional and local partners; 
 multi-annual programming, instead of the annualone; 
 additionality: EU expenditure must not substitute national subsidies. 
In the early 1990s standardised rules for regional policy spending were laid 
down, and the still valid principle of shared management of the supported projects 
was introduced, meaning that the tasks should be shared between Brussels 
officials and administrations in the member states. It was an important event when 
“priority objectives” for regional policy actions were introduced and the share of 
regional policy in the EU budget was increased from a mere 16% in 1988 to 31% in 
1993. The reform in 1994 intensified European influence on regional policy by 
setting up a system of close co-operation between member states and the Commis-
sion in implementing a multi-annual regional policy funding programme. How 
does it work in its current version? 
(1) The Structural Funds budget and the rules for its use are decided by the 
European Council and the European Parliament on the basis of a proposal 
from the European Commission. 
(2) The Commission makes a proposal after having consulted closely with the 
member states over the “Community strategic guidelines on cohesion”. This 
pillar of the policy gives it a strategic dimension. The guidelines guarantee 
that the member states adjust their programming to the priorities of the 
Union. 
(3) Each member state prepares a National Strategic Reference Framework 
(NSRF), coherent with the Strategic Guidelines. That document defines the 
strategies to be chosen by the member states and proposes a list of opera-
tional programmes to be implemented. 
(4) The Commission validates each operational programme (OP) which gives 
the priorities of the member state (and/or regions) as well as the way in 
which it will manage its programming. For the current 2007–2013 period, 
317 operational programmes were adopted by the EU Commission. 
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(5) After the Commission has made a decision on the operational programmes, 
the member states and their regions have the task of implementing them, 
i.e. selecting the thousands of projects, monitoring and finally assessing 
them. All this work is done through the “management authorities” in each 
country and/or region, and not in Brussels. 
(6) Finally the Commission pays the certified expenditure and monitors each 
operational programme alongside the member states. 
As it is clear from the above description, this system of co-operation harmo-
nises all member states’ and the region’s interests and also realises European pri-
orities at the same time. 
In the programme period 2000–2006 regional policy was mainly focused on the 
preparation for enlargement, which brought a 20% increase in EU population, but 
only 5% increase in GDP. The funds were augmented and new pre-accession 
instruments were introduced. 
Many regions developed well thanks to EU support. Just a snapshot of the 
cohesion policy’s main achievements in the last seven years (2000–2006): 
 regional disparities were reduced. The index of disparity between the most 
and the least developed regions fell by a sixth thanks to sustained growth in 
the less developed regions; 
 an estimated 1.4 million jobs were created, of which about 1 million in 
enterprises, mainly in SMEs; 
 transport links were modernised, regional policy funded 4700 km of 
motorways, 1200 km of high speed rail and 7300 km of normal rail; 
 development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was supported, 
230,000 SMEs received mainly grants, but also loans; 
 and although research and innovation were not the main priority of the EU’s 
regional policy until 2007, investment in R&D intensified: nearly 38,000 R&D 
projects obtained support which created over 13,000 long-term research 
jobs. 
These are quite impressive cohesion/regional policy achievements – but then 
why is European regional policy still necessary? 
Let us remember that the EU generates 43% of its economic output in just 14% 
of its territory. So regional economic and social disparities in Europe are still 
substantial and they have significantly increased with recent enlargements. En-
largement took place some 9 years ago, but the EU still has to cope with its effects. 
Luxembourg, the wealthiest member state in terms of per-capita income, is still 
seven times richer than Romania, the poorest one. Thus despite the good results of 
the EU’s regional policy in 2000–2006 it has had to be continued. How does the 
current one look like? It continues to promote the economic, social and territorial 
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cohesion of the Union by reducing development disparities between regions and 
member states, and by striving for a spatially balanced economic development. 
While doing this, cohesion policy also implements the goals of overarching EU 
strategies, like the EU 2020 focusing on competitiveness and employment by 
smart, inclusive and sustainable growth. The majority of the European Union’s 
financial support has to be earmarked to achieve these overarching EU 2020 goals. 
There are three concrete objectives to be achieved by the current cohesion/re-
gional policy: 
The first objective is convergence, that is, the acceleration of the catching-up 
process in the least developed regions. It concerns 84 regions whose per capita 
GDP is less than 75% of the EU average. Convergence regions are concentrated in 
the Central and Eastern European new member states and in the Mediterranean 
area. Convergence is a dominant goal: 82% of the cohesion policy budget is allo-
cated for that purpose.  These investments are focusing on improving the infra-
structures, modernising the economy and boosting employment. 
The second objective is: improving competitiveness and employment in other, in 
the advanced regions. 16% of the total allocation is used for this objective, 
available for a total of 168 regions. In these advanced regions investments in inno-
vation are in the foreground. 
The third objective is territorial co-operation, namely, strengthening co-
operation between European regions. 9 billion EUR or 2.5% of the total is available 
for this goal in the programme period. 
The Europe 2020 strategy has put research and innovation at the forefront of 
the European Union’s efforts to get out of the current economic crisis. Europe’s 
competitiveness, its capacity to create new jobs, its social fabric and cohesion, and 
overall, its future standard of living clearly depend on how the EU is able to trans-
late innovation into new or at least renewed products, services, businesses and 
organisations. As a consequence, the EU has dedicated 25% of the current cohesion 
policy budget – 86 billion Euros – to research and innovation, with a focus on 
research infrastructure, technology transfer and assistance to SMEs, networks and 
clusters. 
The ways of achieving the EU 2020 goals – namely smart, sustainable and inclu-
sive growth – will be determined to a large extent by decisions made by local and 
regional actors. Regional policy is, therefore, indispensable for mobilising the full 
innovative potential of EU regions. 
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New Cohesion Policy, Research and Innovation 
Consequently cohesion policy with regional policy as its main element has been 
identified as a key “delivery mechanism” for the Europe 2020 and the Innovation 
Union strategies. And this is why on drawing up the blueprint for a reformed 
regional policy for 2014–2020, the EU Commission chose research and innovation 
as the key elements. 
The knowledge and innovation capacity of regions depends on many factors. To 
quote just a few:  quality of research, education and training institutions;  business 
culture; entrepreneurial climate; work force skills; innovation support services; 
access to financing; technology transfer mechanisms; ICT infrastructure and local 
creative potential; and, of course, good governance is  crucial too. 
However, there is no “one-size-fits-all” blueprint for the economic development 
of a region. Therefore regional policy focusing on integrated strategies can best 
help each region to create the specific policy mix. It will be tailor-made not only to 
strengthen the region’s innovation system in general, but also to capitalise on its 
assets and capabilities. By this, regions will be empowered to work towards excel-
lence and carve out their niche specialisations in the globalising economic envi-
ronment. 
It is generally known that there are no shortcuts to economic growth. It is espe-
cially so if a region has to compete in high quality and innovation, and not in low 
price of products and services, as we all have to do in Europe. There is simply no 
other way than investing into a country’s and region’s competitive advantage. This 
is the only route to fiscally sound and sustainable economic stimulus. 
The jobs which need to be created now and in the future to outgrow the effects 
of the crisis can only come from innovation and a relentless effort to become bet-
ter, fitter and faster. 
In today’s ICT-powered global economy, it is no longer enough to be “world 
class”, but one should be the best in the world, even if it is in a particular market 
niche or through a marginally differentiated strategy. This means that in terms of 
regional policy the EU will move beyond an era of ribbon cutting – beyond focusing 
on infrastructures – towards more innovation, more knowledge-based invest-
ments. Therefore the EU Commission proposes that for the next programming 
period of regional policy (2014–2020) at least 80% of future Structural Funds 
investment in the more developed regions or at least 50% in the less developed 
regions should go into three objectives, namely into (1) research and innovation, 
(2) SME competitiveness and (3) energy efficiency and renewables. Which con-
crete investment priorities will the EU support in research and innovation? 
(1) Investing in R&I infrastructure enabling capacities to move towards excel-
lence. 
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(2) R&I in businesses, technology transfer, networks and clusters, social inno-
vation, public service applications and open innovation will be promoted. 
(3) The different stages from research to marketable products will be eligible 
for support, including “Key Enabling Technologies” and the diffusion of ge-
neral purpose technologies. 
But before the member states and regions can develop their future Operational 
Programmes and start investing Structural Funds allocations in research and inno-
vation, the regions will have to set up an innovation strategy for smart specialisa-
tion. For the EU Commission “before” means an “ex-ante conditionality” – without 
that the EU will not support projects. But what does smart mean in smart regional 
specialisation? 
First of all it is smart because it is knowledge based. So it asks regions to put 
knowledge and innovation into the centre of their development strategies. Being 
smart requests to make better use of the Structural Funds, to build regional re-
search and innovation capacities. 
Secondly, specialisation is smart if it is focused on a region’s greatest assets and 
opportunities, and if it sets clear priorities. Linking knowledge assets to economic 
potential is at the heart of this concept. 
Thirdly, specialisation is smart if it is based on the notion of building successful 
innovation eco-systems in cities and regions. This can mean the following: stimu-
lating entrepreneurship, university–business co-operation, innovation support 
services, access to financing for SMEs; upgrading education, skills and training 
schemes. 
Fourthly, smart specialisation is achieved if it is process based. It needs to be 
developed in real partnership with the main regional innovation actors, especially 
with the business sector and the knowledge providers. This partnership should 
facilitate shared commitments in relation to a limited number of key priorities. 
Fifth, smart specialisation looks to position the region in global value chains 
and establish co-operation with other relevant regions and clusters to add more 
critical mass and more diversity to a region’s structures and activities. 
Smart specialisation strategies are essential for regions to advance in regional 
development and to improve their effectiveness in using EU Structural Funds. 
These strategies will also allow them to better leverage their spending and to 
increase synergies with other private and public funds. 
This obviously includes research investments to be co-financed by the next EU 
research framework programme. Investments in the field of research and innova-
tion supported by the Structural Funds should complement, and be mutually sup-
portive of, actions co-financed by “Horizon 2020”. 
There is a clear division of labour: Horizon 2020 is excellence based and is im-
plemented through pan-European calls for project proposals. It focuses on tackling 
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major societal challenges; maximising the competitiveness impact of research and 
innovation; raising and spreading levels of excellence in the research base. Horizon 
2020 will use open competitions to select the best projects implementing these 
objectives, regardless of geographical location and of the profile of the actors in-
volved. 
In contrast to that, the Structural Funds mainly address national/regional-level 
objectives, through integrated strategies for economic transformation and struc-
tural change. Promoting synergies between Horizon 2020 and cohesion policy 
requires the harmonisation of implementing rules, which is to be done by the EU 
Commission in the next period (2014–2020). Thus the same research/innovation 
project may receive support from different EU funds in the future, but only for 
different expenditure items. The EU Commission will introduce similar eligibility 
rules in order to simplify financial project management under both policies, that is, 
Horizon 2020 and cohesion policy. The much wider application of simplified cost 
options such as lump sums, flat rates and unit costs will further reduce the ad-
ministrative burden on beneficiaries. After these technical, but important items let 
us make some remarks about a very important one of our objectives, namely sup-
porting capacity building leading to excellence in research and innovation, the so-
called “stairway to excellence”. 
Regional Fund support for R&I should thus galvanise smart growth which 
nevertheless should be endogenous growth on the basis of local assets, capabilities 
and economic potentialities. To enable the less developed regions to participate in 
the European Research Area, the Regional Fund should finance primarily the basic 
preconditions and sufficient capacities for R&I, including infrastructure and human 
capital. 
The European Social Fund (ESF) is an additional EU instrument available. It 
supports the development of human resources in R&I. Key actions would include 
the modernisation of tertiary education, the improvement of research capacities 
and skills of students and researchers, and the transfer of knowledge between 
research institutes and the business sector. 
Research and innovation activities should follow the line of smart specialisation 
strategies by concentrating these activities on the specific strengths of regions and 
member states, identifying innovation niches, and helping to avoid overlaps and 
duplication of efforts. 
How does the EU Commission see the relation between “stairways of excel-
lence” and “smart specialisation”? Strengthening the capacities of researchers to 
successfully participate in research activities at EU level requires the existence of 
global excellence in the regions in specific thematic fields. But how do they get 
there? How does the EU Commission want to support this quest for excellence in a 
region? The answer is: by specialising in areas a region is already good at, or where 
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it has embedded capacities or a critical mass of actors and institutions to create a 
virtuals cycle. It is known from a variety of research that trying to build research 
and innovation capacity from scratch is a very risky business and mostly unsuc-
cessful. On the other hand, it is obvious that a region cannot be excellent or 
attempting to be excellent in everything. Spreading its efforts too widely and thinly 
will only end in suboptimal outcomes and dilute impact. 
It is a much better and safer route to build on a region’s existing assets and 
clusters and to work through a thematic focus on areas of strength and real poten-
tial. This is also the way that generates most added values, especially for the 
region. Furthermore, it also helps to embed capacities in the region and stimulate 
entrepreneurial activity. 
It should be mentioned here that the Regional Fund encourages project funding 
and not institution funding in terms of research. Research projects funded by it 
need to have a precise benefit for the region in respect of socio-economic develop-
ment. This is not about blue skies research, but about applied research. However, 
the Regional Fund may finance the setting up of a research infrastructure, but it 
does not cover its running and operational costs. 
As already indicated, regions will have to identify the knowledge specialisations 
best corresponding to their respective innovation potentials. This should happen 
through a process of entrepreneurial discovery involving stakeholders as well as 
the private sector. 
Then the regions are asked to focus their Regional Fund investments on those 
areas that can best maximise a competitive edge in the international value chains. 
By this they can achieve a critical scale, scope and spill-over effect that are crucial 
for efficiency gains. In other words, this concept calls for singling out competitive 
advantages and rallying regional stakeholders and resources around a vision for 
the future. 
The Regional Fund supports existing regional scientific excellence. While doing 
so, it will also insist on the diffusion of knowledge and innovation, including 
practice-based – i.e. “non-technological” – innovation like, for example, social and 
service innovations; innovation addressing societal challenges; new business 
models, etc. The efficiency gains through a more strategic use of the Regional Fund 
can only be achieved if they are not used in isolation. Using Structural Funds 
therefore should aim at an optimal co-ordination of different existing policies. As a 
consequence, it is a strong intention of the EU Commission to create synergies 
between different EU policies. 
The regional innovation strategies of the past received criticism sometimes for 
their inability to provide choices. They have shown lack of engagement of stake-
holders in the conception, lack of outward orientation and the absence of peer 
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review mechanisms. These weaknesses are to be eliminated under smart speciali-
sation. 
While the concept of smart specialisation has been taken up by DG REGIO, the 
Directorate General for Regional Policy and Urban Development, it is also strongly 
supported by DG Research and Innovation as well as by the research community 
because of its potential to deliver synergies between research and regional policy. 
A quite recent report from the Synergies Expert Group (SEG) underlines the need 
to ensure co-ordination and networking between the different innovative regions 
and also with other national or European policies in order to avoid the “irrelevant 
duplication” of efforts. The SEG therefore welcomed the current work on estab-
lishing the Smart Specialisation Platform which should also provide useful guid-
ance to those Managing Authorities that need it in the development of strategies. 
This platform was launched in June 2011. Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, Commissioner 
for Research, Innovation and Science welcomed the Smart Specialisation Platform, 
saying that it demonstrates the Commission’s determination to bring regional 
policy and research & innovation policy closer together in order to achieve the best 
results in terms of growth and employment. 
Indeed, R&I excellence and regional innovation are two complementary policies 
with a common objective: maximising knowledge-based economic potential 
throughout the Union. 
While only a few of the EU regions are ready now to fully embrace excellence, 
all of them are entitled to pursue regional innovation that can lead to future excel-
lence. That is what the EU Commission wants them to do. And that is what smart 
specialisation and the new cohesion/regional policy should enable them to do. 
In addition, the important role universities play in both an efficient regional 
and research & innovation policy has to be underlined. “University–business co-
operation” is a key agent for exploiting research results and for promoting innova-
tion. Universities have to play a pivotal role in the social and economic develop-
ment of their regions. They are a critical “asset” of the region; even more so in the 
less favoured regions where the private sector may be weak or relatively small, 
with low levels of research and development activity. The successful mobilisation 
of the resources of a university can have an extremely positive effect on its 
regional economy and on the achievement of comprehensive regional strategies. 
This is also a reason why university–business co-operation should be particularly 
considered by regions when devising smart specialisation strategies. The co-
operation between universities and business/industry can also lead to the setting 
up of “centres of excellence” or “competence centres”. These are interpreted in 
many different ways, but typically they are collaborative entities often established 
by industry and aiming for global excellence in specific specialisation niches. They 
are resourced by highly qualified researchers associated with research institutions 
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who are empowered to undertake different types of research, but tend to engage 
frequently in market focussed strategic R&I for the benefit of industry. As soon as 
there have been concrete outputs achieved and new technologies developed 
through research, the diffusion and application of these results in the region can be 
funded by the Structural Funds. The EU Commission wants to set a virtual cycle 
into motion which leads to increased technology transfer particularly to regional 
SMEs. By this, innovation actors can be enabled as well as the SMEs in the regions 
to participate in the EU’s research framework programme and to lay the founda-
tions for regional excellence in specific areas. 
 REFLECTIONS ON THE PERFORMANCE OF COHESION 
POLICY 
John Bachtler – Carlos Mendez – Stefan Kah 
“The state of the empirical evidence on the performance of cohesion policy is 
very unsatisfactory. …[due to] …the lack of any systematic attempt at EU and 
national/regional levels to assess whether specific interventions ‘work’ through 
the use of advanced methods of impact evaluation, and a very poor use of the 
system of outcome indicators and targets formally built by the policy.”  (Barca 
Report 2009, p. xv) 
“Public resources cannot be spent without setting in a transparent and clear 
way what we want to achieve with those resources. …we should not hesitate 
about the need to respond clearly to the EU taxpayer if asked: What is this money 
for? What do you want to achieve? How will things improve thanks to cohesion 
programmes?” (Johannes Hahn 2011) 
“At a time when member states are under pressure to consolidate their 
budgetary positions, and when resources for public investment are scarce, it is 
essential – more than ever – to ensure the efficient and effective use of available 
resources and to maximise the added value of cohesion policy.” (Informal 
Meeting of Regional Policy Ministers 2012) 
Introduction 
Over the past decade, the performance of cohesion policy has come under increas-
ing political scrutiny. In part, this is associated with the debate on the EU budget: 
following the difficult 2005 negotiations on the Multiannual Financial Framework 
for 2007–13, it was clear that continuing to allocate a substantial part of the EU 
budgetary resources to Structural and Cohesion Funds would need more robust 
evidence on what the policy was achieving. This was reinforced by the conclusions 
to emerge from the Barca Report, which itself was synthesising the results of aca-
demic and policy research that was critical of the lack of evidence at national and 
EU levels on the efficiency and effectiveness of the policy (Barca 2009). The Barca 
Report also criticised the lack of public accountability, notably the absence of a 
public debate on the results of the policy in Council or Parliament, other than the 
annual discussion (and criticism) of the error rate by the European Parliament’s 
budget committee. 
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This concern about the performance of the policy prompted a political com-
mitment by the European Commission to place a stronger focus on results and to 
move towards evidence-based policy making to improve the impact and value 
added of cohesion policy, as well as a stronger monitoring and evaluation culture, a 
commitment to learning within partnerships and incentives and conditionality to 
encourage quality (Hübner 2009). This was subsequently developed first in the 
Fifth Cohesion Report (EC 2010) and then in Commission’s legislative proposals 
for the future of the policy. 
The cohesion policy regulations for 2014–20 contain a range of new measures 
to strengthen the strategic orientation of programming and incentivise better 
performance. Programmes have to specify objectives, intervention logics and re-
sults targets more clearly. Conditionality provisions are intended to ensure that 
the pre-conditions for effective implementation of the Funds are put into place. A 
new performance framework, review and reserve seek to incentivise the achieve-
ment of targets and sanction serious under-achievement. Simplified financial 
management geared towards results is encouraged through so-called Joint Action 
Plans for parts of programmes. Monitoring and evaluation is expected to place 
more emphasis on achievements and impact (Mendez et al. 2012).  
In theory, this “performance turn” provides a promising opportunity to 
enhance the quality of strategic thinking and management of the Funds and pro-
grammes. In practice, it poses important challenges for the Commission, member 
states and regions in terms of methodological design, management capacity and 
cultural change.  
This chapter assesses the debate on the performance of cohesion policy and the 
implications of changes being introduced for the 2014–20 period.1 It begins by 
examining the contested evidence for the performance of cohesion policy and then 
reviews the rationale and substance of new performance obligations proposed by 
the Commission. The final section considers whether the objectives of the reforms 
can be achieved. 
The Contested Evidence for the Performance of Cohesion Policy 
The context for the debate on the performance of cohesion policy is the difficulty 
that regional policymakers have had in demonstrating that EU funded interven-
tions through Structural and Cohesion Funds have been effective. 
                                                                        
1
 At time of writing (May 2013), the negotiations on the legislative framework for the 2014–
20 period were not yet concluded. Many aspects were the subject of “partial general 
agreement” but the regulations were not expected to be approved until October 2013. 
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A first problem is that monitoring and evaluation practices have not been able 
to provide a convincing picture of how (well) Structural and Cohesion Funds are 
being spent, despite efforts dating back 25 years. Before the 1988 reforms, the 
evaluation of the Structural Funds was accorded low priority and the monitoring 
and control of expenditure was widely acknowledged as inadequate. The landmark 
reforms of 1988 introduced the first systematic obligations to monitor and eval-
uate the Structural Funds, but implementation was poor. Evaluations were gener-
ally of low quality and were considered to lack methodological rigour. The inade-
quacies of monitoring systems included a widespread lack of monitoring data, 
particularly on physical implementation, and the absence of standardised indica-
tors that would allow aggregate assessment of performance at Community level.  
Subsequent reforms in 1993, 1999 and 2006 progressively strengthened the 
regulatory framework (Polverari et al. 2007): the member states and the Commis-
sion became co-responsible for appraisal and evaluation of the Structural Funds; 
the types and stages of evaluation were specified; targets for financial and physical 
indicators were made obligatory; the role and powers of Monitoring Committees 
were enhanced; and reporting requirements became more prescriptive. In 1999, 
incentives were introduced to reward good performance (in the form of the per-
formance reserve) and sanctions for poor financial absorption (through the de-
commitment rule, n+2). The 2006 reforms also included a requirement for mem-
ber states to produce strategic reports on the performance of all programmes at 
two stages during the 2007–13 period. 
These regulatory pressures led to significant investment in reporting, moni-
toring and evaluation systems that sought to capture both financial and physical 
outcomes. Programme documents incorporated monitoring indicators, with 
benchmarks, targets and milestones. Extensive evaluation has been conducted at 
ex-ante, interim and ex-post stages of programme implementation. However, the 
quality of data has often been poor, target-setting has been unrealistic, monitoring 
systems have not always worked, and evaluations have tended to prioritise the 
assessment of implementation processes over the analysis of outcomes. 
As the conclusions of the most extensive ex-post evaluation exercise conducted 
to date observed, the fundamental problem is that programmes have been de-
signed and implemented without sufficient regard for achievements. Specifically, 
at programme level (Applica et al. 2010, p. 11):  
“There was… a lack, in many cases, of a clear indication in concrete terms 
of the objectives of the policy implemented in a form which would enable the 
success or failure of the measures taken to be properly assessed. Often the 
aims of the policy were expressed in terms so general (e.g. an improvement 
in regional competitiveness) to make it difficult, if not impossible, to judge 
after the event whether they were achieved or not. Though quantitative 
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targets were often set and an indicator system established, as required by 
the Structural Fund regulations, in many cases neither were linked in a 
meaningful way to ultimate policy objectives.  
Where targets were set, they were often not taken seriously in the sense 
of being carefully determined in relation to the funding made available and 
what it could plausibly achieve… In most cases, they did not play a central 
role either in the design or in the monitoring of policy and rarely featured in 
the policy debate. No authorities were held accountable for not meeting the 
targets set and few questions were asked when the targets were easily 
achieved… Though systems for monitoring expenditure were established 
over the period in all member states together with a set of indicators for as-
sessing the outcome of spending, they were not a central part of the decision-
making process.” 
Research on the 2007–13 programmes indicates continuing problems with as-
sessing outcomes due to deficiencies in the information in Member States Annual 
Implementation Reports and Strategic Reports in 2009 and 2012, uncertain relia-
bility of data on indicators and errors in the data recorded. Evaluations are exam-
ining achievements: fewer than a fifth of studies conducted on the current period 
have focused on outcomes and effects (Ward 2013). This was reiterated in the 
Commission’s 2013 strategic report which, while providing aggregate data for 
some core indicators for the first time, expressed concerns about the uneven avail-
ability and quality of data (EC 2013). 
Apart from the difficulties with monitoring and evaluation, the second major 
problem is that the evaluation evidence on the performance of cohesion policy is 
contested. Research shows that regional disparities have narrowed across the EU, 
both across regions and across member states over the long-term, albeit with sig-
nificant differences between groups of countries and within countries. There is 
little consensus on what influence cohesion policy has had on regional growth and 
convergence, with results varying according to the method, time period or territo-
rial unit used (Bachtler – Gorzelak 2007). Much of the modelling work, and some 
econometric analyses and other studies, have concluded that cohesion policy has 
had a considerable impact on the output and income of the lagging regions and 
countries of the EU (e.g. Bradley – Morgenroth 2004; Varga – in’t Veld 2010 and 
2011) and that Structural and Cohesion Funds have contributed to a reduction in 
regional disparities (Cappelen et al. 2003, Dall’Erba – Le Gallo 2003, ECOTEC 2003, 
Puigcerver-Peñalver 2007). However, other economic studies have found cohesion 
policy to have had a neutral or even negative impacts on regional convergence 
(Ederveen et al. 2003, Villaverde – Maza 2010), or that is has very limited conse-
quences for growth (Boldrin – Canova 2001, Puga 2002).  
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Clearly, there are severe methodological difficulties in analysing the effects of a 
policy implemented in different national and regional contexts, through thousands 
of different interventions, co-financed with other funding and whose outcomes 
may not be readily measurable, especially in countries or for programmes where 
EU funding is relatively small. As Applica et al. (2010) noted, establishing direct 
causal links is challenging: “[t]he context in which cohesion policy was implemented, 
the often small scale of the funding in relation to the forces it was intended to coun-
teract and the many other factors at work [means that] it is unrealistic in most cases 
to expect to be able to trace a direct link between policy and regional developments” 
(p. 10). 
Alternative methods for analysing achievements have sought to aggregate pro-
ject-level data collected through monitoring systems and survey research. The ex-
post evaluations conducted on the 1989–93, 1994–99 and 2000–06 programme 
periods have variously estimated employment creation associated with Structural 
Funds intervention to involve upwards of a million additional jobs in each period 
(Ernst & Young 1997, CSES 2003, ECOTEC 2003, Applica et al. 2010). These esti-
mates are, however, affected by the shortcomings noted above – reliance on in-
complete or inaccurate data-sets, questionable definitions (such as the meaning of 
“jobs safeguarded”), and problems with aggregation across programmes, funds 
and objectives. Figures for employment creation have often been expressed as 
gross jobs because of difficulties in taking account of displacement and deadweight 
effects in calculating net job creation. 
Lastly, research on the performance of cohesion policy has tried to assess the 
qualitative effects, or added value, of cohesion policy (Bachtler – Taylor 2003, 
Mairate 2006, Bachtler et al. 2009). These studies have found that the regulatory 
obligations for programming and implementation of Structural Funds programmes 
have had certain administrative, learning and spillover effect on domestic systems 
and, in some cases, are associated with innovation and greater efficiency. Thus, 
multi-annual planning requirements are said to have encouraged the adoption of 
more long-term and strategic approaches to economic development by different 
tiers of government. The monitoring, evaluation, reporting and control require-
ments are considered to have contributed to the improvement of public admin-
istration processes and cultures. The requirement to involve different types of 
partners in the design and implementation of programmes has encouraged more 
inclusive policy-making and delivery and has contributed to broader decentralisa-
tion trends across Europe. From a financial perspective, it is reported that addi-
tional resources for economic development have been leveraged through the addi-
tionality principle and co-funding requirements.  
However, assessments of the added value of cohesion policy management and 
implementation are not conclusive. They have been strongly disputed by some 
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government authorities and commentators, not least in member states which have 
argued for less money to be spent on cohesion policy (Bachtler et al. 2013). It has 
also been noted that, an assessment of “net” added value needs to consider the 
additional costs associated with the administration of cohesion policy in terms of 
bureaucratic time and procedures (SWECO, 2009). 
Improving the Performance of Cohesion Policy 
Against a background of contested effectiveness, and a political imperative to jus-
tify EU spendin , the regulatory framework for cohesion policy in 2014–20 is giv-
ing a high priority to performance issues. This is not new: arguably performance 
has always been embedded in the policy’s design. Since 1988 in particular, the 
programming principle has required the setting of multi-annual objectives and 
targets informed by strategic analysis, debate and negotiations with key partners 
and stakeholders. Monitoring, reporting and evaluation are well-institutionalised, 
providing accountability over the use of the Funds and supporting programme 
decision-making processes. Disciplined financial management has been encour-
aged since the late 1990s, as has the use of programme-level incentives to reward 
performance. Throughout the policy’s history, the “added value” of cohesion policy 
expenditure has been high on the agenda of policy debates and reviews (Bachtler – 
Taylor 2003). In its explanatory memorandum to the 2004 reform proposals, the 
Commission stated that “a stronger accent on performance and quality” would be a 
hallmark of the 2007–13 policy regime and called for (EC 2004, p. 11): 
“a greater focus on impact and performance, and for a better definition 
of the results to be achieved. Overall, the efficiency of cohesion policy would 
be improved by the establishment of an annual dialogue with the European 
Institutions to discuss… the progress and results of national and regional 
programmes, so to enhance transparency and accountability towards the 
institutions and the citizens.  
Evaluation before, during and after the end of the programmes would 
remain essential to the overall effort to maintain quality. In addition, the 
Commission proposes to set up a Community performance reserve whose 
main objective would be to reward the member states and regions which 
show the most significant progress towards the agreed objectives.” 
Nevertheless, the experience of the 2007–13 period indicates that systemic 
weaknesses remain (Barca 2009). As noted above, at the programming stage, 
strategies often have very broad priorities covering a wide range of interventions 
and have been found to lack clear-cut objectives and a justification of how planned 
interventions should achieve them (Applica et al. 2010). Outcome indicators and 
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targets often play a marginal role in programming and do not incentivise good 
performance at the implementation stage (Casavola 2009).  
Monitoring and reporting of programme delivery in Annual Implementation 
Reports is considered to be “wholly inadequate to enable progress to be meaning-
fully assessed” due to excessive focus on inputs (financial resources spent), a 
failure to link indicators to intervention or policy objectives, and inconsistent defi-
nitions which do not allow comparisons over time or across regions (Applica et al. 
2010). The reports often do not explain why outcomes have fallen short of targets 
or exceeded them, nor do they put outcomes into context or relate the co-financed 
interventions/projects to national and regional policies. 
A further criticism is that performance conditionality is weak (Barca 2009). 
Programmes are often designed and delivered to prioritise financial absorption 
and meet spending deadlines rather than policy objectives, and they do not 
provide adequate incentives to use resources effectively; it notable that only two 
member states, Italy and Poland, used the voluntary option to create an ERDF 
performance reserve in the 2007–13 period. Commitments to address institutional 
and strategic pre-requisites and conditions for effective use of the Funds are also 
inadequate. 
Lastly, EU institutions place little emphasis on performance considerations. The 
Commission has been criticised for focusing on administrative issues and a 
perceived “mechanistic” enforcement of rules, particularly concerning financial 
management, audit and control. High-level political debate in the Council of 
Ministers and the European Parliament gives insufficient attention to the policy’s 
achievement (Barca 2009). 
In response to these weaknesses and pressures, the Commission has proposed 
a range of new measures to strengthen the strategic content of programming and 
incentivise better performance in 2014–20.  
First, programmes should have more clearly specified objectives and a stronger 
focus should be placed on “result” indicators and targets. Each investment priority 
should identify one or a limited number of result indicators that best express the 
intended change, the direction of the desired change, a quantified target or a range, 
and a baseline. Underpinning this shift in emphasis towards outcomes is a new 
“intervention logic” for programming, monitoring and evaluation. The key dif-
ference from the past is that the distinction between result and impact indicators 
has been dropped (Gaffey 2012). Impact is now understood as the contribution of 
the policy to changes in the result indicator, thus placing less emphasis on longer-
term effects on the wider economy (such as GDP). The aim is also to focus attention 
on the identification of needs, objectives, results and corresponding indicators at 
the start of the programming process – rather than the allocation of resources 
(Figure 1). 
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Figure 1. The new intervention logic 
Source: European Commission (2011, p. 5).  
Second, conditionality provisions aim to ensure that the pre-conditions for 
effective implementation of the Funds are put into place. To ensure that the strate-
gic, institutional and administrative conditions for effective cohesion policy invest-
ments are put into place, a structured system of ex-ante conditionality require-
ments is introduced for 2014–20. The regulation distinguishes two types. Thematic 
conditionalities are specific to each thematic objective and relate mainly to the pre-
existence of domestic strategies (e.g. on smart specialisation), the transposition 
and implementation of EU Directives (e.g. on water or waste), addressing EU 
guidelines (e.g. employment and social policy) and capacity-building activities (e.g. 
sufficient project pipelines in the transport sector). General conditionalities mainly 
relate to compliance with EU law (e.g. strategic environmental assessment, State 
aid rules etc.) and capacity-building to support compliance as well as a condi-
tionality to strengthen the statistical systems and data for programme monitoring 
and evaluation.  
Third, a new performance framework, review and reserve should encourage 
better measurement, provide incentives to reward the achievement of targets and 
sanctions for serious under-achievement. Intermediate targets (or “milestones”) 
will be set out for each Priority in the Partnership Agreement and Operational Pro-
grammes (OPs) for the year 2018. This would include financial output and, “where 
appropriate”, result indicator targets. The Commission and member states will be 
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required to undertake a performance review of programmes in 2019 to examine 
the achievement of the intermediate targets of programme priorities. A perfor-
mance reserve would be set aside at the start of the period (5% of national allo-
cations for each Fund and category of region) and allocated in 2019 following the 
performance review. Simplified financial management geared towards results is 
encouraged through so-called Joint Action Plans for parts of programmes (Table 
1). 
Lastly, monitoring and evaluation should place more emphasis on achieve-
ments and impact. The OPs should contain for each Priority axis common (EU 
wide) and programme-specific output and result indicators, with a baseline value 
and a quantified target value “where appropriate”. 
Table 1. Ex-ante conditionalities 
Type of conditionality Domestic 
strategy 
EU regulation EU priority / 
guideline 
Capacity 
Thematic     
1. RTDI x    
2. ICT x    
3. SME competitiveness  x x  
4. Low-carbon economy  x x  
5. Climate change x    
6. Sustainable resources x x   
7. Sustainable transport x x x x 
8. Employment & labour mobility x  x x 
9. Skills, education, learning x  x  
10. Poverty and inclusion x  x  
11. Institutional capacity x   x 
General     
Anti-discrimination  x  x 
Gender equality x    
Disability   x x 
Public procurement  x  x 
State aid  x  x 
Environment  x  x 
Statistical systems & indicators    x 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Will Performance Improve? 
In justifying the continuation of a well-funded cohesion policy, the European 
Commission has made ambitious commitments for the ability of Structural and 
Cohesion Funds (now termed European Structural and Investment Funds) to 
implement the Europe 2020 objectives and to demonstrate that it is making 
effective use of the EU budget. The proposals to improve performance are based on 
more extensive consultation among European institutions, member states and 
other interests than ever before, and they are built on substantial research and 
evaluation evidence. As noted at the outset of this chapter, this “performance turn” 
provides a promising opportunity to enhance the quality of strategic thinking and 
management of the Funds and programmes. However, putting the proposals into 
practice, and achieving visible change to the performance of the Funds, faces some 
formidable obstacles. 
Previous reforms of cohesion policy have shown that there is generally a 
disjuncture between political objectives and practical implementation when it 
comes to performance issues. Member states may agree in principle to goals such 
as greater effectiveness and efficiency, but they resist any measures, such as 
controls or sanctions, that may give the Commission greater influence over 
Member State spending decisions (Bachtler et al. 2013). Thus, the proposals for 
2014–20 put forward by the Commission in 2010 have been progressively diluted 
in the course of the negotiations on the regulations: Partnership Contracts have 
been renamed as Partnership Agreements; the scope for the Commission to 
enforce conditionalities has been restricted; the proposal to have two performance 
reviews in 2014–20 has been reduced to one; the power of the Commission to 
suspend intermediate payments and make financial corrections has been limited; 
and the wording of originally strict rules has been made more flexible by allowing 
reference to “national rules and practice” or only being applicable “where appro-
priate” (Mendez et al. 2013). The danger of such piecemeal modification of a 
coherent set of proposals is that new administrative obligations are introduced but 
with a weakened potential influence on performance. 
A second challenge is the interpretation of the new regulations by managing 
authorities at the programme level. Again, previous experience demonstrates that 
member state authorities have found ways to avoid complying with the intention 
of policy reforms; in negotiating programmes with the Commission, they have the 
advantage of greater knowledge and are aware that there are limits on what the 
Commission can insist. A survey of managing authorities conducted in late 2012 
found that the reaction to the new performance requirements was less than might 
have been expected (Mendez et al. 2012). While some managing authorities are 
seeking to adopt the intervention logic, many claimed not to be anticipating major 
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changes to their programming and programme management procedures. Refine-
ment and relatively minor adaptation of systems were more common, with a view 
to minimising the impact of administrative changes on implementing bodies and 
beneficiaries. It is striking that the high-minded statements made at the political 
level about the need to improve the quality of spending and improve the 
performance and results of cohesion policy – as for example at the recent Informal 
Ministerial Meeting and Directors-General Meeting under the Cyprus Presidency – 
had not found an echo at the level of managing authorities. 
Member state compliance with performance obligations in the regulations is 
conditioned by the incentives and sanctions that are put in place and specifically 
whether there are financial or political penalties that might be incurred. The expe-
rience of the past decade is that measures related to financial management (that 
involved the suspension or recovery of funding) or the decommitment rule (which 
led to the loss of money that was not spent within two years of being committed) 
had a significant effect on the seriousness with which member state authorities 
took financial controls and absorption. By contrast, measures such as the perfor-
mance reserve in 2000–06, whose incentivising and sanctioning effects were 
largely neutralised in the regulatory negotiations, had limited impact on perfor-
mance in many member states. 
Lastly, a more fundamental question is whether there is the requisite adminis-
trative capacity and culture to meet the Commission’s objectives. Previous re-
search has attributed the poor effectiveness of cohesion policy in some countries – 
especially strategic decision-making on the allocation of resources – to weaknesses 
in administrative capacity (Bachtler – Gorzelak 2007, Milio 2007). There is con-
siderable evidence that the priority for many programme managers is ensuring 
timely financial absorption rather than maximising the strategic impact of pro-
grammes (Bachtler et al. 2009). The new performance framework is intended to 
shift the focus of attention and effort towards the achievements of interventions, 
supported by investment in institutional capacity and resources at Commission 
level to promote knowledge exchange and learning on effective policy manage-
ment. However, whether it succeeds will depend on managing authorities and 
implementing bodies subscribing to these objectives, using new tools and proce-
dures (for project generation and selection, monitoring and evaluation) to priori-
tise achievement, and for monitoring committees to be regularly debating what is 
working well, the progress in achieving strategic objectives, and the effectiveness 
of delivery arrangements. Perhaps most importantly, the Council and Parliament 
need to drive a change in culture by regularly debating the progress being made in 
achieving policy goals in each member state, and giving a political profile to the 
effectiveness and efficiency of spending. 
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 CHALLENGES FOR REGIONAL POLICY – OLD DILEMMA, 
NEW PERSPECTIVES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF 
INSTITUTIONS 
Michael Steiner 
Introduction 
What are relevant goals for regional policy? What kind of institutions are neces-
sary to achieve desired objectives? Does the convergence goal lead to more justice? 
What are the consequences of new theoretical insights into innovation and 
growth? 
The aim of this paper is to discuss these questions in the context of a revived 
debate on the institutional bases of economic policy in general and on the role of 
space for economic development in specific.  
In the following we will describe the ongoing shift in paradigm of regional 
policy and the underlying factors and motivations; we then outline the importance 
of an institutional approach referring to elements of “old” and “new” institu-
tionalism; new perspectives on regional innovation and growth will be derived 
from three recent interpretations; this leads to an excursion to the debate on jus-
tice in order to evaluate the objectives and finally to potential consequences for 
regional policy including some “caveats”. 
Shift in Paradigm 
Regional policy has undergone substantial changes in the last decades: a change in 
primary objectives, extension of instruments, increase of institutions and agents as 
well as new theoretical foundations and legitimisation of their policy orientation. 
At the same time the regional dimension of economic activities has gained im-
portance, and hence regional policy in general as well (Bachtler – Brown 2004, 
Cooke 2002). On the one hand, a stronger regionalisation and decentralisation of 
economic policy, mainly its technology and research orientation, took place; on the 
other hand, the spatial aspect of many sectoral policies was recognised and em-
phasised. 
Examples of reform are paramount – at least on paper, but nevertheless as a 
clear expression of change. 
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A prominent example is the “Europe 2020 Agenda”, the European Union’s ten-
year growth strategy (2010), soon extended by a “Territorial Agenda of the Euro-
pean Union 2020” (2011). Its basic aim is to address the shortcomings of the 
“standard” growth model and to create conditions for a different type of growth 
that is smarter, more sustainable and more inclusive. As such it relies heavily on 
institutional change and on new governance structures and processes and empha-
sises the diversity of regions. 
In a similar direction OECD’s “Growth Strategy” calls for stronger, cleaner and 
fairer growth. In its regional perspective (2009) it has as an explicit new paradig-
matic objective: the tapping of underutilised potential in all regions for enhancing 
regional competitiveness and proposes as tools a mix of soft and hard capital (capi-
tal stock, labour market, business environment, social capital and networks). 
More specifically “regional” reform of the EU cohesion policy emphasises a 
“place-based” territorial approach; it concentrates on a limited menu of priorities, 
reveals increased urban emphasis, is oriented towards results and performance 
and with its thematic concentration stays in line with the Europe 2020 objectives 
(McCann 2012). 
The US government’s regional growth policy documents – not as explicit as the 
European ones – nevertheless also point to sustainable communities, innovation 
clusters and revitalising neighbourhoods (McCann 2012). 
The World Bank’s Strategy (2009) – although spatially neutral and hence more 
in the tradition of “people-based (as opposed to place-based) policies” – targets 
people by improving their social and human capital (Partridge 2012). 
There are three main factors and motivations underlying this shift in paradigm 
of regional policy, having strong implications especially for the objectives and the 
allocation of competences for strategy development and application of (new) 
instruments. 
 Knowledge has been recognised as a major source of competitive advantage 
in an increasingly integrated world economy. The most successful regions 
are perceived to be those whose firms display innovative capacity, being able 
to adapt to a rapidly changing marketplace and stay one step ahead of 
competitors. This is connected with the changing character of knowledge 
leading to new forms of organisations where the dichotomy between market 
and hierarchy is challenged by hybrids in the form of networks.  
 Another factor is the growing interest in the role of institutions as a factor 
shaping economic performance in general, and of knowledge creation in 
specific. The complexity of co-operation (Axelrod 1997) is a phenomenon 
that cannot be explained solely by individual decision-making: strong ra-
tionality is not sufficient for relatively effective economic behaviour. 
 Both these factors together lead to a third element: the role of space for 
knowledge generation and the specific institutional background within given 
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territories. The focus here is on the necessity, and forms, of proximity for 
knowledge exchange. The key argument is that the collaborative nature of 
innovation processes has reinforced tendencies toward geographical clus-
tering because of the advantages of locating in close proximity to other firms 
in specialised and related industries.  
These strands of thinking – relatively new in kind and especially their combina-
tion – have nevertheless a longer tradition: the influence of institutions on human 
(economic) behaviour, the role played by knowledge in the creation of wealth, the 
influence of space and distance on economic decision-making as well as the prob-
lem of co-ordination of individual decision-making units, are topics which have 
long attracted discussion. Yet, in outlining the necessity of a new approach in 
regional policy, both elements – the emphasis on the need for guiding institutions 
and the role played by space for knowledge generation – deserve new attention 
and interpretation. 
To Learn from Institutional Economics – Old and New 
The recent renaissance of interest in institutions as a factor shaping economic 
performance has implications also for the objectives, implementation of strategies 
and instruments of a new regional policy focused on knowledge and contributing 
to smart growth. Knowledge creation and technology management is not an 
automatic outcome of individually rational behaviour but needs “guiding” institu-
tions. These guiding institutions have to be seen from “the perspective that tech-
nology and institutions should be understood as co-evolving” (Nelson 2001, p. 19). 
Development processes do not take place in a vacuum, but rather have profound 
institutional and cultural roots: “The central issue of economic history and of 
economic development is to account for the evolution of political and economic 
institutions that create an economic environment that induces increasing produc-
tivity” (North 1991, p. 98). To what extent can regional policy contribute to and be 
regarded part of this co-evolutionary process which is the driving force behind 
economic growth? 
Several general ideas of institutional economics (both “old” and “new”) seem to 
be of relevance and help in understanding the institutional dimensions of regional 
policy in the process of technological development. They also help to answer the 
“why” – question posed by Arrow (1987, p. 734) as the essential perspective of the 
New Institutional Economics: “…it does not consist of giving new answers to the 
traditional question of economics – resource allocation and the degree of utiliza-
tion. Rather, it consists of answering new questions, why economic institutions 
emerged the way they did…” 
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Starting with the proposition that “institutions do matter” (Matthews 1986; 
Williamson 2000) it follows that individual behaviour is moulded by – and in turn 
constitutive of – social institutions. This was the basic idea developed by Veblen 
(1899): institutions act upon individuals by changing their habits. This habit-for-
mation becomes the more important, the more co-operation – instead of competi-
tion – is needed. Innovation and productivity gains are based on subtle forms of co-
operation, where the creation of new knowledge implies an intense process of 
interaction which cannot be explained solely in terms of individual decision-
making. 
Innovation processes in developed economies have essentially been marked by 
differing forms of innovative milieu and their supporting institutions. Evolutionary 
economics – as a special interpretation of the institutional perspective – sees these 
institutions as a moulding device for the technologies used by a society. In this 
context, drawing on Nelson and Sampat (2001) and Nelson (2001), institutions can 
be regarded as “social technologies”. Whereas “physical technologies” refer to the 
technical forms of commodities and services, and the ways in which they are 
produced using particular divisions of labour, “social technologies” are the specific 
mode of co-ordination once there is a division of labour. Social technologies 
involving “patterned human interaction” become institutions as soon as they are 
regarded by the relevant social group as standard and become accepted ways to 
get things done. In Nelson’s view this concept encompasses ways of structuring 
activity not only within particular organisations, but also across organisational 
borders: institutions are not so much constraints on behaviour, but rather an 
effective support as soon as human co-operation is needed (Nelson 2001, p. 24). 
A central fact about the modern process of innovation is that it is based on a di-
vision of labour, as clearly foreseen by Adam Smith. He early recognised what is 
now called the social nature of the innovation process. This division-of-labour 
induced social process produces efficiency gains from both specialisation and 
professionalisation, but also requires a framework to connect the component con-
tributions of the different agents. As far as knowledge and skills are concerned, this 
aspect of connectivity, or technology transfer, cannot be effectively co-ordinated 
by conventional markets: we are in need of specific institutional arrangements. 
Yet – as has been outlined by Helmstädter (2003) – the idea of connectivity 
transcends the usual problems of “division of labour”, there are additional and 
non-trivial problems of “knowledge sharing” thus far not properly appreciated by 
the New Institutional Economics. The main line of arguments runs as follows 
(Brödner – Helmstädter – Widmaier 1999; Helmstädter 2003): 
 The pure transaction cost approach misses fundamentally the essence of 
knowledge as an economic resource. “The new institutional economics deals 
with institutions that govern the interactions taking place under the division 
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of labour, but leaves aside the division of knowledge activities that go with 
it” (Helmstädter 2003, p. 14). Once the object of interaction between partici-
pating actors is knowledge, the character of interaction changes; the institu-
tional conditions for an efficient division of knowledge are different. 
 The main differences reside in the form and the impact of interaction. Under 
division of labour the transaction of goods and services is paramount, and 
subject to the rules of competition and to exclusivity of use and consumption. 
Under knowledge sharing it is knowledge and skills that are paramount, and 
these are subject to co-operation and the increase of knowledge for all 
(inclusivity). Whereas division of labour involves differentiation and separa-
tion of method, mode and product, knowledge sharing involves internalisa-
tion and recontextualisation. 
 The most important “institutional” consequence is that “co-operation is the 
basic institution of the process of the division of knowledge” (Helmstädter 
2003, p. 32). But the degree of co-operation depends again on the type of 
knowledge use: application has stronger competitive elements whereas the 
creation and the transfer are dominated by non-economic competition (sta-
tus, acceptance) and co-operation. The interest lies here in the institutions 
that make knowledge sharing efficient. 
These strands of “new” institutional thinking in the context of knowledge crea-
tion and sharing emphasise that connectivity and the desired efficiency cannot be 
effectively co-ordinated by conventional markets, but require non-market institu-
tional arrangements for the generation of knowledge. This has implications also for 
strands of new thinking about regional growth and innovation. 
New Perspectives on Regional Innovation and Growth Dynamics 
The topic of innovation and growth in a spatial context is wide and long-lasting 
having led and still leading to treatment in handbooks, books covering advances in 
spatial science and of course in textbooks. To make it – in the context of this paper 
– focused and short, three examples coming from each type of “standardisation” of 
new knowledge will be cited and interpreted in order to derive consequences for 
regional policy. 
The first one is the “cognitive” approach to innovation and local/regional 
growth as summarised in a handbook-contribution by Capello (2011). Innovation – 
in Capello’s terms “the smart use of advanced knowledge” – is regarded as the 
result of the presence of collective learning processes where territory becomes a 
“cognitive engine” enhancing co-operation and interaction. 
The specificity of the cognitive approach consists of the role played by space. 
Whereas space has in the two other approaches a rather passive role or is treated 
in a widely abstract, indirect and stylised way, the cognitive approach sees 
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knowledge flows and information channels clearly “embedded in the territorial 
structure of an area” (Capello 2011, p. 112). This happens both through the huge 
mobility of professionals and skilled labour and through the intense co-operative 
relations among local actors. This alters the character of space: “Space becomes 
real territory” where economic and social interactions are embedded into geo-
graphical space, a substrate which is able to incorporate collective learning pro-
cesses. Its cognitive proximity is based on shared behavioural codes, common cul-
ture, mutual trust and sense of belonging – clearly “institutional” elements of a 
regional economic landscape. 
As a special “advance in regional science” Crescenzi and Rodriguez-Pose (2011) 
propose a “territorial integrated approach” to innovation and the genesis of re-
gional growth. The core of their analysis is not the individual firm, the sector, the 
“cluster”, or “milieu” but – also – the “territory” where all these factors interact. 
To integrate all these factors they combine three different approaches to the 
process of innovation in a coherent framework: 
 The analysis of the link between investment in R&D, patents, and economic 
growth in order to understand the mechanisms through which knowledge is 
created and translated into growth; 
 The study of the existence and efficiency of regional innovation systems 
where they take a broader view on the process of innovation and emphasise 
the role played by institutions in order to translate available knowledge into 
economic growth; 
 The examination of the geographical diffusion of regional knowledge spillo-
vers in order to demonstrate how institutional factors and global networks 
shape the spatiality of knowledge flows. 
This approach – making use of a cross-fertilisation of different theoretical ap-
proaches to the process of innovation and setting them in the context of socio-
economic contextual factors – enables them to offer an integrated empirical frame-
work, a “growth diagnostics approach” leading to a model of a modified knowledge 
production function in an “integrated” territorial framework, which serves as a 
common platform for top-down and bottom-up policies (Crescenzi – Rodriguez-
Pose 2011, p. 176). Again: “territory” has turned into a sophisticated system com-
bining several keystones of regional and local economic development. 
The last example for “standardising” new perspectives of innovation and 
growth is a recent textbook on “Ökonomische Geographie” (Bröcker – Fritsch 
2012) where all sophistications and complexities have to be reduced to the capaci-
ties of undergraduates and the essentials made clear: 
 The source of growth is an increase in capital and knowledge – only the 
interaction of both elements creates growth; hence we have to learn how this 
interaction produces growth. 
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 Investment in knowledge combined with complementary capital is – as the 
endogenous growth theory tells us – not subject to the law of diminishing 
returns; continuous growth is therefore possible. 
 This does not imply convergence in a world with many regions; realistically 
assuming different efficiency of regional innovation systems,  less innovative 
regions would lose against more innovative ones; yet the possibility of and 
the potential for imitation impedes complete relative pauperisation. 
 The efficiency of innovation systems differs in respect to both the level and 
the quality of innovative activities. Public research infrastructure is a neces-
sary condition, yet what is decisive are the network relations between dif-
ferent actors of the system. 
 Regional innovation systems differ not so much in knowledge infrastructure, 
but in the quality of co-operation among different elements of the system; 
improving this quality takes time. 
The main messages of these “new perspectives” are clear: regional growth is 
endogenous, innovation (“smart use of advanced knowledge”) has a strongly dif-
ferentiated impact depending on the openness of regions, the efficiency of the 
innovation system, and on the quality of the institutional interaction of various 
elements where informal relations play an ever increasing role – it is “territory” 
that counts. Do these perspectives lead to new objectives of and for regional 
policy? What consequences do they have for strategies and instruments of regional 
policy? 
Objectives: From Old Dilemmas to New Philosophical Dimensions of Justice 
Let us turn first to the question of objectives taking a look from a broader philo-
sophical perspective. For students being trained in the 1970s (and also for the 
ones teaching in those times and after) regional policy had a primary goal – 
reducing regional disparities. Although it was pointed out that regional policy may 
have many objectives, they were – in the simplest model – reduced to two 
(Richardson 1978, p. 226): efficiency (the maximisation of growth in the national 
economy) and equity (the reduction of interregional disparities in indices of in-
come, welfare and growth). And still today the case for regional policy is – not ex-
clusively but strongly – discussed in this dilemma of efficiency versus equity (for a 
prominent textbook example see Armstrong – Taylor 2000).  
Equity is hereby interpreted as striving for more justice for poorer and under-
developed regions. And it is basically the core of a European regional policy fa-
vouring lagging regions. Understood as “cohesion policy” leading to more conver-
gence it is based on the assumption that the process of convergence makes a 
“Europe of regions” a better – and more just – place. A small excursion into recent 
philosophically based discussions on the term justice may help to illustrate the 
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complexity of this equity versus efficiency trade-off and contribute to a potential 
“paradigm shift” in regional policy objectives. 
Does convergence lead to more justice? The answer depends on what one 
means by the term justice. Only very naïve believers in the ideals of justice would 
expect the term to refer exclusively to an increase in equality of income. In fact, it 
means much more than this. In his book A Theory of Justice, John Rawls (1971) 
pointed out that a distinction must be made between several different levels. At 
one level, for example, that of individual liberty, which forms the basis of modern 
liberalism, primacy is given to personal rights and to establishing fair “rules of the 
game”. The essential focus here lies on developing equitable institutional proce-
dures and not on the provision of equitable outcomes. Another level concerns itself 
with questions relating to “the good life”, and the search for the ultimate goals to 
be achieved when organising a society. At this level, justice becomes one of many 
possible goals. 
The Indian economist and philosopher (and winner of the Nobel Prize in Eco-
nomics), Amartya Sen, has pointed out that even when the pursuit of justice is 
given pride of place among all possible objectives, the question still remains as to 
what exactly needs to be distributed in a just manner. A fair distribution of free-
dom is just as much implied as a fair distribution of income (Sen 2009). Further-
more, following all the above, a decision still has to be made concerning the basis 
upon which social inequalities are to be judged. According to Rawls’ “difference 
principle” a move towards greater social equality is achieved when a society 
accepts that strengthening the position of its weakest members is an essential 
assessment criterion. This places the emphasis not on social equality as such, but 
on establishing a social order in which it is possible for the poorest to benefit from 
the total wealth of society. 
This is not to imply that basic individual freedoms and liberties may be ignored. 
Quite the contrary. Liberalism is still essential since we, as individuals, will never 
achieve unity of purpose. However, in full knowledge of this, we must nonetheless 
strive to achieve a practical and reasonable answer to the question of how we 
should live together in a manner acceptable to all. In an exact and careful analysis, 
Rawls proposed that a solution lay in his principle of “justice as fairness”, and de-
manded a form of social contract for fair play. 
Increasingly, social justice is taken to infer justice in exchange. Otfried Höffe 
(2004) in particular, has emphasised that the debate on matters of inequality 
involves an implicit bias in that the main focus tends to be on questions of distribu-
tion (here he explicitly includes John Rawls’ work which he sees as belonging to 
the “dogma of justice” debate). The resources available for distribution do not arise 
spontaneously – they must first be produced. In order that products may become 
available for distribution at all, basic patterns of co-operation are first necessary, 
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i.e. institutional arrangements in order to organise the giving and receiving, in 
other words, justice as exchange. 
The expression of self-interest in the form of market exchange derives not only 
from an acceptance of individual freedom, but also from the realisation that our 
desire to engage in acts of solidarity is not unlimited [a view found in particular in 
the work of Peter Koslowski (Kettner – Koslowski 2011)]. From this perspective, 
solidarity is itself a scarce resource, and thus occupies a central place in the 
development of free markets and the exercise of self-interest. Since resources are 
scarce, and since our good intentions alone will not enable us to love others suffi-
ciently so as to produce for them, self-interest leads to market exchange arising as 
a form of “second best” arrangement. Scarcity of the resource solidarity calls for 
the release of self-interest, which in turn needs to be tamed by the discipline of 
competition – an important function of market exchange. However, it is only the 
presence of both factors which allows for a relatively efficient and fair provision of 
goods for distribution. 
This implies a paradigm shift with respect to our considerations of justice. In-
stead of viewing distribution as starting point in the discussion, we need to focus 
on exchange processes, whereby not only exchange in an economic and material 
sense is implied, but also the exchange of intangible ideals and concepts such as 
security, power, respect, freedom, and opportunities for personal development. 
The inclusion of such concepts in the term justice lends it a much wider, “trans-
economic” character. 
Imperatives for Regional Policy 
Three important factors influencing and causing a “shift in paradigm” of regional 
policy have so far been identified: (1) the renaissance of institutional economics 
revived with insights of “new” institutionalism; (2) new perspectives in the inter-
pretation of innovation and regional growth based on a vast literature of at least 
one decade of research focussing on the link between endogenous growth and the 
various dimensions of knowledge leading to precise condensations in hand- and 
textbooks; and (3) starting with familiar conflicts of goal setting of regional policy 
in order to do justice to regions, an ongoing debate in meta fields to regional 
science about interpretations of justice. 
Taking again the methodological approach to focus on and interpreting recent 
advances as to policy consequences of these new perspectives, four new impera-
tives emerge. 
The first is about objectives. It concerns the thematic concentration and priori-
ties, the strategic orientation and form of implementation of regional policy in a 
European context with the underlying but adaptive concept of cohesion. Under-
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lining and selecting various elements of an ongoing debate on the reform of EU 
cohesion policy (McCann 2012, Barca – McCann 2011), the following points are of 
special importance: 
 Regional policy is an investment policy. This main statement in support of 
the delivery of the Europe 2020 strategy implies a move away from the con-
vergence criteria to focus on adjustment and transformation criteria. 
 This includes the consideration of broader issues relating to well-being and 
the necessary extension of indicators to get a better sense how to design, im-
plement and assess policies aimed at improving social progress (Stiglitz – 
Sen – Fitoussi 2009). 
 There is a strong need for contractual arrangements for promoting the 
institutional changes appropriate to localities; this includes the considera-
tion of local regional capabilities and regional untapped potentials. 
 The switch from financial/input to the use of results/outcome indicators is 
more than a technicality, but is designed to change behaviour and to foster 
policy-learning and policy-innovation. 
The second imperative derives from both the institutional and philosophical 
background as well as from the specific interpretation of territory – there is a need 
for basic patterns of co-operation. The cognitive approach emphasises collective 
learning processes and socialisation to the risk of innovation and therefore calls 
for “the existence of rules, codes and norms of behaviour which: (1) facilitate co-
operation among actors and therefore the socialization of knowledge; and (2) 
assist economic actors (individual people, firms and local institutions) to develop 
organisational forms which support interactive learning processes” (Capello 2011, 
p. 107). For territory to become a “cognitive engine” interaction and co-operation 
must be enhanced, uncertainty, information asymmetries and the probability of 
opportunistic behaviour reduced – all typical forms of market failure which only 
well-developed and institutionalised forms of co-operation can overcome; only 
then does space become a source of knowledge creation. 
Taking the importance of a territorial approach to innovation policies for 
granted a new approach to regional innovation policy underlines the collective 
nature of the learning processes with their main ideas of specialisation, embed-
dedness and connectedness. Yet: formal knowledge is not the only source of inno-
vation, there is a large variability of forms of territory and of regional paths to-
wards innovation (Camagni – Capello 2012). This leads to a differentiation of 
smart innovation policies according to the specific territorial patterns of innova-
tion with distinct policy actions for local knowledge generation (concentrating on 
embeddedness) and policy actions for exploitation of knowledge spillovers (con-
nectedness). 
Third imperative: combine top-down and bottom-up policies for new trade-offs 
between different factors for growth, but also between efficiency and equity. The 
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territorial “integrated” framework with its cross fertilisation of different theoreti-
cal approaches to the process of innovation and its joint empirical model can serve 
as a common platform to overcome the separation of top-down and bottom-up 
policies. The translation of this combination of a macro “growth diagnostic” ap-
proach and a diagnosis of local economic conditions into a diagnostic/policy tool 
proposes pragmatism and eclecticism (Crescenzi – Rodriguez-Pose 2011, p. 169): 
 Innovative effort does not produce the same effect in all regions – a variety of 
local factors have an influence on this process. 
 There are trade-offs between different factors, some factors work in order to 
compensate for the weakness of others – the reduced exposition to 
knowledge flows can be compensated by a more efficient exploitation of ex-
isting knowledge. There is no one-dimensional concept for efficiency; not all 
constraints bind equally. 
 The combination of bottom-up and top-down policies allow a new balance 
between efficiency and equity issues: top-down regional policies have been 
mostly concerned with a mixture of aggregate efficiency and territorial 
equity, bottom-up approaches more with local efficiency – co-ordination 
between different policy actions become increasingly relevant and are able 
to mitigate the traditional conflict and surpass the old dilemma. 
 Socio-economic contextual factors – the “social filter” – are fundamental for 
the process of innovation. This also applies to accessibility – it is not only 
physical, the position of the local economy in global networks can be influ-
enced by the capability of local actors to develop organisational, institutional 
and social proximity relations with other agents. 
Fourthly: There is a need for new allocation of competences between different 
levels of policy. 
 There is a potential mismatch between policy objectives and beneficiaries of 
(EU) funding – “the sources of disadvantage are more spatially concentrated 
than the funds devoted to compensating such disadvantages” (Crescenzi – 
Rodriguez-Pose 2011, p. 171). This may account for the limited impact of EU 
regional policy. 
 EU policies have to be place-based for local design, control, and legitimacy. 
The onus of responsibility should be transferred to local stakeholders and 
policy-designers to identify bottlenecks, market failures and missing links 
(McCann 2012). 
 Place-based competition (“Standortwettbewerb”) between regions can pro-
mote (under the conditions that the reach of competence coincides with 
costs and benefits of allocated goods and existing control of subsidies) both 
efficiency and development as well as democratic control. Under present 
conditions there is a legitimate economic need for reform in the allocation of 
competences at a European level (Karl 2012, p. 300). 
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Caveats 
Do we have clear answers to the challenges for regional policy? 
Yes, on first sight: 
The choice of objectives should be guided by new weights to be given to distri-
butional equality on the one hand and overall enhancement supported by co-
operation on the other. 
This should lead to a thematic concentration of goals with a newly balanced 
menu of priorities. 
Institutional reform must be aimed at supporting co-operation as the basic 
institution for generating and sharing knowledge and as precondition for territory 
to become a “cognitive engine”. 
A pragmatic implementation should respect trade-offs and allocation of compe-
tences. 
Yes, but on second sight:  
Mary Douglas suggested that social institutions may be regarded as codified 
information. Yet, according to her view, it is highly improbable that institutions 
arise continuously as a clustering of congruent ideas and a mixture of force and 
convention (Douglas 1986, p. 179). Also North (1991) has pointed to the possi-
bility of “institutional obstruction” and to the potential failure of economies 
because of the lack of new institutions capable of adopting available productive 
technologies. 
According to Emile Durkheim the elementary social bond only emerges if a 
model of social order becomes rooted in the thinking of individuals. And William-
son (2000, p. 595) conceded not only that all forms of institutions are flawed, but 
that we are still very ignorant about institutions and should therefore be accepting 
of pluralism.  
Amartya Sen (2009, pp. 7 and 10) mentions the dichotomy between an 
arrangement-focused view (what are the right institutions and rules) of justice, 
and a realisation-focused (what can be actual realisations and accomplishments) 
understanding of justice. Instead of a transcendental agreement on the institu-
tional arrangements for the best of worlds we should take a comparative approach 
that is concerned with social realisations (resulting from actual institutions, actual 
behaviour and other influences). “Debates about justice – if they are going to relate 
to practicalities – cannot but be about comparisons” (Sen 2009, p. 400). 
Let us be practical – let us look not for the best, but for a comparatively better 
regional policy. 
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 TERRITORIAL COHESION, CROSS-BORDER CO-
OPERATION AND THE EU’S POLITICAL IDENTITY: 
A BRIEF OBSERVATION 
James W. Scott 
Introduction 
The European Union has in large part been a project of transcending borders and 
national divisions and thus creating conditions for durable peace, prosperity and 
more effective interstate co-operation. In doing this, the development of the EU has 
gone hand in hand with the emergence of shared policy agendas and policy 
instruments that have created new links between member states. At the same time, 
the EU has sought to create a supranational community based on a shared sense of 
political, social and cultural identity. As a result, processes of “Europeanisation” – 
defined in terms of a gradual diffusion of transnational understandings of citizen-
ship, identity and governance – are closely related to changing political under-
standings and uses of Europe’s many state borders (Radaelli – Pasquier 2006, Scott 
– Liikanen 2011).  
Since the end of the 1980s, cross-border co-operation (CBC) has been firmly 
embedded within EU structural policies, cohesion policy in particular. It is also an 
important element of the new European Neighbourhood Programme operating at 
the EU’s external borders. Consequently, questions of territoriality, regional policy 
and cross-border co-operation have been central to the emergence of the Euro-
pean Union as a political community. According to Manzini and Mendez (2009, p. 
9), regional policy has been “perceived as a crucial instrument for the identity of a 
European model of society, and for the legitimacy and viability of the whole politi-
cal process of integration.” However, in order to signify something more than the 
sum of national concerns, the EU has needed an exceptionalist and idealist narra-
tive that goes beyond state-centred political thinking and that is open-ended – 
territorially and conceptually. I thus argue that a major element of the EU’s politi-
cal identity lies precisely in reconciling flexible “idealist” with more fixed “realist” 
territorial perspectives. EU cohesion policy has thus emerged concurrently with 
paradigms of cross-border co-operation and notions of territory based on spatial 
relationships, cross-border and transnational networks and supranational geo-
strategies rather than exclusively on administrative and legalistic frameworks. 
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A central aspect here is the recasting of national spaces as integral elements of an 
international political community; from this also emerges the attempt to create a 
common set of discourses in which various political and social issues can be nego-
tiated.  
Cross-border co-operation has been promoted by the EU on the assumption 
that national and local identities can be complemented (perhaps partly trans-
cended) and goals of co-development realised within a broader – a European – 
vision of community. As such, borders have been used as explicit symbols of Euro-
pean integration, political community, shared values and, hence, identity by very 
different actors (Lepik 2009, Perkmann 2005, Popescu 2008). Consequently, the 
Euroregion concept has proved a powerful tool with which to transport European 
values and objectives (see Bojar 2008). The popularity of the Euroregion concept is 
undeniable. These associations are now a ubiquitous feature along the EU’s exter-
nal borders as well in many non-EU European contexts. Euroregions, cross-border 
city partnerships and similar co-operation vehicles have also come into being 
(Lepik 2012, Popescu 2008, Zhurzhenko 2010). Thus, a significant degree of “de-
bordering” through CBC appears to have taken root within the enlarged and wider 
European Union context.1 
CBC is an area where Europeanisation has exerted considerable adaptational 
pressure in countries such as Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and the Czech Republic, 
resulting, for example, in a flurry of cross-border regional development initiatives 
and “Euroregions”. At the same time, however, it is more than evident that pro-
cesses of Europeanisation are not straightforward or uncontested. Local adapta-
tion rather than direct “convergence” to European norms is the rule, not the excep-
tion (Brusis 2005). Furthermore, the development of a European political commu-
nity is also often subject to entrenched national political interests as well as a lack 
of agreement as to what constitutes “common” European values (Augenstein 
2012). More than two decades after the end of the Cold War, borders themselves 
often remain an obstacle to greater political and social interaction, even if the de-
fensive character of European borders has virtually disappeared.  
Given these apparently contradictory experiences what can be said about the 
trajectory of CBC as an element of EU political identity and within the context of 
cohesion policy? Recently conducted research reflects tensions between “realist” 
regional policy concerns related to national development and more “idealistic” 
policy imperatives that seek to create alternative, border-transcending territorial 
                                                                        
1 See, for example, Scott and Liikanen (2011); the special issue of Regional Studies, Volume 
33. No. 7, 1999, edited by Anderson, O’Dowd and Scott (2006), as well as European 
Research in Regional Science, Volume 10. 
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contexts for regional policy.2 Idealistic notions of cohesion as exemplified by CBC 
(territorial co-operation in EU parlance) co-exist in a parallel policy level driven by 
geostrategic thinking (e.g. spatial planning) but that only partially interpenetrates 
the realist policy environment. At the level of EU cohesion policy, the direct 
coupling of CBC with regional development goals appears to be shifting towards 
more territorially flexible arrangements and a focus on “place-based strategies” 
and “integrated territorial investments” which can be potentially implemented in 
cross-border and transnational contexts. Nevertheless, the overall resources avail-
able for genuinely border- transcending regional development are but a small 
fraction of the overall EU structural funds budget which is – targeted largely at 
newer and “poorer” member states. 
In terms of the significance of CBC as a regional development instrument we 
can detect highly differentiated patterns. Admittedly, there has been a general shift 
away from prioritising CBC in cohesion policy. However, while CBC has become 
routinised and even independent of structural fund support in Western European 
contexts, it is seen more in instrumental, even opportunistic, terms in Central and 
Eastern European countries. 
Cross-border Co-operation as “Europeanisation”  
Formally introduced by the Single Act of 1985, partly in response to the regional 
challenges posed by southern enlargement, the notion of “economic and social 
cohesion” has become a central unifying idea legitimising an EU role in territorial 
development. Furthermore, territorial co-operation (TC) within the European 
Union is understood as a form of local and regional promotion of Cohesion that 
transcends state borders. In academic debate, territorial co-operation is most 
generally known as “cross-border co-operation” but, basically speaking, both 
terms have equivalent meanings. More pointedly, CBC/TC can be defined in terms 
of political projects carried out by private, state and, to an extent, third sector 
actors with the express goal of extracting benefit from joint initiatives in various 
economic, social, environmental and political fields. This has been associated with 
state-society paradigms that suggest that new forms of politically relevant action 
can (or must) increasingly take place “beyond the state” and beyond the seemingly 
inflexible territoriality of the state. Through new forms of political and economic 
interaction – both institutional and informal – it has been suggested that greater 
                                                                        
2 Among other sources, reference is made to research funded by the EU’s 7th Framework 
Programme for Research and Innovation (EUBORDERREGIONS, contract 266920) the 
ESPON TERCO project (www.esponterco.eu) and research carried out by the author within 
the framework of the Distinguished Visiting Scientist Programme of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences (2012–2013). 
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cost-effectiveness in public investment can be achieved, economic complementari-
ties exploited, the scope for strategic planning widened and environmental prob-
lems more directly and effectively addressed. 
The concept of CBC in the European context is not new; it began as a number of 
subnational political projects already in the 1950s between Dutch and German 
communities. However, it is the context of post-Cold War change that has elevated 
CBC to the paradigmatic status it has enjoyed in EU policy. As such, CBC has been 
appropriated by the European Union as a unique social innovation and as part of 
the EU’s new and progressive political identity (Scott 2009). CBC is thus an 
element of “Europeanisation” – which can be understood as a diffusion of suprana-
tional notions of post-national stateness and a hybrid, multi-level sense of 
governance, citizenship and identity (Scott – Liikanen 2011). Through its support 
of CBC, the European Union has promoted a self-image of role model for intercul-
tural dialogue and local/regional development.3  
During the 1990s and early 2000s, the EU was in fact busy promoting spaces 
for new forms of cross-border “multi-level governance”. Within this context, bor-
der regions were explicitly understood to be important elements within European 
integration policies by representing potentially flexible vehicles with which to 
manage conflict and facilitate collective action in the management of social, eco-
nomic and environmental issues (Bufon – Markelj 2010, Perkmann 2002). In retro-
spect, it is clear that normative notions of Europeanisation through CBC were 
largely influenced by formal, structural understandings of transnational govern-
ance (see Blatter 1997 and 2004). In prescriptive policy terms this translated into 
an imperative of institutionalisation in which prospects for successful CBC were 
defined by the outcomes of a gradual and complex process of institutional innova-
tion and capacity-building at national, state and local levels. At the same time, 
intercultural dialogue, together with adequate strategies with which to reconcile 
and co-ordinate diverse interests, were seen to offer considerable promise for 
developing cross-border alliances between cities and their regions (van Geen-
huizen et al. 1996, Leibenath et al. 2008). One further normative aspect in all of 
this were highly optimistic assumptions of new synergy effects and greater mutual 
benefits to the actors and localities that engage in CBC.  
This governance focus on CBC has had a direct impact on cohesion policy 
through the emphasis of networked – territorially flexible and border-transcend-
ing relationships between stakeholders in local and regional development. Cross-
border co-operation involves attempts to exploit borderlands situations, using 
                                                                        
3 This is reflected, for example, in the EU’s Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion (subtitled 
“Turning Territorial Diversity into Strength”) in which the need to develop strong cross-
border linkages as well as more robust forms of regional and local co-operation with 
neighbouring states is emphasised (see EC 2008). 
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borders as a resource for economic and cultural exchange as well as for building 
political coalitions for regional development purposes (Popescu 2008). With spe-
cific regard to “Europeanisation” and its role in the construction of cross-border 
co-operation contexts, European policies have been aimed at networking cities and 
regions within a theoretically borderless European space (but without excluding 
the formal space of administrative regulation). This is evidenced by a proliferation 
of initiatives aimed at promoting transnational networking, including the Euro-
pean Spatial Development Perspective (ESDP), Visions and Strategies for the Baltic 
Sea Region VASAB, INTERREG, and the ESPON (European Spatial Planning Obser-
vatory Network) programme. One principal strategy pursued by the EU has been 
to couple the development of cross-border local and regional co-operation struc-
tures with more general regional development policies This has also gone hand in 
hand with the promotion of institution-building, generally, but not exclusively, in 
the form of so-called Euroregions or other cross-border associations. The main 
goal of Euroregions and similar organisations has been to promote a sense of “EU-
Europeanness” through mutual learning and co-operative initiatives across bor-
ders and, at the same time, address specific regional economic, environmental, 
social and institutional problems. These associations have served as instruments of 
EU policy in sharing roles (not always as equal partners) with regional and 
national governments in the channelling of European regional development sup-
port into border regions.  
Euroregions were pioneered and developed as locally based co-operation 
initiatives in Dutch–German border regions as early as the 1960s (Perkmann 
2007). Since then, Euroregions have become part of complex policy networks at 
the European and national levels and have contributed to in cross-border regional 
development, particularly in Western European contexts. Indeed, the Dutch–
German EUREGIO, a Euroregion with its own local council and close ties to German 
and Dutch state agencies, has served as a model of sorts for the development of 
border region associations within the European Union. In its different phases of 
development CBC been characterised by the adaptation of existing institutional 
structures to new opportunities and problems set by recent geopolitical changes. 
Given the long track record of cross-border co-operation in Western Europe it is 
not surprising that co-operation stakeholders in Central and Eastern Europe have 
emulated many of the institutions and projects pioneered within the EU.  
Furthermore, at the pan-European level, spatial planning promotes a decidedly 
post-national perspective within the larger post-1990 geopolitical context of Euro-
pean development. Indeed, one of the principal assumptions underlying cross-
border planning exercises is that symbolism guides collective action by creating a 
sense of common understanding and “language”. Alternative European geogra-
phies have been defined, among others, through symbolic planning concepts, the 
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transnationalisation of space through networks and flexible regionalisation, and 
network-like forms of governance (Faludi 2010). These initiatives are reflected in 
the ESDP, first elaborated in 1999. Although not a community level policy in the 
sense of agriculture or regional development, ESDP, together with the ESPON pro-
gramme of creating a Europe-wide planning database, has provided a policy frame-
work of an advisory nature agreed by the European Ministers of Spatial Planning 
and that pursues sustainable economic development and socio-economic cohe-
sion.4 Since 1990, European spatial development visions have also been con-
spicuously cartographic in nature; blue bananas, the mesoregional zones of 
INTERREG, Euroregions, programme regions, networks and trans-European urban 
and regional hierarchies have emerged as elements in the definition of an inte-
grating European economic and political space (Scott 2002). 
CBC – Between Multi-level Governance and “Filling in the Gaps”? 
Despite the above, there is no doubt that since the historic turn of events of 
1989/1991 and the heady days of a “new European order” there has been a shift in 
the EU’s focus on CBC. EU rhetoric about the benefits of CBC is today a far cry from 
the prosaic language of the 1990s. In the now archived EU regional policy website 
we can read that in fact “cross-border co-operation is essentially about filling the 
gaps [between national development].”5 Most recently, CBC has been subsumed 
within the more inclusive notion of TC and its main aim remains “to reduce the 
negative effects of borders as administrative, legal and physical barriers, tackle 
common problems and exploit untapped potential.”6 It is clear from recent debate 
on European Cohesion that the EU stakes much of its political capital in more 
traditional instruments of redistribution that are nationally oriented even if 
subject to supranational guidelines. Indeed, the 2007–2013 budget of €8.7 billion 
for territorial co-operation amounts to a mere 2.5% of the total cohesion policy 
budget. Furthermore, a major overall share of cohesion funds are targeted to 
Central and Eastern European countries where there appears to be less enthu-
siasm for CBC as a regional development resource. 
Arguably, we see a strong dose of political realism creeping into European dis-
cussion of borders and cross-border co-operation. As some observers have pointed 
                                                                        
4 Central to ESDP is a focus on regional urban systems, urban-rural relationships, access to 
development opportunity structures and a concern for a diverse natural and cultural 
heritage. These spatial strategies cross-cut traditional nationally-oriented development 
practice; in effect, nothing less than an “EU-Europeanisation” of regional and local political 
spaces is being attempted (see Jensen – Richardson 2004).  
5 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/cooperation/crossborder/index_en.htm 
6 http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/cooperate/cooperation/crossborder/index_en.cfm 
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out, hardening external borders (Vitale 2011) and an increasing EU emphasis on 
territoriality of political community (Fritsch 2009, Scott 2011) as well as more 
specifically national orientations in cohesion policy have relegated CBC to the 
status of a regional policy appendage. By the same token, the fact that CBC has 
been rhetorically delegated to the interstitial spaces between integrating national 
economies is partly understandable given the mixed results of past CBC initiatives. 
Although the promotion of territorial co-operation and as sense of cross-border 
“regionness” through common institutions has been intensive in theory, in practice 
institutionalisation patterns have been uneven – both in terms of governance 
capacities and their performance in terms of actual co-operation.7 Despite unde-
niable successes, Euroregions have clearly not automatically guaranteed the estab-
lishment of new public and private sector alliances to address regional and local 
development issues. In less successful cases, for example, cross-border projects 
have merely served to enhance local budgets without stimulating true co-opera-
tion. Generally speaking, it has also been very difficult to stimulate private sector 
participation in cross-border regional development. European experience would 
also seem to indicate that, ironically, co-operation practices have maintained an 
administrative, technocratic and “official” character that as yet has not sufficiently 
encouraged citizen action and public-sector participation.  
Perhaps as a result of these sobering experiences, the direct coupling of CBC 
with EU Cohesion goals appears to be shifting towards more territorially flexible 
arrangements and a focus on “place-based strategies” and “integrated territorial 
investments” which can be potentially implemented in cross-border and transna-
tional contexts. Partly in response to the institutional limitations of CBC organisa-
tions, the EU also introduced in 2006 the formal-legal option of the European 
Grouping of Territorial Co-operation. The concept of cross-border and transna-
tional co-operation also remains an important aspect of European spatial planning 
which continues to influence the definition of cohesion policy’s core tenets, such 
as: sustainable economic development, regional equity, urban-rural integration 
and polynucleated (and thus balanced) urban development. Although not a com-
munity level policy, spatial planning is a framework for structural transnational co-
operation within the EU based on macro and meso-regionalisation processes, mul-
ti-level governance partnerships and agenda-setting in spatial development issues. 
CBC thus remains an important EU principle but in policy terms it has become 
an opportunity structure that is much more targeted at regions with a high degree 
of institutional capacity for formal CBC co-operation on the one hand, and periph-
                                                                        
7 Early critical observations of cross-border co-operation are provided, for example, in: 
European Parliament (1997), Mønnesland (1999), Notre Europe (2001) as well as in 
evaluations of EU structural policies such as INTERREG (http://europa.eu.int/comm/ 
regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/p3226_en.htm). 
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eral border regions on the other. As the ESPON TERCO project has indicated, the 
distribution of functioning EGTCs remains heavily weighted in favour of Western 
European countries and functional urban regions in “Core Europe”.8 Additionally, 
the overall resources available for CBC make up a small fraction of the overall EU 
structural funds budget and in the new programming period from 2014 will be 
targeted largely at newer and “poorer” member states. 
CBC as Differential Europeanisation  
The European Union has had an important impact on the nature of cross-border 
relations in Central and Eastern Europe (Zhurzhenko 2010, Scott 2006). In pre-
paring Central and East European countries for membership, the EU adopted a 
strategy based on institutionalised CBC and aimed at a gradual lessening of the 
barrier function of national borders. These policies have also been aimed at inte-
grating previously divided border regions in order to build a more cohesive Euro-
pean space. Nevertheless, Gabriel Popescu (2011) has argued that this normative 
political language of Europeanisation (e.g. as a process of de-bordering regional 
development) often contrasts with local realities where cross-border co-operation 
(CBC) reflects competing territorial logics at the EU, national, regional and, local 
levels and conflicting attitudes towards more open borders. As a result, cross-
border co-operation is not uncontested. A partial resurgence of national rivalries 
and historical animosities has taken place in several EU member states and has, for 
example, affected local co-operation between Hungary, Slovakia and Romania. 
Different regional interpretations of CBC thus indicate a highly variable appropria-
tion of Europeanisation policies. Concretely, there is a notable East-West divide in 
the acceptance and adaptation of CBC as a set of regional development practices. 
The post-1989 de-bordering of Europe provided yet another historical and 
dramatic backdrop for promoting CBC and goals of European cohesion within a 
process of interstate integration. The German–Polish border after 1989 is an ex-
cellent example of the attempt of the EU to appropriate CBC as a multilayered 
exercise in regional development and historical de-bordering of post-Cold War 
Europe. Through the use of symbolisms of the border as a bridge between neigh-
bours, the German–Polish relationship was recast in a wider European context of 
overcoming the “scars of history”.9 Political co-operation, and most certainly cross-
border co-operation, were closely intertwined with rapprochement and desire to 
                                                                        
8 The ESPON-TERCO final report is available at: http://www.esponterco.eu/en/news,terco-
final-report. 
9 Robert Schuman’s pronouncement that national borders in Europe represented scars of 
history (“Les cicatrices de l’histoire”) has become an avocative political discourse in the 
processes of European integration and enlargement. 
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develop a culture of mutual goodwill. Conversely, the 1990s reflected a “drive for 
convergence” of Central and East European countries to European standards and 
the universal adoption of overall cohesion policy goals as a means to secure EU 
membership.  
However, since 2004 the situation has changed markedly. Rather than reflect 
conformism to “Core Europe”, CECs (e.g. Hungary, Poland and Slovakia) now strive 
to actively construct Europe through a redoubled focus on national development 
priorities. In the case of Hungarian national development strategies of 1998 and 
2007 we in fact see a marked change. While in the first document Hungarian 
border areas and regional development issues related to co-operation with neigh-
bouring states received generous coverage, the 2007 National Development 
Strategy (National Development Agency 2007) only gives very brief mention of 
CBC. In practical terms, CBC remains as a minimalist exercise – national strategic 
plans generally take it into consideration as an extension of national development. 
The minimalist, instrumental approach of CECs indicates a relative lack of 
policy mainstreaming as well as a focus on national consolidation. Reasons for 
difficult CBC contexts in CECs also include: lack of local capacity to promote co-
operation, cumbersome EU regulations and project management rules, interstate 
tensions and ethnolinguistic conflict, as well as local orientations to national 
centres and European core regions rather than to neighbouring states (see, for 
example, Baranyi 2008, Hajdú et al. 2009, Hardi 2010, Mezei 2008). Furthermore, 
as Popescu (2006 and 2008) has suggested, EU inspired strategies of institutionali-
sed CBC in Central and Eastern Europe – an area of complex social, economic and 
political diversity – have tended to be “co-opted” by specific nationally defined 
interests: Euroregions emerging in Central and Eastern Europe are generally “top-
down” creations, inhibiting processes of region-building through local initiative. At 
the same time, institutional legacies, such as strong central control, have con-
tributed to variegated Europeanisation processes (Pálné Kovács 2009). Hence, CBC 
in the Carpathian basin (which involved Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) is not a 
self-evident phenomenon and appears to have lost momentum since the days of 
PHARE-INTERREG. In the case of Hungary, CBC is certainly understood in terms of 
European Cohesion but is heavily influenced by overlying political goals of “nation-
building” and improving the living conditions of ethnic Hungarian communities in 
neighbouring states. However, this also engenders the distrust of Hungary’s neigh-
bours who at times have interpreted CBC as a means to extend Hungarian extra-
territorial sovereignty claims.  
In stark contrast to these developments in CECs, CBC in Western Europe is no 
longer as dependent on external funding as it once was. Here, we see a routinisa-
tion of local and regional cross-border co-operation that is generally embedded 
within multi-level governance structures. It is therefore no coincidence, as the 
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ESPON-TERCO project has shown, that EGTCs are concentrated in western areas of 
the EU. In the most “successful” – that is, the most well-organised – border regions 
(e.g. the Dutch–German Euroregions), public-sector and NGO co-operation has 
been productive in many areas, especially in questions of environmental 
protection, local services and cultural activities. Additionally, successful cases (e.g. 
German–Dutch) seem to involve a process of pragmatic incrementalism, with 
“learning-by-doing” procedures and a gradual process of institutionalisation. As 
working relationships have solidified, experience in joint project development has 
accumulated and expertise in promoting regional interests increased, as has the 
capacity of regional actors to take on large-scale problems and projects. 
Conclusions  
Transcending boundaries – at least rhetorically – remains a “leitmotif” of European 
Union policies. However, put in William James’ terms, what is the “cash value” of 
the idea of CBC in the development of EU political identity and with regard to the 
overall objectives of cohesion? Similarly to the idea of a “Europe of Regions”, it is 
certainly important in terms of conceptual change in the political framing of EU-
Europe (Scott 2009). CBC has been a constant element in Europeanisation dis-
courses and within the context of European cohesion. However, it is clearly subor-
dinated to the core “national” goals of cohesion. There is, furthermore, a notable 
East–West divide in the acceptance of CBC as a set of regional development prac-
tices.  
This reflection on CBC thus takes into consideration the possibility rather than 
inevitability of a “post-national” Europe and the longue durée nature of creating 
cross-border political practices at the local and regional level. Indeed, CBC has 
rarely produced rapid results in terms of economic growth and regional develop-
ment. Furthermore, local and regional actors develop co-operation mechanisms 
situationally and in ways that reflect both political opportunities and social and 
structural constraints. Despite all the shortcomings of the EU’s model of institu-
tionalised CBC, institutional change elicited by EU policies and funding mecha-
nisms has led to a degree of “Europeanisation” of co-operation contexts and thus of 
spatial planning and development dialogue. This is evident in the discourses, agen-
das and practices of cross-border actors; they very often legitimise their activities 
by referring to the wider political, economic and spatial contexts within which 
their own region must develop. Nevertheless, actual patterns of CBC practices indi-
cate a rather disjointed and complex reality. The European Union itself cannot 
provide a central template for de-bordering Europe. This will rather depend on 
how a post-national Europe is interpreted, negotiated and constructed “at the mar-
gins”.  
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 ECONOMIC IMPACT EVALUATION CHALLENGES POSED 
BY THE NEW EUROPEAN UNION COHESION POLICY: 
A RATIONALE FOR THE GEOGRAPHIC MACRO AND 
REGIONAL POLICY IMPACT MODELLING APPROACH 
Attila Varga 
Introduction 
Economic impact evaluation is an essential component of the overall assessment of 
the European Union cohesion policy (Batterbury 2006). It estimates the aggregate 
influence of policy interventions on selected variables such as GDP, employment or 
wages. Considering that cohesion policy is the most significant area of Community 
policy in budgetary terms, which increases the pressure for more accountability in 
spending (Bachtler – Wren 2006), knowledge on its contribution to the supported 
countries’ economies has become particularly relevant.  
Economic impact assessment substantially differs from micro-level evaluations 
that aim at assessing the immediate impacts of individual projects via cost–benefit 
analysis or alternative methodologies. Input–output linkages, Keynesian income 
multipliers and technological spillovers are the main mechanisms by which initial 
project level impacts propagate and affect the entire economy. Macroeconomic 
models are the most frequently applied instruments to estimate the economic 
impacts of cohesion policy interventions (Bradley 2006). It is argued in this paper 
that the different principles on which the new EU cohesion policy is built necessi-
tate the reconsideration of traditionally followed modelling approaches in policy 
evaluation.  
Disappointment in the effectiveness of traditional economic development poli-
cies (e.g., financial transfers for physical infrastructure investments, or subsidies 
and tax credits to attract new firms to lagging regions) to combat interregional 
disparities motivates the recent emergence of a new wave of “modern” policy 
thinking. Policies suggested by the new streams focus on macroeconomic growth 
stimulation and treat cross-regional balancing of economic development either by 
separate interventions (Barca 2009) or parallel with growth enhancement (World 
Bank 2009). The current debate is centred on two dominant approaches. The first 
one grounds policy prescriptions on new economic geography models and recom-
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mends the type of interventions that reap the growth benefits of agglomeration via 
dominantly “space-neutral” instruments (World Bank 2009). The second approach 
is based on policy experiences of recently emerged high technology clusters on the 
one hand and the geography of innovation literature on the other, and suggests 
that growth potentials exist in every region and the role of mainly “place-based” 
policies is to help lagging regions realise these potentials (OECD 2009).  
Perhaps the most notable conceptual development common in both approaches 
is the strong awareness of the key role of geography in policies targeting aggregate 
economic growth. A clear message of this newfangled geography-awareness is that 
regional policy ought to be treated as an integral part of a national-level structural 
policy package (Garcilazo – Oliveira Martins – Tompson 2010). It became thus 
clear in the new policy thinking that the impact of countries’ structural policies 
largely depends not only on the specific instruments applied (such as investment 
in transportation infrastructure, education or R&D), but also on the concrete geo-
graphic patterns in which these instruments are deployed regionally. The same 
development policy budget may in principle finance different alternative sets of 
projects, each involving a certain combination of instruments implemented in a 
distinct distribution across regions. Properly designed economic models could be 
helpful in the policy planning process in selecting that set of projects for support 
which is expected to yield the highest impact on economic growth.  
The issue of evaluation is particularly relevant for the EU’s new cohesion policy 
which will apply modern development policies to spur macro- and regional level 
economic growth. Integrated regional projects eligible for support will be centrally 
selected by the European Commission and by member state governments. Con-
sidering the substantial size of the cohesion policy budget and its potential to 
generate meaningful impacts, it is extremely important to use the funds effectively 
in order to boost aggregate (EU and national) growth to the highest possible level. 
Barca (2009) also underlines the key function of ex-ante impact evaluation as an 
instrument in the design of the new EU regional policy. However, the suggested 
control-group methodology is best applied in ex-post policy evaluation and as such 
it is not especially helpful in the policy design stage.  
Specially constructed economic models could help policy-makers to select a 
particular geographic and instrumental combination of projects that seem to uti-
lise most efficiently the available structural policy budget according to the 
knowledge available at the time of decision. Macroeconomic models widely applied 
for development policy impact analysis have only limited relevance in this respect. 
This paper suggests that with substantial efforts and careful, professional and en-
during work it is possible to develop those models that can usefully support 
modern development policy-making. Economic theory on the one hand and em-
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pirical techniques on the other have already reached the critical intellectual mass 
to support such a challenging endeavour.  
Increasing activity of different research groups aiming at developing “new 
generation” economic impact models indicates that the problem has already been 
realised and the search for suitable model constructions is ongoing. These research 
directions include for example the MASST model (Capello 2007), the Geographic 
Macro and Regional (GMR)-approach followed in the GMR-Hungary (Varga 2007), 
GMR-Europe (Varga – Járosi – Sebestyén 2011), the European Commision’s 
RHOMOLO model (Brandsma – Ivanova – Kancs 2013), and a regional innovation 
policy system dynamics impact model (Fratesi 2012).  
The following structure is chosen for this paper. The second section situates 
economic impact modelling challenges in the context of the debate on modern 
development policy. In the third section the most important technical issues 
reflected in new generation economic models are introduced. The forth section is 
devoted to a concise description of the GMR-Europe model as an illustration of 
new generation economic modelling. Summary concludes the paper.  
The Debate on Modern Development Policy and the Economic Modelling 
Challenge 
The new EU cohesion policy reflects on the critiques raised in the recent policy 
literature against “traditional” regional development approaches (Barca 2009). 
Starting in the post-war period the mainstream of regional policy in Europe and 
North America employed top-down organised redistributive systems to subsidise 
lagging places by means of providing funds for investments in infrastructure and 
public services. In the first period until about the 1970s the emphasis was on at-
tracting new firms or retaining existing ones in particular sectors via increased 
physical accessibility resulting from transportation infrastructure investments as 
well as via direct subsidies, or tax reductions. The limits of this approach led to the 
second wave of interventions, which started to increase its popularity in the 1980s. 
In this approach the emphasis moved towards building indigenous capacities of a 
knowledge-intensive economy via education and R&D support, promotion of 
university–industry linkages or encouragement of regional entrepreneurial activi-
ties. 
The literature reports limited success of development policies in reducing 
regional disparities. For instance the contribution of cohesion policy to regional 
convergence in the EU is only weakly positive (Hagen – Mohl 2009) despite posi-
tive impacts on national GDP (e.g., Bradley 2006, Schalk – Varga 2004, Varga – in’t 
Veld 2010). Limited success in combatting regional inequalities might be asso-
ciated with the heavy emphasis placed on transportation infrastructure invest-
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ments, which can easily result in strengthening the positions of existing agglom-
erations with wasted resources to support declining industries in lagging regions 
(Barca – McCann – Rodríguez-Pose 2012), with the dominantly top-down philos-
ophy (Barca 2009) or with little integration and co-ordination among different 
programmes organised by different central government agencies. Criticism against 
traditional regional development approaches caused by disappointments in policy 
effectiveness is further strengthened by some negative side effects of centrally 
administered redistributive systems such as the culture of dependency from 
external financial support, or rent seeking behaviour (Farole – Rodríguez-Pose – 
Storper 2011).  
Disappointment in traditional approaches has stimulated policy thinking to 
reconsider the old instruments in order to suggest the kinds of interventions that 
are expected to enhance economic development more successfully. Two streams of 
policy thinking emerged recently. The first one does not trust in regionally tar-
geted interventions in general and favours “space-neutral” policies with universal 
coverage in every territory, while the second one would continue supporting 
region-specific interventions and argues that properly designed “place-based” 
policies are still appropriate means of economic development. In these “modern” 
approaches the focus has moved towards policies that strengthen aggregate eco-
nomic growth. Equity issues are either addressed as part of the growth package in 
space-neutral policies (World Bank 2009) or by means of separately designed 
parallel policies as suggested by the proponents of place-based interventions 
(Barca 2009).  
The debate between the two dominant modern approaches to development 
does not seem to be much on the set of instruments, but more on the weight each 
instrument gets in the desirable policy mix (Garcilazo – Oliveira Martins – 
Tompson 2010). While the first approach targets economic integration with main-
ly space-neutral instruments to reinforce agglomeration effects and the second one 
puts emphasis on place-based innovation policies to stimulate growth in lagging 
regions, it is clear from the debate that a space-neutral focus does not disclose the 
validity of place-based innovation policies (World Bank 2009) and a place-based 
focus also endorses the significance of agglomeration and space-blind policies 
(OECD 2009, Farole – Rodríguez-Pose – Storper 2011).  
Given the divergence of assumptions behind the two approaches on the main 
geographical sources of growth, the question arises naturally as to whether the 
debate on the most appropriate modern economic development policy can at all be 
resolved theoretically. Considering that each approach refers to those instruments 
that are central in the other’s policy set as generally not effective and applicable 
only in certain circumstances (which is a statement itself that can only be judged in 
concrete situations), it seems that we reached the limits of solving the debate at 
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the theoretical level. In one specific country strengthening agglomeration by either 
space-blind or place-based policies could be more effective for aggregate growth 
than promoting innovation in lagging areas, while in another country the reverse 
might be more efficient. However, when less developed areas and not the eco-
nomic core are the desired targets of policies, the question still remains as to which 
particular instrument set should be applied in any of the regions and what is the 
most desirable distribution of the financial resources among the regions being sup-
ported.  
Thus without a serious comparative analysis of costs (at the regional level) and 
benefits (at the macro- and regional levels) of potential intervention plans, each 
referring to different geographical and instrumental distributions of the same 
development policy budget of the country, it is not possible to come up with an 
accurate development policy decision (Farole – Rodríguez-Pose – Storper 2011). 
Such an investigation can be correctly done with the backing of properly designed 
empirical economic models run for the analysis of macro- and regional impacts of 
each concrete overall policy plan. 
New Generation Development Policy Impact Modelling 
Economic impact evaluation of the “traditional” cohesion policy also posed chal-
lenges to macroeconomic modelling when these models were first applied in this 
area in the mid-1980s. These challenges included the implementation of the supply 
side and endogenous growth mechanisms in the then dominantly Keynesian 
demand-side models (Bradley 2006). The resulted macroeconomic models most 
frequently applied in EU cohesion policy impact analysis such as the HERMIN 
(Bradley 2006) or the QUEST (Varga – in’t Veld 2010) model families successfully 
managed to meet these challenges.  
The current challenge of incorporating geography in impact modelling raised 
by the new cohesion policy is different, and macroeconomic models presently 
available for policy evaluation have only limited relevance in this respect. The new 
type of models should incorporate those various dimensions of geography that 
affect the overall impact of modern development policies.  
These policies involve a range of instruments implemented in selected regions 
(place-based instruments) or everywhere in the country with no geographic pref-
erences applied (space-neutral instruments). It is suggested by policy experience 
that place-based instruments targeting well-specified locally dominant economic 
sectors need to be integrated with each other at the regional level to mutually 
enhance their impacts (McCann – Ortega-Argilés 2013). Instruments of this kind 
might include private or public R&D support, human capital and entrepreneurship 
development, public infrastructure investments or promotion of intra- and inter-
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regional collaborations among firms and public research institutions. Space-
neutral policies like R&D tax regulations or laws governing intellectual property 
rights might also be part of the package (Farole – Rodríguez-Pose – Storper 2011). 
Impact models need to incorporate the most important geographical dimen-
sions that may crucially determine the growth effects of development policies. 
These include the following aspects. 
 Regional development programmes are built on important local specificities 
(industrial structure, research strengths of the region, size and specialisation 
of human capital etc.) that need to be reflected in model structures. 
 Models have to capture the effects of policies on local sources of economic 
growth, such as technological progress, investment and employment. 
 The models also need to be able to follow those cumulative agglomeration 
impacts, such as intensifying localised knowledge spillovers and their feed-
back mechanisms, that may arise as a consequence of policies.   
 There are certain additional impacts on the regional economy instrumented 
by Keynesian demand side effects or Leontief-type intersectoral linkages.  
 Most of the infrastructural programmes target better physical accessibility. 
Impacts of these policies on regions that are (directly or indirectly) affected 
also have to be reflected in the models.  
 There are different mechanisms through which policies implemented in cer-
tain regions affect other territories such as interregional knowledge spillovers 
and trade linkages, and as such these effects also need to be incorporated in 
model structures. 
 Resulting from the above considerations, alternative national plans for 
development involving different regions to be supported, even if overall 
budgets are the same, will most probably result in different macroeconomic 
impacts. As such these new generation impact models could serve as a useful 
tool both in planning and ex-post evaluations of national development poli-
cies.  
Below we are going to detail key economic modelling challenges that should be 
addressed in the impact models. These include modelling the impact of policies on 
technological progress, formulating the transmission of innovation impacts to eco-
nomic variables, modelling spatiotemporal dynamics of growth and incorporating 
the macro-dimension.  These challenges will be described in four steps of model 
building.  
Step 1: Modelling Policy Impact on Technological Progress 
The first question in model design is related to the way the impacts of policy 
instruments on innovation are represented in an economic model. A rich empirical 
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literature has mapped several geographical aspects of innovation and collected 
important information for model builders (Varga – Horváth 2013). The observed 
positive association of innovation with research, human capital, physical proximi-
ty, agglomeration, entrepreneurship and knowledge networks at different spatial 
scales suggests that integrated policies proposed by modern development ap-
proaches aiming at stimulating R&D, education, entrepreneurial culture, trans-
portation infrastructure investments and collaborations in research are indeed 
realistically expected to positively influence innovation. The question still remains 
though as to how these elements of innovation are integrated into a coherent em-
pirical modelling framework. Possibilities in this respect might range from the 
application of geographic knowledge production function and regional computable 
general equilibrium approaches to dynamic evolutionary modelling techniques. 
Step 2: Modelling the Transmission of the Technology Impact to Economic 
Variables 
The choice of how to empirically model the transmission of policy impacts on 
innovation to changes in economic variables such as output, employment or infla-
tion is not an obvious one. Innovation may contribute to aggregate growth in two 
(not necessarily independent) ways. Technological progress either increases the 
production of already existing goods (a productivity impact) or results in the 
introduction of new products (a variety impact). Modelling the productivity and 
variety effects in a common framework is a real challenge. Nevertheless it is a 
common experience for any theoretical solution that their translation to empirical 
models becomes indeed difficult because of the appearance of several technical 
issues. Among them data availability is a really serious problem especially at sub-
national regional levels. 
Step 3: Modelling Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Economic Growth 
The technical challenge of modelling spatiotemporal dynamics could be 
addressed by modelling both policy-induced expansion of indigenous resources 
and their migration at the level of regions. Consistency with the neoclassical 
growth framework then implies to derive saving and investment behaviour from 
intertemporal optimisation of households and firms in all locations. Development 
of models in this direction is slow and solutions are rare due to substantial analyti-
cal and computational difficulties involved. Alternatives include the introduction of 
some ad-hoc investment and saving behaviour in regional models or separately 
modelling intertemporal optimisation of investment and saving behaviour at the 
macro-level, and migration and dynamic agglomeration effects at the regional level 
in an integrated model system. 
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Step 4: Macro-impact Integration 
The macroeconomic framework such as the exchange rate of the national cur-
rency, government deficit and debt, the monetary policy regime or the interest rate 
could be important factors behind the impact of development policies. In a care-
fully designed macroeconomic policy, economic development is indeed aligned 
with other macro-framework conditions. Since the derivation of these conditions 
from the regional level is not understood theoretically (and most probably regional 
to macro-aggregation is not even possible in this respect) integration of the macro-
dimension into modelling seems to be a desirable solution. This is an open area of 
research and examples are rare in the literature (Varga – Járosi – Sebestyén 2011). 
The GMR-approach  
The GMR approach is an economic development policy impact modelling frame-
work. GMR models provide ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of development policies 
such as promotion of R&D activities, human capital advancement or improved 
physical accessibility. The models simulate macro- and regional economic impacts 
while taking into account geography effects such as regional innovation system 
features, agglomeration, migration and costs of transportation. The intention of the 
GMR research programme is to develop efficient and relatively simple model struc-
tures which fit to the generally weak quality of regional data.  
The GMR framework is rooted in different traditions of economics (Varga 
2007). Knowledge generation modelling is significantly influenced by the Rome-
rian endogenous growth theory (Romer 1990). Spatial patterns of knowledge 
flows and the role of agglomeration in knowledge transfers are formulated with 
insights and methodologies learned from the geography of innovation field. Inter-
regional trade and migration linkages and dynamic agglomeration effects are 
formed with an empirical general equilibrium model in the tradition of the new 
economic geography (Krugman 1991). Specific macroeconomic theories are fol-
lowed while modelling macro-level impacts. 
The first realisation of the GMR approach was the EcoRET model built for the 
Hungarian government for ex-ante and ex-post evaluation of the cohesion policy 
(Schalk – Varga 2004). This was followed by the GMR-Hungary model, which is 
currently used by the Hungarian government for cohesion policy impact analyses 
(Varga 2007). GMR-Europe was built into the IAREG FP7 project (Varga – Járosi – 
Sebestyén 2011) and was recently extended and applied for policy simulations for 
DG Regional Policy (LSE 2011). The GMR approach reflects the modelling chal-
lenges outlined in the previous section by structuring its system around the mutual 
interactions of three sub-models such as the Total Factor Productivity (TFP), the 
Spatial Computable General Equilibrium (SCGE) and the macroeconomic (MACRO) 
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sub-models. To illustrate the challenges involved in modelling economic impacts of 
the new EU cohesion policy following the four modelling steps we provide here a 
concise introduction to the structure of the GMR-Europe model. 
The GMR-Europe Model 
The model system uses data from various sources. Some of them are publicly 
available on the EUROSTAT web page (such as the New Cronos database for 
regional patents, R&D, technology employment and data for most of the macro-
level variables) and some others are developed for the European Commission 
(such as the regional FP5 and FP 6 databases and the regional publication data-
base). The model system includes 163 EU NUTS 2 regions. Estimation of the equa-
tions in the TFP sub-model is carried out in SpaceStat on the 1998–2002 data 
panel of EU NUTS 2 regions, and parameters in the SCGE sub-model are calibrated 
for 2002 data. The GMR-system is programmed and run in Matlab.  
Step 1: Modelling Policy Impact on Technological Progress 
Policy impact on innovation is formulated in the TFP sub-model. Following 
Romer (1990) development of ideas for new technologies is explained by the 
amount of research inputs and the stock of accumulated scientific–technological 
knowledge. The assumption behind this formulation is that even the same research 
inputs (e.g., number of researchers) can result in a larger number of new technolo-
gies if the level of knowledge already accumulated over time is higher. 
Step 2: Modelling the Transmission of the Technology Impact to Economic 
Variables 
Many of the new technological ideas become introduced in production, but 
many of them remain unexploited. The development of concrete technologies on 
the basis of technological ideas is formulated in the Total Factor Productivity 
equation. Therefore innovation policy impact on economic variables is transmitted 
through an increase in TFP. Policy induced change in TFP may increase output 
even if capital and labour stays the same. Increased output might result from new 
varieties and/or from growing productivity. 
The system of equations in the TFP block is estimated econometrically in Varga, 
Pontikakis, Chorafakis (2013) and Varga, Járosi, Sebestyén (2011). In order to fit 
the equations to the data of each individual region, parameters then are calibrated 
regionally. Figure 1 depicts the system of mutual connections for each region in the 
sample. Policy variables are R&D, interregional research networking, human 
capital, social capital and physical accessibility. 
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Figure 1. The estimated regional dynamics of innovation policies in the TFP block of the GMR-
Europe model 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Steps 3 and 4: Modelling Spatiotemporal Dynamics of Economic Growth 
and Macro-impact Integration   
A higher level of TFP resulting from innovation policy interventions may affect 
production partly via increased regional employment and investment and partly 
via labour and capital migration from other regions. Increased concentration of 
economic activities might strengthen dynamic agglomeration economies that could 
initiate a cumulative process towards further concentration. Therefore, increased 
capital and labour on the one hand and additional expansion in TFP sparked by 
agglomeration on the other drive policy-induced regional growth. In modelling 
spatiotemporal dynamics this complex process is separated into three parts, which 
at the end result in a coherent macro-regional impact via mutual alignments. 
That is why spatiotemporal dynamics is modelled in three steps. The first two 
steps reflect spatial dynamics. In their design the solution frequently applied in 
many of the new economic geography models is followed. In the first step, the 
short run impact of a change in TFP on the values of economic variables (e.g., 
output, capital and labour demand, prices, wages) for each region is calculated, 
assuming that aggregate supply of capital and labour as well as their regional dis-
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tribution remain constant. In the second step, utility differences across regions 
motivate labour migration, which is followed by the migration of capital. The first 
and second steps are modelled in the SCGE model block. So far aggregate labour 
and capital supply have been assumed constant. Their dynamics is modelled in the 
third step with the MACRO model block.  
Step 3a: Short-run Effects 
At the EU NUTS 2 regional level only aggregate R&D data are available. There-
fore with no information on industrial sectors or scientific fields of research 
activities it is not possible to relate R&D expenditures to particular industries. This 
explains the choice of an aggregate SCGE model for regional policy impact analysis. 
The applied SCGE model is a simplified version of the Dutch spatial general 
equilibrium model RAEM adapted to the framework of the GMR system. An in-
crease in regional TFP as a result of a policy intervention decreases unit costs, 
which affects demand for labor (L) and capital (K) negatively. However, decreasing 
prices increase demand in each territory where the region exports, which in turn 
raises the demand for L and K via increased supply. In a short-run equilibrium, a 
region’s production equals interregional product demand, while regional labour 
and capital supply, taken fixed in the short run, equals their respective demands. 
Step 3b: Spatial Dynamics with Constant Aggregate K and L 
Innovation policy interventions resulting in an increase of regional TFP affects 
prices and wages, which determine consumption. A change in consumption affects 
utilities as well. Labour migration reacts to cross-regional utility differences. Both 
positive and negative impacts of agglomeration are modelled. The balance between 
positive and negative agglomeration effects determines the extent of migration, 
which will change the distribution of labour, initiating a cumulative causation 
process that affects several variables in the system of regions over time. 
Step 3c: Dynamic Regional and Macro-impacts 
The applied SCGE model is static and as such it does not account for temporal 
changes in labour, capital and technology in an endogenous manner. What it does 
is that for any given aggregate level of labour, capital and technology it calculates 
their equilibrium spatial distributions. Dynamism in technology is modelled in the 
TFP model block, while dynamic effects of interventions on labour and capital are 
simulated in the MACRO model block. With this block QUEST III, the DSGE1 sub-
model for the Euro zone, is incorporated into the system (Ratto – Roeger – int’l 
Veld 2009).  
                                                                        
1 DSGE (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models represent the dynamic aspects of 
economic activity explicitly capturing the dynamic behaviour of agents: they operate with 
forward-looking decisions of households and firms. 
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Changes in regional TFP as calculated in Step 3b are weighted-averaged for 
each time period and inputted into the MACRO model where the impacts on 
several macro-variables (GDP, employment, investment, inflation etc.) are calcu-
lated. Aggregate changes in K and L are then distributed across regions following 
the patterns of initial policy interventions. This way the indigenous change in re-
gional K and L is simulated. To estimate the effects of agglomeration, Step 3b above 
is initiated again. The three model blocks are interconnected and run subsequently 
until the aggregate regional impacts in the regional sub-models converge to EU-
level impacts estimated in the macroeconomic model. The impacts of policy inter-
ventions in the GMR model system are illustrated in Figure 2. 
With the GMR-Europe model and its QUEST III macro sub-model it is also 
possibile to investigate the likely impacts of innovation policies assuming different 
macroeconomic policy regimes. Macro-level policies simulated in the MACRO 
model could then run through the GMR system as illustrated in Figure 2 and may 
affect the effectiveness of innovation policies targeting economic development. 
 
Figure 2. Regional and macro-impacts of regionally implemented innovation policies in the 
GMR-Europe model 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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Summary 
Disappointment in traditional economic development approaches stimulated 
policy thinking to reconsider old instruments in order to design the kinds of 
interventions that are expected to enhance economic development more success-
fully. Contrary to earlier approaches, the new development policy thinking, which 
is reflected in the new EU cohesion policy, correctly understands the key role of 
economic geography in the success of policy interventions. 
It is not possible to design optimal policies on the grounds of pure theoretical 
considerations. Instead, correctly constructed empirical economic models, which 
we call “new generation policy impact models”, are needed in the planning and 
implementation phases of economic development policies. In this study the most 
important modelling challenges raised by modern economic development were 
surveyed. To illustrate how economic models can respond to these challenges the 
GMR approach was briefly introduced along the lines of the challenges. A policy 
analysis application of the GMR-Europe model shows the capabilities that can 
realistically be expected from the new models in their current stage of develop-
ment. 
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 METHODOLOGIES TO MEASURE THE IMPACTS OF 
TERRITORIAL COHESION POLICIES – WHAT’S NEW 
IN BRUSSELS?1 
Zsuzsanna Márkusné Zsibók 
Introduction 
Territorial cohesion is a complex concept referring to the sustainable, balanced 
and harmonious development from a territorial perspective. Heterogeneous spa-
tial structures and regional disparities have always existed, even in the developed 
part of the European Union (see e.g. EC 1999, Cotella 2011 and Horváth 2012). For 
this reason, cohesion policy aims at strengthening economic, social and territorial 
cohesion by reducing disparities between the levels of development of regions and 
countries of the EU and at promoting further economic integration. This policy 
contributes to the overall economic performance of the EU and is an important 
expression of solidarity (Barca 2009). 
After the accession of the 12 new, Central and Eastern European (CEE) member 
states, territorial disparities have become significantly deeper (doubled),2 while 
within-country inequalities are also higher in the new members. The economic 
recession has affected the countries and regions of Europe seriously, the developed 
and underdeveloped ones alike. However, vulnerability to economic shocks is not 
the same among the different regions. Those regions where the export-oriented 
manufacturing sector has dominated suffered a sudden economic contraction after 
2008, but they have been able to recover relatively rapidly. Initially, underde-
veloped regions were not affected badly by the first waves of the recession, but 
later their growth potential decreased largely. As a consequence, interregional 
disparities diminished a little in the initial phase of the crisis, but later started to 
increase again. 
The contrasting spatial dynamics described above are even more apparent in 
those countries where economic growth is concentrated in a strong capital region, 
                                                                        
1 The research underlying this study was ordered by the National Development Agency of 
Hungary and the author hereby acknowledges the provided support. 
2 In terms of per capita GDP, the most developed region (Inner London) reached 328% of 
the EU27 average, while the most backward region (Severozapaden, Bulgaria) reached 
only 26% in 2010 (EuroStat). 
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while the peripheral regions are constantly losing economic power. In countries 
characterised by an uneven, monocentric spatial structure, the global crisis did not 
have a severe impact on the economic performance of the capital regions. This 
tendency suggests that capital city regions have been able to extract purchasing 
power, human capital and financial capital from the peripheral hinterlands. As a 
result, interregional spatial inequalities deepened during the crisis and cause 
serious challenge for EU cohesion policy and national spatial policies. These trends 
suggest that (national) competitiveness and (interregional) cohesion remain to be 
regarded as conflicting policy goals in the CEE countries, especially during the 
recovery from the crisis. However, in the long term, the economic potential of all 
the regions of the EU can only be utilised through a more balanced spatial struc-
ture (EC 1999). 
It is accepted that free, competitive market forces fail to deliver territorially 
balanced economic and social development (Dühr – Colomb – Nadin 2010). Conse-
quently, a redistribution system is needed to reach the spatial policy objectives 
through investing public money in the least developed regions. The supports 
awarded under the cohesion policy are not compensatory (income) payments, but 
support for development, and their success depends to a large extent on the 
capacity and preparedness of those at whom the support is targeted to make the 
best possible use out of it (including the building of good governance and adminis-
trative capacity) (Ahner 2009). It is in the interest of all stakeholders (both con-
tributors and recipients) to evaluate whether the support was allocated and used 
efficiently and if it helped to reach the spatial policy objectives. 
Evaluation of the Territorial Impacts of Cohesion Policy Interventions 
New Philosophies in the Evaluation of Cohesion Policies in the EU 
EU policies may have diverse direct and indirect (or short term and long-term) 
effects from spatial aspects, which may be either intended or unintended. In order 
to enhance the efficiency of structural and cohesion policies, a proper evaluation 
system and culture is needed. For this reason, the European Commission shifts the 
focus of evaluation from physical and financial implementation and absorption to 
result orientation in close connection with evidence-based policy-making. In 
addition, the Commission promotes the use of clear outcome and result indicators 
which help judge whether or not objectives of a policy or programme have been 
met (EC 2012b, c). 
Another new element of EU regional policy is the place-based approach which 
has to be reflected in the evaluation system as well. The objective of this “new 
paradigm” is to “reduce persistent inefficiency (underutilisation of resources re-
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sulting in income below potential in both the short and long-run) and persistent 
social exclusion (primarily, an excessive number of people below a given standard 
in terms of income and other features of well-being) in specific places” (Barca 
2009, p. xi). A place-based development policy focuses on “the place-specificity of 
natural and institutional resources and of individual preferences and knowledge; 
the role played by the (material and immaterial) linkages between places; and the 
resulting need for interventions to be tailored to places” (Barca 2009, p. 4). The 
three main characteristics of a place-based policy are the flexible conceptualisation 
of different geographical scales and boundaries; cross-sectoral co-operation and 
multi-level governance (Bachtler 2011). For this reason, place-based policy is often 
mentioned in the context of “flexible geography” which notion focuses on func-
tional areas rather than existing administrative territorial units and concerns the 
interactions of the functional centres and their peripheral hinterlands. Depending 
on the issue, the appropriate geographical dimension may range from a macro-
region to metropolitan and cross-border regions or a group of rural areas and 
market towns (EC 2010). Although the main task of the evaluation is to reveal the 
actual, detectable territorial impacts of policy interventions, in practice, the 
relevant methodologies are constrained by the limited available territorial data 
bases in terms of quantity and quality. The notion of territorial cohesion gradually 
emerged in European policy discourses, but the assessment methodologies still lag 
behind the needs in the field of this complex process. 
The General Framework of Impact Assessment 
A central element of impact assessment is the “theory of change” or “programme 
theory” which is a “chain of results, and the assumptions behind why the interven-
tion is expected to work are plausible, sound, informed by existing research and 
literature and supported by key stakeholders” (Mayne 2012, p. 272). The theory of 
change investigates the causal relationship between a certain intervention and the 
objective of the policy-maker. Many of the current evaluation practices regard this 
process a “black box”, since there are too many idiosyncratic, disturbing circum-
stances on the theoretical way from a development policy action towards the 
desired outcome. Therefore, it is a great challenge to create a general assessment 
method being not dependent on the context of use. 
According to the traditional approach (Figure 1), the inputs of a policy action 
(e.g. money spent) result in certain short-term consequences called outcomes, and 
long-term, real consequences called impacts. The direct outcomes and the real, 
indirect impacts may differ a lot due to the presence of externalities, which may be 
reflected in the different results shown by micro-oriented and macro-oriented 
evaluations (see e.g. Wren 2007). 
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Figure 1. The basic logic of policy evaluation in the traditional approach 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
The European Commission assumes a more complex system of evaluation and 
uses a somewhat renewed terminology. Figure 2 shows two points where the 
evaluators have to face uncertainty: first, it is not sure that the allocated inputs will 
lead to the targeted outputs. Second, it also emphasises the role of externalities 
which may be as important as policy actions in shaping the actual results in both 
short and long run. According to EU terminology, outputs are the direct products of 
programmes intended to contribute to results. In the literature, the terms impacts 
and results are used interchangeably, while the European Commission makes a 
distinction between them. Impact is the change that can be credibly attributed to 
an intervention (“the effect of an intervention”, “the contribution of an interven-
tion”), while result is the specific dimension of well-being and progress for people 
that motivates policy action. This means that a change in the result indicator can be 
attributed to the contribution of intervention and/or the contribution of other 
factors.3 
The Methodological Framework of Territorial Impact Evaluation 
Nowadays we can see a continuous development of novel techniques in the field of 
cohesion policy evaluation, yet, there is a lack of common standardised method-
ology at EU level. As the new programming period of 2014–2020 is getting 
underway, these kinds of research got a new impetus. 
The European Commission often refers to two broad evaluation categories: the 
theory-based impact evaluation, shortly mentioned above, and the counterfactual 
impact assessment. These are not alternatives, but rather complement each other, 
since they help us answer two distinctive questions. First, counterfactual impact 
evaluation allows to reveal whether a public intervention has an effect on the 
                                                                        
3 In a similar vein, Mayne (2012) describes the “contribution analysis” developed in the 
2000s as an analysis looking at the theory of change, the risks to it and the available 
evidence that support or challenge the “contribution story”. 
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Figure 2. Outputs, results and impacts in relation to programming, monitoring and evaluation 
Source: European Commission (2012a, p. 5). 
selected indicator: “Does it work?” Second, theory-based impact assessment inves-
tigates why an intervention produces certain effects, i.e. “How and why it works?” 
(EC 2012a). 
Territorial impact assessments may use two different approaches. Bottom-up 
approaches are based on individual, programme or project level data obtained 
from surveys and case studies, thus, mainly rely on micro-oriented, qualitative 
techniques in their analysis. They are vital elements of theory-driven evaluation. 
However, the concept of territorial cohesion rather assumes a macro-oriented 
approach which may capture the effects of a policy programme by applying top-
down methodologies. 
According to the EU rules, evaluations have to be carried out before, during and 
after the programming period. Ex-ante, top-down analyses are only able to predict 
the upper limit of an intervention’s effect, while the actual effects may be much 
more below it. According to current practices, the phenomenon of territorial cohe-
sion is captured indirectly, in a two-step procedure: first the (economic, social etc.) 
development paths are determined separately for all territorial units, and in the 
second step, the dynamics of territorial disparities are analysed with the help of 
some common inequality measures such as dispersion measures (cross-sectional 
standard deviation, coefficient of variation etc.), Gini-coefficient or Theil-index, and 
more sophisticated convergence analysis tools. 
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More realistic results can be obtained from econometric analyses applied ex-
post, therefore they may detect the actual effects of policy interventions, not just 
the potential ones. Econometric methods often use regressions to identify the 
causal relationship between EU supports and other external variables, and the 
development of certain territorial units. The use of this method is constrained by 
the availability of appropriate long enough regional-level time series. 
There is a very limited number of methods which allow to assess territorial 
cohesion in a direct manner. Usually, they utilise specific territorial indicators, 
models based on expert estimations (e.g. ESPON’s TEQUILA model, Camagni 2009), 
and aggregate, dynamic territorial cohesion indices such as the ESPON’s European 
Territorial Cohesion Index (ESPON 2006). Unfortunately, current tools are not 
mature enough concerning their methodological background or data base, there-
fore they are not widely used. An advantage of these indices and models is that 
they are able to capture environmental, social, spatial structure indicators beyond 
the usual economic indicators. 
A possible categorisation of the available evaluation methodologies is shown in 
Table 1. 
Models usually follow a counterfactual approach and investigate the quanti-
tative effects of cohesion policy, while the results are given in absolute numbers or, 
more frequently, in differences. It poses a challenge on these methods to determine  
Table 1. Major methods of policy impact evaluation 
Top-down methods Bottom-up methods 
models theory-based assessments 
econometric methods beneficiary surveys 
macroeconomic models (e.g. DSGE models) case studies, interviews, workshops 
sectoral models (e.g. E3ME, TRANS-TOOLS) realist evaluation 
computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, 
spatial CGE models (SCGE) 
participatory evaluation 
input-output models evaluating alternatives 
TEQUILA cost–benefit analysis 
multivariate methods, indices (e.g. ETCI) cost effectiveness analysis 
counterfactual analysis multi-criteria analysis 
difference-in-difference contingent evaluation 
discontinuity analysis evaluations with indicator systems 
matching methods 
instrumental variables 
randomised controlled trials 
Source: Author’s elaboration based on European Commission (2012b). 
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the realistic causal relationship between the policy action and the impacts. For this 
reason, these models have to rely on empirical, theory-based assessments and 
other bottom-up tools to look into the “black box”. Such a complex approach may 
help estimating a broader range of effects including the catalysing, spillover or 
crowding-out effects of supports at the regional level. It is commonly observed that 
the ex-post econometric models usually attribute much less impact for the inter-
ventions than the “optimistic” ex-ante models, which implies that a huge part of 
supply-side effects disappears from the economy. 
Ex-post counterfactual analyses may be carried out in two ways: one may com-
pare the states before and after the intervention or compare beneficiaries with 
similar non-beneficiaries. This latter is used primarily in micro-oriented analyses. 
Ex-ante macro and regional models determine a so-called baseline scenario for the 
selected economic or social variables which represent e.g. their path without policy 
intervention, then different alternative policy scenarios are computed and com-
pared to this baseline. 
A General Methodology Mix to Evaluate Territorial Cohesion 
Since the phenomenon of territorial cohesion is complex, no single method is able 
to capture the exact effect of cohesion policy. First of all, it is important to deter-
mine the optimal territorial scale of evaluation in line with the aims of the policy-
maker, which, as mentioned before, may differ from the existing administrative 
units. Possible territorial scales may include the national level (regarding the con-
vergence of countries towards the average EU-level development), macro-regions 
(e.g. NUTS 1 level), NUTS 2 or 3 regions and LAU 1 regions and even certain func-
tional urban areas (agglomerations). 
Concerning the 2014–2020 programming period, the European Commission 
aims to streamline the administrative burdens of policy implementation including 
evaluations. For this reason, recommendations emphasise that there is no need to 
develop radical new methodologies, instead, territorial aspects have to be in-
tegrated in existing sectoral evaluation tools. 
An optimal methodology mix has to include almost all of the elements listed in 
Table 1. Just to give some examples, a few good practices will be mentioned in the 
following paragraphs highlighting some Hungarian specificities. Cross-country 
convergence is often estimated with the help of DSGE models, e.g. QUEST II and III 
models for the euro area (e.g. Varga and in’t Veld 2010) or the Hungarian ECO-
TREND model (Cserháti – Keresztély – Takács  2003), but these are not able to 
capture convergence at a disaggregated level. Spatial dynamics are often estimated 
with the help of a macroeconometric model called HERMIN (Bradley 2006) which 
was developed in numerous EU countries including Hungary (see Gács 2006) and 
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aims to evaluate the economic effects of EU supports in peripheral countries. An 
important feature of this model is that it can be regionalised in case the appro-
priate regional data are available. 
An ideal tool to capture spatial interactions is SCGE modelling which is able to 
control for positive and negative spatial agglomeration effects. The EU’s best prac-
tice in this field is the RHOMOLO model (Regional Holistic Model) (Ferrara – 
Ivanova – Kancs 2010) which is currently being developed and tested for DG 
REGIO. RHOMOLO consists of not only economic, but also social and environmental 
variables, and it has a regional (NUTS 2 level) and a sectoral (potentially 23 sec-
tors) dimension, too. It can be used for both ex-ante and ex-post impact assess-
ment. A Hungarian example is the GMR-Hungary model (Varga 2008) which is a 
model system consisting of a macroeconomic, an SCGE and a TFP (Total Factor 
Productivity) sub-model. This model was developed for the ex-ante evaluation of 
the Hungarian National Strategic Reference Framework (2007–2013), and pro-
vides a flexible tool with its regional scenario analysis framework. 
Macro-models have to be supplemented with econometric methods which are 
used in ex-post analyses. Nevertheless, due to the great flexibility of these types of 
models, one cannot select a generally recommended best practice. The features of 
these models depend on the available disaggregate data base and the aims of the 
evaluator. 
For the evaluation of territorial impacts at a highly disaggregated level (micro-
regions, functional urban areas etc.), complex methods are available which inte-
grate qualitative and quantitative tools. Best practices include the above-
mentioned territorial cohesion indices (ETCI) and the TEQUILA model which can 
be used to identify the territorial impacts of policy interventions, since these 
methods aim to quantify the multi-faceted aspects of territorial cohesion. An 
essential element of these evaluations is the use of subjective expert assessments. 
As a conclusion, we argue that even the most recent evaluation approaches only 
partially let us understand the transmission process of cohesion policy interven-
tions, therefore an appropriate methodology mix should be applied. In this respect, 
national evaluation systems concerning interregional cohesion seem to be frag-
mented, since the integrated use of the full range of best methodological practices 
is lacking in most member states. In sum: what is new in Brussels? For 2014–2020 
the European Commission is moving towards a stronger focus on results (instead 
of implementation), a much stronger emphasis on intervention logic and concen-
tration, and encourages more evaluation. The evaluation of impact has been intro-
duced into the role of evaluation. Also, there is a major emphasis on reducing the 
number of indicators to be evaluated, which is linked to a need to concentrate re-
sources. 
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 EVALUATION OF EU FUND DEPENDENCY – DEAD 
WEIGHT LOSS AND SUBSTITUTION EFFECT1 
Sándor Gyula Nagy – Balázs Lóránd 
Introduction 
SMEs provide the majority of jobs in the economy and the wealth of millions of 
families owning and running small companies. Decision-makers, politicians, many 
economists and sectoral lobby groups are convinced that helping SMEs with appli-
cations grants is an essential and the best (and sometimes the only available) way 
of using EU’s Structural Funds’ “development aid”. The problem with this approach 
is double: it is not efficient at a national economic level and it creates a certain 
degree of sectorial dependency on EU funds to maintain the existing level of func-
tioning, instead of boosting the economy to reach the “European” level of competi-
tiveness in the single market (without state aid). 
State Aid and Competition 
State aids to enterprises are basically forbidden in the European Union by Article 
87.1 of the Treaty of Rome. At the same time, 87.2–3 legitimates the existence of 
“de minimis” and the regional development aids (from the Structural Funds).  
However, market failure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for state 
intervention. Where the market does not lead to optimum decisions, it is abso-
lutely not sure that state intervention will lead to its correction (Stiglitz 2000) 
“Economic development” aids are often criticised for several reasons: it has a 
market distorting effect, the efficiency of using the gained support is dubious, and 
every project has some alternative cost (e.g. extra administration) (Lóránd 2010). 
We are highlighting here the inefficiency of the non-refundable state aids by 
using two special concepts: the “dead weight loss” effect and the “substitution 
effect”. The “dead weight loss” effect means the lack of incentive, namely, some 
enterprises funded through publicly supported measures would have obtained 
finance with the same terms even in the absence of state aid (EC 2006). The 
                                                                        
1 Research for this publication has been supported under OTKA – Hungarian Scientific 
Research Fund grant #NK 104985 (New driving forces of spatial restructuring and regional 
development paths in Eastern Europe at the beginning of 21st century). 
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“substitution effect” (in our case) is when an investment does not improve the 
output either at national economic or at European level, because demand for 
the produced product or service is limited at state level, so the improvement in its 
production “crowds out” national competition, which is thus a nearly “zero sum” 
game (Béres 2008). The only exceptions are when the supported company 
produces for export or creates new demand for its products (which is less 
common). 
Our research and analyses having targeted the efficiency of EU subsidy (or state 
aid) to the SME sector (Béres 2008, NFÜ 2011) were financed by the National 
Development Agency. The objective of the research has been to try measuring the 
dead weight loss and the substitution effect of EU funds to the SME sector in 
Hungary.  
Conceptual Framework 
The National Development Plan aims at improving competitiveness by supporting 
SMEs to help them in acquiring new technology, employing new staff, improving 
working conditions, training (including vocational training of workers and execu-
tives), and in introducing new IT solutions (also in quality management and 
control systems), as well as by FDI-attracting measures for large Hungarian and 
multinational companies. 
KPMG (2006) carried out a mid-term analysis of the Economic Development 
Operational Program (EDOP) of the first National Development Plan of Hungary. 
They investigated the share of projects supported by EDOP: 
 which would not have been realised without the help of EU funds (the 
inverse of the “dead weight loss” effect), and 
 which are increasing the output of the national economy (the inverse of the 
“substitution effect”). 
The evaluators concluded that the examined SMEs would not have imple-
mented 18% of their projects without the EU funds, and this value was 51% in 
sectors competing in the international market, whereas 9% of all projects fulfilled 
both criteria. This means that 91% of the projects had dead weight loss or substi-
tution effect. Regarding the subsidies given to multinational and/or large Hungari-
an companies, they measured 89% dead weight loss and 9% substitution effect. 
Regarding the first National Development Plan of Hungary 2004–2006, Attila 
Béres (2008) carried out a comparison with regression analysis between the in-
vestments of the “supported” target group and those of different control groups, 
based on tax declaration databases. He stated in the analysis that  
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 the supported enterprises invested significantly more than an average Hun-
garian company, however, 
 there were no significant differences between their investment activities and 
those of the enterprises which applied for subsidy but did not win. 
Data and Methods 
Our survey contained specific questions on the topic of our research, but it 
followed the logic of the SME Yearbook survey (Table 1 shows the variables used 
in our analysis), however, with a different methodology and distribution strategy. 
The questionnaire was sent to all the enterprises registered at the regional cham-
bers of commerce and industry in Hungary. (It is nearly 90% of the ca. 600,000 
Hungarian operating companies.) The data collection was made between 5th of 
January and 13th of February 2013. We received 1351 responses, which shows a 
very low level of interest on the part of the Hungarian enterprises. Nearly 19% of 
the responses had to be eliminated due to uninterpretable or meaningless 
answers, so the final sample size was 1098, which contains some partially useful 
answers (10.5%) as well. 
The first dependent variable was the share of companies having won grants co-
financed by EU funds. We tried to gain some information on the type and relative 
size of their development projects (“the kind of development grant” and “the ratio of 
EU funds in their yearly turnover”). The last dependent variable was whether the 
company owes “subsidised loan”, and if yes, which type.  
The most important variable of our survey was the “dead weight loss” effect: the 
size of the investment the company would have made without the EU subsidy (in 
ratio of the total investment made). We tried to measure, or rather, to estimate the 
“dead weight loss” effect of the EU-subsidies in the SME sector.  
We attempted to measure the effects of the EU funds: the change in the com-
pany’s life as a result of the EU funded investment or project. 
For differenting between micro-, small and medium-sized enterprises we used 
the official definition of the European Commission’s Recommendation (2003/361/ 
EC). 
The ownership of a company could be a determining factor in winning and using 
EU funds, so we differentiated between companies with Hungarian and those with 
foreign majority ownership. Regarding the geographical situation (region where 
the SME is situated), we followed the results of previous researches which made a 
clear difference (in competitiveness, value  added, productivity etc.) between SMEs 
situated in the central region (including the capital city of Budapest) and the rest of 
Hungary. We presumed similar differences in our research. 
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The existence and the intensity of export activity (share of export in turnover) 
are key factors in investigating the “substitution effect” of EU funds, so we also 
included this factor in our research. 
We regarded the supplier activity of an SME to multinational firms situated in 
Hungary as a kind of indirect export, since the majority of the multinational 
companies in Hungary are producing for export markets. 
The distribution of the survey is a crucial point of every research. Due to data-
protection legislation, we are not allowed to store databases of companies, so we 
had two possibilities. We could have used the “snowball” model, asking our per-
sonal and university contacts to forward the questionnaire and to ask their con-
tacts to do the same. The other alternative was to ask our contacts in the Ministry 
of National Economy and the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce and Industry to 
ask the regional and local chambers to send the questionnaire to their members. 
We applied mainly the second method, although we also tried to apply the first 
one, including all former students, friends and colleagues, online social media, and 
some “application writers”. 
The online survey programme used for our research (Survey Gizmo) allowed us 
to run unlimited number of automated analyses with different filters (for control 
variables) and to compare these, searching for significant differences in the results 
relating to the size, the geographical situation etc. of the responding enterprises. 
(We could also refine the results by closing out double or multiple replies from the 
same company identified by the same computer IP address.) 
Results 
We can clearly see from the results of the survey that the small and medium-sized 
enterprises are overrepresented in the sample group of EU fund-winners (just like 
in the survey) compared to their share in the economy. This is confirming the 
results of previous researches and evaluations (e.g. Béres 2008) that the majority 
of the winners of EU funds are from among the most competitive enterprises 
(which are not the micro-enterprises). The data show that 46% of the winners 
have received some kind of subsidy from EU funds more than once in the last 9 
years (EU funds are available from January 2004) and this confirms the research 
results mentioned above. 
We found a very interesting relation between the share of subsidy in turnover 
and the “dead weight effect”. The average “dead weight effect” of the winners is 
46%, while that of the companies which won (between 2004 and 2012) more than 
40% subsidies as a percentage of their yearly turnover in 2012, this effect is just 
24%. There might be various explanations for this. Either they are continuously 
applying for subsidies to “survive”, because otherwise they would not be competi-
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tive and would disappear from the market; or they made one big or several small 
but sequential investments, which they would not have made without EU-
subsidies. It is also possible that both explanations are (partially) valid.  
The relationship between the ratio of EU funds in yearly turnover and the “dead 
weight loss” was further analysed by correlations. The Pearson correlation was –
0.236 (significant at 0.01 level), which means a weak negative relation between the 
ratio in turnover and the “dead weight loss”.  
We analysed the relationship between different variables to highlight how 
company features affect “dead weight loss” with the ANOVA2 method. There is 
practically no difference among the winners and non-winners as regards the SMEs’ 
geographical location. However, we have found a significant relationship between 
the size of the company and the “dead weight loss” effect. At micro-enterprises the 
average “dead weight loss” is 41.00%, at small enterprises 46.98%, while among 
medium-sized companies it is 58.33%. 
We have also found significant correlation between the ownership of the 
company and “dead weight loss”. Foreign owned enterprises generated an average 
of 63.89% “dead weight loss”, while enterprises with Hungarian majority owner-
ship only 44.72%. However, the reason for this might also be the low number of 
foreign firms in the sample (8%). 
It is another significant result that the number of times of winning from EU funds 
is also correlated with the value of “dead weight loss”: 42.47% in the case of 
companies winning only once, whereas it is 51.38% at enterprises winning more 
than once. 
It is interesting to note that while only about 1% of the Hungarian SMEs carry 
out export activity, this is more than 41% in the case of EU-subsidised companies. 
If we also include enterprises supplying for multinationals, we find that more than 
39% of the winners have significant (more than 10% of their turnover) export 
activity. Furthermore, export activity (substitution effect) has a very significant 
relationship with “dead weight loss”: companies with more than 10% export in 
their turnover produced a significantly higher “dead weight loss” average (53.70), 
than those with less than 10% export in the turnover (41.97). 61% of the EU-
subsidised companies compete exclusively in the Hungarian market, but at the 
same time the share of export activity among the winners is very high, which 
decreases the substitution effect of the EU funds and concurrently increases the 
dead weight effect. This is very controversial and highlights the negative correla-
tion between “dead weight loss” and the substitution effect. 
The average share of EU funds won in the last 9 years (2004–2012) in the 2012 
turnover of the companies examined is below 10% (and it is about 1% if we 
                                                                        
2 Proper method to analyse the relationship between categorical variables. 
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calculate with the yearly EU-subsidies), which is very low. However, there is a 
group of winners (around 10% of the respondents) that won more than once and 
the share of their EU-subsidies in their 2012 turnover is quite high (20.2%). 
Furthermore, the 2011 data of the Hungarian Statistical Office show that both the 
gross value added and the share of the SME sector in export activity have signifi-
cantly surpassed the pre-crises level (Table 2). 
On the basis of our survey results it seems that EU fund-winners use some kind 
of subsidised (16.8) and non- subsidised loans as well (40.5%), while this value is 
only 3.2% in the whole Hungarian SME sector. This highlights strong connection 
between the two types of government programmes (refundable and non-refundable 
subsidies) and the EU fund-winners’ willingness and/or need to exploit all acces-
sible possibilities to finance their investment. As our survey revealed, the majority 
 
Table 2. Analysing the means of “dead weight loss” among different groups of companies 
(results from ANOVA) 
Feature/variable Categories Means Significance level 
Size of the company Micro-enterprise 41.00 
0.009 Small enterprise 46.98 
Medium-sized enterprise 58.33 
The ownership of the 
enterprise 
Foreign owners 63.89 
0.007 Hungarian majority 
ownership 
44.72 
Geographical location Central Hungary  41.67 
0.632* 
Central Transdanubia  51.56 
Northern Great Plain  44.12 
Northern Hungary  38.71 
Southern Great Plain 49.43 
Southern Transdanubia 53.26 
Western Transdanubia 47.92 
Széchenyi-card Yes 47.28 0.888* 
No 46.48 
Subsidised loan Yes 45.72 
0.731* 
No 47.22 
Winning grant from EU 
funds 
Once 42.47 0.038 
More than once 51.38 
Export activity Less than 10% in the turnover  41.97 
0.007 More than 10% in the 
turnover 
53.70 
*No significant correlation. 
Source: Authors’ calculation. 
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(52%) of the companies without loans would be willing to participate in access-to-
finance programmes, but they do not fulfil the conditions to do so. The total share 
of subsidised loans in the total loan-stock in Hungary is around 11%. 
According to our survey results EU grants had a good effect on the enterprises 
(in 80% subsidies had a positive effect on the company’s life), mostly by increasing 
employment (62%), and/or by improving working conditions (78%), its market 
positions (57%), its position as a supplier to multinationals (55%), and its 
profitability (70%). There was no significant difference among the various control 
variables (size, region or ownership etc.). 
We asked the enterprises which effects they would prioritise in connection 
with EU-subsidies, and they ranked with slight differences “increasing employ-
ment” 1st, “increasing turnover” 2nd, “introducing green technologies” 3rd, and far 
behind these “increasing export” 4th, which shows a lack of confidence in ex-
panding towards foreign markets. 
Conclusion 
From our results we can conclude that companies with larger size, foreign owner-
ship, winning more than once from EU funds and having more than 10% of export 
in their turnover tend to cause higher “dead weight loss”. This is very controversial 
and highlights the negative correlation between “dead weight loss” and the sub-
stitution effect. Our research reveals that the majority of SMEs do not depend on 
EU-subsidies, while the high dead weight effect shows low efficiency of using the 
EU funds in the SME sector through non-refundable grants. Unfortunately we lack 
the international (at least EU level) comparison to assess the relative importance 
of this result. 
The research results do not give explanation for the cause of the negative 
correlation between “dead weight loss” and the substitution effect. This could be a 
possible topic of further research and investigations. Furthermore it would also be 
interesting to look deeper into the access-to-finance programmes, the reasons of 
the non-participating enterprises and how could more SMEs be involved in these 
programs. Another possible topic could be a comparative international research, 
which could help in understanding the causes and possible ways of mitigating the 
adverse effects of EU funds on the SME sector. 
Preparing for the new planning period, decision makers should be provided 
with possible ways of allocating EU funds more efficiently and of producing higher 
added value at national (macro) level. 
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THEORIES, METHODOLOGIES, 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMES IN REGIONAL 
SCIENCE 
 TERRITORY, AS IN TERRITORIAL COHESION 
Andreas Faludi 
 
Territory … should not be understood as the static backdrop or container of 
political actions. Nor is it the passive object of political struggle. It is something 
shaped by, and a shaper of, continual processes of transformation, regulation 
and governance. (Elden 2013, p. 13) 
Social theorists are questioning territories-as-containers and so do practitioners. 
Thus, Nauwelaers (2012, p. 24) warns against “...myopic approaches, confined to 
regional boundaries and overlooking potential cross-border synergies.” Politicians 
defer to their electorates, so one must demonstrate the opportunity costs of over-
looking potential benefits to be gained through co-operation, as Nauwelaers says. 
Meijers, Hoogerbrugge and Hollander (2012, p. 142) comment likewise that politi-
cians being under pressure “…leads to an emphasis on short-term, locally coloured 
political agendas. Without hard evidence on how decisions taken for ‘the regional 
good’ trickledown locally, and how regional performance affects local perfor-
mance, also on the long run, it is hard to overcome this gap between regional 
issues and local administration.” The underlying principle is territorial constituen-
cies electing representatives which “…has become so habitual that it is almost 
never questioned, despite the fact that the ‘communities’ supposedly involved have 
changed radically in their stability, size and composition” (Schmitter 2009, pp. 
487–488). However, relevant territories are not fixed. They depend on the issue 
and policies concerned. This is also true for territorial cohesion policy. Conven-
tionally it is assumed that the territories concerned are jurisdictions. These con-
tainers are thought as layered stacks. Territorial cohesion is thought of in terms of 
how well activities within and also between the stacked containers harmonise with 
each other. The other view of territories is one of ad-hoc constructs, dynamic and 
depending on who is concerned. Such territories may overlap and do not fit into a 
“Russian Doll”, as constitutional thinking – including much thinking about the EU – 
would have it. The view is one of a dynamic network with fuzzy internal as well as 
external boundaries. Territorial cohesion refers to how well this network reflects 
existing complexity, at the same time ameliorating inefficiencies and outright con-
flict. 
 Andreas Faludi 124 
Territorial Cohesion 
During consultations on the “Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion” (EC 2008, see 
Faludi 2010, pp. 162–167, Sykes 2011) one criticism was the lack of a clear 
definition of the concept. From the beginning it had been a container for different 
meanings and intentions, an “unidentified political objective” (Faludi 2005). This 
allowed governments and EU institutions to interpret territorial cohesion accord-
ing to their own interests, preferences and development challenges, reminding 
Evers (2012) of the “garbage can model”. Indeed, Commissioner for regional policy 
Michael Barnier (2004) gave a long list. He emphasised first of all that EU policy 
already embraced aspects of territorial cohesion such as the support for regions 
lagging behind. He then outlined new directions aiming to improve the response to 
the EU’s territorial imbalances: 
 exploiting opportunities, and not just addressing problems; 
 encouraging co-operation and networking; 
 building on existing strengths so as to improve the targeting of cohesion 
policy; 
 ensuring the incorporation of the sustainability agenda, including addressing 
the issue of natural risks; 
 more coherence and co-ordination between regional and sectoral policies. 
It has become common since to talk about different territorial cohesion “story-
lines” like “Europe in Balance”, “Competitive Europe” and “Clean and Green Eu-
rope” (Waterhout 2008). However, as Martin and Schmeitz (2012, p. 120) argue: 
“…greater policy coherence and governance changes are needed.” A further story-
line thus concerns the packaging of policies with territorial impacts, in the terms of 
the Barca Report (2009) of integrating territorial development; the “Coherent EU 
Policy” storyline. 
Van Well (2012) follows up on the storylines relating them to the arenas in 
which territorial cohesion is discussed: the “ESPON pillar” so called after the Euro-
pean Spatial Planning Observation Network; the “Territorial Agenda pillar” so 
called after the “Territorial Agenda of the European Union” (TA 2007) and its 
update, the “Territorial Agenda 2020” (TA 2011); the “Green Paper pillar” and 
finally the “European Territorial Co-operation pillar” referring to the EU cohesion 
policy objective under this name. Then Van Well turns her attention to “Cohesion 
Policy Storylines in OPs 2007–2013”, identifying storylines not unlike Waterhout’s: 
reduction of regional/spatial imbalances; regional co-operation; exploiting region-
al potential; horizontal (multi-level) principles. 
So there are different meanings to territorial cohesion, but Faludi (2010, p. 
170) argues that integrated territorial development policy is its unique selling 
point. “Coherent EU Policy” refers to the co-ordination of regional, environmental, 
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agricultural, transport and so forth policies, ensuring that such policies acquire 
added value by forming coherent packages, taking account of where they take 
effect, the specific opportunities and constraints there, now and in the future. 
Indeed, the post-2013 proposals for cohesion policy signal a strengthening, Men-
dez (2012, p. 2) says, of “...territorial and integrated principles and the reassertion 
of Commission control over programming”, a return to the founding ethos of the 
1988 reform. He, too, presents this “place-based” narrative as a key driver in the 
ascendancy of a territorial cohesion discourse and traces the development of the 
“place-based” narrative from the OECD to Barca. Concerning the “place-based” 
narrative in Commission policy he concludes that its “...tenets of spatial balance, 
integrated development and inclusive governance... resonated with the well-
established multi-level governance and territorial cohesion concepts, which had 
gained increased attention through the EU's constitutional reform initiatives” 
(Mendez 2012, p. 10).  
The salience of the “Coherent EU Policy” territorial cohesion storyline is clear. 
At the same time sector reluctance is problematic. This is the more the case since it 
is unclear whether member states or the EU should be responsible: the compe-
tence issue concerning European spatial planning (Faludi – Waterhout 2002, Janin 
Rivolin 2010). As an objective of the “Union”, as the EU is called in the Lisbon 
Treaty, one might be excused for thinking that this is no issue with territorial cohe-
sion. Be that as it may, this paper is not about competence, but about territory 
which tends to be taken for granted, and well in the sense of territory being a con-
tainer. 
Territory, as in Subsidiarity and Multi-level Governance 
The Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion asks for a shared understanding of the 
concept which should improve the governance of cohesion policy “…in conformity 
with the principle of subsidiarity” (EC 2008, p. 4). What it seems to want to allay 
are fears that pursuing territorial cohesion could weaken the position of member 
states and their regions. The backdrop is that of the existing governmental hi-
erarchy: the stack of containers. What the concept of subsidiarity invoked means 
that the EU should get involved only where they cannot cope. Commission 
proposals to effectuate any shared competence require the approval of the Council 
of Ministers and also the European Parliament. For instance, the Council could 
reject a common soil protection policy. Much as the counterarguments, the un-
successful Commission proposal was couched in terms of subsidiarity. In light of 
attitudes expressed during the consultations on the Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion, Faludi (2012a) surmises that proposal concerning territorial cohesion 
would share the same fate.  
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Even where reactions to the Green Paper are positive, the frame of reference is 
the existing government hierarchy. For instance, the Committee of the Regions in 
its reaction to the Green Paper and also in its White Paper on Multi-level Govern-
ance (CoR 2009) states that 
“…the principle of subsidiarity… prevents decisions from being re-
stricted to a single tier of government and which guarantees that policies 
are conceived and applied at the most appropriate level. Respect for the 
principle of subsidiarity and multi-level governance are indissociable: 
one indicates the responsibilities of the different tiers of government, 
whilst the other emphasises their interaction”. 
Because of the presumed relation with multi-level governance, Faludi also dis-
cusses that concept. The view above is of course prefaced upon the existence of a 
government hierarchy. However, according to Hooghe and Marks (2010) there is 
also type II multi-level governance relating to specialised jurisdictions assuming a 
potentially endless field of intersecting spatial relations. Here, subsidiarity makes 
no sense which leads him to exploring underlying notions of space and territory: 
Dangschat (2006) arguing that our understanding of space needs to move to con-
ceiving of it as a jumble of overlapping networks; Davoudi and Strange (2009) 
advocating a relational conception of space, one that depends on the processes and 
substances that make it up; and Healey (2010, p. 32) pointing out that “…those 
with a ‘stake’ in what happens in a place are not only local residents, or citizens, of 
a specific administrative-political jurisdiction”. Subsidiarity takes no account of 
this multiplicity of arenas and identities. In working to maintain the existing 
nested hierarchy, it is a conservative principle prefaced upon a view of governance 
in boxes. Faludi asks whether the production of democratic legitimacy as a mo-
nopoly for territorial representatives is equally problematic.   
Faludi (2012b) sharpens the analysis of multi-level governance. The concept is 
ambiguous. It often refers to vertical relations between bodies of government 
within a multi-level polity, but sometimes also to the more comprehensive process 
called governance. A related and for the purposes of this paper more important 
point reflecting the critique also of subsidiarity is that the multi-level governance 
literature fails to problematise the underlying “territorialist” metageography. Ter-
ritory is seen as a container with fixed boundaries. Invoking a term of Murphy 
(2008), what is underlying is a particular metageography shaped by the map of 
sovereign states.  
Without actually invoking the term, Scholte (2000, p. 47), too, castigates this 
metageography as “territorialism” according to which “…macro social space is 
wholly organized in terms of units such as districts, towns, provinces, countries 
and regions. In times of statist territorialism more particularly, countries have held 
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pride of place above the other kinds of territorial realms…” However, connections 
exist that are at least partly detached from this territorial logic. Thus, in global 
transactions, “place” is not territorially fixed, territorial distance is covered in 
effectively no time, and territorial boundaries present no particular impediment. In 
the terms of the famous work by Castells (1996), the “space of flows” overgrows 
the “space of places”. Social space cannot, therefore, be understood in terms of 
territorial geography alone.  
Murphy points out also that the current “cartography of social life” – Scholte’s 
territorialism – is the outcome of historic choices, “…of efforts to achieve particular 
ends with concrete implications for how things are organized and how people 
think about the world around them”. He continues by claiming that the “…ter-
ritoriality of the European state system helped to produce a geographical imagina-
tion that privileges the ‘nation-states’ over river basins, vegetation zones, popula-
tion concentrations, or other possible regionalizations…” As a historic phenome-
non, territorialism is thus subject to change. Indeed, Scholte (2000, p. 57) says that 
“…we need to develop an alternative, non-territorialist cartography of social life”, 
one that does not treat jurisdictions with their fixed borders as the inevitable 
building blocks, the metageography that Murphy criticises.  
Faludi continues to show that the original inspiration of authors dealing with 
multi-level governance was not as “territorialist” as its invocation, for instance in 
the Committee of the Regions “White Paper on Multi-level Governance” (2009), 
and discusses also the programmatic article “Regions Unbound: Towards a New 
Politics of Place” by Amin (2004). The butt of Amin’s criticism is a “new regional-
ism”. The latter is based on the mainstream view of cities and regions as territorial 
entities. However, “cosmopolitan forces” produce a world of cities and regions 
without prescribed or proscribed boundaries, so Amin is proposing a relationally 
imagined regionalism freed from the constraints of territorial jurisdiction. 
Some of the authors discussed invoke another concept, territoriality, according 
to a classic, by Sack (1986), spatial strategy of controlling resources and people by 
controlling area. This is often equated with state territoriality, but government 
control is diminishing. Also, Hajer (2009) diagnoses a waning of the “territorial 
synchrony”, discrepancies between geographical reach of the scale of problems. 
Much policy work takes place next to or across established orders. This shifts 
policy-making to an “institutional void”.  
If states no longer have a monopoly on territoriality, does this mean that terri-
toriality as such is no longer a useful concept? Burgess and Vollard (2006) deny 
this, but unbundling territoriality may mean non-territorial forms of organisation. 
Faludi relates this to arguments about soft spaces. The emphasis is on scales other 
than those of the statutory planning system and on planners co-operating with 
others actors. Allmendinger and Haughton (2009, p. 3) reviewing literature on 
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rescaling argue that this reflects “…an apparent predilection for promoting new 
policy scales, initially at least through the device of fuzzy boundaries”. 
Drawing on more literature from the field of human geography, Faludi (forth-
coming) pursues the themes of territorialism and territoriality. The studies dis-
cussed are innovative in conceptualising new territories criss-crossing existing 
jurisdictions leading to an “unusual regionalism”, the term coined by Deas and 
Lord (2006, p. 1850). New imaginative configurations straddle national and re-
gional boundaries challenging territorialism and state territoriality.   
Indeed, there is much “soft” planning at cross-border and transnational scales 
implying a new understanding of territory and of territoriality. The Commission 
promotes this and under the authority of the European Council co-ordinates its 
relevant policies and brokers agreements on concrete actions under the Macro-
regional Strategy for the Baltic Sea Area, an example of “spatial rescaling” (Stead 
2011, p. 163) and of soft spatial planning. If Metzger and Schmitt (2012) signal a 
tendency to veer back towards hard planning, then this only goes to reiterate that 
there is a complicated interplay between the two forms of planning. 
From all this, Faludi concludes that territory is not necessarily a fixed entity 
enveloping all major aspects of social and political life. Rather, it is the object of 
negotiation and compromise, open to multiple interpretations. He points out its 
exciting aspect. In his work on “European Union and the Deconstruction of the 
Rhineland Frontier”, Loriaux (2008, p. 2) says “…that the terms we use so casually 
are rooted not in ‘nature’, but in the poetic imagination…”, adding that this “…has 
the effect of freeing deliberation and debate from a vocabulary of obfuscation and 
reveals... the contours of a Europe that is… about deconstructing frontiers so as to 
bring to light a civilizational space that is… intensely urban, cosmopolitan, multi-
lingual, and less hierarchical than in the past”. The challenge that flows from this is 
to visualise networks and flows through the use of “scenarios” and “fuzzy maps” 
(Davoudi – Strange 2009, p. 38) representing untidy and complicated situations 
prevalent in the twenty-first century. At the same time, hard spaces are en-
trenched. They are the bases for the organisation in wards, constituencies, elec-
toral districts and so forth, of democratic decision making. For as long as there are 
no convincing alternatives, hard spaces will remain building blocks for territorial 
organisation, the forthcoming paper concludes.  
Two Worlds Coming Together? 
The first 2013 issue of Regional Studies is about “Regional World(s): Advancing the 
Geography of Regions”. The editorial states: “Traditional views of regions as 
bounded, homogeneous units have been mostly rejected… [T]he 1990s witnessed 
new relational tunes in the deliberations on regions” (Jones – Paasi 2013, p. 2). 
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Above, the paper has already alluded to such “relational tunes”. This section elabo-
rates on the theme, discussing the papers by Varró and Lagendijk (2013) and 
Harrison (2013). First, though, the introductory paper makes a point that is true 
not only of regions but of all territorial entities: “[R]egions of whatever scale or 
definition are neither immediately self-evident as geographic designations nor 
meaningful outside the historical context and theoretical frame in which they are 
used” (Agnew 2013, p. 7). It distinguishes between various modes of usages of 
regions: macro-regions, functional regions, aggregates of lower-level units without 
much regard to national boundaries (geographical areas of similarity), regions as 
entities involved in the “hollowing out” of national economies and regions as the 
vehicles articulating sub-national identities. Agnew identifies seven disputes over 
regions and several “regional logics” and warns against swapping the nation-state 
for the region as another one-size-fits-all alternative geographical unit of account. 
Varró and Lagendijk (2013) cast light on the “relational turn” alluded to above 
by invoking the influential example of England's “regional problem” and regional 
governance. The “relational versus territorial debate” opposed “radicals” to 
“moderates”. The debate gained poignancy under New Labour. To the disappoint-
ment of “radicals” its regional policy was based on a container-view of socio-
economic processes prompting Amin and others to sharpen their critique of new 
regional and urban policies based on the assumption that, quoting Amin (2004, p. 
36) in the paper already referred to, a defined geographical territory exists out 
there over which local actors have control. Referring to the pamphlet “Decentering 
the Nation: A Radical Approach to Regional Inequality” (Amin – Massey – Thrift 
2003), Varró and Lagendijk (2013, p. 21) point out that instead of “...the misleading 
celebration of self-reliant regions that actually remain entangled in centrally or-
chestrated policy frameworks, radicals have called for a more radical revision of 
the UK's territorial management. [They – A. F.] have asked more specifically – and 
evoking traditional, that is, Keynesian regional policy measures – for a dispersal of 
state investments, including public sector institutions”. Whilst sympathising, 
“moderates” as against this “…have pointed out the need to be aware of the per-
sisting relevance of the territorial dimension of socio-spatial processes” (Varró – 
Lagendijk 2013, p. 21) which amounts to a combination of territorial and relational 
readings. They conclude: “’Territorially embedded’ and ‘relational and unbounded’ 
conceptions of regions are complementary alternatives, and actually existing 
regions are a product of a struggle and tension between territorializing and de-
territorializing processes” (Varró – Lagendijk 2013, p. 21).  
However, “radicals” do not absolutely deny this point and so the critique 
levelled against them by “moderates” is not wholly justified. The gap between the 
camps is narrower than it seems. Both see regions as social constructs. Making a 
point that will not be explored further, Varró and Lagendijk identify differences 
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between the respective meta-theoretical frameworks. This is of more general im-
portance, and the way forward “...is to think of regions, and by extension, of all – 
thus also national – spaces as constituted relationally through agonistic struggles” 
(Varró – Lagendijk 2013, p. 27). 
Harrison (2013), too, discusses how concepts of regions have been invoked in 
UK regional planning. Having outlined the controversy between “territorially em-
bedded” and “relational and unbounded” conceptions, he states the purpose of the 
paper which is to demonstrate how the required “key diagrams” employed in the 
UK Labour Government's “new regional policy” reflect the move from a one-
dimensional to a polymorphic view of regions. He notes globalisation’s challenge to 
existing national arrangements and also the identification by Jessop, Brenner and 
Jones (2008) of the dimensions of the “polymorphy” of social enquiry, territory, 
space, scale and network. 
All this concerns North West England being at the object of endeavours to build 
more networked regional governance influenced, as it has been, by academic 
thinking. Indeed, after the failure at the hands of voters of regional devolution, the 
draft strategy was couched in terms of networks based on the premise of a “space 
of flows”, this being reflected in the priority given to networks over Jessop et al.’s 
other dimensions of socio-spatiality. Thus, most lines on the map refer to connec-
tivity; the focus is on growth corridors; prominence is given to international gate-
ways; city-regions are presented as pivotal points; and the key diagram disregards 
political or administrative units. Even the regional boundary is inaccurately 
defined as enveloping areas not part of the administrative region. 
When it came to the official strategy, the weighting had shifted. The regional 
boundary was prominently – and accurately – represented, and boundaries around 
political and administrative units forming part of the city regions were hard. Flows 
were less prominently illustrated, and so were gateways: the airports and ports 
linking the region to the world. “[N]etworks and their institutional forms have 
clearly been unable to escape the existing territorial mosaic of politico-administra-
tive units and their boundaries in the way that relationists argue they can” (Harri-
son 2013, p. 68). 
This was not the end of the story because another key diagram for the 2010 
Integrated Regional Strategy appeared. Referring to the Jessop et al. paper, Harri-
son (2013, p. 69) claims that it is “...configured around the four first-order dimen-
sions of socio-spatial relations”. Thus, the territorial boundary of the region 
remains evident, but the three areas not formally part of it are once again included; 
scale has been brought back into the equation in that sub-regions are made visible, 
but in a way that makes them compatible with the existing territorial mosaic; net-
works remain evident, but loose more of their power. Notions of virtual flows 
disappear; connections beyond the region are no longer to city regions but to cities 
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and regions; flows are truncated at the regional boundary and only lip service is 
being paid to international connectivity. Harrison diagnoses this as simultaneously 
less relational and less territorial.  
All of which leads to an important question. To what extent are emerging con-
figurations conducive to producing more effective spatial policies? For in the North 
West, if the emphasis on networks in 2006 and then on territory and networks in 
2008 was driven by a clear rationale and certainty amongst key actors as to why it 
was necessary to adopt this approach, the move to less territory and less networks 
in 2010 appears to be driven by a politics of increased uncertainty over the eco-
nomic, political, and institutional future of regions (Harrison 2013, p. 71).    
What the study shows is how and why the dimensions of socio-spatial relations 
as identified – territory, space, scale and network – were dominant, emerging or 
residual at each moment. The conclusion to be drawn is that what is needed are 
“…ever-more-complex configurations in order to make emergent strategies com-
patible with inherited landscapes of socio-political organization, and for new con-
ceptual frameworks capable of theorizing the ‘inherently polymorphic and multi-
dimensional’ nature of social relations” (Harrison 2013, pp. 71–72), a reference to 
Jessop, Paasi and Jones. 
Harrison does not elaborate on these “ever-more-complex configurations”, but 
his diagnosis chimes well with the observation of territorial governance, of which 
territorial cohesion policy is, or would be, an example becoming complex. Speaking 
to spatial planning, Allmendinger and his various co-authors writing on soft spaces 
and the equivalent kind of planning are sure to concur, and so are elected repre-
sentatives having a hard time dealing with opaque arrangements mirroring the 
“polymorphic and multidimensional” social relations addressed above. How can 
they give an account of their dealings to their constituencies? Political representa-
tives and the whole bureaucratic apparatus of states and their sub-units are firmly 
embedded in – and dependent on – the “territorial mosaic”.  
Conclusions 
Faludi (2012a) broaches the issue of territorial representation in relation to con-
cepts of deliberate democracy. The fundaments of representative democracy: vot-
ing in territorial constituencies, come into focus. As Schmitter has been quoted in 
the introduction, there is little discussion of this in the relevant literature. Rehfeld 
(2008, 1st ed. 2005, p. ii) is an exception in asking: “Why do democratic govern-
ments define political representation in this way? Are territorial electoral con-
stituencies commensurate with basic principles of democratic legitimacy?” Refer-
ring to US congressional districts, he argues that “...the use of territory for repre-
sentation has never been explained or justified... In never having been contested... 
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territorial constituencies qualify as an arbitrary institution...” (Rehfeld 2008, 1st 
ed. 2005, p. xv). It gives arbitrary preference to territorial interests. His alternative 
is large random constituencies. 
This has received some commentary. Urbanati and Warren (2008) confirm that 
the concept of constituency is an underdeveloped subject. Like Rehfeld they note 
that “…the idea that constituencies should be defined by territorial districts has 
been all but unquestioned until very recently” (Urbanati – Warren 2008, p. 396). 
They concur also that “...when represented geographically, the people are only a 
‘demos’ insofar as their primary interests and identities are geographical in nature. 
Non-geographical constituencies... are represented only insofar as they intersect 
with the circumstances of location, producing only an accidental relationship 
between democratic autonomy... and forms of representation” (Urbanati – Warren 
2008, pp. 396–397). Examples of constituencies underrepresented are racial, class, 
and gender groups. So “…geography-based constituency definition introduces an 
arbitrary criterion... Exclusion works not on people... but rather on issues, since 
residence-based constituencies define residency-based interests as most worthy of 
political conversation and decision...” (Urbanati – Warren 2008, p. 397). Action 
groups and NGOs that play a role in notions or deliberate democracy articulate 
such interests of underrepresented constituencies.  
All this does not mean to say that Rehfeld’s proposal, worked out in his book in 
some detail in the form of a scenario of what US politics would be like with ran-
domly assigned rather than territorial constituencies, has found broad acceptance 
amongst constitutional theorists. Thus, Schmitter (2009, pp. 487–488) agrees that 
the “…territorial base of representation has become so habitual that it is almost 
never questioned”. He also concurs with his asking: unless citizens “…are choosing 
within collective units that are meaningful to them, why should the winning repre-
sentatives be regarded as legitimate... Territory may have seemed the ‘natural’ and 
logistically effective solution in the past, but why continue to rely so exclusively 
upon it in the present” (Schmitter 2009, p. 488). However, he says he finds the 
inferences concerning the positive effects of Rehfeld’s proposals of random con-
stituencies implausible. In his summary, he states: “Territorial constituencies are 
still considered the most appropriate and reliable political units within which 
interests and passions should be aggregated, despite evidence that these units ha-
ve changed considerably due to greater mobility and that citizens identify strongly 
with functional or ideational constituencies” (Schmitter 2009, p. 489). 
The above shows that issues that have agitated participants in the relational vs. 
territorial debate have at least been raised by constitutional theorists. If the rela-
tional/territorial debate has resulted in something like a draw, that is less true of 
the discussion around representation in terms of territorial constituencies. How-
ever, at least the existence of critics shows that, when faced with the limitations 
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which decision-making in fixed territorial units imposes, one need not raise one’s 
hands in desperation. Merely bemoaning the short-sightedness of politicians and 
their constituencies, and at the same time questioning the virtues of representative 
democracy behind closed doors for failure to deal with the complex territorial 
reality seen by experts, is not the only alternative. It is appropriate to question 
arrangements for articulating the “will of the people”. 
A last point is to reiterate that arrangements to deal with “polymorphic and 
multidimensional” social relations in a territorial-cum-relational reality are sure to 
remain opaque. Requesting simplification for simplification’s sake is illusionary. 
Manipulating scale alone through government reform, increasing or decreasing 
territorial decision-making units does not solve much either. Territory is a multi-
ple. Fixed territories are like islands in a sea of malleable ones, with its wave pat-
terns incessantly re-modelling the islands’ shorelines. To remain within this meta-
phor, territorial cohesion may thus refer to how well activities on islands harmo-
nise with each other, but it may equally refer to how well their inhabitants manage 
their relations with the seas surrounding them. The pursuit of territorial cohesion, 
so conceived, means conceptualising, and re-conceptualising relations, amounting 
to ever-new images, not in lieu of territories as islands but as counter-points obvi-
ating their apparent isolation. 
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 THINKING THE SPACE(S) OF EUROPE BEYOND THE 
“SPACES OF FLOWS”/ “SPACES OF PLACES” DIVIDE: 
A VIEW FROM THE EUREGIO MEUSE–RHINE 
Krisztina Varró 
Introduction 
Today it appears commonsense that European Union (EU) integration has always 
been “inescapably spatial” (Richardson 2006, p. 203). However, this spatial dimen-
sion remained for a long time rather neglected by scholars. It was only from the 
late 1990s, parallel to the forming of a more explicit (although informal) European 
spatial policy, that attention turned to “[t]he spatial novelty of Europe” (Rumford 
2006, p. 127). Several scholars became inspired by Castells’ (1996) twin concepts 
of “spaces of flows” and “spaces of places”, and proposed to think European1 space 
in terms of these two “spatial logics”. Furthermore, many have noted that EU inte-
gration and EU spatial policies more specifically promote “spaces of flows” at the 
expense of “spaces of places”. As it has been argued, this bias is problematic 
because it will enhance uneven development; dealing with questions of redistribu-
tion would necessitate a territorial approach.  
Such arguments sound plausible given the fact that EU integration has 
enhanced mobilities of various sorts, i.e. the “spaces of flows”, but has not brought 
about a corresponding regulatory spatial policy at the scale of the EU concerning 
the “spaces of places”. The aim of this paper is to show, however, that these at first 
sight insightful metaphors are not helpful for problematising spatial development 
in Europe. Flows, networks, territories and places are not distinct “kinds” of 
spaces; they are all constituted by (institutionalised) relations. Accordingly, we 
should focus on how EU policies shape such relations, and how resulting govern-
ance practices help constitute new spaces. 
In order to develop this argument, first the paper briefly discusses the “spatial 
turn” in studying Europe, and how thinking in terms of “spaces of flows” and 
“spaces of places” has gained ground in the literature. In a second step, this view is 
put under critical scrutiny and will be substituted by a relational perspective on 
space. Subsequently, the usefulness of this approach is illustrated at the example of 
                                                                        
1 In discussing scholarly views, this paper aligns with the common practice of equating the 
EU with “Europe”; in fact, it is “EUrope” that is meant. 
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the Dutch–Belgian–German Euregio Meuse-Rhine. The paper concludes by arguing 
that the key task for scholarship concerned with European space(s) remains to 
study the inherently political processes through which space-constituting institu-
tional relations are being transformed “in” Europe.  
Studying European Space: “Spaces of Flows” and “Spaces of Places” 
Initially, given the dominance of political scientists and International Relations 
scholars in the field, the focus of much EU-related research was on the changing 
role of the nation-state, and the conceptualisation of the EU as a polity, federal 
system or supranational state (Rumford – Murray 2003). Later, the forming of EU 
spatial policy in the 1990s generated more and more scholarly interest in the spa-
tial dimension of European integration. From the 2000s, scholars from various 
disciplines, including geography, sociology, and spatial planning started to prob-
lematise the spatiality of Europe. This gradual “spatial turn” challenged the domi-
nant view of EU space as the aggregation of pre-existing national territories and 
drew attention to transnational aspects of Europeanisation (Rumford 2004, 2006). 
Arguably, one of the most influential sources of inspiration for conceptualising 
the space(s) of Europe became Castells’ work, which by then had already had great 
impact in the social sciences. Briefly, Castells (1996) proposed to theorise urban 
transformation in the context of the global “information age” through the concepts 
of “spaces of flows” and “spaces of places”. For Castells, “spaces of flow” captures 
the translocal connectedness brought about by the revolution in information 
technology. Given that capitalism came to be driven entirely by information, the 
metaphor of flows is the “expression of processes dominating our economic, 
political, and symbolic life” (Castells 1996, p. 412). “Spaces of places” are in turn 
the local spaces of every-day experience. Ultimately, Castells argues that contem-
porary cities are shaped by the articulations of these two competing spatial logics. 
Castells’ perspective (or its re-interpretation) became introduced to the 
emerging scholarship on European spatial development and policy in the early 
2000s, through a number of discourse-analytic studies. The key proposition of 
these studies was that EU spatial policies attempt to create shared meanings of 
European space which then inform policy-making at different levels, become insti-
tutionalised, and actually come to shape European spatial reality. Hajer’s (2000) 
analysis of Common Transport Policy and of the trans-European Transport Net-
work (TEN-T) programme2 was one of these studies, and perhaps one of the first 
                                                                        
2 The TEN-T programme, introduced under the Treaty of Maastricht and further defined by 
the European Commission in 1996, set the aim to guarantee optimum mobility and 
coherence between the various modes of transport in the Union. 
 Krisztina Varró 138 
to use the metaphor of “flows”.3 Hajer’s key argument is that the conceptual lan-
guage used by policy-makers in the case of the TEN-T programme, which he 
characterises as the “Europe of Flows” discourse, frames in fundamental ways in 
which European space is conceived (and acted upon). The key supposition of this 
discourse is, amongst others, that “enhanced mobility and connectivity are both 
ways to strengthen the global competitiveness of Europe and ease out uneven 
geographical development within Europe” (Hajer 2000, p. 138, emphasis original). 
Similarly, Richardson and Jensen’s (2000) analysis of the European Spatial De-
velopment Perspective (ESDP) – which actually does refer to Castells, but not to his 
twin concepts – notes that polycentricity, efficiency and accessibility are central to 
the ESDP’s vocabulary and its competition-oriented understanding of European 
space. 
In their subsequent writings (Jensen – Richardson 2001; Richardson – Jensen 
2003), and finally in their seminal Making European Space: Mobility, Power and 
Territorial Identity (Jensen – Richardson 2004), Jensen and Richardson explicitly 
suggest that Castells’ ideas concerning “spaces of places” and “spaces of flows” can 
be usefully transposed to the study of European spatiality. In particular, they re-
mark that “the EU spatial policy discourse, with its twin key issues of polycentricity 
and infrastructure networks, is a classic manifestation of the embedded tensions 
between mobility/flow versus nodes/places” (Jensen – Richardson 2004, p. 218). 
Furthermore, Jensen and Richardson note that the “Europe of flows discourse” 
legitimises the notion of multi-speed Europe which in turn contradicts the idea 
that infrastructure enables balanced development. On the whole, they argue that 
the hegemonic discourse of a “monotopic” European space implies a neglect of 
places, in particular in rural peripheries. 
The normative message of Making European Space was further elaborated by 
Richardson’s (2006) article on the spatial policy knowledge advanced by the ESDP 
and operationalised by the European Spatial Planning Observation Network 
(ESPON). Richardson argues that the idea of a single European space, made pos-
sible by “seamless networks enabling frictionless mobility” (p. 204), is a thin sim-
plification with potentially dangerous consequences. In particular, he argues that 
this idea privileges economy-oriented, networked forms of strategy making out-
side (or neglecting) the realm of territorial government. These worries are echoed 
by Herrschel (2009), who notes that the emphasis on networked urban (metro-
politan) spaces implies a lack of concern with the connectivity and economic 
opportunities of spaces “in-between” these networks. 
                                                                        
3 While Hajer (2000) makes neither mention of Castells nor of “spaces of places”, given the 
clear impact of Castells’ network society thesis among (Dutch) planners at the time (see 
e.g. Hajer – Zonneveld 2000), it seems plausible to assume that he was inspired by Castells. 
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More recently, the analysis of EU spatial governance in terms of flows/places 
was elaborated on further by Holder and Layard’s (2011) study focusing on the 
evolution of territorial cohesion policy. Holder and Layard argue that the tension 
between a “Europe of flows” and a “Europe of places” that characterised the trajec-
tory of European spatial planning in the 1990s (as described by Jensen and 
Richardson) has been observable in the case of evolving territorial cohesion policy. 
However, they suggest that the development of the territorial cohesion concept 
and the funding attached to it has potentially opened up the way for “spaces of 
places” to become more relevant. To back this argument, the authors refer to in-
tensifying “place-making activities” across the EU as exemplified by the establish-
ment of macro-regions and European Groupings on Territorial Co-operation 
(EGTC). 
Towards a Relational View of European Space(s) 
Although certainly not exhaustive, the previous section’s overview allows us to 
make some conclusions on how the notions of “spaces of flows”/ “spacesof places” 
have tended to be applied in studies on EU spatial governance. “Spaces of places” 
have been understood as territories and as the repository of (some of) the fol-
lowing: identity, self-empowerment, democracy, redistribution. In contrast, 
“spaces of flows” have been regarded as networked/non-territorial spaces at a 
higher-scale, geared towards efficiency and competitiveness. Furthermore, schol-
ars converged not only on seeing these spaces to be in tension; they have also 
tended to normatively favour the former over the latter.   
Even though at first sight compelling, the understanding of European space as 
shaped by the conflicting logics of flows and places is problematic as it suggests 
that flows (networks) and places (territories) are distinct “kinds” of places. How-
ever, as Massey aptly noted, “territory and flow do not exist in pure form, nor are 
they static. Moreover, each is involved in the formation of the other” (Massey 2008, 
p. 328). This is obvious if we consider that the implementation of the TEN-T 
programme relied on a Council Directive4 that required member states to harmo-
nise their high-speed rail systems in order to create an interoperable European 
network. Flows thus cannot be promoted in isolation from territorially framed 
interventions. Similarly, places and territories can be understood as the effects and 
the outcomes of networks between actors (Painter 2008). On the whole, all spaces 
are constituted by social relations (see e.g. Allen et al. 1998, Massey 2005).  
                                                                        
4 Council Directive 96/48/EC of 23 July 1996 on the interoperability of the trans-European 
high-speed rail system. 
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This relational view has been surprisingly absent from scholarship on Euro-
pean spatiality (although see Clark – Jones 2009), partly because it has tended to 
be mistaken for an approach that claims that “everything is fluid” and that neglects 
aspects of power. However, a relational perspective on space recognises that social 
relations always imply power relations and stresses that social relations can 
solidify (institutionalise) into more-or-less stable practices. In fact, it is by “forget-
ting” the underlying, relational processes of institutionalisation that we tend to 
think in terms of distinct spaces. Importantly, a relational view also entails that 
weshould not (cannot) assume straight away that any spatial form is “good” or 
“bad” (Massey 2008). Instead, the task is to expose the power-laden, political pro-
cesses in which particular relations are forged and not others. 
In the next section, the usefulness of this perspective is demonstrated through a 
brief account of the development of the Euregio Meuse-Rhine. As a cross-border 
region thathas commonly been labelled as a “laboratory of European integration”, 
the case of this Euregio is a good entry point to reconsider the way we think about 
European space(s). 
The Euroregio Meuse-Rhine: Badly Connected Places  
in the Shadow of Flows? 
The Euregio Meuse–Rhine (EMR)5, established in 1976 as one of the first Eure-
gions, includes regions from three countries: from the Netherlands, the Southern 
part of the Province of Limburg; from Germany, the “Regio Aachen”; and from 
Belgium, the Provinces of Limburg and Liège, and the German-speaking Commu-
nity. For most of history until the nineteenth-century emergence of nation-states, 
the area of the EMR was politically fragmented. Later, the threefold division by 
national borders was reinforced by homogenising nation-state interventions that 
increasingly separated border region populations (Knippenberg 2004). The 
underlying motivation for setting up the EMR was to dismantle the hindrances 
represented by state borders, in order to more effectively address the challenges of 
structural change that the whole area faced following the decline of coal-mining 
from the 1970s (Figure 1). 
European Union policies have clearly played a great role in the development of 
the EMR. Following the launch of the Community Initiative INTERREG in 1990, the 
Euregio acquired the formal juridical status of a foundation (under Dutch law), in  
                                                                        
5 The discussion in this section draws on the study of policy documents and on interviews 
conducted (between February 2009 and October 2012) in the Netherlands, Germany and 
Belgium with policy-officials, with staff members of a consulting company involved in 
cross-border projects, and with the staff of a transport company. 
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Figure 1. The administrative composition of the Euregio Meuse-Rhine 
Source: http://www.euregio-mr.com/nl/euregiomr 
order to comply with funding requirements. In the course of successive program-
ming periods, cross-border co-operation has become more structured and inten-
sive, leading to investments in various fields that have greatly contributed to tack-
ling unwanted border effects. Today, the region likes to present itself as lying “at 
the heart of Europe”. This characterisation seems fitting given that the EMR is lo-
cated amidst the core urban areas of North-Western Europe and has good 
transport connections to them via high speed services from Liège and Aachen, 
through the Liège and Maastricht–Aachen international airports, and through 
highways. 
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However, the development potential stemming from this favourable location 
could still not be fully exploited because the region lacks internal coherence. Public 
transport connections at a lower scale within the immediate tri-border area are far 
from satisfactory; cities of the border region tend to be better connected to their 
national hinterlands than to adjacent cities across the border. Furthermore, 
discrepancies between national fiscal and juridical regulations, pension schemes 
and health insurance systems persist, just as language barriers. These factors 
explain the low percentage of cross-border commuters; in 2004, only 1.3% (22,000 
people) of the EMR’s population worked across the border (EMR n.d.). 
At first sight, the EMR’s development trajectory seems to fit well the previously 
discussed perspectives on European space. The emphasis on flows in EU spatial 
policies has manifested itself in the region through the advent of high-speed train 
services that connect the two major cities to main metropolitan areas of Europe. 
However, these transnational connections seem to have left the “rest” of the region 
“in the shadows” (Richardson 2006, p. 212). Furthermore, although INTERREG 
funding has undoubtedly contributed to reduce the negative effects of borders, the 
programme has tended – just as across the EU more generally (see Dühr et al. 
2010) – to favour co-operation networks that are scarcely transparent, and pro-
jects that have increasingly focused on economic objectives and barely (if at all) on 
spatial integration.  
Yetas indicated above, thinking in terms of a tension between networked 
“spaces of flows” and territorial “spaces of places” does not allow for a sufficiently 
nuanced and dynamic account of the EMR’s spatial development. In particular, 
such a view is ill-equipped to fully acknowledge the related aspects of politics and 
scale. Also, as the case of the EMR shows, we cannot label flows as “bad”; rather, 
the (political) question is which flows are desirable at what scale, and which insti-
tutional relations would facilitate that? In order to address this question (amongst 
others), we should attend to how actors entangled in constantly evolving, power-
laden scalar relations negotiate their spatial agendas, and how this inherently po-
litical process brings about new governance practices with what spatial effects. 
The following brief discussion of recent developments in the EMR will illustrate 
the added value of this perspective. 
To begin with, such a perspective would allow recognising how actors “speak-
ing for” territories and places at different scales have played a key role in 
improving the regional public transport system, and the cross-border railway net-
work in particular, in order to facilitate intra-regional mobility in the EMR. The 
apparent sluggishness of this process has been certainly due to the fact that the EU 
and national authorities have remained more in the background, leaving the initia-
tive to local and regional actors. In the Netherlands, for example, governmental 
rescaling shifted the responsibility for regional public transport, including cross-
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border regional railway connections, to provinces and city-regions; the Ministry of 
Transport has seen itself as a mere facilitator. It has taken a while for local and 
regional actors to come to terms with these responsibilities and especially to 
bundle efforts and negotiate with local and regional partners across the borders 
over how to overcome physical, conceptual, commercial and institutional hin-
drances. In the second half of the 2000s such efforts gained momentum and there 
is wide consensus that the INTERREG programme has played a great role in this by 
stimulating contacts across borders and by helping to build trust. 
However, as one respondent formulated, while “anyone understands that you 
have to connect two cities through rail”, it is much more difficult to agree on an 
integral (spatial) development of the region, or even to put it on the agenda. Efforts 
in this direction have been done by the EMR Foundation that proposed a strategic 
vision for a faster pace and closer co-operation in the EMR in 2007 (EMR 2007). 
This vision has been further elaborated under the heading of “EMR 2020” (clearly 
aiming to connect to “Europe 2020”); parallel to that, the possibilities of estab-
lishing an EGTC have been explored. As to the latter, one of its appeals has been 
that it allows national (federal) governments to become members which allows for 
more flexible solutions to cross-border problems. However, these higher-level 
authorities have shown little appetite for becoming involved in such a construct. As 
to the EMR 2020 initiative that has resulted, following lengthy negotiations 
involving the partner regions and higher authorities, in a strategic document con-
taining the development objectives for the EMR. The document (EMR, 2013) pre-
sents an ambitious strategy focusing on five “core themes” (economy and innova-
tion; labour market, education and training; culture and tourism; health care; 
safety) and four “transversal themes” (mobility and infrastructure; sustainable 
development; territorial analysis; representation of interests and region-market-
ing). However, it remains to be seen how the strategic objectives will be realised, 
especially given the fact that the EMR 2020 strategy has been elaborated sepa-
rately from the (“INTERREG V”) Operational Programme for the 2014–2020 pro-
gramming period. A key explanation for this is that the INTERREG programme area 
is not coterminous with (it is bigger than) the territory of the EMR Foundation, and 
the Monitoring Committee of the INTERREG programme and the Executive Com-
mittee of the EMR (which acts as the Managing Authority for INTERREG) are, in 
spite of their partly overlap, two bodies with different agendas. While under the 
auspices of EMR 2020 actors were (more) concerned with the integrated develop-
ment of the region, the Operational Programme has been “filled in” strategically, 
without little or no such concerns. 
Considering the European Commission’s Draft Legal Framework for the cohe-
sion policy of 2014–2020, and the proposals concerning cross-border co-operation 
in particular (EC 2012), it appears that efforts aiming at the integrated develop-
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ment of the EMR will not be able to count on a more straightforward EU backing 
either. While the requirement of concentrating co-operation efforts on a limited 
number of themes and corresponding investment priorities might help to prevent 
the fragmentation of funding (and is welcome by local actors), it is not likely to 
facilitate an integrated approach, rather the contrary. Furthermore, the Commis-
sion has put the emphasis on economic growth and has refrained from stipulating 
that cross-border regions should (at least partly) focus on themes for which addi-
tional investment priorities (for example concerning cross-border labour mobility 
or co-operation in the field of education) have been defined for cross-border re-
gions. As a result, it is to be expected that just as in the period 2007–2013, the EMR 
Operational Programme for 2014–2020 will prioritise the stimulation of innova-
tion in the region’s key economic sectors and the support of small and medium 
enterprises. On the other hand, there are also signs that the ambition of the EMR 
2020 strategy to make cross-border co-operation less dependent on EU funding is 
not just wishful thinking: for example, recently an information point for cross-
border workers was set up by Dutch and German local and regional authorities 
without EU funding. 
On the whole, this brief discussion showed that the development of the Euregio 
Meuse-Rhine cannot simply be explained by the distinct “spatial logics” of EU poli-
cies. Instead, we have to examine how EU policies have contributed to reconfigur-
ing (or forging new) scalar-institutional relations, and how this has simultaneously 
had various “flow-”, “network-”, “territory-”, “place-” (and other spatial) effects “in” 
the region. This approach will result in a more nuanced account of the EMR than 
that simply picturing it as a group of “badly connected places in the shadow of 
flows”. 
Concluding Remarks 
The aim of this paper was to contribute to discussions about the conceptualisation 
of European space(s). While the “spatial turn” in EU studies has resulted in valua-
ble insights on how to think the spatiality of Europe, it was argued here that (some 
of) its conceptual vocabulary has been problematic. In particular, conceptualisa-
tions of European space(s) in terms of a tension between “spaces of flows” and 
“spaces of places” have suggested that space takes distinct forms. As the case of the 
Euregio Meuse-Rhine showed, however, we should not uncritically rely on com-
mon-sense concepts of “flow”, “network”, “territory” or “place”. Rather, we should 
regard these as imaginaries that are mobilised (explicitly or implicitly) and en-
acted by actors involved in different relational practices. By taking relational prac-
tices as our objects of analysis we can arrive at a more nuanced critical perspective 
on the making of European space(s) than scholars initiating the “spatial turn”. In 
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particular, we can better highlight the multiple tensions inherent in different 
actors’ spatial agendas. Furthermore and significantly, such a relational view al-
lows acknowledging learning processes and self-empowerment, and the creative 
space-constitutive potential of local and regional initiatives. Europeanisation is 
thus regarded less in terms of “impact” and more as an open-ended process (see 
Clarke – Jones 2009). This open-ended perspective is crucial for being able to 
conceive of a serious notion of European spatial politics and of spatial change. Or 
to adapt Massey’s remark on space (2005, pp. 11–12) to Europe: “For the future of 
Europe to be open, European space must be open too”. 
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 REGION BUILDING AND STRATEGIC PLANNING 
IN A WORLD OF RELATIONAL COMPLEXITY 
Anssi Paasi 
Introduction: Regions as “Social Constructs” 
It is common to underline in the current social science literature how the “region” 
is back on the agenda. Comments on the importance of regions have been bour-
geoning and new interpretations on the meanings of this concept are constantly 
put forward (Entrikin 2008, Paasi 2011, Jones – Paasi 2013). The concept of 
“region” has been understood in these writings in many ways and, contrary to the 
rather straightforward empirical understandings in terms of regional governance, 
traditional planning practice or regional statistics, it is not always clear what the 
“region” means in contemporary academic debates. In general, researchers seem to 
perceive regions currently not as given, neutral backdrops for social processes and 
relations (as the region was understood in the traditional regional studies), but 
rather as social constructs that exist in and through such social processes and rela-
tions and that have relatively “soft” borders. Also, as social constructs they are 
seen as processes that are perpetually becoming rather than being fixed end 
products. Hence, regions are seen as historically contingent entities that are per-
petually in the making and may become institutionalised (and de-institutionalised) 
as part of wider social and material practices, relations and frameworks of power.  
This paper will examine the ongoing debate on the nature of regions as an 
example of the perpetual tendency to rethink spatial categories. It serves as a con-
ceptual introduction to the paper that will be presented by the author in the Pécs 
conference in June 2013. This introduction will particularly look at the rise and 
“practical” limits of so-called relational thinking that has been significant in human 
geography since the 1990s and that has become significant in planning theory 
during the last 10–15 years. Therefore, “practical” refers here above all to strategic 
regional planning activities. This paper firstly tries to interpret why spatial con-
cepts seem to be in a perpetual transformation and scrutinises as an example how 
the conceptual basis of geography has developed in the long run. It will then look 
at the rise of so-called relational thinking in geography and the spread of such 
ideas into planning circles. This contribution to the Pécs conference will scrutinise 
how such thinking manifests itself in concrete strategic regional planning carried 
 Anssi Paasi 148 
out by Regional Councils in Finnish provinces. A further aim of the conference 
presentation is to study how the planners responsible for writing and/or co-ordi-
nating the making of these plans understand the character of regions and their 
boundedness. 
“Rethinking the Region”: A Never Ending Road? 
The ideas of region and regional transformation have recently become significant 
in political science and International Relations studies (often in the case of supra-
state regions), but geographers in particular have for a long time struggled to 
develop new theoretical tools for understanding what the region is and how it can 
be best conceptualised for various academic and empirical purposes. 
Figure 1 displays the complexity of this theoretical enterprise (Paasi 2011). 
New conceptualisations of region presented by scholars seem to be constantly 
competing with old ones in what I have labeled here as the space of keywords. This 
is of course partly related to the fundamental premise of scientific research that is 
the efforts to develop novel and innovative ideas to make sense of the world. The 
space of keywords is continually related to wider academic and societal contexts 
and contains simultaneously currently established and accepted core concepts and 
interpretations, older residual concepts that have lost their power in academic 
markets and new emerging concepts that may some day become part of the core. 
Similarly the concepts of region always resonate with wider philosophical ideas of 
space, social practices, interests of knowledge and even broader geohistorical 
events, think-tanks and institutions. In the discursive space of keywords some 
categories dominate the debate and conceptual perspectives in research, while 
some other categories become gradually residual. At the same time new concep-
tual solutions are pushed onto the  agenda by scholars. It thus seems that David 
Harvey’s comment presented in the context of the rise of neoliberalism also illus-
trates in broader terms the struggle to redefine the conceptual basis of regional 
studies: “For any way of thought to become dominant, a conceptual apparatus has 
to be advanced that appeals to our intuitions and instincts, to our values and to our 
desires, as well as to the possibilities inherent in the social world we inhabit” 
(Harvey 2005, p. 5). 
Why are Regions Back on the Agenda? 
The key context for region-building and regionalisation processes has typically 
been the modern state. New interest in regions reflects the transformations and re-
scaling of the state that is occurring because state authorities strive to trim state 
spaces into a more competitive shape in the globalising world (Zimmerbauer – 
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Paasi 2013, Moisio – Paasi 2013). State governments have not simply downscaled/ 
upscaled regulatory power, but have rather tried to “institutionalise competitive 
relations between major subnational units as a means to position local and 
regional economies strategically within supranational (European and global) cir-
cuits of capital” (Brenner 2004). As an expression of this process we have wit-
nessed both efforts to devolve power but also to amalgamate administrative re-
gions in the name of effectiveness and saving costs. 
As a much used term, “new regionalism” summarises these tendencies and sug-
gests that the new roles of the region are based on its institutional position in the 
broader field of political, cultural, economic and administrative processes. It also 
implies that the territorialities of the present capitalism are best regulated and 
governed in/through the decentralisation of socio-economic decision-making and 
associated policy implementation to regional institutions, frameworks and sup-
ports. New regionalism and its claims for devolution have been underpinned by 
three interrelated concepts that interpret the region as a focus for (1) the for-
mation of common economic strategies in the context of globalization, (2) new 
forms of cultural identification, and (3) the mediation co-present in social interac-
tions (Raco 2006). Accordingly new regionalism is characterised by multidimen-
sionality, complexity and fluidity. It involves a variety of state and non-state actors, 
who often come together in rather informal multi-actor coalitions (Söderbaum 
2003). Such tendencies are also clear in coalition based strategic planning pro-
cesses that have become typical in the EU, for example.  
Regions are thus not fixed entities. Rather they are constructed and recon-
structed in uneven ways that defy assumptions of hierarchical scalar neatness and 
often reflect struggle around such key themes as what are the identities and 
boundaries of such units (Paasi 2013). While regions have become significant 
around the world they have remained vague and contested categories in research. 
In addition, a gap between relatively fuzzy concepts and empirical research can be 
noted. There are many obvious backgrounds for such a gap. Firstly, region-building 
processes have been studied in many fields (for instance, geography and IR 
studies) and scholars more often than not tend to reproduce existing concepts by 
simply bringing them into new research contexts. Secondly, scholars have looked 
at many scales which implies partly diverging views on the regional impacts of 
globalisation, partly disciplinary practices. For geographers the region is normally 
a unit between the national and local scale whereas IR scholars typically link it 
with supra-state regions (Paasi 2009 and 2012). One group of scholars looks at 
networks of global city regions or polycentric urban regions and see them as pri-
mary nodes and motors of global economy. Further, some scholars are interested 
in the development trajectories of “old” regions that have become institutionalised 
along with history and may be important for regional identities. However, increas-
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ing attention is paid to “new” regions (e.g. cross-border regions, development 
zones) that are typically created via regionalisation for certain purposes and may 
be rapid products of political decision-making. Such regions are often examples of 
active efforts towards regionalisation.  
The Rise of Relational Thinking 
The 1990s witnessed a rapid rise of relational views on spatiality and the concept 
of relational, open region quickly become crucial among the core spatial concepts. 
Geographers inspired by such approaches suggested that rather than separate 
spatial entities – bounded regions, places or territories – it is networks and rela-
tions that matter in contemporary globalising world characterised by flows, inter-
actions and cultural hybridity. Massey (1993, p. 66), the key figure in the rise of 
relational thinking, proposed that “instead of thinking of places as areas with 
boundaries around them, they can be imagined as articulated moments in net-
works of social relations and understanding”. Allen at al. (1998, p. 17) pushed this 
idea further in their analysis and argued how “regions are, after all, constituted by 
their place within a wide constellation of forces and events, some of which may 
come out of long-running shifts in the structure of the region or society more 
generally, whilst others take their shape from a particular historical moments”.  
Relational thinking is a fitting example of the power of concepts and ideas to 
create “truth effects” that is of their potential to create “facts”, their own objects 
and realities as part of their articulation. This was obvious in the fact that rela-
tional views soon became significant also in planning theory that became now less 
pre-occupied with land-use issues and more interested in different conceptualisa-
tions of space and place. Respectively Healey (2006), for example, suggested that a 
“relational complexity” approach to regional governance means eschewing notions 
of inherent territorial coherence or integration, as well as univocal concepts of 
territorial identity. Graham and Healey (1999, p. 625) criticised the practice of 
planners to consider places and cities in an unproblematic way “as single, inte-
grated unitary, material objects, to be addressed by planning instruments”. In their 
discussion about the city, Graham and Healey suggested how it is often depicted as 
a “jigsaw” of adjacent, contiguous land use parcels, tied together with infrastruc-
ture networks and laid out within a bounded, Euclidean, gridded plain. They cited 
Massey who suggest that places are “articulated moments in networks of social 
relations and understandings”, rather than “areas with boundaries around”. 
Discussions on the features of relational, open spaces and bounded territorial 
spaces often occurs on a general, ontological level and may be far away from social 
practice where the absolute, relative and relational dimensions of space become 
fused in material practices (e.g. boundary-making for some specific purposes), 
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representations (e.g. mapping) and lived meanings (e.g. affective loyalties, regional 
identities) (cf. Harvey 1973, 2009). 
Relational and Territorial Perspectives on Region: Boundedness as a 
Problem 
An increasing number of researchers have noted that it is unhelpful to look at the 
spatialities of the contemporary world as an either or issue, i.e. either as relational 
or territorial bounded units and suggest that we should recognise the contextuality 
of such boundedness and the inherent relations of power. They remind us that 
both regional and state borders can sometimes be insignificant and sometimes 
more persistent. Yet relational thinkers do not argue that borders will never ade-
quately define a region or that they can be assumed not to be important. Rather 
they mean that borders should never be taken unquestionably as adequate defini-
tions (Allen et al. 1998, p. 137). Indeed, Massey (1995) has a long time ago made 
some reservations on the nature of borders and proposed e.g. that borders do not 
embody “any eternal truth of places” but rather are drawn by society to serve par-
ticular purposes. Further, “borders are socially constructed”, i.e. they are as much 
the products of society as are other social relations which constitute social space. 
Also, borders cut across some other social relations that constitute social space 
(e.g. gender, ethnicity). They matter in that the place where people live may de-
termine potential services, tax levels, or indeed, which boundaries they are 
allowed to cross. Finally, borders are an exercise of power and can be constructed 
as protection by the relative weak (i.e. as a form of resistance identity) or by the 
strong to protect the privileged position they have. 
The recent resurgence of the region and the rise of the so-called “new regional-
ism” have clearly displayed this (Paasi 2009). Many regions are territories de-
ployed within processes of governance, and hence are made socially meaningful 
entities. Many geographers and planners have rejected essentialist understandings 
of societal phenomena, but the state is still partly operating as if the world consists 
of essences. Regions and territories show how absolute, relative and relational 
aspects of space became fused in material practices (boundary-making), represen-
tations (mapping) and lived meanings (affective loyalties to territorial units) 
(Harvey 2009, p. 174). Regional borders may also have a constitutive role not only 
in the governance and control of social action, but also for social identities and 
spatial ideologies. The importance of identity narratives produced and reproduced 
by regional activists and advocates, the media and governmental bodies force us to 
study such politics of distinction rather than denying their existence. Such politics 
of distinction can be seen in the significance of regions and boundaries as catalysts 
for regionalist movements, ethno-territorial groups and planning strategies. 
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The whole issue of borders and boundedness seems to be partly on a wrong 
track. Why should regional borders be understood as fixed and prohibiting (which 
may often be the case with state borders)? Why are they not seen as institutions 
and symbols that may or may not have a role to play? This view is not in conflict 
with the basic elements of relational thinking which conceptualises spaces as open, 
multiple, and relational, unfinished and always becoming. Similar ideas were put 
forward 20 years ago when scholars accentuated the perpetual becoming of re-
gions and wider spatial divisions of labor in which the institutionalisation of re-
gions occurs (Paasi 2011). Researchers have later asked what is actually changing 
in the world of interaction and networks, is it “borders” or “social institutions” that 
are constitutive of the institutionalisation of the regions (Paasi 2009). Actually the 
ideas of border and boundedness represented by many relational thinkers have 
implied the rather old fashioned and stereotypic ideas of borders as strict lines 
between socio-spatial entities. In new regional geography as well as in political 
geography borders are increasingly understood as institutions and symbols that 
are spread widely in societies and even outside of them, i.e. they are not located 
merely on “borders” (Paasi 2012). Respectively, rather that automatically denying 
the importance of borders (whether this is done on normative political or onto-
logical grounds), it is crucial to study how boundedness, borders and bounded 
entities “exist”, are narrated to exist and how such units are used in social practices 
and discourse and, further, what kind of power relations ground this use. 
It may therefore be suggested that both the recognition and rejection of the im-
portance of borders, and more generally boundedness, should not be seen one-
sidedly as a theoretical or empirical question but both at the same time. Further, 
both the social context and the social practice in question make a difference. 
Therefore the theorizing of relational thinking, borders and bounded spaces 
should be done contextually and in relation to specific social practices. I will end 
this intro with two citations based on the interviews that I carried out among the 
planners operating in Finnish Regional Councils. They show that relational 
thinking and boundedness of the regions may exist concomitantly. 
“Well, of course, in the administrative sense we are forced to think (regions) as 
very bounded… And as you mentioned networks, so networks cannot be restricted 
to any administrative border. But in some bureaucratic figures, I take as an exam-
ple the issue of structural funds, so we have to stay in certain prescriptions. But I 
see the future absolutely so that borders will lose something of their meanings” 
(Male planner). “When we do not at all operate with those behind the border and 
they have their own systems and like that, so always when such administrative 
regional divisions and all kind of divisions are made, this begins to limit terribly 
the ideas on what is our sphere of operations. So that they are doing their own 
things in that region, so let’s do our things here because we do not belong together. 
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Our “sandboxes” do not actually come across anywhere. Thus these, sort of narrow 
interpretations disturb me a lot, i.e. where we do put into practice some 
programmes and what is the area of structural changes or what is the area of co-
operation. You can’t draw this on a map and say that this is now your area of co-
operation” (Female planner). 
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 BASIC PRINCIPLES OF THE CONSTRUCTIVIST THEORY 
OF SPACE AND THE CREATION OF REGIONS  
László Faragó 
Introduction: Constructivism and Space  
Space is not a concrete physical element of reality which can be completely known 
and described by natural scientific methods. Space is essentially an “eternal and 
infinite non-entity” (to paraphrase Kant), a condition of possibility that can only be 
observed in the multiple forms of appearance of other beings, from aspects 
adjusted to their nature. Interpretations of space – which can be understood as 
organising principles and “historical a prioris” derived from society and its various 
knowledge constructions – evolve in space and time with the accumulation of 
experience (practice, communication) and the transformation of knowledge. Inter-
pretations and concepts of space, approaches and cognitive methods determine day-
to-day practices, influence the discourse on space (politics and public speech as 
well) and contribute to engendering and shaping spaces. 
The constructivist creation of space resembles the Marxist “production of 
space” (Lefebvre 1991) since both share the belief that space is a “complex social 
product”, a socially constituted historical system of relations. However, our rela-
tionship to reality, the extent to which it can be known, is different in the construc-
tivist approach. This is clearly expressed in Heidegger’s ground-breaking theory of 
space (2001) as being-in-the-world (Dasein), according to which everything exists 
ab ovo in the world (in space) to which we humans also belong. Each sense of 
space, each reception of spatial information is an interpretation at the same time. 
Each (spatial) community organises information, creates its spatial images, de-
scribes its situation and defines its vision according to its own views (existence, 
perspective).  
The application of new interpretive frameworks/models with which to under-
stand space is thus more than justifiable. This does not indicate replacing old 
theories with new ones but an extension of our choices. Relatively new results are 
available in epistemology and other fields such as neurobiology, knowledge 
sociology, cybernetics, which allow for a novel interpretation of space and spatial 
systems. Radical constructivist ideology has permitted the exploration of space 
from new/different aspects. In philosophy and psychology, constructivism is first 
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and foremost an epistemological and cognitive theory of knowledge and learning.  
Its philosophical roots can be traced back to the Antiquity. Put in concise terms, the 
epistemological debate is focused on an opposition between materialist and 
idealist ideas, empiricism and rationalism, and more recently, realism and con-
structivism. According to materialists, realists and empiricists, the criteria of truth 
and scientificity are based on the objective world which implies that only one true 
representation, one objective statement, one “truth” applies to a given thing (cor-
respondency theory). According to these (world)views, there is a fundamental 
distinction between objective and subjective, the subject and object of cognition.  
What follows in this paper is a brief discussion of major theses of construc-
tivism with a view to their application in spatial theory. Space will thus be inter-
preted as a social product constructed by various relations (structures) during the 
process of observation. Furthermore, the concept of autopoiesis will be suggested 
as an appropriate means for distinguishing and explaining the functioning of spa-
tial systems. In the final section of this paper, I will provide examples of practical 
application of constructivist ideology with regard to Hungarian regionalism and to 
the construction of regions in Hungary.  
Cognitive Processes and Autopoeisis 
According to the representatives of constructivism, thinking and reason play an 
active role in the process of cognition. This does not imply a negation of external 
reality, but acknowledges the thesis articulated by many thinkers throughout 
centuries (antique sophists, Edmund Husserl, Niklas Luhmann, Thomas Luckmann, 
Michael Polányi, etc.) that there is no knowing without a knower. Our perception 
and comprehension (depth, extent) of reality is correlated to our ability to ask 
questions about it. 
In the constructivist model (Figure 1) the knower and the object of cognition 
constitute a unified whole in their environment, but the actor (knower) has the 
initiating role. The observer constructs – to paraphrase Max Weber – orders 
reality. The perceived reality is grounded in the existence of the knower who is its 
sole measure (Cassirer 2000). The interpretive framework developed in a 
historical-cultural context plays an active role in the process of cognition. On the 
basis of a certain presumption, we select the object of our observation and the 
means and tools through which we observe it impact our self-constructed 
knowledge. The cognitive process means cognitive adaptation to the environment. 
Due to our internal structural determination, we hear and comprehend only what 
is adjusted to our cognitive and emotive reality (Maturana 1978). In general, we 
accept the things we find useful (plausible and viable) and which serve the 
fulfilment of our objectives and constitute the basis of our actions. 
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Figure 1.  The constructivist deductive model of the cognitive process 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Constructivism is methodologically empiricist in the sense that it contrasts its 
knowledge constructions with the external environment, while constantly testing 
those in the experiential (perceived) world. Therefore, the veracity of the theories 
is “justified” by their coherence with experienced lifeworlds, their capacity of 
problem resolution and through their comparison with other experiences. The 
popular statement of Paul Karl Feyerabend (2002) is interpreted in a specific way: 
“anything goes” that works. In our day-to-day lives, the only reality (necessity) is 
the Self and our common world which our knowledge must reflect. Man constantly 
tests his knowledge construction in the experiential and the communication world, 
and in case he does not find it useful or suitable, he modifies it. 
Autopoiesis1 (self-organisation, self-construction) and structural coupling (drift) 
form the basic hypotheses of constructivism. Life is a self-sustaining, self-
organising process which reproduces itself through its own operations, its de-
pendence upon its environment is only relative and indirect, filtered through its 
own structure. Social units (e.g. local society) can also be regarded as autopoietic 
self-organisations (Luhmann 2006), as self-modifying functional systems which 
have their own historically evolving operational order and may develop structures 
that are compatible with their environment and only perform programmes and 
actions which their environment allows.2 The structural connectedness of closed 
systems does not imply insensitivity towards the environment, it is a selection 
                                                                        
1 To generalise the statement made by Humberto R. Maturana (1981) concerning living 
organisms, self-referential, closed systems are called autopoietic. The elements consti-
tuting such systems shape and construct themselves (poeisis). Unity stems from the 
system. They are able to observe and describe their self-identity. 
2 The relationship between the EU and its member states may be interpreted this way. Most 
member states filter and adapt the impacts of the EU according to their historically 
evolving identity, their own internal operational order. 
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mechanism through which certain effects enter, while others are rejected in order 
to permit the system to interpret only those opportunities which are vital for its 
functioning. The external effects/connections influence the internal development 
and behaviour of structurally connected closed systems and do not induce direct 
changes (Figure 2). 
 
Figure 2. The functioning of the deterministic open system (A) and the 
autopoietic closed system (B) 
Legend:  Input X will always be transformed into Output Y, if the aim is 
not self-reproduction. If Effect T is compensated, the system rejects it. 
If Effect Z is adapted and transformed by the system this may result in 
various changes (z1-n) according to the prevailing situation. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
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The World is What You Pour into it3: The Spatial Constructions 
of Experiencing the World 
What is space? How is it formed? What and how do we investigate in spatial re-
search? In light of the above, my response is that the object of our investigations 
(observations) is not an absolute (physical) space which exists independently from 
us, but the spatiality of our approach to things and the process through which 
society constructs space, the way we conceive and cope with our spatial existence. 
We interpret space as a construction of various linkages and relations, their struc-
ture, system and architecture which we are determined to shape. While sociologists 
observe the behaviour of society, its groups, institutions, organisations, economists 
investigate the production, allocation and consumption of economic goods, etc., 
spatial sciences investigate the formal/spatial manifestation and structure of these 
social constructions, and planners-developers attempt to transform these according 
to their perception of space. They basically investigate the object of the mother 
sciences from a different approach, from another cognitive subject’s perspective. 
The specific professional sciences and sectors operate on the basis of self-
constructed paradigms, laws, operational principles. From a territorial approach, 
the intentionality of the cognitive agent is different, his attention is focused on 
other objects, and on the other hand, we investigate the same phenomena through 
the collective historical consciousness of spatially separated population groups 
(participation), and from their perspective (on the basis of their practical utility 
and the functions fulfilled in their lifeworlds), the interventions always take place 
in the concrete lifeworld, in a given place. 
The nature of the existence of space is not physical; space is always constructed 
in the existence of other things, during the process of observation. It is not that space 
which also serves as an external efficient cause impacts the experienced and 
cognoscible space, on the contrary, we humans are active parts and constructors of 
it. Through our actions (as we move from one place to another, as a company pro-
duces a new product, as the state organises public administration, etc.) we con-
struct spaces that become the object of cognition and during the cognitive process, 
we create new constructions with our space-oriented thinking, our ideas and inter-
pretations of space. A circular causation, a dialectical interaction exists between 
existence and cognition.  
Relational space composed of linkages, interactions, interrelations – along with 
the possibility of the spatial manifestation of the relations – is generated by the 
linkages as we experience and interpret them (Faragó 2005). As Doreen Massey 
(1995, p. 1) has argued “...space as relational means both that it should not be con-
ceptualised as some absolute (that is to say, pre-existing) dimension and also this 
                                                                        
3 Taken from a Dreher (Hungarian beer brand) commercial of 2011. 
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it is actually constructed out of, is a product of, the relations between social phe-
nomena. We actively create space (time-space, time-spaces) in the organisation 
and living of life”. Due to this cognitive situation and interpretation we refer to 
these as social spaces or spaces of reason.4 The action situation, the actor’s status 
and orientation determine the space which manifests itself to him/her. The various 
spatial structures are dimensions which embody the human intellect and the col-
lective praxis. The meaning, the sense of this constructed space can be deciphered 
in light of the intention of the constructor. Our interpretations of space become 
collective interpretations during the process of communication. Our thoughts or 
conversations about space concern the spatial constructions of our society, the 
spatial order of our reality. On one hand, space constitutes the dimension of our 
existence, the manner and framework in which we and the things around us exist, 
on the other hand, it is an order, a structure which permits us to comprehend the 
world, in light of which we organise our knowledge and our lives. The spatial 
world manifests itself to us according to our experiences of a reality in whose con-
struction we actively participate. We construct our own lifeworlds, we decide what 
constitutes reality for us, and we attribute certain values to the “facts” that we are 
willing to accept. 
Our knowledge about a given entity (an object, an event) contributes to our 
knowledge of the manifestation of space. Space is a prerequisite for existence, 
shared understanding (historical a priori perspective) and orientation in the world. 
This order (system, structure) does not exist the way physical entities do, it consti-
tutes the possibility condition of existence, the manifestation of the content. There is 
no “single valid” knowledge of space; the detected relations are but attributed 
meanings which evolve in history and with culture and to which the knower inten-
tionally “adds” something (through interpretation) in a concrete context. We are 
able to comprehend the order of the world through the structures inherent in 
thinking. 
A concrete spatial unit (e.g. settlement, region, civil community, company in a 
given approach) is a self-constructed and self-created entity. The various elements 
may either form a coherent whole (due to their concrete relationships, common 
functions or operation) – and thus constitute a common space –, or, in the opposite 
case, they do not constitute an individual spatial unit. The operation of each 
unit/system is (spatially) distinct and unique, and it remains an autonomous entity 
                                                                        
4 The term “space of meaning” has been identified by Husserl in various ways ranging from 
the “field of phenomenological immanence to transcendental consciousness. For Heideg-
ger, it is simply the world opened up by Being. For Husserl, (…) “idealism refers to the fact 
that the ‘space of meaning’, the intelligibility that is presupposed in all logical enquiry, can 
be clarified only by recourse to the intentional structure of conscious experience.” (Crowell 
2001, p. 173) 
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until its existence (operation, activities) does not conflict with the environment to 
such an extent that abolishes the relations and functions which assure their co-
existence (cohesion). 
A spatial construction operates as an autopoietic system provided that it is ca-
pable of self-construction, self-sustainment and adapting external effects for the 
sake of its own replication and development. For instance, self-organised/cohesive 
social groups or economic units centred on culture, identity, communication, com-
mon problems or objectives select external effects according to their own (emer-
gent) needs and possibilities. Self-reference and self-development is of primary 
importance, serving for them as the basis for the evaluation of environmental 
impacts. Social systems do not have a direct causal, deterministic relationship with 
their environment, nevertheless, their functioning must be compatible with it. 
Empty, unmarked space is just a set of possibilities, a possibility condition. The 
cognitive subject, the observing individual (or group of planners) recognises the 
relationships between elemental units and performs the division of space (exist-
ence/the world) constructed by these units. When we denote something, it be-
comes spatially differentiated. Spatial segregation, differentiation is the primary 
factor which precedes identity, through demarcation, we separate a thing from 
other things which we exclude (Luhmann 2006). The interpretation of space is 
always related to a set of elements, things which are being experienced, imagined 
and distinguished. 
The world is too complex for us to fully comprehend and explore it. The 
multiple relations constituting space cannot all be taken into account at the same 
time, nor examined during a research project, therefore we create subsystems on 
the basis of their functions and internal relationships, we disrupt the interdepend-
ence. On the basis of the observed disparities, space can contain a large variety of 
places, sets, fields, categories of existence. To distinguish these from one another, 
human beings (local society, group of planners) select (create) the distinctive 
caesuras and frames of reference which also change in time. 
A critical question is how to distinguish the various types and levels of space 
(fields, sets, systems) and how to interpret their relations and linkages. The 
boundaries of the distinct units are spatial mental boundaries created through 
their separation from the environment (internal coherence). The basic spatial 
units/components are constructed by the relations (cohesion) and functions 
(operation, approach) which compose them. They cannot be divided any further on 
the basis of the old criteria, the functioning of the border-creating internal at-
tributes ceases on the border, and the relations external to this system will be of a 
totally different nature.  
According to Luhmann’s “thesis of operational closure” (Luhmann 2006, chap-
ter 3) systems establish their boundaries via their own operations, and this is the 
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only way for us to observe them as a system. The functional differentiation and 
specialisation of modern societies (Durkheim) produces functional and localisable 
spaces (whose existence is characterised by geographical specifics). They have a 
structural outward connection with their environment and to other autopoietic 
systems within it. On the basis of their functions, individual elements constitute a 
specific/unique closed system of relations. These may be considered functionally 
autopoietic subsystems distinct from their environment due to their internal cohe-
sion, logic and their own functioning which provide the basis for their differentia-
tion. The intensity and frequency of internal relations is always higher than in the 
case of external ones. Internal relations are relatively more concrete, while exter-
nal ones are so-called framework relations which are adapted in function of the 
system’s internal operation. The planes or fields of interaction between the various 
spaces fulfil an important role from the aspect of differentiation and prevent ex-
ternal determination. If the system serving as the object of our cognition disposes 
of multiple external determining factors, it will not constitute an autonomous spa-
tial unit from the given perspective. Complex spaces become differentiated them-
selves. For instance, a local social space may be comprised of political, economic 
and other spaces depending on how subsystems establish their own boundaries or 
how it is perceived by an external (secondary) observer. The individual ap-
pearance or visualisation of a spatial entity (e.g. a concrete place or industrial clus-
ter) depends on its internal closure. If the internal relations and operations are not 
strong and there is a lack of individual priorities and objectives, the result will be 
their dissolution in a larger spatial unit or system. 
As Heraclitus proclaimed, panta rhei – one can never inhabit the same space 
twice. The world is always unfinished, to contradict the statement of Fukuyama 
(1994), history has no ending. One is not born into a finished, unchanging world 
(space) waiting to be explored. Through being born into the world and through our 
later actions we ourselves contribute to shaping the world, since we do not live in 
an external space, we live and act as a part of space. The world is what we make of 
it, space manifests itself to us as we experience and occupy it. 
All of us organise our own world, create our real and virtual spaces, through 
which we may contribute to the creation and shaping of space. Through our 
actions and inventions, we occupy places in space and we create relations, i.e. we 
create space. Inevitable relationships and interactions exist between the elemen-
tary places and events due to their simultaneous occurrence. These are constantly 
changing, emerge and decay, which transforms the intelligible space which is 
manifest in the relations. More permanent subsystems exist as well which take a 
material form or become institutionalised. The resulting realities will be experi-
enced, comprehended and evaluated by each individual in a different manner, and 
this unique interpretation will affect our future actions and spatial constructions.  
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The differing operations, various types of relations and functions provide the 
basis for the differentiation between natural/physical, economic, social and other 
spaces, which leads to closure and the possibility of structural connectedness. 
Effects from the outside world, the system’s environment (irritations) may either 
be regarded as neutral or else, they need to be rejected and adapted. 
The Example of “Creating” Regions  
Based on examples of “region-building”, I will suggest a practical application of the 
theory of constructivism and the way in which it differs from traditional ap-
proaches. Generally speaking, in a simplified form, there are two approaches to the 
interpretation of the region and regionalisation:  
 Ontological, scientistic, empiricist approach: The objective of realists, mate-
rialists, Marxists is to institutionalise regions on the basis of an assumed 
„objective” reality, an existing, cognoscible, describable entity such as the 
geographical space of economic co-operation. 
 Epistemological, idealist approach: From a rationalist, constructivist, socio-
logical-anthropological, linguistic-constructivist perspective, the existence of 
regions cannot be directly linked to experiential factors, they are the product 
of human intellect and our use of space – they are social constructions, 
interpreted entities. They are a product of human differentiation, a construc-
tion of the observer, which become a part of the collective consciousness or 
institutional system through communication. 
According to the first interpretation, the region is an ab ovo entity (it “exists” in 
nature, in the economy, etc.), therefore, it can be explored, and on the basis of the 
accumulated experiences (cause), institutional regions have to be created (effect). 
The representatives of this approach tend to regard the natural environment (e.g. 
geographical landscapes) or in a Marxist perspective, socio-economic processes 
(e.g. the area of inter-firm co-operation) as an appropriate basis of regionalisation. 
The logic of this empiricist-analytic region making is the following: exploring first 
of all the substance of a region, theory organisation, demarcation of borders which 
reflect reality (the explored regularities) and finally, institutionalisation. This case 
clearly shows that the existing knowledge, values or interests provide the basis of 
selection between the possible facts. Therefore, even if a certain “element of 
reality” (e.g. cultural identity, economic cluster) is selected as the basis of regional-
ism through empirical analysis, this will still reflect the value choice of the cogni-
tive subject, and the resulting region will be a social construct.  
Contrary to the scientist-empiricist analytic approach, regions are not existing 
entities, they are not something “out there”, they are social constructions (Allen et 
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al. 1998, Paasi 2001). Regions are not mental images or abstractions of reality, but 
an interpretation of space, a sense-giving endeavour, the realisation of a symbolic 
idea of space. The objective of regionalism is the transformation of space-perception, 
the creation and legitimisation of the idea of the region, regionalisation is the pro-
cess of the construction of concrete spaces (territory) and institutions which are 
coherent with this cognitive image. The process of regionalisation is not based on 
direct experience, the endeavours and intentionality of the actor (state, local com-
munity, network of subcontractors) play the primary role. The intent, preferences 
(faith), objectives, orientations are determining factors eliminating a cause-and-
effect relationship. Regionalism and regionalisation are functioning on the basis of 
teleology and not causality. The adequate territorial level and unit of the provision 
of functions and tasks (self-governance, organisation of public administration, eco-
nomic competitiveness) is selected on the basis of symbolic (consciously devel-
oped/manipulated) space-perceptions. Geographical localisation, the demarcation 
of borders and institutionalisation come only afterwards. Our space-perception 
coherent with our intention is the first to differentiate, this is followed by the 
creation of the concrete element of reality. If society’s members and economic 
stakeholders accept and use the newly created structure, if it functions in day-to-
day life, it means that practice justifies the original intent and space-perspective. 
But even if it does function in reality, if it does satisfy practical needs, that still does 
not mean that other spatial divisions would not work, maybe in a more efficient 
way even. The pertinence of a new regional spatial construction is confirmed if the 
created vision takes into consideration our images of reality and the existing limits 
as well, and is able to integrate various fields of knowledge and social reflections. 
Popper’s falsification and the circular learning process guarantee the objectivity of 
social science. 
Keating’s dual concept of space is based on an interaction between physical 
space (territory) and social constructions. “Regions are seen… as social construc-
tions, within territorial boundaries. The territorial element… is fundamental; the 
social economic and political content of regionalism varies according to the 
outcomes of political process” (Keating 1998, p. 13). In Keating’s view, regions are 
open political social systems and not “self-contained societies”. In a constructivist 
approach, regions and their borders are created on the basis of ideas, functions 
and operations which are generated and shaped by society, the physical, geo-
graphical environment gains relevance only in this context. In the absence of these 
factors it is impossible to talk about regions as autonomous spatial units.  
Several regions may function as closed autopoietic systems. This requires the 
existence of a certain degree of autonomy (capacity for action and self-sustain-
ment) and self-reference (identity). The region must not be in a deterministic 
relationship with its environment, it has to be capable of selecting and adapting the 
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external effects. Autonomous cultural regions or functional districts (e.g. automo-
tive industry cluster) are such systems. In the absence of these conditions, regions 
may still be social/political constructions but no longer autopoietic. Hungarian 
regions are political constructions which do not function as autopoietic systems, 
but are mere spatial tools of higher-level power games (systems). 
Ideologies, Ideas and Political Efforts in Hungarian Regionalism  
During the 20th century, the Hungarian system of public administration was basi-
cally transformed on three occasions: following the two World Wars and during 
the régime change of the 1990s. The first occasion meant a radical transformation 
of the spatial structure, while during the latter two periods, ideological, political 
changes played the major role. In addition to the reforms related to these major 
breaking points, ideas about the modernisation of the spatial structure and the 
creation of regions emerged continuously in Hungary, however, no major changes 
occurred in practice, since the created regions had only narrow functions. 
The regionalisation efforts post-World War II and during the 1990s were moti-
vated by ideologies with similar roots imported from abroad. European new 
regionalism is not a far cry from Marxist views, nor does it differ from the Soviet 
theories of “rayoning”. Both are based on the hypothesis according to which the 
nature of the economy has changed and the new mode of production is charac-
terised by a different spatial structure, and the adjustment of the spatial institu-
tional system (superstructure) to this structure will contribute to socio-economic 
development. In the Soviet Union, attempts at the methodical establishment of 
production complexes resembling the current spatial clusters were visible already 
in the 1920s and the role of natural assets was emphasised. According to the defi-
nition of Kolosovskij (1969), production complexes are co-operations between 
firms of various sectors which are concentrated within a limited territorial unit. A 
multi-level planning and economic system (in harmony with the current principles 
of regionalisation) was elaborated in the Soviet Union (macro regions, oblasts, 
federal republics), and to ensure a balanced territorial development, these were 
intensely developed in order to facilitate the integration of less developed (unex-
ploited) regions into production (Krajkó 1987). The co-ordination of inter-sectoral 
developments was regarded as an important function of territorial management 
(Sjamuskin 1977). 
Following the genesis of the idea of the “Europe of regions” in the 1980s, the 
question of the internal spatial division of European countries was partially 
transferred to the arena of international discourse. European new regionalism as 
an EU policy was not simply a level of statistical analysis, but normative regulation 
(regulative idea), a perspectival requirement (sollen) and a political strategy for 
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the countries aspiring for accession. Regionalisation was considered by many as a 
neoliberal policy instrument which contributed to the restructuring of member 
states and the weakening of national governments. A degree of uncertainty arose 
due to the fact that the European Union did not dispose of an unambiguous model 
for the region, as a matter of fact, the ideal image underwent constant evolution, 
and national practice tended to deviate from the prevailing ideal according to each 
given context. Regions developed in the process of Europeanisation “…exist at first 
perhaps in the namings, strategic definitions and proclamations of politicians, 
foreign policy experts and researchers, and may then be gradually transformed 
into representations on maps and texts… and into sets of social… institutions, prac-
tices and discourses” (Paasi 2001, p. 13). 
As in other countries, the territorial restructuring (regionalisation) of the sys-
tem of power encountered several obstacles in Hungary. The governments’ loss of 
power due to supranationalism and regionalism was compensated by their in-
creased role in the establishment of regional institutions (financing, delegating 
officials) which enabled them to maintain their leadership and power positions. 
The new NUTS 2 regions were not the result of a natural evolution and a bottom-up 
building process, but were created due to external pressure (coming from the EU) 
and governmental intervention, and they only served the fulfilment of minimal 
functions required by the EU. It is idle to talk about regional identity in Hungary, 
the existing regional relations constitute heterogeneous spaces. The NUTS  2 plan-
ning/development regions created in 2004 had only one common objective: how 
to acquire as much external funding (support) as possible. However, the allocation 
of the obtained funds among counties, microregions and settlements put an end 
even to this community of interests.  
In the 1990s, science and higher education played the major role in the adapta-
tion of the idea of regionalism and the region and its introduction into the institu-
tional world in Hungary. Initially, utopias and positive symbolisms were attached 
to new regionalism and examples of the direct association of decentralisation with 
regionalism are present even in our days. The various actors of the discourse 
tended to associate the concept of the region with meaning and functions coherent 
with their own concepts of space. Regions have not become new factors of power, 
previous stakeholders (governments, sectors, counties, political parties, etc.) have 
used them as new arenas for the articulation of their private interests. The 
established regional institutions were in fact “nationalised” by the government, 
they have never enjoyed even a relative autonomy. The EU Commission has not 
considered them to be effective partners either.  
Similarly to other countries of Europe, the high hopes surrounding regionalism 
have not been justified in Hungary either. The internal structure of the enlarged 
European Union contains nation states and interest groups that represent indi-
Basic Principles of the Constructivist Theory of Space… 167 
vidual member states, furthermore, the administrative division of the various 
countries has been largely re-relegated to the realm of internal national issues. 
Faith in regionalism has decreased in the European Union following the turn of the 
millennium, due to which the main driving force of Hungarian regionalisation has 
also waned. NUTS 2 regions have even been deprived of their formal role asso-
ciated with EU funding, their institutional functions are gradually being eliminated. 
In harmony with the current European trends, counties with historical traditions 
(NUTS 3) and metropolitan areas have been granted once more the leading role in 
spatial development. 
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 TRENDS AND POLICIES IN STRATEGIC SPATIAL 
PLANNING AND REGIONAL GOVERNANCE IN EUROPE1 
Louis Albrechts 
Introduction: Setting the Context 
Europe is facing major developments, challenges, and opportunities which are 
affecting its cities and regions, either directly or indirectly. They include: growing 
complexity (rise of new technologies; changes in production processes; the crisis 
of representative democracy; diversity; globalisation of culture and the economy; 
rising costs of energy); the financial crisis and the subsequent economic crisis; 
persistently uneven development; the problems of fragmentation; the aging popu-
lation; and the increasing interest (at all scales, from local to global) in environ-
mental issues (e.g. global warming, etc.) (Albrechts 2001, 2004). Moreover, the 
need for governments to adopt a more entrepreneurial style of planning in order 
to enhance regional, city-region, and urban competitiveness; the growing aware-
ness that some planning concepts (i.e. learning regions, knowledge communities, 
industrial districts, compact cities, livable cities, creative cities, multi-cultural 
cities, fair cities) cannot be achieved solely through hard physical planning; and the 
fact that – in addition to traditional land use regulation, urban maintenance, pro-
duction, and management of services – governments are being called upon to 
respond to new demands, which imply the abandonment of bureaucratic ap-
proaches and the involvement of skills and resources that are external to the 
traditional administrative apparatus, all serve to expand the agenda. So, in many 
places in Europe, a shift appears to be taking place from a more regulative, bureau-
cratic approach towards a more strategic, implementation-led, and development-
led approach. Indeed, a growing literature and an increasing number of practices, 
all over the world, seem to suggest that strategic spatial planning may be looked 
upon as a possible approach able to cope with the challenges and to embed struc-
tural change. 
As there is no “one best or one single European way” to do strategic planning, 
the purpose of this chapter is to add a new dimension in terms of values, approach 
and process. It therefore (re)examines strategic (spatial) planning by using views 
                                                                        
1 For a more elaborated version with full references see Albrechts (2011, 2012). 
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from the planning literature, from the European practices of strategic thinking at 
different scale levels, and from shifts in the overall planning approach. This is done 
by combining theory with practical experience. 
The Re-Emergence of Strategic Spatial Planning 
In a number of European countries, spatial planning evolved in the 1960s and 
1970s towards a system of comprehensive planning – i.e. the integration of nearly 
every aspect of planning – at different administrative levels. In the 1980s, when the 
neo-liberal paradigm replaced Keynesian–Fordist logics and when public interven-
tion retrenched in all domains, a retreat from strategic planning can be witnessed 
fueled not only by the neo-liberal disdain for planning, but also by post-modernist 
skepticism, both of which tend to view progress as something which, if it happens, 
cannot be planned (Healey 1997a). Within the architectural/urbanism discipline, a 
new approach emerged to land use regulation and urban projects, especially for 
the revival of rundown parts of cities and regions. A new generation of strategic 
(mainly urban) projects, such as the French “Projet urbain” has been trying to 
develop a more inclusive approach informed by insights in policy analysis and 
strategic planning. From these practices, a whole body of knowledge is developing, 
which could be described as “theorising practice” (Masboungi – De Gravelaine 
2002). However, a more theoretical framework within which these concrete prac-
tices could be framed and evaluated has not yet been developed, and the gaps 
remain open. Planning and urbanism seem highly complementary in their ap-
proach, as well as in their strengths and weaknesses. There is a need for cross-
fertilisation between the more model-based and top-down planning views, with 
the more casuistic, bottom-up experiences, to construct an integrated approach. 
Other discourses to be integrated concern the social, cultural, social, political, 
ecological and economic aspects. 
In conclusion, in both the public and private sector, the need emerged to 
develop more strategic approaches, frameworks, and perspectives for cities, city-
regions, and regions. In this chapter, I focus on a planning approach that provides a 
critical interpretation of the structural challenges and problems and thinks crea-
tively about possible answers and how to get there. I deal with new strategic 
planning by elaborating three interrelated questions: a what? a how? and a why? 
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Strategic Spatial Planning 
What? 
Strategic spatial planning is a transformative and integrative, public-sector-led but 
co-productive, socio-spatial process through which visions/frames of reference, 
justification for coherent actions, and means for their implementation are pro-
duced. Taken together, these forms of agency shape and frame what a place is and 
what it might become (Albrechts 2004, 2012). The term “spatial” brings the “where 
of things” into focus, whether static or dynamic; the creation and management of 
special “places” and sites; the interrelations between different activities and net-
works in an area; and significant intersections and nodes in an area which are 
physically co-located (Healey 2004b, p. 46). Cities, city-regions, and regions pos-
sess a distinctive spatiality as agglomerations of heterogeneity locked into a multi-
tude of relational networks of varying geographical reach (Amin 2004, p. 43). 
Strategic spatial planning processes with an appreciation of “relational complexity” 
demand a capacity to “hear”, “see”, “feel”, and “read” the multiple dynamics of a 
place in a way that can identify those key issues which require collective attention 
through a focus on place qualities (see Healey 2005). As a consequence, strategic 
spatial planning evolves continuously in formulation (see Healey 2007a). The focus 
on the spatial relations of places allows for a more effective way of integrating 
different agendas (economic, environmental, cultural, social, and policy agendas) 
as these agendas affect places. As these agendas have a variable reach, they also 
carry a potential for “rescaling” down from the national or state level and up from 
the municipal and neighborhood level. The search for new scales of policy 
articulation and concepts is also linked to attempts to widen the range of actors 
involved in policy processes and with new alliances, actor partnerships, and 
consultative processes (Albrechts et al. 2003).  
How? 
Strategic spatial planning focuses on a limited number of key issues. It takes a 
“collective” critical view of the environment in terms of determining strengths and 
weaknesses in the context of opportunities and threats. Strategic spatial planning 
focuses on place-specific qualities and assets (the social, cultural, and spatial quali-
ties of the urban/regional tissue) within a global context. It is therefore impossible 
to understand material places and social nodes such as “the city”, “the city-region”, 
“the region”, positioned in a one-dimensional hierarchy of scales (Healey 2007a, p. 
267). Strategic spatial planning studies the external trends, forces and resources 
available. It identifies and gathers major actors (public and private) in a coproduc-
tion process (Albrechts 2012); it allows for a broad (multi-level governance) and 
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diverse (public, economic, civil society) involvement during the planning, decision-
making, and implementation processes. It creates realistic long-term visions/per-
spectives and strategies at different levels, taking into account the power struc-
tures (political, economic, gender, cultural), uncertainties, and competing values. 
Strategic spatial planning designs plan-making structures and develops content, 
images, and decision frameworks for influencing and managing spatial change. It 
provides a frame of reference that gives direction and justifies specific action. It is 
about building new ideas and processes that can carry them forward, thus generat-
ing ways of understanding, ways of building agreements, and methods of organ-
izing and mobilising for the purpose of exerting influence in different arenas. 
Finally, strategic spatial planning, both in the short and the long term, focuses on 
framing decisions, actions, projects, results, and implementation, incorporating 
monitoring, evaluation, feedback, adjustment, and revision. 
Why? 
The “why” question deals with values and meanings, with “what ought to be”. 
Without a normative perspective, we risk adopting a pernicious relativism where 
anything goes. In a conscious, purposive, contextual, creative, and continuous pro-
cess, strategic planning aims to enable openness to new ideas and to understand 
and accept the need and opportunity for (structural) change. Strategic spatial 
planning opposes the blind operation of the market forces and involves con-
structing “desired” answers to the structural problems of our society. Normativity 
indicates the relations with place-specific values, desires, wishes or needs for the 
future that transcend mere feasibility and are the result of judgments and choices 
formed, in the first place, with reference to the idea of “desirability”, to the idea of 
“betterment” (Ozbekhan 1969) and to the practice of the good society (Friedmann 
1982). To influence particular future states is an act of choice involving valuation, 
judgment, the decision-making that relates to human-determined ends and to the 
selection of the most appropriate means for coping with such ends. The “future” 
must symbolize some qualities, and virtues that the present lacks (diversity, sus-
tainability, equity, spatial quality, inclusiveness, and accountability). This is oppo-
site to the future as an extension of the present. 
Governance2 
Just as there are many traditions and collective practices, there are also many 
images of what regions, city-regions, and cities want to achieve. The power con-
stellation in a place determines what the problems and challenges of a place are 
                                                                        
2 See the bulk of material generated through the ESPON program (www.espon.eu). 
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and how they should be addressed. Some actors (individuals, groups, institutions) 
have more resources and power, which allows them to pursue their ideas and poli-
cies. Therefore, power relations must be built into the conceptual framework of 
planning (Forester 1989) and looked at in a given context of place, time and scale 
regarding specific issues and particular combinations of actors.  
Strategic spatial planning processes challenge established divisions of govern-
ment and the cultures embedded in them. They also bring different models of gov-
ernance and governance change into encounter with one another (Healey 2006). It 
is argued that a feasible and efficient planning process should be centered on the 
elaboration of a mutually beneficial dialectic between top-down structural policies 
and bottom-up local uniqueness. Besides a bottom-up approach, rooted in condi-
tions and potentialities of diversity (interpreted in their broadest sense), a comple-
mentary multi-level top-down policy aimed at introducing fundamental and struc-
tural changes is indispensable. Indeed, a mere top-down and centrally organised 
approach runs the danger of overshooting the local, historically evolved and accu-
mulated knowledge and qualification potential, while a one-dimensional emphasis 
on a bottom-up approach tends to deny – or at least to underestimate – the im-
portance of linking local differences to structural macro tendencies (Albrechts – 
Swyngedouw 1989). This dialectic constitutes the bare essence of multi-level gov-
ernance. 
Place policymaking is embedded in multiple institutional domains and interac-
tion arenas. This blurs the meaning of traditional administrative boundaries and 
hierarchical settings in the development and implementation of policies (see the 
European INTERREG program). Initiatives to overcome fragmentation due to en-
trenched tiers of government and sectoral policy communities typically require a 
major institutional effort to achieve long-term effects (Albrechts et al. 2003). 
Moreover, the demand to transform the state in ways that will serve all relevant 
actors, especially the least powerful, the emerging partnerships between govern-
ments and the private sector are provoking a shift towards more hybrid forms of 
democracy in a number of places in Europe. 
Pluralist and Inter-Culturalist Place 
As spatial planning has almost no potential for concretising strategies, it is neces-
sary to involve relevant actors (public and private) needed for their substantive 
contribution, their procedural competences, and the role they might play in 
acceptance, in getting basic support and in providing (a kind of) legitimacy. In 
Europe, some politicians, as well as planners, seem reluctant to involve these 
actors in decision-making, because it involves giving up some control, and people 
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who hold power are usually not inclined to give it up or share it. In other places, 
there is a tendency to involve major actors in the process.  
Some actors have the knowledge, skills, power, and networks through which 
they are able to influence or even steer planning proposals and policy decisions. 
Others lack the means and the cultural codes to participate in the system. Class, 
gender, race, and religion do matter in terms of whether citizens are included in 
the process (Young 1990). Any change has to deal with structural constraints, with 
issues of power and resistance, and with the irreconcilability of certain forms of 
interests. This requires a democratic polity that can encompass the realities of 
difference, inequality, and so on. The core is a democratic struggle for inclusive-
ness in democratic procedures; for transparency in government transactions; for 
accountability of the state and planners to the citizens for whom they work; for the 
right of citizens to be heard and to have a creative input in matters affecting their 
interests and concerns at different scale levels; and for reducing or eliminating 
unequal power structures between social groups and classes (Friedmann – 
Douglass 1998).  
Out of a shift towards a more hybrid democracy in some places, a type of 
governance has emerged that expands practical democratic deliberations rather 
than restricts them; that encourages diverse citizens’ voices rather than stifles 
them; that directs resources to basic needs rather than to narrow private gain. This 
type of approach uses public involvement to present real political opportunities, 
learning from action not only what works but also what matters. Through the 
involvement of citizens (and especially weak groups) in socially and politically 
relevant actions, some degree of empowerment, ownership, or acceptance is 
sought for these citizens (Friedmann 1992).  
In Europe, increased personal mobility has made places more diversified. This 
can be seen either as a threat or as an opportunity. On one hand, it can destabilise a 
place as migrants bring in habits, attitudes, and skills different from the original 
society. On the other hand, it can enrich and stimulate possibilities by creating 
hybrids, crossovers, and boundary blurring (Landry 2000, p. 264). Places must be 
creative with mutual understanding between cultures and ideas of equity (this is 
nothing less than a claim to full citizenship) (Sandercock 2003, p. 98). Inter-
culturalism builds bridges, helps foster cohesion and conciliation, and produces 
new ideas out of the multi-cultural patchwork of places. This gives a voice to the 
minority groups or the otherwise socially excluded, so that their ideas are taken 
into account and their ideas are brought into the process that influences the realms 
of change as well in planning, political decision-making as in implementation 
(Landry 2000). 
Planning has the potential to have an impact and to connect a very wide range 
of issues (from all kinds of actors with interests in a place to nature). These inter-
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ests are potentially very diverse and conflicting. Spatial planners capitalise on the 
“locus” using the characteristics of space and place; the natural as well as the build 
environment; the socio-spatial structure; the flows and the tissue (both spatial and 
social). To overcome a commodified representation, also nature must find a voice 
to reveal its intrinsic values (i.e. natural stability in ecosystems, biodiversity) as 
well as the more intangible cultural (i.e. aesthetic, symbolic) values (Sachs – Esteva 
2003, Hillier 1999). In this sense, space gets its own relative autonomy. It serves as 
a medium and as an integration frame for human activities. 
Institutionalisation 
Government systems for development, control, and regulation have often been 
fixed for a long time; however, they are not fundamentally reviewed to adapt to 
changing circumstances. There are many examples to illustrate how difficult it is 
for an institution to change. The life of an institution often seems to be more im-
portant than what it does. Hence the need to view governance institutions not as a 
set of formal organizations and procedures established in law and “followed 
through”, but rather as referring to the norms, standards, and morals of a society 
or social group, which shape both the formal and the informal ways of thinking and 
acting (Healey 2004a, p. 92). In some places, the process of “discourse structu-
ration” and its subsequent “institutionalisation” become perhaps more important 
than the plan as such (Hajer 1995, Albrechts 1999). In this way, new discourses 
may become institutionalised and embedded in the norms, methods, attitudes, and 
practices, thus providing a basis for structural change. From there, a shared stock 
of values, knowledge, information, sensitivity, and mutual understanding may 
spread and travel through an array of regional, provincial, and local government 
arenas, sector departments, and consultants. Gradually, new approaches and new 
concepts can be sustainably embedded via institutionalisation (Healey 1997a, 
Gualini 2001). Governments may call upon this intellectual capital when using its 
control function to reframe ways of thinking (Innes et al. 1994). 
Multi-level Governance 
A multi-level governance approach would offer the potential to tease out causal 
linkages between global, national, regional, metropolitan, and local change, while 
also taking account of the highly diverse outcomes of such interactions. The dialec-
tic between shifts in institutional sovereignty towards supranational regulatory 
systems (e.g. the possible impact of European directives for deregulation of public 
transport) and the principle of subsidiarity, which entails the rooting of policy 
action in local initiatives and abilities, illustrates the embeddedness of place policy-
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making in multiple institutional domains and interaction arenas which blur the 
meaning of hierarchical settings in the development of policies (Gualini 2001). 
Tensions may occur between the well-known scale and related government struc-
ture of a nested hierarchy from large to small or from top to bottom and scale in 
terms of the reach of relationships in time and space (Healey 2004b, Albrechts – 
Liévois 2004). 
In a new governance culture, the construction of arenas (who has to be in-
volved, what is fixed and what is open in these arenas and which issues must be 
discussed), their timing (links to the strategic momentum), and the awareness that 
“fixed” may be a relative concept in some contexts, all need careful reflection and 
full attention. 
Epilogue 
In Europe, planning is diverting from the idea of government as the sole provider 
of solutions to problems towards an idea of governance as the capacity to substan-
tiate the search for creative and territorially differentiated solutions to problems, 
challenges, and opportunities. It implies a move towards a more desirable future 
through the mobilisation of a plurality of actors with different and even competing 
interests, goals, and strategies (Balducci – Fareri 1996). Strategic spatial planning 
as presented in this chapter is conceived of as a democratic, open, selective, and 
dynamic process of coproduction. It produces a vision which leads to a framework 
within which the problems and challenges can be understood and provides a 
justification for short-term actions within a revised democratic tradition. A dissec-
tion of the process reveals the key elements that underlie this strategic planning: 
content and process; the static and the dynamic; constraint and aspiration; the 
cognitive and the collective; the planned and the learned; the socio-economic and 
the political; the public and the private; vision and action; the local and the global; 
legitimacy and a revised democratic tradition; values and facts; selectivity and 
“integrativity”; equality and power; the long term and the short term. 
I have applied the “lenses” of a reflective practitioner and of the (strategic) 
planning literature in an effort to broaden the concept and provide an alternative 
to address the structural challenges of our postmodern world in a constructive and 
progressive way. Strategic planning case studies illustrate innovative practices. I 
see a need for inquiring into the epistemology of these practices, for making sense 
of what has been learned in action in relation to a wider context and for testing the 
depth and comprehensiveness of these practices (Schön 1984). This should help 
efforts to evaluate and make sense of these practices in relation to a wider (theo-
retical) context. Abstract conceptualisation and generalisation of the accumulated 
knowledge of learning in action may help theorists to see some of what can be 
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learned from practice. Strategic spatial planners, on the other hand, can be in-
spired and guided by new emerging theories. 
The critical question of the leverage that the European strategic spatial plan-
ning exercises will achieve over time must be raised. Do they have the persuasive 
power to shift territorial development trajectories or – as some argue (Kunzmann 
2001) – are they little more than a cosmetic veil to hide the growing disparities 
evolving within Europe? A number of European experiences provide a fertile 
laboratory for advancing the understanding of the nature and potential of strategic 
spatial frameworks and strategies for twenty-first century conditions. 
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 RETHINKING CONSTRUCTIONS OF SPATIAL JUSTICE 
IN REGIONAL POLICY 
Gordon Dabinett 
Introduction 
This paper attempts to provide insights into the normative constructions of spatial 
justice that underpin regional policy as recently articulated within discourses that 
have shaped the EU territorial cohesion agenda. The conceptualisations that 
underlie this analysis assume that regional policies can be regarded and studied as 
social constructs, as they give meaning and expressions to rationalities, ideas, 
political behaviours and power relations (Fischer 2003). The approach follows 
arguments predicated on the belief that the values behind concepts of EU spatial 
policies have largely remained hidden, both in policy processes and in related 
research (Bohme et al. 2004). 
The paper seeks to apply a critical analysis by presenting discussions within 
three key areas: understanding territorial cohesion as an EU project, as a co-opera-
tive process and as a change in governance; interpreting contested meanings of 
territorial cohesion through new geographies and outcomes; and reflecting on the 
possible opportunities to further understanding of territorial cohesion through 
constructs of spatial justice. 
Uneven spatial development between regions has been regarded as a legitimate 
concern of governments for a considerable period of time. Most commonly this 
was expressed through policies of national state governments that had an explicit 
or implicit objective to influence the distribution of economic development or 
growth. For example, any major imbalance in the regional distribution of wealth 
creation would commonly be perceived by governments to potentially pose threats 
to economic, social and political stability. Such concerns were also subject to EU 
measures within regional policy and the Structural Funds after the 1980s. The 
nature of uneven development and the purpose of EU policy came under scrutiny 
again as a consequence of the ascension of new nation states (Hudson 2003), 
persistent spatial disparities within the original member states (EC 2004), and an 
attempt to re-conceptualise territorial development, or “cohesion” (Faludi 2010). 
Since 1986, the object of EU cohesion policy has been to strengthen economic 
and social conditions, and the Lisbon Treaty and EU high level Europe 2020 strategy 
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introduced a third dimension of “European fairness”, that of territorial cohesion, 
which became an integral element of EU policies from 2013. The construction and 
meaning of spatiality and fairness within territorial cohesion are clearly con-
testable and contested, and despite the publication of a Green Paper (EC 2008), the 
policy needs to be conceptualised beyond the implementation of a single core 
policy document.  
The EU member states adopted the new “Territorial Agenda” in Leipzig in May 
2007. The notion of territorial cohesion imbedded within this agenda built on the 
priorities of economic and social cohesion enshrined in the 1992 Maastricht 
Treaty, and the broad aim of the Agenda was to contribute to the harmonious and 
balanced development of the Union as a whole in support of the 2000 Lisbon and 
2001 Gothenburg Agendas. The Agenda outlined a desire to promote regional iden-
tities and a place-based approach and for sector policies of the EU that have spatial 
impacts to also consider territorial cohesion. This gave expression to a European 
spatiality more aligned with the content of the European Spatial Development Per-
spective (EC 2009), by seeking to cast Europe’s urban areas as motors of develop-
ment; to strengthen urban-rural partnerships for balanced development; to pro-
mote trans-national regional development; to strengthen trans-European net-
works; to promote trans-European technological and natural risk management; 
and to strengthen the trans-European ecosystems and cultural resources and 
heritage. This focus shifted spatial analyses to the cities and metropolitan growth 
areas of Europe, and cohesion was seen as a way to achieve the balanced spatial 
development of a largely polycentric EU territory, realising indigenous potential 
through vertical and horizontal co-ordination of EU policies. Further elaborations 
of territorial cohesion were made in Europe2020 which made a link with the goal 
of “inclusive growth”, by fostering a high-employment economy delivering social 
and territorial cohesion. This latest EU strategy sees a need to spread the benefits 
of economic growth to all parts of the Union as essential, including its outermost 
regions, thus strengthening territorial cohesion by ensuring access and opportuni-
ties for all (EC 2010). 
From this perspective, the emergence of any attempt to build a common EU 
approach to spatial policy might be regarded as part of a concerted attempt to 
impose some vision and co-ordination across the wide range of policies, regula-
tions and other instruments which seek to implement EU political, economic and 
social objectives. ESPON research has revealed that territorial capital and oppor-
tunities for development are inherent in the regional diversity that is a charac-
teristic of Europe (ESPON 2010). Consequently, different types of territories are 
endowed with diverse combinations of resources, putting them into different 
positions for contributing at this moment of time to the achievement of the goals 
set by Europe 2020 (EC 2010). Thus a critical and discursive view on justice in this 
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European spatial policy making demands that complex relations between values 
and diversity need to be taken into account. As a result, critical analysis pursuing 
this agenda must be inherently spatialised, but has to avoid a conception of space 
simply as a container in which things happen, where spatial justice is simply 
shorthand for social justice in space. Space needs to be conceptualised as some-
thing itself constructed, rather than given, and that certain aspects of space them-
selves sustain the production and reproduction of injustice. Such problems as 
inequality, exclusion, segregation and social polarisation are manifested spatially 
and reproduced spatially through spatial development. 
Territorial Cohesion as an EU Project 
Territorial cohesion is a construct that is not found outside the documents and 
discourses that constitute the worlds of EU spatial policy makers. Well evidenced 
accounts have illustrated the centrality of cohesion policy to the European project 
(Molle 2007) and the emergence of territorial cohesion as a key link between the 
economic and social goals of EU wide solidarity and spatial policy thought (Adams 
– Cotella – Nunes 2011, Waterhout 2007). The Green Paper (EC 2008), and subse-
quent policy formulation processes, extended this discussion beyond  a community 
of planning experts to a wider discourse involving broader stakeholders, and the 
future still remains open (Faludi 2010). It has been suggested that at the heart of 
these discourses were attempts to secure strategic positions by stakeholders 
around four key elements inherent to territorial cohesion (Servillo 2010): policy 
principles that seek to define a range of general values and institutional aims in 
regard to balanced spatial growth and development; territorial dimensions that 
allow the concept to be applied at several geographical scales; strategic policy 
options largely formulated within imaginaries and options of place-based out-
comes, realising local assets within polycentric models of urban development; and 
territorial governance expressed through procedural and processes aspects. 
Broadly the territorial cohesion “project” constituted an agenda to shape dia-
logue – a political project; a set of principles to guide action – a co-operative pro-
cess; and action through practices – a change in governance. Specifically much is 
made of the EU as being incredibly rich in its territorial diversity, and thus Euro-
pean territorial solidarity in the face of this is about “ensuring a balanced devel-
opment of all these places and about making sure that our citizens are able to make 
most of inherent features of their territories – to transform diversity into an asset 
that contributes to sustainable development of the entire EU” (EC DG Regional 
Policy Conference December 2009). The goals for future spatial development are 
encapsulated within notions of sustainable development that can marry European 
polycentric settlements and economic concentration inherent in agglomeration 
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processes, and place emphasis on achieving connectivity through infrastructure 
and access to services of general interest. Great emphasis is placed on potential 
territorial impact synergies that can arise from the co-ordination of EU sector poli-
cies. Finally the rescaling of the state alongside changes in social, economic and 
environmental spatialities create new challenges for functional co-operation 
across borders between neighbouring regions, trans-nationally in emergent mega-
regions such as the Baltic Sea, Danube and Alpine areas, and inter-regionally 
between non-neighbouring regions in different countries. 
Territorial cohesion as an EU project thus seeks to: achieve greater outcome 
effectiveness of EU social, economic and environmental interventions; achieve 
greater resource efficiencies in EU social, economic and environmental interven-
tions; promote changes in governance to address changing EU wide spatial forms 
of economic, social and environmental developments; achieve territorial outcomes 
that go beyond those achievable through EU social, economic and environmental 
interventions alone; address EU wide inequalities that underlie territorial diversity 
and differences; and provide a rationale for a future EU “integrated place-based” 
cohesion policy. The discourses that arise from these intents go to the heart of two 
fundamental questions: what additional outcomes in regards to European wide 
spatial development are aspired to, and how will strategic institutional relation-
ships achieve such outcomes through essentially new multi-level intergovernmen-
tal behaviours based on voluntary co-operation? 
Contested Meanings of Territorial Cohesion 
The Assembly of European Regions (2009) called upon territorial cohesion to be 
seen as: “Territories developing harmoniously and in synergy with each other, 
heading to common priorities and objectives, by implementing strategies with 
means and tools adapted to their territorial capital, providing an equal access to 
services and opportunities for all European citizens”. Such aspirations demand an 
agreement on the common objectives of the EU that can underpin the practical 
achievement of potentially contested outcomes, in light of a founding principle of 
cohesion policy that favours a development approach rather than one based on 
compensation or redistribution (Jouen 2008). Camagni (2007) thus argues that 
territorial cohesion efforts can enhance attempts to improve social and economic 
cohesion through increasing territorial quality, territorial efficiency and territorial 
identities, whilst Fabbro and Mesolella (2010) provide evidence that policy makers 
can view it as either an existing system of territorial qualities to be defended and 
protected from the impacts of external causes; or the outcome of a process of 
territorial rebalancing between metropolitan concentrations and the rest of the 
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region; or as a way of pursuing regional competitiveness through the definition of 
new regional space.  
Whilst some interpretations might seemingly depoliticise the underpinning 
values inherent in such debates and simply seek to reframe current socio-
economic problems, a more substantive set of challenges arise around the con-
tested meaning of territorial cohesion that contrast it as a means to achieve com-
petitiveness and globalisation, or as a way to re-inscribe welfare problems and 
policies in spatial terms (Davoudi 2007, Vanolo 2010).  Such a variety of perspec-
tives are also reflected in polycentricity and TENS, core elements in the imagined 
visions of territorial cohesion.  As Faludi (2010) reminds us: “the use of words thus 
depends on context and intentions”, and territorial cohesion becomes “a catalytic 
concept around which several (spatial and non-spatial) discourses and policy prac-
tices have been generated...” (Servillo 2010). 
Territorial cohesion in the context of current debates about the future of post-
2013 cohesion policy in an enlarged Europe during times of economic austerity 
and potential environmental crisis might be seen to offer varied spatial-economic 
outcomes (Adams – Cotella – Nunes 2011): smart growth in a competitive and 
polycentric Europe; inclusive, balanced development and fair access to services; 
recognition of territorial diversity and importance of local development condi-
tions; and the protection of geographical specificities. 
Territorial cohesion might be seen to contribute to economic growth in order to 
achieve the aims of Europe 2020 and boost EU competitiveness. Such an outcome 
would see a strong focus on the potential of Europe’s major inter-connected eco-
nomic centres to support smart growth and act as engines for development of 
larger areas that surround them – a territorial vision that builds on a polycentric 
Europe but with a greater number of nodes in the global economic networks. Such 
an objective has a theoretical background in new economic geography and growth 
pole theories with the spatial dimension of economic development policies based 
on economies of agglomeration. Positive externalities are expected to trigger 
higher growth with diffusion effects later achieving more balanced territorial de-
velopment.  
A strong and counter perspective sees territorial cohesion as being about a 
balanced development that focuses on European solidarity and stresses inclusive 
growth and fair access to infrastructure services. Within such a view there is a 
strong idea of strengthening potentials outside the main growth poles, where 
future growth is instead based on distinct territorial assets and comparative 
advantage. Such a vision tends to support fair or equal development, not least 
through access to services of general interest, based largely on examples of areas 
that thrive despite their size or relative isolation through the development of local 
innovative milieu, industrial districts and local productive systems. Thus territorial 
Rethinking Constructions of Spatial Justice in Regional Policy 183 
cohesion could be seen to be about place-based policy making, that pays particular 
attention to local development conditions, below the regional level. In such an 
approach particular attention is given to the specificities of places and their 
comparative advantages, often based on tacit knowledge and local networks, 
focussing on the processes that allow local actors to identify and exploit economic 
potentials based on natural resources, cultural heritage etc. 
The desire to achieve outcomes beyond those delivered by economic and social 
cohesion requires territorial cohesion to address geographical specificities. Par-
ticular types of region with permanent features require recognition in such a view.  
Article 174 of the Lisbon Treaty states that: “In order to promote its overall 
harmonious development, the Union shall develop and pursue its actions leading 
to the strengthening of its economic, social and territorial cohesion. In particular, 
the Union shall aim at reducing disparities between the levels of development of 
the various regions and backwardness of the least favoured regions. Among the re-
gions concerned, particular attention shall be paid to rural areas, areas affected by 
industrial transition, and regions which suffer from severe and permanent natural 
or demographic handicaps such as the northernmost regions with very low popu-
lation density and island, cross-border and mountain regions”. This suggests that 
geographical handicaps for regional development exist, and require measures and 
regulatory exceptions that can compensate for additional costs of infrastructure 
and service provision. 
European Space, Regions and Justice 
A critical and discursive view on justice in this European spatial policy making 
demands that complex relations between values and diversity need to be taken 
into account. Research pursuing this agenda must be inherently spatialised in its 
analysis. But this spatialisation has to avoid a conception of space as absolute, as a 
container in which things happen, where spatial justice is simply shorthand for 
social justice in space. A fixed conception of space would point towards a partial 
view that would simply look at distributional aspects. Instead space can be given 
different meanings. It might be seen as a single geographical unit – defined by 
common rules for trade, market behaviours, legal processes, financial exchanges, 
and political representations. In other contexts it is seen as a collection of nation 
states – based on boundaries that have become fixed over time as a result of con-
tested geo-political processes, with sub-divisions constructed around administra-
tive and political units or the application of statistical techniques to assist in the 
management and targeting of policies. Space is also seen to be a construction of 
institutional networks – based on shared trust or reciprocity, but unequal power 
and influence. It is also possible to see forms of multi-scalar territorial capitalisms 
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– combining the legacies of past uneven development and emerging differentiated 
competitiveness and economic performances. Thus space should be conceptual-
ised as something itself constructed, rather than given, and that certain aspects of 
space themselves sustain the production and reproduction of injustice (Graham – 
Healey 1999). Such problems as inequality, exclusion, segregation and social po-
larisation are manifested spatially and reproduced spatially through spatial devel-
opment. 
These reassessments of the values underpinning the notion of “fairness” within 
EU spatial policy lead to further questions about equality of what – employment 
opportunities, mobility, housing, water, income, health, expression of identity and 
culture, the right of participation and representation, and notions of governance. 
The injustice of spatiality becomes expressed through needs, commonly given 
meaning through the design of criteria for spatial targeting and intervention; 
through rights, often associated with markets, access to services and specific 
conditions attached to property and development; or through rewards, suggesting 
choices are made about legitimacy in the allocation of resources or power. Finally, 
whilst the goal of balanced urban development might suggestively argue that 
people should neither be advantaged nor disadvantaged because they happen to 
reside within the boundaries of a particular locality, the notion of competitive fair-
ness and the diverse spatial conditions that underpin the wider goals of cohesion 
policy, both support a view that there is a paradigmatic policy transition from a 
unitary and substantive rationale of spatial fairness towards a pluralist and proce-
dural one (Giannakourou 1996). The later largely resides in a multi-level pluralist 
model of policy-making, invoking principles of partnership and shared responsi-
bility. 
Over the last fifteen years, arguments have been advanced that suggest there 
has been paradigmatic shift in spatial policy in Europe, in its aims and goals, but 
also in its values, analyses and implementation. Giannakouro (1996) in a reflection 
on Structural Funds has argued that “the traditional universal and legally formal 
approach of spatial justice, that is, the right to equal treatment of all territories, is 
actually replaced by a novel rationale… in the face of a more complex and unpre-
dictable world” (p. 604). A new European style of “competitive spatial fairness” has 
emerged, which is very different to the previous national state welfarism that 
promised the redistribution of resources, services and incomes among the differ-
ent areas of the national territory and, thus the equalisation of their development 
conditions.  
Thus whilst the goals of balanced urban development might suggestively argue 
that people should neither be advantaged nor disadvantaged because they happen 
to reside within the boundaries of a particular locality (EC 2004), the notion of 
competitive fairness supports the view that the nature of spatial justice within 
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territorial cohesion and economic integration needs to be examined with respect 
to its basic norms and values, and within specific and situated territories. Justice 
might be based on a number of fundamental and very different normative out-
comes in terms of intervening in spatial development: a need to improve the wel-
fare of the worst-off areas, by prioritising the more urgent or greater claim, con-
structing a scale of privilege; the redistribution of resources to areas based on an 
utilitarian value, on what will afford the greatest good to the most people, rather 
than prioritising minorities; regarded as fairness based on the idea that everyone 
has an equal right to the most basic liberties – an equality of opportunity; an 
equality achieved by respecting and acknowledging difference, that requires a 
rejection of universalism and the assumptions of dominant group. 
Spatial justice is concerned not simply with the (uneven) spatial distribution of 
welfare, but also with the qualities of the constructed space through which pro-
cesses affecting welfare are mediated. The injustice of spatiality may also be 
expressed through needs, commonly expressed through the design of criteria for 
spatial targeting and intervention; through rights, often associated with markets, 
access to services and specific conditions attached to property and development; 
or through rewards, Boyne and Powell (1983) and Fainstein (2001) have argued 
that there have not been many attempts to apply these complex arguments to an 
empirical context, and a great deal of vagueness often surrounds these basic 
concepts, and real  problems arise in showing how any of them could be used as a 
practical guide. It has also been suggested that it is likely that policymakers’ 
preferences are both volatile and ill-defined, thus greatly reducing the chances of 
there being a coherent and consistent policy towards spatial justice. Furthermore, 
the equity effects of spatial policy and planning cannot simply be inferred from 
instruments and measures but also need empirical assessment of individual 
outcomes (Dabinett 2010) – who benefits? 
Final Reflections 
Regional policy in Europe is no longer simply the practices of individual member 
states but instead might be seen as an instrumental construction of wider geo-
political forces that constitute diverse and varied forms of spatial development. 
The past underlying assumptions of regional policy: that regions “are” functional 
spatial economies; that economic imbalance has both resource efficiency and 
welfare implications; and that economic imbalance can distort state policy aims 
and objectives, require critical re-examination. Regional policy can have different 
normative purposes and outcomes. It might be assumed that economic growth will 
always be unbalanced, an inevitable outcome of increasing globalisation, but 
development can still be inclusive. Alternatively, uneven development might be 
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seen to reflect territorial diversity, and policy should promote place-based cohe-
sion and assets through reforms in governance. A further construct might regard 
uneven spatial development as not primarily or uniquely a regional problem, and 
interventions should promote place-based initiatives for worst-off areas, or 
specific social groups and classes. Similarly, spatial development might be con-
structed as not the problem but a symptom of national competitiveness and spatial 
power relationships, and any measures should promote nation-wide infrastructure 
investment, innovation, skills training, and employment alongside political devolu-
tion. Finally, to address these “normative” questions and constructs of regions and 
policy, spatial justice might offer a conceptual framework to critically assess alter-
natives. It might offer a set of measures that can extend beyond territorial justice, 
incorporating notions of social and environmental justice within explicitly spa-
tialised and distributive outcomes. 
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 REGIONAL GRAVITY AXES AS VECTORS 
OF TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Pompei Cocean 
 
In order to achieve the expected success, territorial planning operation requires, as 
an apriori condition, the rigorous setting of the analytical and interpretative 
framework in the form of concepts, theories and paradigms. They will not only 
enable a proper argumentation for the various solutions and proposals to optimise 
the functions of the territory, to mitigate the existent dysfunctions, and support its 
sustainable development, but also to formulate a coherent, well-articulated strate-
gic vision. 
In recent scientific debates, centred on regional development issues, the focus 
lies on growth poles, considered by many researchers and by institutions involved 
in the planning process as spatial elements where innovation emerges and from 
where its dissipation into the spatial system begins. 
In addition to growth poles, a concept introduced in the practice of regional de-
velopment by Perroux (1955), regional gravity axes provide a different, much 
more complex logistic support due to their structures and functions, a contribution 
emphasised in a series of previous interventions (Cocean 2010b and 2011). If po-
larising centres (mostly synonymous with growth poles) are at the origin of 
polarising regions, analysed in their complexity by numerous geographers from 
Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1826) until today, gravity axes are at the origin of 
anisotropic regions described by Dauphiné (1979) and his followers. In Romania, 
we should mention Pop’s (2003) and Conţiu’s (2010) contributions on the topic of 
gravity axes and anisotropic regions. 
Methodology 
The phenomena within gravity axes will be approached in line with the concepts 
specific to functional system regions as described by Dauphiné (1979), Nir (1990), 
Claval (1993), Vallega (1995), Wackermann (2002), Cocean (2002), etc. Gravity 
axes generate an anisotropic spatial entity, within which a particular set of rela-
tions between the component elements and between them and their exterior are 
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born and develop. The difference between growth poles and gravity axes lies, from 
the very beginning, in their own area of influence, starting from a punctual element 
in the first case up to a line (a summation of points) in the second case, as was 
suggestively outlined in the chorem methodology proposed by Brunet and Dolffus 
(1990), where the point and the line become basic figurative signs. 
Factor analysis, synthesis, comparison, ranking and classification are also es-
sential tools for highlighting and explaining the complex phenomena inside the 
gravity axes and in the strips of interface between them and the rest of the terri-
tory. All this must be used in the context of a rigorous implementation of the 
regional method (Cocean 2002), namely the integrated approach of the whole spa-
tial issue regardless of its complexity. 
Individualisation of the Gravity Axes through Interspecific Competition 
Besides growth poles, represented by major urban agglomerations and considered 
as focal points of territorial regularisation by the European Union, regional gravity 
axes play an equally important role in the spatial development of Romania, just like 
in other countries. If growth poles exert their influence from the centre towards 
the periphery, in a radial-divergent manner, in line with the principle of gradual 
dissipation of mass and energy, in the case of gravity axes, dissipation takes place 
within an ellipsoidal type of spatial matrix, thus affecting larger areas and more 
diverse territories. 
The phenomenon of individualising regional gravity axes is much more com-
plex than that of poles or centres of attraction, thus requiring a longer period for 
shaping the spatial system and a more convulsive evolution.    
Initially, they took shape in all the regions with heterogeneous relief, according 
to the pre-existing morpho-hydrographical matrix, the morphological corridors or 
river valleys, characterised by better accessibility, being preferred to their neigh-
bouring territories less favourable from this point of view. In the plain areas, 
without important morphological, hydrographical or other type of obstruction, the 
route of axes developed where the distance between two or more polarising habi-
tats was the shortest. 
The spatial selection that led to their individualisation was performed in line 
with the principle of main drains in the endokarst hydraulic systems, where the 
most active, most intensely utilised and most efficient circulation corridor in terms 
of water flow amount has imposed itself in relation to the others, ultimately 
generating the groundwater flow network, with a main drain to which secondary 
drains are connected as ramifications, consisting of the initial drain lines which 
have lost the interspecific competition (Mangin 1974).   
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When applying this hydrodynamic principle to the territory, so varied in struc-
ture and function, a series of organisation models and forms result, dictated by the 
diversity of the natural or anthropogenic factors involved in their coagulation. Of 
the natural factors, morphology and hydrography have a visible mark, generating, 
according to the physical principles of flow, natural models of gravity axes, namely, 
morphological corridors (the depression corridor at the contact of the Transylva-
nian Depression with the mountain range), hydrographical ones (the Danube, the 
Mureş or the Siret corridors) or morpho-hydrographical ones (e.g. Timiş-Cerna). 
The natural gravity was closely followed by the anthropogenic one, the affirmation 
of the human settlements and, hence, of the nucleation centres (Cocean 2010a), 
and the configuration of the communication route system practically followed the 
natural gravity lines.  
With the establishment of rural and urban habitats in their area and the inten-
sification of the flows of people, goods and products, their development received a 
strong inertial character which has maintained these axes topical, although cur-
rently the initial conditionings can be easily overcome by means of technology.  
According to the same hydraulic principle invoked by Mangin, the main gravity 
axis will overlap the most intensely circulated corridor, with various and efficient 
transport networks, the territory of utmost affluence of resources, characterised 
by economic and social effervescence. The efficiency of raw material, goods, 
product or interest flows in the respective corridor is conditioned by the presence 
of an open gravity axis (Cocean 2011) having charging (absorption) and dis-
charging (dissipation) funnels optimally configured. On the other hand, the semi-
open gravity axes or, even more so, the closed ones will lose the competition with 
the main drain, becoming territorial vectors of lower order.  
An illustrative example of spatial selection in the case of gravity axes is offered 
by Transylvania, a geographical-historical province located in the centre of Roma-
nia, where the initial natural conditioning has imposed the genesis of two types of 
corridors, morphological and morpho-hydrographical. 
Figure 1 illustrates a system composed of three parallel gravity axes which po-
larise the southern and central part of Transylvania. The Sebeş–Sibiu–Braşov axis 
(A) overlaps some morphological corridors developed at the contact of the Tran-
sylvanian Plateau with the Southern Carpathians, while the Târnava Mare (B) and 
Târnava Mică (C) axes overlap the homonym valleys. 
These simple gravity axes branch out from a complex joint axis (D), developed 
on the morpho-hydrographical corridor of the Mureş River, between its confluence 
with the Tisa River at Szeged (Hungary) and the village of Izvorul Mureşului, in the 
Giurgeu Depression (Romania). 
The figure above reveals the existence of three neighbouring parallel gravity 
axes, of different order, the southern one: Sebeş–Braşov (A) playing the role of the 
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main axis; Târnava Mare (B), Blaj–Sighişoara, being a second-order axis; and the 
northern one, Târnava Mică (C), Târnăveni–Sovata, being a third-order one. In a 
study focused solely on the gravity axes of the Târnava Rivers, Conţiu (2010) iden-
tifies here a forked gravity axis which joints axes B and C. 
 
Figure 1. Spatial selection of gravity axes in the central-southern part of Transylvania 
Legend: A – Main axis (first-order axis); B – Second-order axis; C – Third-order axis; 
D – Joint axis. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
The question is how did such a selection, or ranking, emerge in a context where 
the major axis Sebeş–Braşov is located in the southern periphery of the historical 
province of Transylvania, while the Târnava Mică axis lies right in its geographical 
centre? Moreover, the favourability index of natural factors is not higher for the 
first axis than for the second, and thus a central and basically advantaged position 
has been eclipsed by a marginal one. The explanation lies in the higher connectivity 
attributes of the southern, peripheral axis in relation to the others, attributes mani-
fested in historical times, from the early Middle Ages until 1918, when Transylva-
nia was separated from Wallachia, having been two different geopolitical entities. 
In these conditions, the Sebeş–Braşov corridor concentrated flows of goods and 
persons superior to the other “inner” corridors, due to its cross-border discharge. 
The fortification of the urban centres of Sebeş, Sibiu and Braşov (three of the seven 
historical cities of Transylvania) generated positive inertia in the gravity axis, 
amplified fluxes, activities and infrastructures, connecting it at both ends, through 
the Mureş and the Prahova axes, with the international transport corridors. This 
status has been preserved up to the present day when the Pan-European 
Transport Corridor IV is inserted partially into its thalweg (the Sebeş–Sibiu sec-
tion). The gap between it and the axes located to the north is obvious, even if we 
compare only the rank of the main cities having developed as growth poles inside 
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them: Braşov and Sibiu belong to the greatest cities of Romania, with complex eco-
nomic, administrative and cultural functions, while Mediaş and Sighişoara are 
ranked among the country’s middle-sized cities and Târnăveni among the small-
sized ones.  
On the other hand, despite its central position in Transylvania, the Târnava 
Mică axis has lost the competition mainly because of its attributes of closed axis 
(Cocean 2011), the volcanic mountain range of Gurghiu and Harghita hindering its 
easy discharge at one end. 
Gravity Axes – Sustainable Spatial Entities  
In the case of both growth poles and regional gravity axes, the question arises how 
sustainable such spatial constructions can be so that the role they have in territo-
rial organisation and good governance be fulfilled. There are different answers to 
this question because, although growth poles and axes have some common fea-
tures, they also have numerous striking differences.   
Growth poles as strictly individualised structures, with a rigorously delineated 
area of influence and with systemic relations dependent on their function and 
rank, have their sustainability ensured as long as their own spatial organism func-
tions optimally. When a crisis emerges in the process of its development and affir-
mation, it will resist through resilience or will decline on its own (many cities 
having disappeared over time is an illustrative example in this respect). 
Within regional gravity axes, especially within the main axis, geographical phe-
nomena receive a much more prominent dissipative development (Ianoş – 
Humeau 2000), starting with the settlement system that establishes itself along 
them and continuing with the infrastructure network, whose diversification, 
amplification and functioning are strictly dependent on the inputs and outputs 
within the axes. According to the same authors (p. 80) “processes of aggregation – 
disaggregation, concentration – deconcentration, imbalance – functional rebalance 
are individualised within them [author’s note: within the settlement systems, well 
defined in such spatial entities], processes that determine a temporary optimiza-
tion of the relations between their main structures”, thus ensuring the viability and 
the development of the axis itself. The presence within a gravity axis of several 
growth poles that generated spatial subsystems in their area of influence 
(Dauphiné 1979) complicates the territorial architecture considerably. Neverthe-
less, it provides a wide range of possibilities for spatial development, based on the 
utilisation of the potential specific to each centre of attraction, as well as its hin-
terland. 
In the case of development axes, sustainability is much more significant and 
long-lasting, being provided by complementarity. The existence of several interre-
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lated local growth poles and the fluxes that constantly animate the axis corridor 
transfer the development principles throughout its route. Therefore, if for what-
ever reason a systemic component of the axis goes adrift, the repercussions are 
much more alleviated than the effects of the same negative action on a city outside 
the axis. This is because the negative effects are redistributed (e.g. the laid-off 
labour force from a bankrupt company can move to similar neighbouring units 
within the axis; or the relocation of some activities from other centres to the infra-
structure that has become available, etc.).  
In a previous study (Cocean 2011) it was demonstrated how the focalisation of 
development policies on the territories at the head of axes positively influences the 
entire activity conducted within the axis. When becoming economically efferves-
cent spaces, these territories play the role of attraction fields in which the bi-
univocal fluxes between them animate the entire axis by continuous processes of 
charge and discharge, having beneficial effects on all the elements that structure 
the anisotropic region thus formed.  
Spatial Occultation Phenomena Generated by Gravity Axes 
The affirmation of gravity axes, with massive concentration of the development 
principles within an anisotropic type of area, can generate major differences in the 
economic and/or social affirmation of the neighbouring territories they over-
shadow through the superior level of their own affirmation. It is a phenomenon 
similar to that described by Gabriela Cocean (2011) in the case of neighbouring 
tourist attractions characterised by a different attractive potential. The ones with 
more numerous and more substantial attractive attributes gain greater importance 
in the tourists’ perception, while the others remain in an undeserved obscurity.   
Such an occultation phenomenon can also be noticed in the case of gravity axes, 
for example in the southern part of Transylvania, between the Sebeş–Braşov (A) 
and the Blaj–Sighişoara (B) gravity axes. Here, due to the major polarisation effect 
caused by the two axes concentrating the majority of activities and mass, energy 
and interest flows in the region, a no man’s land type of territory has emerged, 
overlaying the Hârtibaciu and the Secaş plateaus (Figure 2). The level of territorial 
development, expressed by the quasi-generalised extension of the profound rural 
environment, the weak affirmation of the settlement system (there is only one 
small-sized town, Agnita, in the Hârtibaciu Plateau, with less than 10,000 inhab-
itants, and no town in the Secaş Plateau), and the unerdeveloped technical infra-
structures emphasise a striking disparity in relation to the other two adjacent axes. 
The situation is even more obvious when we compare the urban centres in the 
three units: Mediaş, Agnita and Făgăraş. The demographic potential of Mediaş in 
relation to Agnita is 4.6/1 and of Făgăraş is 3/1. The economic potential and the 
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facilities of the three urban centres show a similar picture, the polarising centre of 
the occulted region having a clear disadvantage. And it is so despite the fact that 
this territory is located right in the geographical centre of Romania (geodesically 
set in the village of Dealu Frumos, in the proximity of Agnita). Therefore, the 
attribute of “central place”, as elaborated in the model by Christaller (1933), that it 
is a favourable factor in the structuring and functioning of the territory by increas-
ing polarisation, does not exist in this case. 
 
Figure 2. Occultation phenomenon generated by the regional gravity axes 
Legend: 1 – Gravity axes; 2 – Urban centres; 3 – Occulted territories; 4 – Synapses. 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
In conclusion, by massively concentrating technical, administrative, economic 
and social infrastructures, habitats, goods and people in narrow spatial strips but 
with notable lengths, regional gravity axes give rise to a rapid pace and a high level 
of territorial development. At the same time they induce, at least in the early stages 
of development, notable disparities in relation to the surrounding regions which 
thus often become occulted territories and therefore repulsive. 
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 THE REGIONAL STRUCTURE AND DECENTRALISATION 
OF SCIENCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Gyula Horváth 
Introduction 
One reason for Europe’s diminishing role in the world economy is its development 
of research capacity and of the human factor lagging behind those of their US coun-
terparts. There was a programme established in the European Union’s Lisbon 
Strategy aiming to correct these deficiencies.  
Europe’s further development depends on how growth factors are spread 
across its regions, and one reason for the lower level of competitiveness is the 
major regional differences in R&D. Weak regional cohesion and an exaggerated 
spatial concentration of modern regional development factors have a clearly nega-
tive effect on European competitiveness today. Activities with high value added are 
concentrated within the London–Paris–Milan–Berlin–Amsterdam pentagon, but 
the distribution of innovative industries differs even within developed countries. 
The existence of national core areas is vital to R&D capacity, high-technology 
industries and to advanced services – but the situation is very similar in the 
Central and Eastern European countries, where the level of concentration, in fact, 
increased after the change of regime in 1989/1990. 
The first aim of this paper is to identify regional differences in the R&D struc-
ture of six large and medium-sized EU member states in Central and Eastern 
Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovakia). The 
basic hypothesis is that exaggerated intellectual polarisation hampers the 
strengthening of regional cohesion and that R&D must be given a priority role in 
economic development strategies. This notion has not yet been realised in the 
operative programmes of National Development Plans. The strengthening of R&D 
featured prominently among the Lisbon criteria, but only a few words were 
devoted to the regional dissemination of intellectual potential, R&D capacity and 
the knowledge-intensive fields of activity. Conditions suitable for innovative 
development are simply not yet available in most European regions. 
The second one is to evaluate the regional research capacities in the countries 
of the former socialist block. We are going to provide a picture of the historical 
antecedents of spatial research, the specifics of regional tasks to be resolved, the 
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characteristics of the institutionalisation of regional science and its publication 
forums. As a conclusion, we will summarise what criteria of regional science exist 
or are lacking in the individual countries. 
The Organisation of Science in Central and Eastern Europe, 1950–1990 
The different levels of development of the two sides of Europe are particularly 
evident in relation to science, and the roots of this reach back several centuries. 
The university foundation period of the Middle Ages affected only a very small part 
of Eastern Europe. Higher education appeared here several centuries later. For 
example, Bulgaria’s first university was founded in Sofia in 1888 (after many years 
of Turkish rule), but newer universities appeared in the country only after 1970. 
The first universities of Romania were founded in Bucharest in the 1850s and in 
Iaşi (Moldavia) in the 1860s. In some major cities – primarily in Transylvania – a 
university network developed between the two World Wars, and in the communist 
era many new universities were founded in major cities or industrial centres, 
including the underdeveloped parts of the country. 
Developments were relatively uniform in many Eastern European countries. 
The basis of higher education and research appeared only after the Second World 
War and the number of institutions was very small. Due to regional development 
issues, and from the viewpoint of sectoral education, few adjustments were made 
after the Second World War. 
The foundation of national academies of sciences was crucial for the scientific 
systems of the Central and Eastern European countries, and all of them had 
organised their academies by the beginning of the 1950s. The academies did not 
only co-ordinate science in these countries, but had an extensive research network, 
typically embracing some 40–70 institutions. It was the consequence of centralised 
governance that these academic research institutions were, with few exceptions, 
established in the capital cities (Horváth 2010). 
Although the Communist Parties’ science policy had different characteristics in 
the individual countries – as in other spheres of the economy and society – we can 
detect some common characteristics: 
 Science enjoyed a privileged position in the socialist era – a typical feature of 
the Soviet model. The favoured groups of people in the sciences (academi-
cians, principal researchers) received high incomes and enjoyed a variety of 
social benefits. 
 Intensive state intervention and government control were accompanied by 
continuous and adequate budgetary resources, although these varied in the 
different branches of science. Two per cent of the national income was spent 
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on R&D in the Central and Eastern European countries in the 1970s–80s. 
This high rate was due partly to research in the armaments industry, and 
partly because many industrial products (in telecommunications and com-
puter technology) were produced on the basis of domestic research on 
account of the boycott on exports of Western European technology. 
 The state established research institutes in technology and the natural 
sciences in the 1950s, a period of extensive development and promotion of 
science, but the social sciences remained in an inferior position for decades, 
due to the dominance of Marxist ideology. The new branches of science 
(sociology, political and regional sciences) started to develop relatively late, 
and they were only embedded in the higher educational system with diffi-
culty. The ratio of researchers employed in the social sciences amounted to 
less than one-fifth of those in the natural sciences in several countries. 
 Academic research networks, sectoral research institutes controlled by the 
ministries and corporate research units were dominant in the institutional 
structure of research. For example, in Hungary in 1985, corporate research 
units absorbed 48% of all R&D expenditure. Universities were primarily 
institutions of education, and research expenditure in universities was mar-
ginal. In 1985, higher educational institutions accounted for no more than 
12% in Hungary. 
How did the Change of Regime Affected the Regional Structure of Central and 
Eastern European R&D? 
The change of regime at the beginning of the 1990s entailed a significant restruc-
turing of the scientific potential in the Central and Eastern European countries. 
One characteristic common to all was a considerable reduction in scientific capaci-
ty which shrank dramatically in two areas, one of these having been the sectoral 
research institute network (Meske 2000 and 2004, Mitter 1996) whre the majority 
of research institutes funded by national bodies (such as ministries) were closed 
down. Simultaneously the number of employees in academic research institutes 
also declined dramatically. As a consequence, the percentage of GDP allocated to 
R&D declined significatly – to one-third or even one-fifth. In Table 1 we show this 
in terms of GERD/GDP (Gross expenditure on research and development as a per-
centage of Gross domestic product). 
In Central and Eastern Europe the capitals and the metropolitan regions are the 
stronholds of research and science, the weight of the metropolitan region being 
greatest in Bulgaria. Four-fifths of the country’s research potential is concentrated 
in Sofia and its vicinity, and two-thirds of Hungary’s GERD is spent in the Central 
Hungary (NUTS 2 – development) region which consists of Budapest and Pest 
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County. The distribution of research capacities in the Czech Republic, Poland, and 
Slovakia reveals a slightly more balanced picture – the metropolitan proportion in 
these countries being under 50% (Table 2). 
Table 1.  Changes in main R&D indicators in Central and Eastern Europe, 1980–2010 
Name Bulgaria Czechoslovakia Poland Hungary Romania 
1980 2010 1980 2010 1980 2010 1980 2010 1980 2010 
GERD/GDP  2.5  0.6  3.9 1.61 
0.62 
2.2 0.7 3.2 1.2 – 0.5 
Number of 
researchers,               
in thousands 
31.6 14.1 39.6 43.41 
24.02 
96.3 100.0 31.4 35.7 71.1 30.7 
Note: 1 – Czech Republic; 2– Slovakia.  
Source: Author, based on national statistical databases for 1980, and Eurostat Yearbook 
2010. 
Table 2.  Weight of capital/capital-city regions in national R&D, 2010 
Country Core region Percentage share in 
R&D expenditure 
Percentage share in 
R&D employees 
Bulgaria South-west 82.8 71.6 
Czech Republic Prague 38.1 40.4 
Hungary Central Hungary 68.8 63.4 
Poland Mazowieckie 42.5 32.6 
Romania Bucharest–Ilfov 59.3 60.9 
Slovakia Bratislava district 47.6 49.8 
Source: Author, based on http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
Most of the important R&D indicators in the core areas of the CEE countries are 
below the EU average, and in no more than two (Czech) regions of the 49 NUTS 2 
regions of the six CEE countries exceed the EU average relating to the GERD/GDP 
ratio. In eight regions the GERD/GDP level is between 1.0 and 1.9%, and in 39 it 
does not reach one per cent. In 20 regions it is even below 0.3% (Figure 1). 
If we look at the regional distribution of R&D activity, we would draw a similar 
conclusion. In the majority of the CEE countries the most highly concentrated R&D 
activity is corporate-financed, and the foreign joint ventures’ target locations for 
establishing R&D units were almost solely the capital cities. 
There were great expectations following the change of regime in terms of 
modernisation of the regional structure of higher education. And although the total 
number of students tripled or quadrupled in these countries, this increase has 
remained spatially unbalanced (Müller 1995, Sterlacchini 2008). The dynamic of 
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higher education in the capitals was the same as that ouside them. The develop-
ments were discursive in that no regional policy concepts were applied and, 
moreover, spatial development planning was undeveloped. Thus the unfavourable 
spatial structure of higher education has been preserved, with some 30–40% of 
students still concentrated in the capital cities. However, there has been a slight 
decrease in the differences as to the regional distribution of R&D generated by the 
fact that research and development started to assume a more important role in 
universities. There is no large number of other type of research organisation out-
side higher education to be seen in any CEE country under observation: the role of 
corporate research is well nigh invisible, and regional development planning insti-
tutions and research centres, like in some Western European countries, can rarely 
be found. 
 
Figure 1.  GERD as a percentage of GDP in CEE regions, 2010 
Source: Author, based on data from http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu 
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Decentralised Regional Science in Central and Eastern Europe 
Regional Research in the Planned Economy 
Due to the specific development paths of Central and Eastern Europe, research in 
the field of social and economic space shows quite a few unique features. Socialist 
science policy, following the guiding principles of the power structure, did not 
consider spatial research as a priority issue. This was mainly because not one tier 
of the strictly centralised state administration was interested in the analysis of 
local–regional specifics. Political practice aimed at homogenisation and considered 
spatial aspects only to the extent needed for central planning.  
Even though the era between 1948 and 1990 was characterised by multidisci-
plinary challenges related to research of the socio-economic space, the demands of 
the commissioners were neither complex nor requiring thematic co-operation 
among scientific disciplines from the aspect of social management. The traditional 
scientific disciplines investigating spatial relations (economic geography, settle-
ment and public administration sciences, economics to a certain degree) could all 
pursue their activities at academic institutes or universities independently of each 
other. The scientific bases of spatial development research were established pri-
marily in public institutions, national planning offices and urban planning insti-
tutes. 
The catalytic effect of the investigation of spatial processes can also be detected 
in the process of the differentiation of Eastern European social sciences. The re-
search results related to the detection of inter-settlement disparities in the struc-
ture of society served as an important driving force for the greater autonomy of 
sociology in terms of both theory and methodology, whilst the investigations of the 
spatial-settlement components of public administrative-power relations contribut-
ed to the legitimation of political science (Bihari 1983, Kulcsár 1986, Musil 1977). 
The results of the development of regional science in Western Europe and the 
USA were summarised in several studies and books (Florax – Plane 2004, Isard 
2003, Isserman 1993 and 1995). Several works were published about the publica-
tion forums of regional science and the activities of its international organisations 
during the past decade. In these works we find only a couple of references to Cen-
tral and Eastern European spatial research. The modest amount of references may 
be explained by the fact that the examination of the spatial evolution of the 
economy and society and the organisation of spatial research into an autonomous 
discipline were not reflected in Eastern European research programmes. 
The major scientific branch involved in the examination of spatial processes 
was social and economic geography. Almost every scientific academy had their 
own geographic institutions whose results in applied geographical research had a 
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significant impact on spatial development decisions of the era. Poland was also 
prominent in the area of institutional innovations, the name of the geographical 
institute of Polish Academy of Sciences was changed to Institute of Geography and 
Spatial Economics at the beginning of the 1970s. In Hungary, the Centre for Re-
gional Studies, functioning in the form of a network, was established in 1984 with 
the South Transdanubian Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy Sciences, 
performing territorial basic research, serving as its base. In 1988 the research 
centre in collaboration with the Faculty of Economics of the University of Pécs 
launched a post-graduate training programme in spatial development. The scien-
tific capacities of the geographical departments and institutes of the university 
were quite significant despite this discipline having been more oriented towards 
teacher training in socialist higher education. Departments of urbanism at techno-
logical universities were also acknowledged research groups in several countries. 
A significant factor in the permanent development of Polish and Hungarian spa-
tial research was the reformist spirit in the political systems of the two countries 
(Enyedi 2004, Frank – Mironowicz 2009). Consequently, relations between the 
scientific workshops of the two countries and Western European research units 
were maintained, joint research programmes were launched, and the national, 
regional and local political elite expressed interest in their research results. In fact, 
it is not too bold to state that regional research played an active role in preparing 
the regime change (Maurel 2002). Research results called attention to the need of  
a substantial transformation of the spatial structure as a consequence of the 
modernising economy, as well as of the reconceptualisation of objectives, princi-
ples and institutions of spatial development policy. The co-operation and develop-
ment coalition between the central state, the local-territorial communities, and the 
public and private sectors was to become the basis of the new model of social 
management. Hungarian research analysing the spatial structural transformation 
of planned economies highlighted the fact that Central and Eastern European eco-
nomic structure and urbanisation did not constitute an independent model, but 
was rather a copying of Western type urbanisation and development cycles with a 
significant delay. The disparities in spatial development are attributed to the 
belated development on one hand, and the functioning of the system of state so-
cialism, on the other (Enyedi 1989). 
EU membership, institutional changes and expanding financial opportunities 
have created favourable conditions in the field of spatial research as well. To be 
able to apply the Structural Policy of the European Union and elaborate regional 
development programmes and concepts, new knowledge about the practices of 
Western European spatial development policy, and an increased economic and 
human resources potential of the regions figuring in national development plans 
were required. 
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Establishment of Regional Science 
The demand for a better comprehension of spatial processes significantly in-
creased after the change of regime. The institutional structure of spatial research 
has also undergone major transformations. Academic research institutions have 
found themselves in a difficult financial situation in several countries. The Czech 
Institute of Geography was closed down, whereas in Bulgaria a research centre of 
earth sciences was established  in which the role of social geography was quite 
peripheral. Large public urban planning institutes with remarkable intellectual 
capacities were closed down which had played a significant role in elaborating and 
executing spatial and settlement development tasks of the socialist era. There have 
been centralising institutional changes within the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
recently, and the leading institution of regional science, having a nation-wide 
research network in seven towns, the Centre for Regional Studies has been 
deprived of its managing functions, and by this the national network has become 
weaker. The new research centre’s seat is in Budapest, and with this the positive 
experiences gained in decentralised management of science have assumably be-
come unavailing.   
On the other hand, the weight of regional scientific capacities of universities has 
increased. Research has once more become a priority task of universities, and the 
structure of training has also been transformed. In geography training, applied 
geography masters programmes have been launched which also specialise in 
training spatial and settlement development experts. The organisation of a masters 
programme in spatial economics and regional policy has been a significant result of 
the comprehensive reform in the economics curriculum. 
Based on internet data collection relating to research institutes and university 
workshops in the six examined Central and Eastern European countries, the num-
ber of employees engaged in spatial research exceeds 900. The distribution of stu-
dent numbers is quite uneven both within and between the respective countries 
(Table 3, Figure 2). 
Among the countries investigated in depth, Poland has the largest capacity in 
regional scientific research and training. Poznań, Łódż, Warsaw, Krakow and 
Wrocław are the country’s most significant centres of regional scientific research. 
Hungary ranks second (the most important workshop centres being Pécs and 
Budapest), with its spatial distribution of research units in nine cities and towns, 
which is more than in Romania, the next country on the list, where regional scien-
tific workshops can be found in four cities. In the Czech Republic, only the three 
largest cities can be regarded as centres of regional scientific research. Slovakia is 
tri-polar from the aspect of regional science, whereas in Bulgaria only the aca-
demic and university geographical institutes of the capital city are engaged in 
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regional scientific research.  Approximately 60 scientific workshops with regional 
research as their main profile have been organised in 30 cities of Central and 
Eastern Europe since the beginning of the 2000s. These workshops have multi-
annual research programmes, they publish their results on a regular basis, their 
participants frequently attend international scientific forums and conferences, and 
publish their own works. 
In addition to research institutions, scientific associations constitute another 
important base for spatial research. Besides researchers engaged in the field, scien-
tific associations assemble both practising professionals interested in the applica-
tion of scientific results and intellectuals interested in regional development. Their 
forums for intellectuals function as autonomous institutions or national divisions 
of international regional science associations. The first group contains e.g. the 
Hungarian and Romanian Regional Science Associations. The Romanian Regional 
Science Association was founded in 2000. Currently it has 140 members. At its 
annual thematic conferences it presents the results of Romanian spatial research. 
It publishes a journal with two issues a year, titled the “Romanian Journal of Re-
gional Science”. The Hungarian Regional Science Association was established in 
2002, currently it has 430 members. Its annual general assemblies are joined by 
thematic conferences. In the rest of the countries the organisations of regional 
scientific researchers are the national divisions of either the European Regional 
Science Association or the Regional Studies Association. In Poland, the Committee 
for Spatial Economy of the Polish Academy of Sciences (Komitet Przestrzennego 
 
Table 3. The number of regional science researchers in Central and Eastern European 
countries, 2012   
 Country The number of 
scientific researchers,  
person 
Distribution, % The rate of 
researchers employed 
in research units in 
capital cities, % 
Bulgaria 30 3.3 100.0 
Czech Republic 115 12.6 34.8 
Hungary 150 16.5 20.0 
Poland 425 46.7 17.5 
Romania 130 14.3 31.9 
Slovakia 60 6.6 50.0 
Total 910 100.0 21.4 
Source: Author’s estimations based on internet data collection. Contains university and 
research institute workshops whose name, research programmes and publications contain 
reference to regional science topics. 
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Figure 2.  Spatial research workshops in Central and Eastern Europe, 2012 
Source: Author, based on internet data sources. 
Zagospodarowania Kraju, PAN) can be regarded as the integration centre of re-
gional scientific research. The committee, operating six working groups, publishes 
three series annually. The 115 members of the Regional Scientific Committee of the 
Hungarian Academy of Sciences are working in five subcommittees. 
Conclusions 
If we examine the spatial location of R&D activity, which should be one of the 
factors supporting the dynamics of European regional development, we can see 
that the change of regime and the transition that followed it have preserved the 
“status quo ante” in the new member states coming from Central and Eastern 
Europe. Major regional inequalities still persist in the regional structure of the 
innovation institutions, with the core areas and capital cities maintaining their 
privileged position. The regional and structural policies based on EU norms have 
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not stimulated the development of R&D in the new member states, as the opera-
tional programmes for 2007–2013 demonstrate. In none of the Central or Eastern 
European countries can we find a regional or competitiveness-related operational 
programme targeting the comprehensive transformation of human resource devel-
opment in the field of research. 
The spatial distribution of regional scientific research units is somewhat more 
decentralised than in the case of other scientific disciplines. In Poland, Hungary 
and Romania, the weight of capital cities in terms of the number of employees in 
regional science is one half to one third compared to other scientific disciplines. 
Regional science could be a symbol and model for the decentralisation of social 
activities. This discipline has accumulated valuable experiences in the operation of 
its decentralised and network based organisational system, and its methods may 
be efficiently utilised in other economic and social sectors as well. 
The decentralisation of science and R&D has a number of positive effects on 
regions. The formation of research-intensive sectors increases the number of 
quality jobs and the business development effects of the spin-off companies are 
clearly evident. Innovative businesses develop the region’s export capacity and 
help the region in integrating into the European and international research area. 
Companies demanding or relying on research contribute to the re-industrialisation 
of the region and to the spread of modern services. All of these improve the 
income-generating ability of the regions and enhance regional cohesion. The 
Lisbon criteria cannot be met without decentralisation. 
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 FUTURE CHALLENGES TO REGIONAL SCIENCE. 
HIGHLIGHTS FOR RESEARCH IN CENTRAL AND 
EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 
Daniela-Luminita Constantin 
Introduction 
The institutional roots of regional science date back to the mid-twentieth century, 
when the pioneering work of Walter Isard resulted in the establishment of the 
Regional Science Association International (RSAI) in 1954. Subsequently, as the 
association developed it created – under its “umbrella” – supranational associa-
tions which included national regional science associations in North America, 
Europe, the Pacific region, Latin America, etc. As regional science has a well-
defined interdisciplinary character, the members of these associations come from 
diverse fields such as economics, geography, urban planning, architecture, sociolo-
gy, public policy, etc., being interested in spatial economics, spatial planning, 
regional and local development and other related issues (Boyce 2004). 
The First European Congress took place in The Hague in August 1961, whereas 
the European Regional Science Association (ERSA) was created later, in 1979, after 
the ERSA Congress in London. At present it counts 17 active associations (usually 
named “sections”) established either at country level or as linguistic groups cover-
ing more than one country (e.g. German and French speaking sections) (ERSA 
2013).  
After the “iron curtain” disappeared many sections were created or revitalised 
in Central and Eastern Europe. Their successful activity made RSAI and ERSA 
entrust them with organising important regional science events such as the World 
Congress of RSAI (Timisoara, Romania, 2012), the ERSA Congress (e.g. Lodz, 
Poland, 2009 or Bratislava, Slovakia, 2012), ERSA Summer Schools (Budapest, Bra-
tislava), etc. The participation of Central and East European regional scientists in 
international regional science meetings brought with it, inter alia, the approach of 
classical topics from the perspective of transition countries as well as the emer-
gence of new issues following from the tremendous tasks they had to face in the 
course of transformation. Even at present, when many of these countries have 
already become EU members, there are many issues that reflect phenomena and 
concerns specific to regional development in Central and Eastern Europe. 
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Based on these overall considerations this paper proposes an inquiry into the 
current and future challenges to regional science, aiming to reveal issues of 
particular interest to research undertaken in Central and East European Countries 
(CEECs) and to recommend new directions of investigation. It may open the door 
for further debates on this subject, able to create synergic effects for regional 
science related research in this part of Europe. 
Sub-periods in the Evolution of Regional Science 
The post-World War II reconstruction efforts boosted regional science, based on 
the increasing demand of planners and managers recruited from the spatial scien-
tists community (Bailly – Gibson 2004). For three decades – 1950s, 1960s and 
1970s – the development vision was deeply influenced by the post-war regional 
adjustments, characterised by “think regionally” and a strong emphasis on location 
issues.  
Then, in the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, the globalisation trends 
entailed new orientations, focused on flexible space, liberal policies and “think 
globally”. In this period regional science underwent a significant decline, scientists 
even talking about a crisis in “mainstream” regional science in terms of relevance 
and perspective (Bailly – Coffey 1996). Based on a realistic approach to this situa-
tion, desirable directions for future orientation in this field were proposed. 
Moreover, the optimists thought that this was a time when regional science was in 
a stage of reflection and evaluation from various perspectives, and they identified 
the following three major themes as sources of “new combinations”: (1) “progress 
in theory, research tools and techniques”, (2) “major changes in the economy” and 
(3) “the rise of new spatial policy questions” (van Geenhuizen – Nijkamp 1996, p. 
224). 
GIS (Geographic Information Systems) modelling, neural network analysis, 
spatio-temporal autocorrelation, the new way of approaching and developing 
spatial planning activities were considered the cornerstones for progress in re-
search tools and techniques, to mention just a few. 
Major changes in the economy have lead to new achievements in classical sub-
jects like regional growth, location patterns, regional labour markets, transporta-
tion and mobility etc., as a result of addressing questions raised by the emergence 
of the knowledge-driven economy, developments in ICT and transition to a service 
economy. 
From among the new spatial policy questionswe would choose here some of the 
extremely challenging issues triggered by the EU enlargement process. These have 
assumed increasing importance to research focusing on regions with emphasis on 
(Constantin 2007): 
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 the regional profile, potential and specialisation; 
 the quality of regional/local business environment and, at the same time, the 
social and cultural influences on the creation of regional networks; 
 the way these specific patterns are reflected in the regional competition and 
competitiveness dynamics; 
 new perspectives for convergence/divergence in regional growth in connec-
tion with the new wave of EU enlargement, etc. 
Transition itself raised specific questions at the beginning of the 1990s that 
were gradually answered. They focused on: 
 the need for theory and policy concepts of transformation processes such as 
those of the establishment of and institutional and legal framework for mar-
ket economy; 
 strategies for economic restructuring, macrostabilisation, privatisation; 
 solutions for meeting the criteria of a functioning market economy as a basic 
condition for accession to the EU; 
 and, at a regional level: 
 problems of economic restructuring in the old industrial regions; 
 ways of opening the formerly closed economic systems and finding a role for 
them in global competition; 
 relationship between Eastern and Western Europe in terms of competition, 
dependency, polarisation, integration; 
 strategic trans-border co-operation; 
 defining and establishing territorial organisation structures compatible with 
those existing in the EU; 
 ensuring high absorption capacity of EU financial supports via structural-
type instruments, etc.  
These new orientations led to effervescence reinvigorating regional research. 
As a result new upward trends were noticed at the beginning of the 2000s. They 
relate to environmental and social sustainability, defined by “think sustainable”, 
continental co-operation and financial power (Bailly – Gibson 2004). Successful 
endeavours can be found in the conceptualisation and operationalisation of re-
gional endogenous growth theory: it is placed in a space–time environment in 
which traditional regional growth theories meet new economic geography and 
modern innovation models. Linking entrepreneurship, leadership and institutional 
reform to regional growth analysis has also been successful (Coccossis – Nijkamp 
2007).  
To put it in a nutshell, Figure 1 presents the three periods of regional science 
with their main characteristics. 
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Figure 1. Three periods in regional science evolution 
Source: Simplified version of Bailly and Gibson (2004, p. 131). 
Current and Future Challenges to Regional Science 
In today’s globalised world the dynamic forces of technological and institutional 
change bring about rapid transitions in space, impacting on regional development, 
technological innovation, knowledge, people and firms. Intense debates focus on 
development and urbanisation, territorial development and international integra-
tion, pointing out specific issues relating to various spatial scales. Thus, on a local 
spatial scale the emphasis is put on integrating rural and urban areas and manag-
ing urbanisation. On a national spatial scale the main question is about the integra-
tion of lagging and leading regions, whereas on an international spatial scale the 
integration of isolated and well-connected countries is the basic concern (Gill – 
Goh 2010). 
 As a result, the international research agendas are driven by new policy issues 
that challenge the established theories and analytical instruments. A complex 
policy analysis framework has emerged aiming to integrate sustainable develop-
ment, territorial cohesion, competitiveness and growth at supra-national, inter-
regional, intra-regional and intra-urban levels (Coccossis – Nijkamp 2007). Deriv-
ing from this framework, there is a major need to address more practical, concrete 
issues affecting large geographical areas and numerous communities. Among these 
three will be discussed here: the ones that have already emerged, those included in 
worldwide policy agendas, and finally those concepts and methods which have 
shown considerable progress and now particular efforts should be made to link 
them to empirical work. 
The first issue refers to the role that regional science can play in approaching 
sustainable development and environmental sustainability from the aspects of 
global environmental changes and human security. Within this context there will 
 Daniela-Luminita Constantin 212 
be strong need for research regarding the operationalisation of critical indicators 
and for conceiving models and scenarios for disaster management. At the same 
time, the constant emergence of local and regional sources of conflict, challenging 
not only local or regional but also global security, also requires specific methods of 
conflict management in a multi-actor spatial system able to contribute to both local 
and global sustainability (Constantin 2007, Coccossis – Nijkamp 2007). 
The second issue – partly related to the first one – addresses the increasing 
worry about international migration. At present no country in the world can avoid 
international migration flows and this phenomenon is a special concern in the 
enlarged EU where the free movement of persons is a basic freedom. There are 
serious debates in the political arena – and regional science has to approach them 
with its specific tools – on the East–West migration flows, temporary (work) mi-
gration versus permanent migration, the question of remigration, issues con-
cerning losses/gains for the country of origin as well as for the destination country, 
the question of remmitances and their influence on macroeconomic indicators, and 
– from a sociological viewpoint – the problem of migrants’ integration into the host 
country’s society. Migration from the countries outside the EU borders – which 
themselves are moving – especially immigration from Asian countries is also a 
major concern. Asia is considered the largest source of migration in the 21st cen-
tury. Another topic connected with the first issue – global environmental changes – 
is the question of population displacement, of large-scale population flows caused 
by natural, environmental disasters. This also has to find its place in regional re-
search with focus on migration (Constantin 1999 and 2007; Constantin et al.  
2004). 
The third issue envisages research on urban phenomena: policies for urban re-
vitalisation and urban renewal, the issues of urban unemployment, poverty, hous-
ing problems, etc. There are interesting parallel developments which refer to 
urban revitalisation, the rise of mega-cities and the urbanisation of rural areas. 
Such developments may generate big changes in classical location models and 
creative research on learning systems, entrepreneurship, interaction, clustering 
and networking in open economies, spatial lifestyles in the e-economy, etc. (Con-
stantin 2007, Coccossis – Nijkamp 2007). Urban policy and international migration 
are also interrelated as large cities witness huge immigration flows.   
To summarise: without neglecting the great contribution of regional science to 
understanding contemporary space-economy, tremendous efforts are expected to 
be made to keep pace with the unprecedented increase in its complexity. The new 
situations require adequate solutions for including space in the new economic 
models, envisaging the cross-fertilisation among location theory, development 
theory and macroeconomic growth theory, clarifying at the same time the territo-
rial micro-foundations of macroeconomic models (Capello 2007). 
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Subjects of Particular Interest to CEECs 
Since the 1990s regional science in the CEECs has incorporated specific issues 
resulting from their transition to market economy and from their EU accession. As 
a consequence, regional analysis and regional policy are being reshaped at EU 
level, discussing subjects investigated for all EU countries but requiring differen-
tiated approaches related to the new EU members. Three topics have been selected 
and are proposed for discussion in this paper. 
First, the EU convergence process, representing the core of cohesion policy, has 
been reconsidered, displaying new dimensions after the expansion of the EU by 12 
accession countries in 2004 and 2007. The latest enlargement deeply increased 
disparities within EU: thus, while the population increased by 33%, GDP rose by 
only 5% (EC 2001). At the same time, the regional policy context changed. Due to 
the unprecedentedly great interregional disparities in the enlarged EU, the regions 
of the CEECs have become the main beneficiaries of the renewed cohesion policy: 
51 out of 55 NUTS 2 regions in the new member states (NMS) are funded under the 
Convergence Objective and all NMS receive allocations from the Cohesion Fund.  
The 2007–2013 programme period is the first one in EU history when cohesion 
policy expenditures surpass those of agriculture in the EU budget (Leonardi 2006). 
In the total budget of approximately € 862.4 billion, Cohesion Policy accounts for 
€ 307.6 billion (35.6%), an average annual expenditure of € 44 billion, compared 
with € 41.8 billion allocated to market-related expenditure and direct payments to 
agriculture. This requires a sound financial base and efficient use of resources, as 
cohesion policy is fundamentally a development policy, a policy for wealth creation 
rather than for redistribution (Barca 2009, Constantin – Goschin – McCann 2012).  
From the start of cohesion policy the CEECs has had big challenges with regard 
to their capability of efficiently using the great amount of allocated funds and pro-
moting adequate economic policies and economic behaviour to generate high rates 
of their endogenous growth. The first issue relates to the so-called “absorption 
capacity”, the degree to which a country is able to effectively and efficiently spend 
the financial resources allocated from European Funds. In other words, it ex-
presses whether a member state is able to “digest and consume” the funds so as to 
foster its development and thus improve its economic and social performance (NEI 
2002, Horvat 2005). Unfortunately, except for Poland and Hungary, the other 
CEECs recorded absorption rates below 40% in December 2012 (Insideurope 
2013), indicating a series of “absorption problems”. Beyond drawbacks in ensuring 
institutional capacity and observing the technical rules related to the implementa-
tion and monitoring of the EU funded programmes, research undertaken in this 
field has also identified problems regarding the impact of the EU funds. In this field 
there is still much room for research dedicated to finding the most appropriate 
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solutions to problems such as: administrative absorption, rent-seeking, use of 
funds for consumption instead of investment, timing related problems, information 
disadvantage of the transfer generating authority/“principal agent” problems, 
multiple priorities leading to sub-optimal choice, or problems resulting from rela-
tive price changes induced by transfers (Kalman 2002, pp. 5–9). These isssues 
emphasise a very important idea, namely that absorption capacity matters but, at 
the same time, the qualitative aspects of the impact of structural assistance is also 
important. The NMS should learn from the experiences of the countries having 
successfully used structural assistance: they have open economies, solid internal 
public policies and administrations able to implement it. 
Second, when it comes to the most attracting regional development directions 
supported by cohesion policy, clusters are definitely among the most cited ones. 
Although regional clusters development is encouraged by special measures in the 
EU, cluster policy in CEECs should consider that cluster development here is still 
behind expectations in many cases and thus different support policies should be 
applied. In other words, there is no single recipe for less developed regions to 
follow to meet the needs of all clusters; on the contrary, successful cluster policies 
have to take into account the specific regional contexts (Rosenfeld 2002, Hospers – 
Beugelsdijk 2002, Leick 2010). A classification proposed by Torre (2008) com-
bining the cluster groups based on the localisation of inter-firm relations with 
those resulted from the organisation of inter-firm relations, has drawn attention to 
the fact that besides the clustering case revealed by Porter and characterised by an 
important degree of localisation and organisation of inter-firm relationships, in 
practice there are also other clustering cases resulting from these combined view-
points. More specifically, there are cases characterised by strong inter-firm rela-
tionships but weak local embeddedness, which correspond to the clusters analysed 
at national and regional levels in a broad sense, as well as to the clusters with 
strong spatial concentration but weak internal local bonds. The latter category is 
specific to many production systems not included in the initial Porter’s definition 
but presently targeted by innovation policies aiming to create synergies at local 
level (e.g. competitiveness poles). This category also applies to many of the “clus-
ters” identified in various emerging markets (Torre 2008). 
The results of analyses of the clustering phenomenon in less developed regions, 
in line with with the reflections formulated by studies in the same field (e.g. Leick 
2010, Constantin et al. 2011), suggest that for these regions the promotion of clus-
ter policies specific to local production systems of an industrial district type would 
be recommended, as described by Becattini (1990). Such policies seem to be the 
most appropriate organisational form for cluster development still in its incipient 
stage. An emphasis on “soft” measures able to strengthen the local networks and to 
ensure cluster identity would be recommended. 
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Third, considering that many regional scientists are not only researchers but 
also academics at the same time lecturing at their universities, there is much room 
for creating network-based collaboration at European level. Its aim would be to 
increase regional science-related subjects in the academic curricula and, conse-
quently, to contribute to a coherent, correlated and updated content of syllabi, able 
to reflect objectively the big progress and changes in many fields, in many disci-
plines of regional science (e.g. regional and urban economics, regional and urban 
planning, etc.).  
There are many universities and research institutes in Western Europe with 
great achievements in academic activities in regional science, but there are not so 
many in Eastern Europe and networking could contribute to a real knowledge 
transfer and synergy between the West and the East. The consolidation of partner-
ships established in the course of noteworthy international projects could be an 
important contribution in this respect. Such projects were, for example, “Growth – 
Innovation – Competitiveness: Fostering Cohesion in Central and Eastern Europe” 
(GRINCOH) – FP7 Research Programme, Lead Partner: EUROREG, University of 
Warsaw; “Indicators and Perspectives for Services of General Interest in Territorial 
Cohesion and Development” (SeGI) – ESPON project,  Lead Partner: Royal Institute 
of Technology, Stockholm; “Adaptability and Change: The Regional Dimensions in 
Central and Eastern Europe” – World Bank financed project, Lead Partner: 
EUROREG, University of Warsaw; “Adriatic Danubian Clustering” (ADC) – project 
under the South-East Europe Transnational Co-operation Programme, Lead Part-
ner: Veneto Region; and so on. In all these projects both universities and research 
institutes from CEECs and from Western Europe have been engaged with substan-
tial positive effects. This practice should be preserved and extended towards new 
universities and research institutes to stimulate new attractive joint projects in the 
future. 
Journals and books in regional science published in CEECs may also stimulate 
networking via increasing the number of articles authored by scholars from these 
countries, possibly in collaboration with West European authors, as well as by 
exchanging members in their international advisory boards. Journals like Roma-
nian Journal of Regional Science, the journal of the Romanian Regional Science As-
sociation; Europa XXI, the journal of the Warsaw Institute of Geography and Spatial 
Organization, Polish Academy of Sciences; the “Discussion Papers” series of the 
Pécs Research Centre for Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences; “The 
Hungarian Labour Market” series of the Budapest Research Centre for Economic 
and Regional Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, etc. are relevant examples, 
to mention just a few. 
The above-mentioned issues gain particular significance in relation to the “new 
configuration” of the EU: the new Central and East European members need a new 
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generation of regional policy-makers, regional planners, and the universities 
should direct their students’ attention to regional science subjects and attract them 
to their MSc and PhD programmes in these fields (Constantin 2007). Eventually, 
this could contribute to the development of networks bringing together regional 
scientists, regional planners, representatives of governmental institutions at 
national and regional levels, business and consultancy firms. This could contribute 
to making regional policies the result of a large partnership, with substantial bene-
fits for economic practice. 
Concluding remarks 
For more than fifty years regional science has proved its viability and usefulness in 
both theory and practice. Its future is closely related to progress in theory and 
improvement in research tools and techniques, going in parallel with structural 
changes in the economy and the rise of new spatial policy questions. At European 
level, the CEECs bring about their own “landscape”, derived from the overall 
orientation of cohesion policy. Consequently, specific responses are required and it 
is strongly recommended to outline these responses in a favourable, synergic, 
networking-based environment. 
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 RESEARCH FUNDING UNDER FISCAL RESTRICTIONS 
Dalina Dumitrescu 
Introduction 
Scientific research, technological development, and innovation are the basic pillars 
of knowledge-based economy, the engine of development, competitiveness and 
welfare. More and more, research, development and innovation (RDI) expenses are 
viewed as ones having significant and long-term positive effects on the economy 
and society as a whole.  
Confronted with the financial crisis, in 2009 Romania adopted an austerity 
package based on a dramatic cut of public resources, affecting RDI spending as 
well. Our paper will try to give an overview of the Romanian RDI funding system 
between 2007 and 2013. We aim to answer the following questions:  
 What decisions did the Romanian authorities make regarding RDI policy 
faced with dramatically reduced resources? 
 Which elements changed in the funding mechanism and based on what 
criteria? 
 What were the effects of these changes?  
The answers are closely linked to the  implementation of the Romanian 
National System of Research, Development and Innovation between 2007 and 
2013, and are related to the future challenges of the RDI system in Romania, too. 
Literature supports our approach. The current RDI institutional landscape in 
the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEs) is seen as “fragments of the old 
R&D systems, which are trying to adjust through a set of diverse survival strategies 
and new pockets of innovation activities” (Radosevic 1999), or as a policy mix of 
survival and restructuring (Radosevic 2003). In these countries RDI is affected also 
by the shortage of demand, being isolated from enterprises, which, therefore, are 
unable to become flagships of innovation (Radosevic 2003). Some authors 
(Dumitrescu 2010) acknowledge the fact that a permanently changing allocation 
system may lead to unintended negative consequences especially in the field of 
basic research outputs. The importance of a sound funding mechanism has been 
underlined also by the European Commission (EC 2010a, p. 20) in the claim that 
the economic relevance of research requires, among other things, “increased and 
more effective public expenditure” – a view shared by a large number of member 
states (EC 2010b).   
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The Mission, Vision and the Instruments of the National Strategy 2007–2013 
The National Strategy 2007–2013 has been the fundamental pillar of Romanian 
RDI policy for almost a decade: its first steps date back to 2005–2006, when as a 
part of the foresight exercise over 5000 people were asked to respond to online 
surveys, and more than 800 persons from relevant research institutions and 
representatives of the public administration participated at workshops. The 
involvement of the main stakeholders in the field resulted in 25 RDI development 
priorities. At the same time a study was prepared, too, dealing with the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and risks of the Romanian research system related to 
the current national social and economic context, globalisation and the integration 
into the European Union. Two fundamental documents could be considered as the 
main outputs of this process: (a) the National Strategy 2007–2013; and (b) the 
National Plan II (NP II). The NP II was approved by the Romanian Government by 
its Decision no. 475/2007 (Ohler et al. 2012). In 2005, the Romanian Research 
Area (RRA) was defined, and identified as the sum of all Romanian entities 
involved in research, development and innovation, and also as a space of co-
operation, collaboration and synergies between research entities and institutions, 
often competing for scarce resources (Anton 2006).  
The transition to a mechanism based on financing through competition has 
determined on the one hand a need that researchers adapt to a new philosophy in 
the preparation of applications aligned to the competitive funding process and, on 
the other hand, a more results-oriented approach, given the fact that expected 
outputs should become visible (ISI articles, patents, new products, new technolo-
gies) (Dumitrescu 2010). 
As regards the available funds for research, characteristic trends can be 
identified: after the sharp increase in 2006 – when they doubled – the volume of 
resources continued to grow until 2008 according to the provisions of the National 
Research Plan. This trend was in line with the annual levels agreed with the 
Romanian Ministry of Finance in order that available public resources for research 
reach 1% of the GDP by 2010. However, in 2009 and 2010, research resources 
were dramatically cut, and a slow growth in funds restarted only with 2011 
(Prisecaru 2012) (Figure 1). 
In the first two years of NP II implementation, good results verified the vision of 
the Strategy: the allocated resources were close to the provisions, the calls for 
tenders were launched every year for all domains, the number of Romanian 
journals indexed in the ISI Thomson–Reuters database increased (together with 
the corresponding number of cited articles), new technological transfer centres 
were set up, the transparence of the funded projects improved, the transfer of 
obtained results to business intensified (Ohler et al. 2012, Talpes 2012). 
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Figure 1. Funds allocated for research, development and innovation in 2000–2012 (million lei) 
Source: 2012 ANSC report. 
Research Funding under Fiscal Restrictions 
The main changes in the RDI funding mechanism under fiscal restrictions could be 
identified as follows:  
(a) considerable reduction in public funds;  
(b) misalignments contradictions between public declarations and facts 
regarding RDI as a national priority;  
(c) the discontinuity of calls,  
(d) the number of criteria used in the funding decisions;  
(e) frequent changes in evaluation criteria and information packages; 
(f) the use of international experts in the evaluation process;  
(g) discriminative rules. 
(a) Starting with 2009 the economic crisis hit the Romanian economy sharply, 
well reflected in some macro-economic indicators (Appendix 1). The consequences 
for the RDI system were severe: important reductions of public funds allocated to 
RDI compared with the Strategy provisions (–63% in 2009, –73% in 2010, –68%  
in 2011, and –70% in 2012), cutbacks of the already contracted project budgets 
(2008, 2009, 2010), changes in the rules of participation in tenders (2011, 2012), 
changes in eligibility and evaluation criteria (2010, 2011, 2012), mergers at the 
level of certain funding agencies, new roles of advisory bodies and new member-
ship (2010, 2011, 2012). Neither the National Council for Science and Technology 
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Policy (CNPST) – identified as a necessary institution by the National Strategy 
2007–2013 – could fulfil its task (Curaj 2012).   
(b) Government decisions on funds were not in line with the public declara-
tions regarding RDI activity as a national priority. Other European countries 
considered investments in research as one of the most effective methods to cope 
with the impacts of the crisis, turning this idea into practice by an increased per-
centage of GDP dedicated to RDI financing during the crisis period 2008–2010. 
Romania was among the few countries which experienced a decrease in the GDP 
percentage allocated to RDI (Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Expenditure on RDI between 2007 and 2010 as a percentage of GDP 
Source: Eurostat (Document code: t2020_20). 
As already mentioned above, expenditure on RDI in Romania had a slow grow-
ing trend between 2000 and 2008, and a reversed one between 2008 and 2010 
(Figure 3).  
At the same time, in Romania the percentage share of RDI expenditure in GDP is  
more than four times lower than the corresponding ratios in the EU27 and the 
Euro zone (Figure 4). 
Based on the data presented in Appendix 2 about the expenditure on RDI by 
source of funds in 2010, the percentage of expenditure on RDI by business enter-
prises represents only 32.2% in Romania (exceeding in the ranking only Cyprus, 
Lithuania, Poland and Bulgaria). In the same year, the percentage of government 
spending on RDI was 54.4% compared to the Euro area average of 35.4% [with 
only Cyprus (69%), Poland (60.9%) and Bulgaria (60.5%) having higher ratios]. 
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Figure 3. Romania’s expenditure on RDI, 2000–2010 (% share of GDP) 
Source: Eurostat (Document code: t2020_20). 
 
Figure 4.  Romania versus the EU27 and the euro zone: expenditure on RDI as a percentage of 
GDP in 2000–2010  
Source: Eurostat (Document code: t2020_20). 
Expenditure on RDI by sector in 2005 and 2010 expressed as a percentage of 
GDP (Appendix 3) reflects an increase in the period for all three sectors. However, 
the 2010 RDI expenditure level of the Romanian higher education sector is the 
smallest in Europe (0.12% of GDP), contrasted by the highest levels in Sweden 
(0.90%) and Finland (0.79), and by the euro-zone average (0.48%). 
(c) The launch of calls related to RDI activity was a discontinuous process. The 
calls for the projects were not launched yearly as assumed in the national Strategy 
and , in 2010,  no call for proposlas was announced (Table 1).  
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Table 1. Calls with public information packages per type of programme 
Type of projects Calls 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Programme ideas       
Exploratory research projects  x x   x x 
Exploratory complex research projects   x   x  
Exploratory workshops  x   x x 
School of Advanced Studies     x x 
Partnerships programms  in priority areas       
Collaborative applied research projects     x  
Thematically oriented RDI projects x x     
Human resources       
Post-doctoral research projects     x  x x 
Research projects to stimulate the formation 
of young independent research teams   
  x  x x 
Research projects for stimulating reinstatement 
for Romanian scientists 
x x x    
Complex projects for the reintegration of 
researchers  
x      
Research projects for young PhD graduates x x x    
Mobility of PhD projects        
Mobility of researchers project        
Awards for outstanding research outcomes     x 
on 
going 
Awards for the scientists getting the 
“habilitation”degree  
      
Rewarding scientific and technical innovation 
and artistic creativity 
x      
Research fellowships “Stefan Odobleja”  x      
Capacities       
Module I – CD investments in infrastructure 
projects  
     x 
Module II – Projects supporting CDI activities        
Module III – Projects to support Romania’s 
participation in international research projects 
    x x 
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Table 1  (continued) 
Type of projects Calls 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Innovation       
Product development – Systems – Technology  x x    
on 
going 
Stimulation of high-tech export      
on 
going 
Infrastructure development of innovation and 
technology transfer 
      
Innovation support services       x 
EUREKA European Cop-EUROSTARS   x   x x 
Source: Strategia Nationala de CDI 2007–2013. 
(d) For funding decisions, both eligibility and evaluation criteria were in use. 
The applicants submitted proposals expected to comply with the two sets of crite-
ria as much as possible. The two sets were not always consistent, neither the num-
ber of criteria was well based. On average, more than 20 criteria were in use for 
each programme. For example, for the Partnership programmes the number of 
criteria was 24 in total, while for the Human resource programme – as part of the 
“post-doctoral research projects” – there were 27. The numerous criteria had some 
overlaps and biases, too, in a number of cases.Certain aspects of the proposals 
were assessed by more than one criterion [e.g. novelty four times, the request for 
“clarity” in different forms, the track record of the director of research ice (post-
doctoral research projects), etc.] (Prisecaru 2012). 
Both for an expert filling in scores or verbal notes and for the evaluators who 
meet to discuss a proposal and reach a consensus, it is difficult to handle such com-
plex systems. Thus evaluators tended to simplify the judgement and to follow their 
own criteria. 
The selected criteria were highly restrictive for the managers of projects, and 
sometimes were not adjusted to their expectable capabilities (Table 2). 
Besides, also the misalignments between the national criteria for promotion at 
the universities and research institutes and the eligibility criteria set for the 
managers of projects induced confusion, resulting in the lack of motivation of 
people involved in research on the one side, and in worsening conditions for re-
searchers in some domains to get access to funds on the other. 
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Table 2.  Eligibility criteria for the mentor of the project (social sciences) 
Minimum eligibility criteria for the mentor 
of the project (social sciences) – Call 2011 
Minimum eligibility criteria for the mentor 
of the project (social sciences) – Call 2012 
A stated minimum number of points ob-
tained based on the following intellectual 
contributions published starting with 
1 January 2001: 
(1) books 
(2) chapters in books 
(3) articles 
Regarding points (1)–(2), only those books 
were taken into account which were avail-
able in at least 3 such libraries of universi-
ties of EU member states or OECD member 
states that are indexed in the World Cat 
catalogue. 
As for point (3), articles should be pub-
lished by the author as main author in jour-
nals with a relative influence score of at 
least 0.25 in the Web of Science, strictly in 
the categories (document type) article, re-
view or proceedings paper.  
A stated minimum number of points ob-
tained based on the following intellectual 
contributions published 2002–2012: 
(1) books 
(2) chapters in books 
(3) articles 
Regarding points (1)–(2), only those books 
were taken into account which were availa-
ble in at least 12 such libraries of universi-
ties of EU member states or OECD member 
states that are indexed in Karlsruhe Virtu-
ally Catalog (KVK)  
As for point (3), articles should be published 
by the author as main author in journals 
with a relative influence score of at least 
0.25 in Web of Science, strictly in the catego-
ries (document type) article, review or pro-
ceedings paper. 
 Source: Strategia Nationala de CDI 2007–2013. 
Some Effects of the Adjustment in RDI funding
The experiences presented above lead us to conclude that the adaptation of RDI 
funding mechanisms to budget cuts affected the performance of the RDI sector as a 
whole, and put a severe pressure on the researcher community in terms of com-
pliance with the changes in the criteria and the rules.  
The effects of these changes can be judged by the strengths and weaknesses of 
Romanian RDI compared with the EU member states and with a reference group of 
comparable countries (Foray – David – Hall 2009). 
In 2010, both the number of new graduates in science and engineering per 
thousand population, and EU Framework Program funding per thousand GERD ex-
ceeded the EU  average, but some other indicators show that Romania has a lot to 
do in increasing the number of highly cited articles in scientific publications 
worldwide, in the funding of private research activity, and the application of pa-
tents (Figure 5). Thus the budget cuts and the subsequent adjustments deeply 
affected the potential of innovation, the research infrastructure, as well as the 
transfer and application of innovation and patents. 
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As for economic competitiveness, in the Global Competitiveness Report 2012–
2013 Romania is classified among the “Stage 2 – efficiency-driven economies”. The 
Innovation pillar is in line with the average of the group, however, it is well below 
the average indicator for countries classified as “Stage 3 – Innovation-driven econ-
omies” (Figure 6). 
Sub-indices of the Innovation pillar show that Romania lost valuable positions 
in the world ranking concerning government procurement of advanced techno-
logical products and university–industry collaboration in RDI, but it is in the first 
half of the classification regarding “Patents, applications/million population”. 
Nonetheless, except for this last element all the sub-indices of this pillar place 
Romania in the second, inferior part of the world ranking (Figure 7). 
 
Figure 5. Strengths and weaknesses of the Romanian RDI system in 2010 [1] 
Notes: 
[1] The value refer to 2010 or to the latest available year. 
[2] In brackets: average annual growth for Romania 2000–2010; Growth rates which do not 
refer to 2000–2010 refer to growth between the earliest available year and the latest 
available year for which comparable data are available over the period 2000–2010. 
[3] Fractional counting method. 
[4] EU does not include DE, IE, EL, NL. 
[5] TR is not included in the reference group. 
Source: DG Research and Innovation Data: DG Research and Innovation. Eurostat. OECD. 
Science Metrix/Scopus (Elsevier). Innovtion Union Scoreboard. 
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Figure 6. Global Competitiveness Index: Romania – Stage of development 
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report 2012–2013. 
 
 Figure 7.  The changing position of Romania in the world ranking of the GCI Innovation pillar  
Source: World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Reports (2008–2009; 2009–2010; 
2010–2011; 2011–2012; 2012–2013). 
58
64
72
78
77
84 82 83
91
84
74 74
103
87
87
72 73
115 113
73
75
105
111
114
60
56 55
59
82
55 57
62 62
56
50
70
90
110
130
Rank/out 134 Rank/out 133 Rank/out 139 Rank/out 142 Rank/out 144
2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013
Capacity for 
innovation
Quality of  scientif ic 
research 
institutions
Company 
spending on R&D
University-industry 
collaboration in 
R&D
Gov’t procurement 
of  advanced tech 
products
Availability of  
scientists and 
engineers
PCT patents, 
applications/million 
pop
 Dalina Dumitrescu 228 
The dramatic drop in research funding has its effects with an expected delay in 
time: the decrease in the number of scientific papers published by Romanian 
authors in journals indexed in the ISI Thomson-Reuters database is clearly visible 
(Figure 8). Similarly, the number of Romanian journals indexed in the same data-
base stagnated between 2008 and 2012 after a spectacular growth in 2007–2008 
(Figure 9). 
 
 
 Figure 8. Number of scientific papers published by Romanian authors in the ISI Thomson–
Reuters database 
Source: 2012 ANSC report. 
 
 
Figure 9. Romanian Journals in the ISI Thomson–Reuters database 
Source: 2012 ANSC report. 
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The Future of the RDI System in Romania 
Leaving the present level of GERD and BERD unchanged, Romania runs the risk of 
falling further behind in competitiveness, with a serious lag in building a 
knowledge-based economy. The RDI intensity target fixed at 2% of the GDP by 
2020 is very ambitious, and difficult to reach if the country does not give priority 
to RDI in the context of smart fiscal consolidation, while implementing some key 
reforms without delay. The main challenges in the sector could be summerised as 
follows (Mărcuş 2012): 
 (1) The Europe 2020 strategy sets a 3% RDI intensity objective, and most 
member states have set their national target values accordingly. Romania pro-
jected a similar trend to that of the EU, but with a target of only 2% of GDP for the 
RDI expenditure (Figure 10).  
Romania and other member states (Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Poland and Spain) need to significantly raise their rate of increase in RDI intensity 
to reach their target values. This, in the case of Romania needs extra efforts (Figure 
11), based on further structural changes (Erawatch 2013). 
 (2) Rising funds for RDI must be accompanied by decreasing fluctuation in the 
level of public funding. In spite of attempts to realise multi-annual planning in the 
National Strategy 2007–2013, annual funding was kept in practice, thus unex-
pected and deep budget cuts affected the continuity of research projects, the quali-
ty of outputs, the trust and the morale of the researcher community.  
(3) A valuable lesson learned in the last ten years was that fragmentation is a 
fundamental weakness of the Romanian RDI system (with a large number of actors 
and the lack of a critical mass of results) (EC 2011). This should be taken into 
account in improving the efficiency and effectiveness of public RDI spending. On 
the other hand, the literature identified a new pillar and a new approach for im-
proving RDI spending. Namely that Eastern European (EE) countries have lower 
levels of productivity than might be expected by their R&D capacities and produc-
tion capabilities, which points to possible inefficiencies in the application of their 
research results (Hicks 2012). That is, a better transfer of knowledge to business 
would be required. A recent research (Kravtsova – Radosevic 2012) revealed that a 
shift of the current exclusive focus of EE R&D systems on knowledge generation to 
knowledge diffusion and absorption could lead to considerable improvements. At 
regional level, the standard deviation of annual changes in productivity of EE coun-
tries showed big cross-country differences. But from the early 1990s to 2007, the 
starndard deviation of the yearly growth rates between countries have been falling 
continuously, which is a bad sign, as for the EE much higher rates of productivity 
growth and differentiation among individual countries would be needed to catch 
up with the EU average. 
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Figure 10.  Trend projections for RDI intensity in Romania and the EU (1) 
Data: DG Research and Innovation, Eurostat, Member State. 
Notes: 
(1) The R&D Intensity projections based on trends are derived from the average annual 
growth in R&D Intensity for 2000–2010. 
(2) EU: This projection is based on the R&D Intensity target of 3.0% for 2020. 
(3) RO: This projection is based on a tentative R&D Intensity target of 2.0% for 2020. 
Source: DG Research and Innovation – Economic Analysis unit. 
 
Figure 11. Progress required to meet Europe 2020 R&D targets 
Source: Europe 2020 Targets. 
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(4) The continuously low level of financial resources allocated to RDI purposes 
reflects the insufficient political awareness of the added value of RDI activities to 
growth and competitiveness. The governance of RDI policies should be strength-
ened, together with the policy instruments of stakeholder ministries, whose in-
volvement in the selection of RDI priorities would be a basic criterion of policy 
planning. There have been attempts to set up institutions co-ordination of the RDI 
policy, but they never functioned as real mediators – let us just mention the Inter-
ministerial Council that exists on paper since 2002, but has never functioned.  
(5) The vulnerability of intellectual property rights legal framework provisions 
and doubts related to their application demotivated the development of private 
RDI, mainly related to the uncertainties of ownership rights and profit sharing of 
research results. Considerable steps are to be taken in the future also to improve 
access to private loans for local small and medium-sized enterprises specialised in 
RDI, and especially for start-ups (Strategia Nationala de CDI 2007–2013). 
The implementation of The National Research, Development and Innovation 
Strategy 2007–2013 developed and consolidated the RDI funding system. In 2013, 
Romania needs a proper and efficient set of policies, instruments and mechanisms 
to transfer RDI results to the benefit of the economy and society. The future RDI 
Strategy 2014–2020 will be based on the European Smart Specialisation research 
and innovation strategy, an approach to economic development through targeted 
support to RDI, a process of developing a vision, identifying competitive advantage, 
setting strategic priorities and making use of smart policies to maximise the 
knowledge-based development potential of any region (strong or weak, high-tech 
or low-tech) (Resiga 2012). 
In sum, to reach the objectives of the Smart strategy,  strong political commit-
ment will be needed to build and to implement a right and realistic RDI Strategy 
that could be a fundamental driver of sustainable and competitive development of 
the socio-economic system in Romania. 
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Appendix 1. Romania – Key economic indicators  
 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Real GDP growth (%)  7.3 –6.6 –1.6 2.5 0.9 
Domestic demand (%)  8.3 –13.5 –1.6 3.2 0.6 
Consumer price index (%, average)  7.8 5.6 6.1 5.8 3.0 
Fiscal balance (% of GDP)  –4.8 –7.4 –6.4 –4.1 –2.2 
Structural fiscal balance (% of GDP)  –7.5 –6.8 –4.9 –3.0 –0.9 
Current account balance (% of GDP)  –11.6 –4.2 –4.4 –4.4 –3.7 
Foreign direct investment balance (% of GDP)  6.7 3.0 1.8 1.4 0.9 
Gross external debt (% of GDP)  51.8 68.6 74.5 72.1 70.2 
Source: IMF, August 2012. 
Appendix 2. Gross domestics expenditure on R& D source of founds, 2005 and 2010 (% of total 
gross expenditure on R& D) 
 
Business enterprises Government Abroad 
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
EU 27(1) 54.1 54.1 34.5 34.9 9.0 8.4 
Euro area (1) 56.1 55.7 35.4 35.4 7.0 7.0 
Belgium (1) 59.7 58.6 24.7 25.3 12.4 12.1 
Bulgaria (1) 27.8 30.2 63.9 60.5 7.6 8.4 
Czech Republic 53.2 48.9 40.9 39.9 4.9 10.4 
Denmark 59.5 60.3 27.6 27.7 10.1 8.8 
Germany (1) 67.6 66.1 28.4 29.7 3.7 3.8 
Estonia 38.5 43.4 43.5 44.3 17.1 11.5 
Ireland (1) 57.4 51.2 32.0 31.3 8.6 15.6 
Greece 31.1 : 46.8 : 19.0 : 
Spain (1) 46.3 43.4 43.0 47.1 5.7 : 
France 51.9 51.0 38.6 39.7 7.5 7.3 
Italy (1) 39.7 44.2 50.7 42.1 8.0 9.4 
Cyprus (1) 16.8 15.7 67.0 69.0 10.9 12.1 
Latvia 34.3 38.8 46.0 26.4 18.5 33.4 
Lithuania 20.8 24.1 62.7 47.5 10.5 20.0 
Luxembourg 79.7 65.9 16.6 29.7 3.6 4.3 
Hungary 39.4 47.4 49.4 39.3 10.7 12.4 
Malta 46.8 51.5 25.9 30.5 26.9 18.0 
Netherlands (1) 46.3 45.1 38.8 40.9 12.0 10.8 
Austria 45.6 44.3 35.9 38.9 18.0 16.4 
Poland 33.4 24.4 57.7 60.9 5.7 11.8 
Portugal (1) 36.3 44.0 55.2 45.3 4.7 4.1 
Romania 37.2 32.3 53.5 54.4 5.3 11.1 
Slovenia (3) 54.8 58.4 37.2 35.3 7.3 6.0 
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Appendix 2  (continued) 
 
Business enterprises Government Abroad 
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Slovakia  36.6 35.1 57.0 49.6 6.0 14.7 
Finland (4) 66.9 66.1 25.7 25.7 6.3 6.9 
Sweeden (1)(5) 63.9 58.8 24.5 27.5 8.1 10.4 
United Kingdom 42.1 45.1 32.7 32.1 19.3 16.4 
Iceland (1) 48.0 48.5 40.5 41.4 11.2 9.9 
Norway (1) 46.8 43.6 43.6 46.8 8.1 8.2 
Switzerland (6) : 68.2 : 22.8 : 6.0 
Croatia 34.3 38.8 58.1 49.2 2.6 9.9 
Turkey (1)(7) 43.3 41.0 50.1 34.0 0.8 1.1 
Japan (3)(6) 76.1 78.2 16.8 15.6 0.3 0.4 
United States (6) 64.3 67.3 30.2 27.1 : : 
Notes: 
(1) 2009 instead of 2010. 
(2) Break in series, 2007. 
(3) Break in series, 2008. 
(4) Break in series, abroad, 2005. 
(5) Break in series, 2005. 
(6) 2008 instead of 2010. 
(7) Break in series, business enterprises and government, 2008. 
Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsc0031), OECD. 
Appendix 3. Gross domestics expenditure on R&D by sector, 2005 and 2010 ( % share of GDP) 
 
Business enterprises 
sector 
Government 
sector 
Higher education 
sector 
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
EU27 1.15 1.23 0.25 0.27 0.41 0.49 
Euro area 1.16 1.27 0.27 0.30 0.40 0.48 
Belgium  1.24 1.32 0.15 0.19 0.41 0.46 
Bulgaria  0.10 0.30 0.31 0.22 0.05 0.07 
Czech Republic 0.86 0.97 0.27 0.30 0.22 0.28 
Denmark (1) 1.68 2.08 0.16 0.06 0.60 0.90 
Germany  1.74 1.90 0.35 0.41 0.41 0.51 
Estonia 0.42 0.81 0.11 0.17 0.39 0.62 
Ireland  0.81 1.22 0.09 0.06 0.34 0.51 
Greece 0.19 : 0.12 : 0.28 : 
Spain (2) 0.60 0.71 0.19 0.28 0.33 0.39 
France (3) 1.31 1.38 0.37 0.37 0.40 0.48 
Italy (4) 0.55 0.67 0.19 0.18 0.33 0.36 
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Appendix 3  (continued) 
 
Business enterprises 
sector 
Government 
sector 
Higher education 
sector 
2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2010 
Cyprus  0.09 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.16 0.25 
Latvia 0.23 0.22 0.11 0.14 0.23 0.24 
Lithuania 0.15 0.23 0.19 0.14 0.41 0.42 
Luxembourg (5) 1.35 1.16 0.19 0.29 0.02 0.19 
Hungary 0.41 0.69 0.26 0.21 0.24 0.23 
Malta 0.38 0.37 0.03 0.02 0.16 0.23 
Netherlands 1.01 0.87 0.24 0.22 0.66 0.75 
Austria 1.72 1.88 0.13 0.15 0.61 0.72 
Poland 0.18 0.20 0.21 0.26 0.18 0.27 
Portugal  0.30 0.72 0.11 0.11 0.28 0.59 
Romania 0.20 0.18 0.14 0.17 0.06 0.12 
Slovenia (2) 0.85 1.43 0.35 0.38 0.24 0.29 
Slovakia  0.25 0.27 0.15 0.19 0.10 0.17 
Finland  2.46 2.69 0.33 0.36 0.66 0.79 
Sweeden (6) 2.59 2.35 0.18 0.17 0.78 0.90 
United Kingdom 1.06 1.08 0.18 0.17 0.44 0.48 
Iceland (7) 1.43 1.64 0.65 0.62 0.61 0.77 
Norway (8) 0.81 0.88 0.24 0.28 0.47 0.55 
Switzerland (9) : : 0.02 : 0.66 : 
Croatia 0.36 0.32 0.21 0.20 0.30 0.21 
Turkey (7) 0.20 0.34 0.07 0.11 0.32 0.40 
Japan (10)(11) 2.54 2.70 0.28 0.29 0.45 0.40 
United States (11) 1.79 2.02 0.31 0.30 0.36 0.36 
Notes: 
(1) Break in series, 2007. 
(2) Break in series, business enterprise sector, 2008. 
(3) Break in series, business enterprise sector, 2006. 
(4) Break in series, higher education sector, 2005. 
(5) Break in series, government sector, 2009. 
(6) Break in series, business enterprise sector and government sector, 2005. 
(7) 2009 instead of 2010. 
(8) Break in series, government sector and higher education sector, 2007. 
(9) 2006 instead of 2005. 
(10) Break in series, higher education sector, 2008. 
(11) 2008 instead of 2010. 
Source: Eurostat (online data code: tsc00001), OECD. 
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 THE INNOVATION AND COMPETITIVENESS OF REGIONS 
AND THE ROLE OF UNIVERSITIES 
Bruno Dallago 
The State and Conditions of Innovation in Europe  
The EU is lagging behind in innovation compared to its most important competi-
tors, including the United States and China (Sonderman 2012). Within the EU, the 
new member countries of Central and Eastern Europe and an important part of the 
old members are moderate innovators, i.e. well below the EU average, whereas the 
leaders are all in Northern Europe (EU 2012). The same observation refers to inno-
vation at regional level: all regions in the new member countries (with the only 
exception of Prague) (Hollanders – Tarantola – Loschky 2009) and an important 
part of the regions in old member states are well below the EU average in innova-
tion. Hence, the stronger innovating regions are in Northern Europe.  
The consequence is that the situation of an institutionally incomplete European 
Union, missing also a common government of the economy, is not sustainable in an 
open and integrated world, one in which living standards – at least in the long run 
– depend upon innovation as the basis of competitiveness. The doomed Lisbon 
Strategy took its inspiration from this fact, and the new Europe 2020 Strategy also 
tries to direct the Union and its member countries towards sustainability in a 
highly competitive world partly by means of innovation. Given the territorial 
agglomeration of innovation and therefore of competitiveness, the revival of inno-
vation requires a more active role played by territories. However, this is a prob-
lematic perspective for the Union.  
Why is it so? In our interpretation the different economic stakeholders (enter-
prises, governments, and the producers of knowledge, particularly universities) 
ﬁnd it hard to co-operate and to co-ordinate their activity in most of Europe. This 
aspect has been magniﬁed by the European adaptation to the international finan-
cial and economic crisis, with severe cuts in ﬁnancing also the institutions that 
produce knowledge and innovation in most of the member countries. In the fol-
lowing we shall concentrate on the role universities can have in promoting innova-
tion in general and at local and regional level in particular.  
In the next section the role of knowledge, innovation, and competitiveness is 
discussed by looking at who and how produces them. Section three goes down to 
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the local level and considers that producing knowledge is not enough, absorption 
capacity is necessary, too. The concept of learning regions aims to stress this rela-
tionship. Section four deals with the localisation aspects of innovation and con-
siders how the supply of university competences enters the picture. This issue is 
continued in the ﬁfth section that looks at the role of universities in fostering inno-
vation, while section six is devoted to illustrating the contribution of universities to 
economic development. Section seven concludes. 
Knowledge and Innovation as Production Processes  
The starting assumption of our paper is that in a globalised world and given the EU 
objectives as deﬁned in the Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 Strategy, a sus-
tainable, prosperous, and competitive EU requires strong, developing, and com-
petitive regions. This may be verified on different grounds. One verification is 
grounded in institutions, related to the institutional architecture of the European 
Union. One of the basic principles that characterise the European Union is the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity as deﬁned in Article 5 of the Treaty on the European Union. 
This principle ensures that decisions be taken as closely as possible to the citizen. 
Accordingly, the Union does not take action, except in cases that fall within its ex-
clusive competence, unless it is more effective than the action taken at national, 
regional or local levels. The same reasoning holds for the sub-national level. This 
level indeed has gained great importance in European affairs and policies as 
testiﬁed by the idea of a “Europe of the Regions” and related policies including the 
growing importance of Structural Funds within the EU budget.  
The principle of subsidiarity is closely linked to the principle of proportionality 
which requires that any action by the Union should not go beyond what is neces-
sary to achieve the objectives of the Treaty. This opens wide room particularly for 
the action of sub-national governments and constituencies, including co-operation 
and co-ordination of actions with their peers elsewhere. 
There are also theoretical and practical reasons why the sub-national level 
should receive a particularly important role in the management of economies and 
in policies and development. The most important such reasons point to 
 the dispersed nature of knowledge as highlighted by Hayek, the role of tacit 
knowledge also in innovation (Polanyi), which is particularly effective at the 
local level, and the circulation of ideas; 
 the nature of innovation processes, which are largely concentrated at the lo-
cal level (Audretsch, Feldman, Acs) and may take the form of local systems of 
innovation (Freeman, Matcalfe, Montresor, Leoncini); 
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 the economic and social importance of incentives and their greater effective-
ness when they are close to where the activity takes place (social innova-
tion); and 
 the issue of control and accountability, which may both be particularly effec-
tive when the contact between the governing body and the governed con-
stituency is particularly close. 
Knowledge and innovation as production processes have a demand and a sup-
ply side. The capabilities of regions and their constituencies (particularly govern-
ments, organisations, civic society) to demand, absorb, transform and adapt to the 
knowledge and innovation that universities produce constitute the demand side of 
innovation. Reaching these goals requires an approach according to which regional 
innovation and competitiveness play a central role and this is so if regions are 
learning regions. The demand side refers particularly to the role of learning and 
the related absorption capacity of ﬁrms and regions. Absorption capacity refers to 
“…the capacity to absorb and to adapt external knowledge to the local entrepre-
neurial context and thus transform it into higher productivity and innovation” 
(Asheim – Parrilli 2012b, p. 10). This process often consists of acquiring, metabo-
lising and adapting codiﬁed knowledge that universities and research centres 
generate, and also knowledge that ﬂows from other enterprises and territories 
(Langlois 2003, Jensen et al. 2007).  
Knowledge and innovation have a central role in the competitiveness and con-
sequently the performance of regions. Universities are known to be fundamental in 
the production, transmission, and circulation of knowledge and in innovation 
through teaching, research, and different forms of transmission of their results, 
including consultancy and other forms of co-operation with ﬁrms. This forms the 
supply side of the knowledge production and innovation.  
Learning processes thus represent the “software” that puts the two “hardware” 
components of ﬁrms and universities into contact, make them understand each 
other, and ﬁnally co-operate in successful production. Such learning requires indi-
vidual and organisational efforts, institutional support frameworks, organisational 
and workplace co-operation, incentives to change and innovation, ability to inter-
pret and contextualise, sufﬁciently long time horizons, and also a common lan-
guage of communication or at least a good translation from one language, that of 
researchers, into the other languages, those of entrepreneurs, technicians and 
workers. The greater the gap between the two hardware components, the more 
important the process of learning is. Successful learning can be helped by means of 
different devices, including various forms of university–ﬁrm co-operation.  
The concept of the “learning organisation” has been worked out recently to 
highlight the fundamental features of operation that an organisation needs in 
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order to successfully manage the learning process. This refers primarily to “…new 
forms to organizing work within a ﬁrm, such as self-determined and auto-
organized work targets and work pace, continuous on-the-job training, and multi-
function and multidisciplinary team work” (Asheim – Parrilli 2012b, p. 14). Learn-
ing organisations master different types of knowledge. Along with traditional 
knowledge that results from R&D, interactive and tacit forms of knowledge ex-
change have particularly great importance.  
The development of learning organisations is a particularly demanding process. 
Indeed, it requires a proper structure of the production and work process within 
the ﬁrm; proper incentives to the employees combining support to commitment 
and change, organisational ﬂexibility, but also job and income security for those 
who may take up risks for pushing an innovation through and may run the risk of 
failure. This requires a system of organisational and social welfare in line with 
“ﬂexible security” that various successful northern European countries have 
adopted. A new approach to education is important, too, giving signiﬁcance to the 
students’ interactive and networking abilities. At the basis of this build-up there 
has to be organisational and social trust.  
Universities are important components of the supply side since they provide 
some of the fundamental ingredients, including education, research, expertise, and 
advice. This role requires that universities, based on their academic autonomy and 
intellectual freedom, be in tune with and open to contribute to local processes and 
problems. This aspect of university activity has also been termed as the “economic 
relevance” of the university. The features and problems of the territories sur-
rounding universities should provide the starting points for designing problem-
solving processes and represent the testing ground for solutions in which universi-
ties should have the intellectually and scientiﬁcally leading role.  
Demand and supply in the process of innovation and building the competitive-
ness of territories involve the society at large, institutions and organisations, and 
individuals. It is important to appreciate that this matrix form of the problem pro-
vides opportunities for and require multi-level and multi-direction interrelations: 
between demand and supply and between different constituencies at different 
levels both on the same side (demand or supply) and between the different sides. 
The outstanding relevance the context of the matrix has should be noted. The con-
text is made up of the global (international, national and inter-local) interactions, 
the basis of which is what happens at the local level.  
However, looking at the present European situation two challenges must be 
pointed out. Although the reasons of the present crisis in Europe could be found in 
the institutional asymmetry and incompleteness of the process of integration, its 
roots are in the loss of competitiveness and the unsatisfactory innovation strength 
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of Europe. The Lisbon Strategy was called to solve this structural problem, but its 
outcomes are disappointing. 
Within Europe two main strategies are being implemented. One is prevalent in 
Southern Europe and is based on a cost-cutting strategy as envisaged in the Euro-
pean Competitiveness Pact of 2011. The stabilisation policies that the European 
Union imposed upon ﬁnancially unbalanced countries such as Greece, Spain, Por-
tugal, and Italy strengthen this approach. While competition through lower tax 
rates must wait for happier times, this strategy lives with the assumption that 
states and regions gain competitiveness by decreasing wages and weakening wel-
fare. Regions may add additional support to this strategy in the form of looser 
regulation and easier access to land and natural resources for potential investors. 
This strategy can hardly be deﬁned as innovative and expects the specialisation of 
countries from mature and traditional industries where cost competitiveness may 
compensate for the lack of innovation up to a point.  
Consequently the role of universities is closer to that of an advisor in cost cut-
ting and farther away from that of a producer of knowledge or even an educator. 
Cheaper labour means indeed lower demand for highly educated people and lower 
return on human capital. 
The Lisbon Strategy offered, perhaps in a naïve form, a different, much better 
and sustainable strategy based on the investment in knowledge infrastructure and 
human resources. The strategy set the goal of offering high quality services, too, 
that are considered to support investment and attract resources. This strategy 
appears much sounder and sustainable than the former, both because it is more in 
line with the level of income and quality of life that European countries have and 
because it directs attention to and puts the priority on assets of relatively lower 
mobility, better linked to territories. Thus it offers a stable and socially sustainable 
strategy, although not an easy one, that relies on positive incentives and the mobi-
lisation of the most productive resources of a society: knowledge and participation. 
The disadvantage of this strategy is that it is slower in bringing results and may be 
difﬁcult to implement in macro-economically unbalanced countries without the 
support of the European Union. Yet its consequences are permanent and sound. 
Northern European countries, including Germany, have relied primarily on this 
strategy and the results speak for themselves.  
This strategy is the only one that favours the territories, at the same time taking 
advantage of their characteristics. The fundamental reason lies with the nature of 
the knowledge that is important for economic activity. Science-based knowledge is 
certainly important and necessary, but is far from being sufﬁcient. A further fun-
damental condition is high-level education that “produces” the actors (persons and 
organisations) who are called to absorb, make use of, adapt to and improve  that 
knowledge. It is also worth stressing that even science-based knowledge is linked 
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to the territories for two reasons. First, it is produced by universities, research 
centres and enterprises which also make use of the particular conditions of the 
territories where they are located. Secondly, science-based knowledge is never 
self-sufﬁcient for production, it must be adapted to local features and to the 
demand of speciﬁc enterprises.  
Success in competition requires that science-based knowledge be comple-
mented by other, tacit types of knowledge, that is, learning by doing, using, and 
interacting. This type of knowledge is embedded in social and economic contexts, 
rooted in organisations and in people who are linked to particular local relations. 
Case-based studies provide ample evidence for the importance of the context and 
the insufﬁciency of science in itself to lead innovation. Moreover,  simple observa-
tion is enough to see that territories having higher costs may be more competitive 
than those having lower costs, and consequently provide better conditions and 
opportunities for ﬁrms. This fact can be explained by the favourable interaction of 
science-based knowledge, tacit knowledge, and the social features of territories 
and organisations. 
Localised Knowledge and Learning Regions 
The role of the local base of universities in economic and social development is 
analysed from several aspects in the literature. Traditional perspectives include 
the concept of national and regional systems of innovation; the triple helix of 
industry, government, and university; and ﬁnally the entrepreneurial university. 
Although there are various and substantial differences among these three perspec-
tives, all share the view that universities are fundamental components of a broader 
economic and social system and  they are necessary for that system to be success-
ful. Universities should be suppliers of important functions for the success and 
competitiveness of territories and should be at the same time recipients of de-
mands, needs, and problems coming from industry, governments and society that 
they try to answer and solve.  
Recent literature on learning regions (Asheim – Parrilli 2012a) seems to be 
more apt to understand the challenge that European regions are faced with. In fact, 
it highlights the conditions for and forms of necessary interaction among govern-
ments (governance), ﬁrms and organisations (production), and universities and 
research centres (knowledge) in creating and supporting innovation, competitive-
ness and the welfare of regions. This approach sees innovation as the outcome of 
processes and interactions that go beyond the three actors constituting the triple 
helix (universities, governments and enterprises), and also considers the context in 
which they operate and interact. 
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According to the literature on learning regions, while the national and interna-
tional levels are important in promoting/hampering economic dynamism and 
growth, those innovative forms of economic action that make economies expand 
and thrive emerge particularly at the regional level. In this frame regional ad-
vantage has to be based on the endogenous capabilities of regions and their 
governments, ﬁrms and universities rather than solely on largely exogenous R&D 
efforts. The aim of regional innovation policies should consequently be the foster-
ing of creative knowledge and learning environment which contribute to estab-
lishing the necessary social and regional economic system. The latter forms the 
context in which security and ﬂexibility as the necessary bases for knowledge pro-
duction and learning could be established. 
The central role of localised knowledge in the learning regions approach stems 
from three factors (Lundvall 2012, Lundvall – Lorenz 2012):  
 Knowledge resides in individuals in the form of tacit knowledge and thus it is 
rather sticky. The stickiness of knowledge can only be decreased, but not 
overcome through the mobility of individuals with scarce talents and skills.  
 Knowledge is also embedded in organisations and plays an important role in 
attracting ﬁrms via the transfer and diffusion of knowledge at local level. 
However, the effect depends upon the absorption capacity of the local inno-
vation system.  
 Such absorption capacity is made of knowledge embedded in the relation-
ships between individuals and organisations. It includes shared specialised 
codes of communication and shared norms and common understandings of 
how to do business, which is often industry- and cluster-speciﬁc, and reﬂects 
the specialisation of a region.  
According to this view of knowledge-led local development “[b]uilding regional 
competitive advantage… requires a twofold strategy. To promote learning and 
adaptability it is rational to encourage close interaction and a common under-
standing among regional agents. But the regional system also needs mechanisms 
that help it to move away from its own routines when it reaches maturity and is 
threatened by stagnation. This is why a certain degree of openness, diversity, and 
even internal contradiction is required for retaining a sustainable regional ad-
vantage” (Lundvall 2012, p. xii). In particular, investing extensively in human skills 
and delegating responsibility to employees should complement attracting top-level 
scientists and experts.  
In this perspective, innovation policies need to foster regional innovation sys-
tems based on infrastructure for knowledge production, interpretation, and diffu-
sion, able to link persons and organisations to different economic and social roles. 
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Learning regions require partnership among governments, business and universi-
ties aiming at learning-based processes of innovation and change.  
There is agreement among scholars and experts that rich countries can proceed 
only along the way of innovation. Indeed, this is the only strategy compatible with 
their level of development, their level of personal incomes and human capital. 
However, there is much less agreement on concretely how that strategy should be 
followed. The traditional view of promoting R&D-intensive industries has not 
passed the test of time, having led to uncountable failures besides the examples of 
success. Applied research and case studies have revealed that this strategy re-
quires much more and different ingredients, particularly at regional level. Espe-
cially important additional elements are the activation and utilisation of the capa-
bilities of the very region in question.  
As a consequence, the strategy cannot be translated into a unique path to de-
velopment and competitiveness. Rather, this strategy consists of bundles of dif-
ferent steps, each bundle based on and in accordance with the region’s capabilities. 
Since each region and its enterprises have unique capabilities, different bundles of 
steps and particular solutions can be successful and lead to increasing regional 
competitiveness. Each regional strategy will represent a variant of the fundamental 
strategy, each region will set up a different, successful structure and will ﬁnd a 
particular niche in the national and international division of labour. The highly 
differentiated structure of modern production and the prevalence of intra-indus-
trial trade offer the background for the success of bundled strategies while they 
require differentiated knowledge and specialisation: “…knowledge creation and 
innovation can take place in all kind of industries but take place in different ways, 
need different kinds of knowledge and skilled people and require different kinds of 
innovation support” (Asheim – Parrilli 2012b, p. 5). Consequently, no type of 
knowledge should be considered a priori as superior to others in fostering and 
supporting economic growth and development. The effectiveness of a strategy of 
economic development and competitiveness depends to a great extent upon the 
advantages of a region stemming from its industrial and knowledge proﬁle which 
is strongly linked to the already existing knowledge and industrial bases.  
It is important to notice that the R&D basis and its strict connection to universi-
ties are not sufﬁcient for a strategy to promote innovation and competitiveness. 
Indeed, the organisation of the work and production process and incentives are of 
utmost importance. Beyond better and more qualiﬁed jobs, organisations are re-
quired to provide the conditions for learning and innovation as well, together with 
fostering and supporting patents. A wide access to sources of knowledge reduces 
the cognitive distance between actors of the regional innovation systems and in-
creases the absorption capacity of ﬁrms and the economic system. 
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Looking at the role of universities and science-based industries, it should be 
noted, following Asheim and Parrilli (2012b), that an excessive focus on their role 
has important disadvantages and cannot serve as a basis for a complex regional 
strategy of innovation. Indeed, this approach tends to concentrate on emerging 
industries to the disadvantage of other ﬁelds of innovation, e.g. engineering-based 
industries where innovation tends to be incremental, and the important ﬁeld of 
cultural industries. Secondly, the success rate of emerging science-based industries 
is quite low and related policies to support these kinds of industries favour large 
cities and regions, and highly educated people disproportionately, to the disad-
vantage of the bulk of regions, industries and people. Although important, a strat-
egy based on emerging science-based industries cannot work as a general strategy 
for the development of regions. And in any case, regional industry should look for 
participation in national and international knowledge networks, and not be linked 
only to regional universities. The inﬂuence and dominant contacts of these univer-
sities are not spread all over the world, neither at continental level, but are limited 
to a usually sub-national area.  
Relevant literature on the importance of the role of universities in innovation 
tends to stress the role of proximity as an explanation for universities’ contribu-
tion. Proximity supports the development of interdependence among university, 
ﬁrm and government, and institutional changes that come along with this interde-
pendence and within each of these actors. These are key aspects at the centre of 
the “triple helix” explanation (Etzkowitz 2003, Etzkowitz – Leydesdorff 1997). This 
was not always so. Industries now considered mature, such as the steel or automo-
bile industry, had no particular relation to universities. Also the success of a num-
ber of high-tech industries and their localisation owes to military and other forms 
of public expenditure and research establishments. The upsurge in universities–
industry relation since the 1980s is rather strictly linked to the new high-tech 
industries, including information technology and biotechnologies. Universities are 
thus increasingly seen as catalysts of local development even if they are not di-
rectly involved in that development.  
Proximity promotes the efﬁciency of the innovation process because it pro-
motes the convergence in missions at different levels: local, regional and national 
(Charles 2003). Clusters represent the most powerful form of proximity, particu-
larly when they include a university or other organisation producing knowledge. 
As Porter (1990 and 1998) stresses, local linkages are key factors in economic 
competitiveness. However, subsequent research has challenged this view: “…the 
impact of universities, many of which will be at regional or local scale, will vary 
considerably over time, over space between sectors, between ﬁrms of different 
sizes…” (Lawton Smith 2006, p. 2). Moreover, as the European Commission has 
stressed (EC 2003), another important component along with the university–
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industry interaction is the reconfiguration and defragmentation of EU public re-
search, including universities and other parts of the European public research 
system. 
Localisation Aspects of Innovation and the Supply of University Competences  
The territorial nature of innovation derives from the fact that innovation is 
increasingly distributed among different organisations. There are different reasons 
why this is so, related to technological, economic and social processes (Lawton 
Smith 2006). All recall the central importance of proximity.  
From a technological point of view, locating ﬁrms close to universities is im-
portant for gaining access faster and more easily to the latest research ﬁndings. 
The effect is particularly strong if there is close match between researchers at the 
universities and engineers at ﬁrms; this is an advantage for large multi-national 
ﬁrms over small- and medium-sized enterprises. It is for this very reason that 
multi-national companies tend to locate their research laboratories in the proxim-
ity of research universities. Mature industries also have extensive links with uni-
versities, but these tend to be short-term connections.  
Economic explanations look primarily at agglomeration and economies of scale. 
Agglomeration tendencies derive from the fact that the cost each ﬁrm has to dedi-
cate to co-operation with a university is lowered if other ﬁrms follow the same 
approach, too, since this allows the ﬁrms to share the costs. Agglomeration and 
thus proximity create important spillovers in the form of ﬂows of knowledge that 
accrue to organisations and individuals. Such spillovers, as a rule differring by 
industries and being often transitory, are from universities to ﬁrms, but may also 
happen among ﬁrms located in the same territory. Economies of scale derive from 
the increasing returns to scale that urbanisation makes possible. However, other 
studies found that the location of industrial innovation depends largely upon 
internal linkages in firms between production and R&D, while the role of universi-
ties is marginal (Tecu 2013).  
Social explanations are mostly based on the role of tacit knowledge and social 
interaction that localisation enables. The importance of tacit knowledge in innova-
tion processes requires that producers and utilisers of knowledge in different 
organisations have direct and stable personal contacts. These contacts build up 
networks that Granovetter (1973) named ”weak ties”. Their main advantage over 
stronger ties lies exactly in the support they give to the ﬂow of information and 
knowledge. Weak, multiple ties among experts in different aspects of innovation 
and active in different organisations – universities and ﬁrms – are embedded 
within particular locations. 
The Innovation and Competitiveness of Regions and the Role of Universities 249 
The role of universities in innovation processes has become important with the 
globalisation of the world economy. World-wide competition makes it more 
difﬁcult for ﬁrms to control the outcome of their investment in R&D and requires 
risk diversiﬁcation. Adaptation to such a change in the structural context includes 
strengthening the international institutional framework for the protection of 
investment (particularly the role of the WTO and other UN institutions, and pa-
tents), and the “outsourcing” of research activity to external agencies, among 
which universities are particularly important.  
It is therefore important to understand how universities can play this critical 
role (which type of academic strategy and policy should be implemented), how 
they should structure themselves, and what type of relation they should have with 
ﬁrms. The external (social, economic) role of universities should not be limited to 
their relation to ﬁrms though. Indeed, a system perspective is increasingly im-
portant in a globalised economy for countries and territories alike. 
In this new context it has been stressed that universities have a “third mission” 
(Aranguren – Larrea – Wilson 2012). The ﬁrst mission is education and the devel-
opment of human capital. The second one is research, including both the genera-
tion of knowledge and its diffusion. The third mission concerns the role of univer-
sities in, and their contribution to, economic and social development.  
All these aspects concern both the universities as organisations and the situa-
tion of individual researchers and scholars within them, including freedom of re-
search and the allocation of property rights of inventions. While the contribution 
and the role of some universities are certainly important in the case of develop-
ment at world level, those of most universities are important rather for local and 
regional development. This is so not only because of the limited strength, re-
sources and capabilities of most universities. Indeed, it is the very nature of 
knowledge and development, and the importance of tacit and idiosyncratic com-
ponents and features that make the local and regional role of universities so im-
portant. In parallel with what has been deﬁned as the de-territorialisation of eco-
nomic and social relations and processes at the global level, the importance of 
proximity in economic and social relations and processes has deﬁnitely increased. 
This is particularly important at the local and regional levels. 
The Role of Universities in Fostering Innovation  
The role of universities is particularly delicate in this new context. Universities 
have seen their nature deeply transformed in recent decades, particularly in 
latecomer countries, but also in European and other rich countries. Universities 
used to be places where later economic and social elites were educated. Professors 
enjoyed high prestige, education was the main mission and research had a basi-
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cally theoretical character. Applied and experimental research, although present, 
was mostly the mission of laboratories and research institutes, with the partial 
exception of the United States.  
Things have changed rapidly under the push of democratisation, increasing 
mobility, and the growing opportunities in the ﬁrst two or three post-war decades, 
and later on in the course of globalisation. Democratisation and mobility created a 
boom in demand for higher education by the new generations, and education 
became an important vehicle of upward mobility. Growing opportunities dramati-
cally increased the demand for higher level human capital that universities were to 
educate, and for applied research outcomes and consultancy as well. Both became 
critical factors in industrial innovation, a must of growing importance in an 
increasingly open and competitive international economy.  
Both processes introduced deep and far-reaching changes: the number of 
students expanded dramatically, and the ﬂow of ﬁnancial resources also increased,  
both from governments and international organisations, and from industry. At the 
same time universities found themselves in a totally new context: competition for 
ﬁnancial resources and students and, consequently, a comparative evaluation of 
their performance.  
The role of universities in fostering innovation is related to their economic and 
social activity in general and to industry in particular. Universities can contribute 
to innovation in three fundamental ways:  
 by educating the persons who will manage institutions and organisations, 
work in laboratories and at the operational level;  
 by working on research topics that generate new technical and social 
solutions; and  
 by working with institutions and industry in order to generate new solutions 
or provide consultancy and advice, including setting up joint structures and 
programmes.  
By their different functions in teaching, research and collaboration, universities 
play a crucial role in society as well as in producing and interpreting knowledge 
and fostering learning, with particular concern for the territories where they are 
located. Considering in particular the perspective of learning regions, it is neces-
sary to look not only at the role of universities within the given context (a locality, 
a region), but also at how universities are structured and governed and how their 
relation with the other major actors of local and regional development (govern-
ments, institutions and organisations, and society) inﬂuences the general outcome 
of promoting competitiveness and development. 
This role of universities is particularly important in the present crisis, since cri-
sis management needs their support in helping regions regain innovativity and 
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competitiveness. This entails that universities should reconfigure their govern-
ance, research and teaching, and develop their relation to the territory. At the same 
time, it is necessary to avoid the present danger of simply cutting their budgets for 
either national or regional ﬁnancial reasons. What is apparently needed is up-
dating governance and incentives also through a different budget structure and 
allocation.  
A particularly important issue in considering the challenges that universities 
are faced with is to ﬁnd proper balance between the new mission of contributing 
to the development of regions and the traditional academic autonomy. The latter is 
a critical factor in the success of universities and its very raison d’être as it has 
been proved from time to time by the history of universities. As a consequence, the 
former goal should be reached in no way to the detriment of the latter.  
Therefore, the challenge ahead for autonomous and self-governing universities 
is to take on new roles in the learning region where they are located, while 
strengthening their traditional academic roles to respond to increased interna-
tional competition among universities. Indeed, these two apparently contradictory 
goals represent two sides of the same process and show important complementa-
rities.  
Another important issue to consider is that this new role of universities opens a 
potential conﬂict between the public mission of universities and the private nature 
of their involvement in innovation and economic development. Successful univer-
sities must be able to use the latter to strengthen the former, e.g. by using a part of 
the funds obtained from applied research and consultancy in public education and 
research.  
A good way of understanding how this works is to take a look at what has hap-
pened in countries such as the United States, where this multiple mission of uni-
versities has a longer history. 
The Contribution of Universities to Economic Development  
The contribution of universities to economic development is not a new issue. As 
Pavitt (2003) stressed, the economic and political role that research universities 
are expected to play in the 20th and 21st centuries is a return to the 19th-century 
paradigm of social usefulness. In recent years, various other paradigms have com-
plemented and made more convincing and sophisticated the usefulness paradigm. 
Lawton Smith (2006) mentions eight different paradigms that consider “…the 
current expectations on universities as to their contribution to innovation and 
economic development” (p. 12).  
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Taken together, these eight paradigms can be summarised as follows:  
 universities fulfil an increasingly central role in following changes in the 
organisation of the innovation process;  
 the features of particular systems of governance (supra-national, national, 
and sub-national) inﬂuence the degree to which their roles become central;  
 academic eminence has benefits also from a utilitarian point of view;  
 biotechnology replaced defence industry in gaining the central place in 
university–industry relations;  
 the accountability of universities is manifold; 
 human capital development rather than technology transfer is the primary 
contribution of universities to economic development;  
 universities are increasingly entrepreneurial; and  
 co-operation of the parties, both at national and sub-national levels takes 
place in their participation in systems of governance. 
Since the 1980s, first in the US and the UK, later on in many other countries in-
cluding European ones, universities started to be considered fundamental players 
in the innovation and development processes, and in improving the competitive-
ness of countries and regions. Although it is difﬁcult to quantify the contribution of 
university research and education to economic development, scholars and interna-
tional agencies have found that their contribution is important. However, it has 
also been shown that this contribution depends upon various important factors.  
Universities in many countries and among different circumstances have been 
engaged with increasing determination and effort in turning their contribution to 
the benefit of economic and social development. In doing so they have also im-
proved their own ﬁnancial situation and social importance, sometimes to a con-
siderable extent. This has provided them with resources for advancing research 
also in ﬁelds not directly related to their economic and social role. However, this 
role has been mostly concentrated in a relatively small number of world-level re-
search universities, and within them in the activities and hands of a relatively small 
number of world-level professors and researchers (Geiger – Sá 2008). 
Research universities have to follow a dual goal: to generate inventions and 
make sure that those are transferred to developers, let them be private ﬁrms, pub-
lic institutions, or other kinds of organisations. This may include a host of activities 
from patenting and licensing to spin-offs and commissioned research, from advis-
ing to promoting and developing academic ﬁelds and subjects that contribute to 
knowledge and technological progress. Clearly, these diverse goals require dif-
ferent academic policies and internal organisational setups. They also require dif-
ferent public policies, be they at national and even international or at local level. 
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Another important aspect to consider is that the public and private concern 
with innovation, and the important contribution of research and universities to it, 
has led not only to increased, substantial amounts of public and private resources 
to that end, but also to the establishment of systems controlling and evaluating the 
outcome of the use of those resources. This, in turn, has generated considerable 
transaction costs and criticism linked to the use of those resources in the favour of 
a low number of large, well-organised and rich universities and a relatively low 
number of specialised top researchers to the detriment of other universities and 
researchers. Although this may have to do with the advantages of economies of 
scale and spillovers in research activity, it has also disadvantages in terms of vari-
ety. Given low numbers and the fact that, although competing, these researchers 
are mostly in strict contact among themselves, conveys the danger of limiting the 
pool of ideas and approaches, ending up in scientiﬁc conformism. In addition, most 
of the research funds and inventions are concentrated in a restricted scope of so-
called strategic sciences and science-based technologies, particularly biotech-
nology and molecular biology, nanotechnology, and pharmaceuticals.  
One further important problem concerns the approach of public and private 
sponsors and their relation to universities. The problem with private sponsors is 
that they may restrict the academic freedom of researchers and thus the develop-
ment of alternative ﬁelds and paths of scientiﬁc development by convincing 
researchers and their universities to go where the money is. However, according to 
many observers and scholars who analysed the problem, this is not a real risk, and 
perhaps the opposite is true. Commissioned research or a highly competitive ﬁeld 
of research provide enough incentive and resources to research in unrelated ﬁelds 
and basic research, too. Universities acquiring additional resources from the 
industry may allocate a greater part of their other resources to ﬁelds that increase 
the prestige of the university and its scientiﬁc standard – both necessary 
conditions to obtain private ﬁnancing. But again, even if debated, this may be an 
issue only for a few large world-class universities, and not for the majority.  
The danger of a rent-seeking attitude by universities is nevertheless a serious 
and perhaps relevant issue. It is not only that universities and researchers may be 
prone to serve the desires of sponsors, but there is a risk in the allocation of public 
ﬁnancing, too, large inﬂuential universities being more successful in convincing 
agencies and governments to allocate funds to the ﬁelds and subjects where these 
universities are strong. This could reduce the contestability of research subjects 
and lead to a decreasing variety of research innovation.  
Indeed, behind the economic contribution of research and science there are 
various dangers that depend to a great extent on the quality of governments’ 
science policies and the incentives that governments, particularly local and region-
al governments, have in designing and implementing them. In general, national and 
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international agencies and national governments have contributed positively to 
the development of frontier sciences and science-based technologies (Geiger – Sá 
2008).  
 The landscape is quite different if sub-national governments are considered. 
Policies are often poorly designed, their knowledge and view of scientiﬁc and 
technological issues are approximate and not up-to-date, including the question-
ability of economic assumptions that underlie policies. These problems may stem 
from the unpreparedness of these governments and their weak technical and 
scientiﬁc/intellectual basis. Moreover, sub-national governments must keep the 
geographical spillovers of their scientiﬁc and technological policies under control. 
Indeed, they must be sure that their policies favour their region, an issue of no or 
less relevance for national governments and irrelevant for international agencies.  
Four aspects are important in connection with the consequences of science-
based technologies for the internal structure and public role of universities. The 
first is the relation between universities’ participation in the development of 
science-based technologies and the universities’ traditional mission. The former is 
clearly a private goal and limited to few fields of science (although these aspects 
may be less important when the promoter and supporter is a public agency), while 
the latter is undoubtedly public.  
Secondly, this new role of universities has required a transformation of their 
internal organisation. In particular, universities had to set up new ofﬁces and 
structures, and hire qualiﬁed personnel to promote co-operation with the industry 
and with public institutions, as well as to market the outcome of research, includ-
ing results of spin-offs. The integration of these ofﬁces into the structure of univer-
sities has often created problems. The majority of such ofﬁces deal with small and 
medium-sized initiatives and enterprises.  
Thirdly, science-based technologies are interdisciplinary while the traditional 
structure of universities is based on distinct disciplines. Participation in science-
based technologies driven by the economic relevance of research requires that 
structures and programmes be set up for integrating different disciplines and 
ﬁelds of research. Other important issues are hiring and, if necessary, training 
specialised personnel, formulate new strategies for hiring faculty, and set up 
research institutes with external support, in certain cases with the participation of 
the external sponsors’ representatives in the governance of these institutes. One 
further aspect is that much of frontier research takes place within the laboratories 
of large corporations by researchers who are employees of the corporation, and 
these research activities convey many company-speciﬁc idiosyncrasies. Universi-
ties are perhaps ill-equipped for the most applied aspects of research and for 
marketing-focused innovation. For this reason the prevalent relations between 
universities and the industry are long-term co-operations on the elaboration of 
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background topics, to which the commercialisation of research ﬁndings through 
university spillovers offer an important complementarity.  
Fourthly, the secrecy of ﬁndings and inventions is often a precondition of par-
ticipation in the development of science-based technologies, particularly when the 
promoter and sponsor is a private organisation. This is contrary to the universities’ 
mission and the professors’ and researchers’ view that research should lead to 
public results. The public character of research within universities ﬁnds strong 
correspondence with the way university careers are managed, i.e. through publica-
tions, conferences, and other means of circulating the ﬁndings of research. 
The bottom line is mixed. The adaptation to economic needs and opportunities, 
and participating in science-based technologies have made their way through 
universities and have had important consequences all over the world, although 
with different intensity in different countries and regions. They have transformed 
universities and helped the development of economies and societies. Yet the con-
tribution of universities still appears rather modest and underdeveloped com-
pared to the existing possibilities and needs.  
Conclusions  
Looking at the university–industry relationships, in the last three decades a clearly 
visible change in approach took place in the United States and in a major part of 
Europe alike, namely a gradual replacement of more general, upstream approaches 
by more speciﬁc, downstream ones. The former is basically in tune with what is 
still considered the traditional public and general role of universities, while the 
latter can be interpreted as a characteristic of the initial stage of the new university 
model where the university appears both as a social and economic player, and as 
an institution following a path towards commercialisation.  
This shift is simultaneous with and complementary to the one in the dominant 
relationship between universities and industry, from large transnational compa-
nies and few large and prestigious universities to mostly small and medium-sized 
enterprises and regional universities. From another aspect this is a shift from 
arms-length relations to relations based on proximity. This transition is not com-
plete, but it is clearly visible in many countries and industries.  
It may be beneﬁcial for economies in general and local development in partic-
ular, but hides the danger that universities are increasingly seen as local factors of 
production and as contexts in which professors and researchers can pursue ﬁnan-
cial beneﬁts at the expense of their public duties. The new model of co-operation 
based on proximity and common interests can make it even worse. Another risk is 
that universities may try to use their local-government contacts to their own ad-
vantage and local governments and main industrial actors may try to interfere in 
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the life of regional enterprises. However, all these risks appear together with 
opportunities and it is in the interest of the parties to assess and try to manage 
them properly.  
What comes out of the experiences reviewed above can be summarised in the 
following ﬁve points.  
 Research and the education of high-quality human capital continue to be fun-
damental missions of any university.  
 The spread of access to higher education has led to the proliferation of 
universities, most of them with an important regional role. This, together 
with the increasing cost of research and the difﬁcult ﬁnancial situation of 
most governments, make it perhaps inevitable that universities look for 
additional external resources by engagement in activities of economic rele-
vance. 
 Large corporations are more interested in incremental innovation and rely 
extensively on their internal laboratories, complementing their activity with 
extensive networks of universities and research laboratories to acquire 
general knowledge. At the same time, small and medium-sized enterprises 
are increasingly active in frontier, risky innovation and are more and more 
interested in co-operating with universities.  
 National governments and supranational institutions just like the EU are 
keen to help their countries compete successfully in the international arena 
through accelerated and widespread innovation by promoting and sup-
porting, among others, closer co-operation among universities and industry. 
 Local governments have more power and more responsibilities than in the 
past related to economic activity under their jurisdiction and are interested 
in promoting similar goals as those of national governments but with the 
intent to have localised returns.  
On the basis of these conclusions it is important to ﬁnd solutions that keep and 
possibly improve the quality of universities and their ability to fulfil their classical 
roles. However, it is also important to ﬁnd new and more stable ways by which 
universities can follow their economic interests and, above all, contribute to the 
regional economies without jeopardising their traditional role. This requires, 
among other things, that universities co-operate with governments and the indus-
try.  
Still, all this may be insufﬁcient. Most universities are pre-eminent at the re-
gional level where they may have or try to have a nearly monopolistic role, par-
ticularly in certain contexts, e.g. where mobility of students is low and research 
contacts are limited, or when both students and business actors would face high 
costs of opting against co-operation with the university. This may have negative 
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consequences for academic quality, consequences that go well beyond, and per-
haps are independent of, the economic interests of universities, being unfa-
vourable also for governments and the industry and, above all, for the perspectives 
of local development.  
Nonetheless, various solutions could counteract these risks and provide univer-
sities with additional resources, contacts and ﬂows of information and knowledge 
coming from interactions with industry, and allowing them to play the socially 
important role related to activities of economic relevance. At the same time, these 
solutions could help governments and the industry to avoid the danger of closed 
localism and to upgrade their capacities and opportunities. We limit ourselves to a 
few hints, since a proper consideration of the issue would require a serious study.  
Regional universities are often too small to be competitive in different ﬁelds 
and have to specialise if they want to emerge in the broader context. This may 
cause other disadvantages and dangers for universities and also for the local econ-
omy. Setting up and entering interregional and also international networks of 
universities may strengthen them, their role and the returns for the regional 
economy. It is very important to choose the partners carefully, based on their 
features, e.g. partially complementary features and specialisations, and not re-
maining limited to proximity. Networks may be stable and involve the whole of 
each university, but may also concern particular projects. Hiring external profes-
sors and researchers, particularly at international level, may usefully complement 
networking.  
One basic condition is certainly the transparency and broad base of competition 
for academic positions and for research calls. This would contribute to the creation 
of high-level, sound and resilient institutional culture and operation that would 
help universities attracting good students. As to co-operation between universities 
and the industry, although it is true that it should be based primarily on proximity 
and stability, in the case of applied research and innovation it could be made open 
and contestable. For instance, in many cases local governments could support the 
setting up of an alternative network which could also produce synergies with and 
spillovers to the benefit of the former. Obviously, this can be done if the cost of the 
investment is not excessively high.  
Governments at any level, including the EU, could play an important role in 
pushing universities and the industry towards the right direction. In particular the 
support that governments may provide in different forms should be conditional 
upon the universities’ and industrial actors’ willingness to go along the lines ex-
posed above of fulfilling their public mission and complying with the requirements 
of openness, transparency and contestability. At any stage, however, the non-
bureaucratic assessment of the accountability of universities and the industry is 
fundamental.  
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The present state of play shaped first by globalisation and then by the crisis 
makes it clear that only those universities, industrial activities, and governments 
prosper that are up to fulfil their classical missions in better ways, and are also up 
to the challenge that the new conditions of innovation and competition set. Only 
these kinds of partnerships can lead to sustainable local development and to the 
prosperity of their stakeholders and constituencies alike.  
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 CITIES AND SERVICES IN THE KNOWLEDGE 
ECONOMY  
Riccardo Cappellin 
Introduction 
National economic growth and urbanisation are interdependent processes, and the 
growth of cities is a major component and driver of national growth (Eurostat 
2008, Cittalia 2009a and 2009b, McKinsey Global Institute 2011, Milken Institute 
2011, The Brookings Institution 2012, Centre for Cities 2012). In China, for 
example, where the urban population increased from 20% in 1980 to 50% in 2011 
and is expected to increase from 636 million in 2010 to 905 million by 2030, the 
process of urbanisation has led to huge investments in cities, in the housing, 
transport, and energy infrastructures, and it has driven industrial production and 
contributed to national economic growth to a greater extent than the exports of 
manufactured goods. This indicates that internal demand, which is mainly 
concentrated within cities, can be a powerful driver of national growth, both in 
developing and in highly developed countries. Moreover, cities are hubs not only 
regarding the commercial transactions of goods but also in the flow of information 
and in the generation of new knowledge, which plays a crucial role in the 
productivity and growth of the economy.  
This study highlights the difference between the growth model of modern post-
industrial cities, such as the large metropolitan areas, and that of industrial cities, 
such as many smaller urban centres in developed countries. It builds on recent 
economic literature in three related fields, namely the “endogenous development” 
of industrial clusters (Cappellin 2003, Simmie 2005, Capello 2007), the regional 
development of knowledge-intensive business services (Muller – Doloreux 2009, 
Cappellin 2009), and the regional factors of innovation and knowledge creation 
(Lundvall – Johnson 1994, Fagerberg 2005, Tidd – Bessant – Pavitt 2005, Asheim – 
Boschma – Cooke 2007, Cappellin – Wink 2009).  
The study first analyses the process of innovation according to a “cognitive–
systemic” model, which focuses on the process of interactive learning. In particu-
lar, it illustrates an “endogenous model” of economic growth in large modern 
cities, according to which the continuous changes in internal demand play a 
leading role in the creation of new firms and employment. Internal demand and 
internal supply are tightly linked by not only monetary but also knowledge flows, 
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unlike in smaller urban centres where the growth of industrial exports is the 
driving factor of the economy, according to the typical Keynesian multiplier model.  
Then we shall analyse the intensifying interaction between users and pro-
ducers in the development of new services within cities, focusing on the increasing 
importance of special cases of “public goods”, such as “club goods” and “relational 
goods”, as drivers of the individual demand, the aggregate consumption, and the 
investment decisions in a modern urban economy. 
In a policy perspective, the study indicates the need for a change in economic 
policy in modern cities. The importance of planning new residential and office 
buildings, attracting foreign investments, and stimulating industrial exports is 
decreasing in modern cities together with a growing need for developing many 
private and public services that meet local demand. These services have a con-
siderable contribution also to the overall employment and GDP of large cities. Poli-
cies promoting private and public investments should enhance the continuous 
renewal of economic activities within urban economies, aiming to satisfy the new 
emerging needs of their citizens. 
The Growth and Evolution of Cities: A Network Approach 
The shift in modern economies towards services and the increasing concentration 
of these in cities explain why the process of the globalisation of firms, markets, and 
knowledge occurs together with the growing preference for cities by most of the 
innovative firms and qualified workers. 
In an industrial economy production was concentrated either in “industrial 
clusters” based on the interdependence of many small and medium-sized firms, or 
in “company towns” organised around a large “Fordist” or vertically integrated 
company. The industrial city (1900–1970) was characterised by commuting, large 
physical structures such as production plants, machinery, and housing, and by the 
importance of the exploitation of economies of scale and of modern technologies. 
Thus, medium-sized and large industrial cities, such as Milan and Turin in Italy, 
have seen an intensive concentration of industrial activity till the end of the 1960s. 
Later, during the 1970s, industrial activity started to be decentralised to less 
congested areas. This process contributed to the creation of the well-known 
“industrial districts” (Simmie 2005, Capello – Faggian 2005, Cooke 2006) in neigh-
bouring rural areas and it explained the increasing specialisation of the large and 
medium-sized cities in services. 
In a modern economy, however, the increasing role of cities is closely related to 
the growing importance of information and knowledge, and to continuous changes 
related to new technologies, new production and organisational forms. Cities are 
now at the heart of the long-term transformation process of the national and inter-
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national economy towards knowledge economy. New types of services for firms 
and for people are all concentrated in the cities.  
The difference between the post-industrial city and a traditional industrial city 
is not represented by the skyscrapers and the large office developments which, 
especially in newly industrialised countries, are promoted by a city-marketing 
policy or by famous architects, and are considered as the landmarks of recently 
achieved industrial strength. The key characteristics of modern cities rather seem 
to be the increase in the flow of and the need to have access to information, as indi-
cated by: 
(a) mobility during working time for business meetings and also during free 
time for shopping and for social purposes,  
(b) the tight interactions between people needed for the creation of new 
knowledge both by the firms and by the individual workers, and  
(c) the increasing need for socialisation among citizens. 
A second related characteristic of modern cities is the diversity of people, firms, 
and actors, coming from different sectors, cultures, and countries. 
Thus, in a knowledge economy, the economic and social system of a metropoli-
tan city looks like a “puzzle” of diverse information, knowledge, structures, people, 
and also of different policy agendas. As in the story of the city of Babel, the 
confusion of languages divides the various groups and may make them unable to 
understand each other. However, this seeming disorder of various material, 
human, and immaterial elements that make up a modern city creates a stimulating 
environment and pushes local actors towards the continuous search for harmony, 
a design of a formal order within the city. The creation of a new order or the intelli-
gent solution of this “puzzle” requires, on the one hand, the production of new 
knowledge. On the other hand, it gets policy-makers to search for a common iden-
tity or for some forms of governance, and for co-operation among the various, 
often conflicting actors in the urban community in order to achieve greater social 
cohesion, security, and well-being. 
Interactive learning, knowledge creation, and innovation are dynamic and 
interlinked processes in urban, regional, or national innovation systems, and also 
across regions and countries. Knowledge is a special good which does not get 
exhausted with use, while it can develop gradually through the combination of its 
old and new components. This process of knowledge creation is enhanced by the 
spatial proximity of various actors. In this respect, cities enjoy a competitive 
advantage over rural areas. The large size of the urban economy allows a greater 
number of consumers and producers, and a great variety of consumer preferences, 
as well as of labour competencies. Cities have a large and diversified market, and a 
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strong demand for new activities. Many workers and firms are located in a city that 
allows the utilisation of a large pool of knowledge or competencies. 
Moreover, cities are more open to the external world and are more accessible 
to distant customers or suppliers. This leads to an easier access for cities to com-
plementary knowledge and accelerates the process of innovation. 
It has to be pointed out that knowledge affects not only the structure of the 
“production function” of the firms but also the “utility function” of people, influenc-
ing both the labour demand of firms and the demand for goods by the consumers 
(Cappellin 2012), as indicated in the model in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The process of urban growth and the creation of new needs and new skills 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
First, greater knowledge has an impact on the demand and supply of labour in 
the labour market. Firms exploit the new individual competencies of the workers 
and combine them in order to adopt new technologies needed in the production of 
new goods or services, but also in order to increase the productivity of traditional 
sectors. 
New knowledge gets firms to increase the demand for qualified employees and 
motivates households to supply more educated workers to the firms. The greater 
productivity of workers leads to an increase in wages which, at the same time, is 
crucial for creating additional demand for firms to sell new products and services. 
Secondly, greater knowledge has an impact also on the demand and supply of 
goods and services. It generates new needs by people and an increase in the 
demand for more sophisticated and innovative goods and services. 
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Firms are thus stimulated to replace traditional production and services by the 
specialised production of innovative products and services. The interaction 
between firms, the availability of qualified labour force within cities, and the 
combination of their competencies encourage the birth of new firms, often created 
as spin-offs from existing companies. 
Thus, the process of development in urban areas is based on the one hand on 
the increasing differentiation of local consumption and the new needs by 
households and by firms, while on the other hand it forces the firms and the labour 
force into a gradual transition from traditional services to modern ones. 
This process of increasing specialisation is very similar to the creation of vari-
ety and the increasing division of labour through the birth of new firms as illus-
trated by Marshall in the case of the “industrial districts” based on many small 
industrial firms, or by the modern evolutionary approach highlighting variety crea-
tion and market selection. 
This continuous differentiation of labour supply and of production capabilities 
of the firms together with the differentiation of the pattern of demand by the urban 
citizens may be defined as a process of “endogenous growth” (Cappellin 2003, 
Cappellin – Wink 2009), since it does not depend on external demand and on the 
attraction of investments from other regions and countries. This makes the eco-
nomic development in modern metropolitan areas different from the export-led 
urban development of highly specialised “company towns” during the early indus-
trialisation phase of the national economy, and also from many small and medium-
sized cities which base their growth on the attraction of external investments and 
employers. 
The Role of Consumption within the City Economy 
The traditional economic approach relates the growth of urban economy to the 
growth of large industrial firms and the exports of industrial products, like in the 
case of automobile productions in Turin, Detroit, or Paris. However, as indicated 
above, economic growth in a city may have an endogenous character, and internal 
demand generated by local investments and local consumption of services and 
goods may become its driver. 
The growth of many cities, especially in their phase of urbanisation, was driven 
by a boost of population, massive immigration, and by huge investments in con-
struction both in housing and in public transport, energy, and other infrastruc-
tures. In fact, the growth of the construction sector is determined by demographic 
expansion, and it has been a major demand stimulus not only for the local but also 
for the national economy, as we have seen it in the case of China or India. The 
construction sector has low import content, and has a considerable multiplier 
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effect on the volume of aggregate urban product. Thus, the growth of a city in 
developed economies may be pulled by massive investments related to the organi-
sation of major events, such as Olympic Games or a large World Expo. 
As we have said above, cities are national and global market hubs that allow 
producers greater access to different groups of customers, and citizens get access 
to a wide scope of goods or services to be purchased. On the other hand, cities are 
not only centres of production, but also places of residence, since in all countries a 
growing ratio of inhabitants live in cities. 
This demand makes us consider a new dimension of the knowledge economy. 
Knowledge, as indicated above, affects not only the structure of the “production 
function” of firms, but also the “utility function” of people. In fact, the knowledge 
economy is characterised by the development of new needs and lifestyles leading 
to the development of demand for new products and services.  
Knowledge thus affects consumer behaviour. While a “linear model” focuses on 
the adoption of new technologies, an evolutionary perspective and the network 
model of innovation focus on the process of interactive learning between the 
consumer or the user on the one hand and the producer on the other. Traditional 
aggregate growth models do not consider the role of interaction between the vari-
ous actors as a factor leading to demand for new products. However, recent 
economic literature highights five different forms of close producer–user interac-
tion (Cappellin 2011). 
The first case is “demand-led” innovation (Fagerberg 2005, Tidd – Bessant – 
Pavitt 2005), when “specialised suppliers”, e.g. in the machine tool industry, adjust 
their products to the specific needs of their customers.  
The second important case of close producer–user interaction is related to the 
field of services (Howells 2002, Strambach 2008, Cappellin 2009, Muller – 
Doloreux 2009), as they require an active role of the user in their production. 
Services, such as management consulting or education, are “co-produced” by the 
supplier and the user, since there is no separation between the production and the 
consumption of a service, as there is in the case of goods. 
The third case is that of “user innovation” (von Hippel 1994 and 2001), typical 
examples of which are when new, specialised medical equipment is designed by 
the doctors themselves, or when specific sports equipment by the champions in 
certain sports. In fact, the user may have such important, specialised personal 
needs and may have accumulated such experience or competence in a specific field 
that enable him/her to design, experiment, and produce a specific good or service, 
with or without the help of a technologist or a specialised firm. Later this equip-
ment or service may be produced by industrial or service firms, too.  
A fourth case of tight interaction between consumers and producers is related 
to “club goods” (Buchanan 1965), that is, to activities of specific communities 
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voluntarily organised by a group of people in order to use specific goods or 
services jointly. A ”club good” is a type of “public good” from the consumption of 
which it is possible to exclude people who do not share the costs of the service, but 
where use is collective and there is no rivalry in consumption up to a given limit 
where demand exceeds supply. In general, consumers are members of specific 
communities characterised by similar consumption behaviours. In this interpreta-
tion many consumer goods may be defined as “club goods”. Specific examples are 
the co-operatives of consumers or the sport and cultural associations. Consump-
tion in these cases is a social activity, just as in the case of housing where the 
measurement unit is the household and not the individual. 
The case of “club goods”  also has a geographical aspect, since people in a club 
should live close to each other to share the same good. Club goods are very 
important in cities, but even cities and other territorial communities themselves 
may be defined as “club goods”. In fact, people who live in a city are willing to pay 
the higher costs (e.g. higher rents) because superior goods and services are 
available there compared to rural areas. Moreover, citizens choose to live in a 
given ethnic community or in communities with similar preferences, and they are 
willing to move in search for a community closer to their preferences.  
In fact, knowledge, too, can be considered as a “club good” rather than a “public 
good”. Knowledge on the one hand allows non-rival consumption, but on the other 
hand there are barriers limiting the access to specialised knowledge for those who 
do not have the necessary educational background. The access to specialised 
knowledge requires previous tacit knowledge shared within specific communities. 
Thus, consumers and producers sharing common knowledge within specialised 
communities can be considered as sharing the same “club good”. 
Finally, the fifth case of significant user–producer interaction in cities is that of 
the consumption of “relational goods” (Becchetti – Pelloni – Rossetti 2008, Gui 
2005), where the use of the good or service by a person implies the parallel use of 
the same good or service by another person. Relational goods are produced and 
consumed at the same time through participation in some social activity. They 
respond to the need for socialisation and the pleasure given by sharing common 
experiences with others. 
Common consumption as a social activity increases individual well-being. 
Emerging needs of people and firms have an interactive or collective character. 
This corresponds to the simple observation that it gives more pleasure to eat and 
drink with others than alone. Various new services may be defined as “relational 
goods” where the actor takes pleasure in the interaction with others, like in the 
case of certain sports, cultural and scientific activities. Here the benefit for the con-
sumer is not just and not primarily the use of a specific good, but rather the access 
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to immaterial goods, such as positive social feedback or reputation within the 
specific community. 
Thus, the consumption of relational goods is not only related to a monetary 
exchange between the individual consumer and the individual producer, but rather 
to the complex and changing distribution of individual roles within communities  
interested in the use or production of the considered goods or services. Belonging 
to a specific community and the adoption of its consumption patterns explain the 
similarities in the preferences of individuals, whether we take the cases of food 
and clothes consumption or choosing the housing location or the forms of passing 
leisure time.  
Within communities the actors share not only goods, services, and knowledge, 
but also emotions, a sense of common belonging, collective identity, various forms 
of solidarity, which bind them together. The sense of belonging is a typical charac-
teristic of human nature, and also of other living species, in response to their need 
for security. In fact, cities had first been created in order to defend their inhabit-
ants from external dangers, and even today the mass immigration to large cities in 
developing countries is explained by the belief in the opportunity to have better 
access to basic goods and services such as food, modern houses, health care and 
education. 
These five cases indicate that cities host frequent user–producer interactions. 
These may stimulate the production of new goods and services that go together 
with the creation of new jobs fairly important for urban governance aiming to 
increase overall employment within metropolitan areas characterised by large 
social groups with high structural unemployment.  
A policy agenda for the economic development of urban areas can be based on 
many new investment initiatives such as material and immaterial investments in 
innovation; investment in research and innovation; launching large strategic 
investments organised by networks of firms; investments in tertiary education and 
continuous learning; investments in the employment of young, highly qualified 
workers; enhancement of back-to-work programmes for retired people; energy 
saving investments in urban buildings and in the production and use of renewable 
energy; protection from natural disasters and improvement of the natural environ-
ment within cities; development of healthy nutrition and of agro-food production 
close to urban areas; investments in tourism, cultural activities, and other activities 
related to free time, socialisation needs, and sports; investments in health and 
wellness services; the development of social services for groups in need; invest-
ments in metropolitan and suburban rail links for commuters and investments in 
international freight transport by air or by rail; enhancement of social services 
provided by non-profit organisations; new housing for low-income households; 
improvement of the efficiency and quality of the public services; investments in the 
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fight against organised crime and in the control of corruption in public and private 
organisations, etc. All these are compatible with the “Europe 2020” development 
strategy  of the European Union (EC 2010). 
However, a change in policy actions should be accompanied by changes in the 
forms of public governance and by an enhancement of the initiatives of private 
actors. The traditional approach to public investment is not a viable solution any 
more due to the need to reduce public debt. On the other hand, the traditional free-
market approach is clearly ineffective in promoting urban growth, since urban 
areas are characterised by the pervasive effect of external economies and, instead 
of greater competition, higher co-operation is needed in order to promote invest-
ment in many innovative fields. Moreover, the free-market approach leads to an 
oligopolistic concentration due to the existence of natural monopolies in the 
provision of many services in a specific urban area, and this widens the disparities 
in income and wealth. A third alternative in a knowledge economy is the multi-
level governance approach (Hall – Soskice 2001, Kaiser – Prange 2004, Cappellin 
2010), which is based on negotiation and consensus, the diffusion of information, 
interactive learning and various forms of co-ordination among the different local 
actors. 
Conclusions 
Transition to a knowledge economy brings changes for modern metropolitan areas 
in four interrelated fields: the labour market, the pattern of consumption, the 
physical structure of the city, and the forms of governance. In brief the changes 
could be described by the increasing share of “knowledge workers”, the growing 
need for new services, “club goods” and “relational goods”, the greater mobility 
and diversity of people, and the need for new governance approaches facilitating 
the co-ordination of an increasing number of different stakeholders.  
In a modern knowledge economy, policy strategies for promoting urban com-
petitiveness and growth in large metropolitan areas should be different from the 
traditional “export-led” strategies usually followed in smaller industrial cities. The 
growth of a city does not depend solely on competition for external investment.  
On the contrary, the process of economic growth in a city may have an endogenous 
character. Internal demand generated by local investments and the local consump-
tion of services and goods may become the drivers of economic growth of a city.  
Our study has illustrated an “endogenous model” of economic growth in large 
modern cities, according to which new services develop because of the increasing 
differentiation of the needs of customers, satisfied by the utilisation of specialised 
knowledge within firms in providing new services. We have demonstrated that 
urban growth can be driven by the development of internal demand instead of 
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attracting external investment, and that the main drivers of the economy in a 
modern city are the emerging needs of citizens rather than exports.  
However, the creation of new markets requires co-ordination at the local level. 
Cities and regions are closer to people and to firms, so they can react to local needs 
and utilise the capabilities of people and firms more efficiently, by stimulating 
private consumption and investments. The development of knowledge economy 
needs greater involvement of cities and regions, and cannot be left only to national 
governments. 
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 BUSINESS & FINANCIAL SERVICES OFFSHORING 
IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE 
Zoltán Gál 
Introduction 
The rapid surge of globalisation, opening up formerly isolated regions such as 
Eastern Europe, Russia and China to global trade, has substantially boosted task 
trade and service related cross-border investments. After and parallel to out-
sourcing/offshoring the low and medium-skilled production processes in manu-
facturing from developed to low-cost developing countries, similar processes have 
emerged in services (Bryson 2007). Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) have played 
a considerable part in both processes. Relocation of these activities have grown 
rapidly, particularly after 2000, especially the new EU member states (NMS) of the 
region have begun to act as host for this type of investment (Gál – Sass 2009). 
The significance of offshoring is often overestimated because still only a small 
proportion of services are transferred abroad (Amiti – Wei 2004 and 2005). In fact, 
offshoring by no means generates as drastic effects as one might expect from the 
ongoing political debate on job losses (Mankiw – Swagel, 2006). The literature 
concentrates mainly on home country impacts, especially in terms of job losses, 
relative wage decreases for unskilled workers and welfare implications (Hansen – 
Schaumburg-Müller – Potter 2007). However, host country impacts have hardly 
been researched though these may be wide-ranging. Even research on the job-
creating impact in home countries is missing (Jensen – Kirkegaard – Laugesen 
2006, Ekholm – Hakkala 2006). Offshoring skill-intensive activities to Central and 
Eastern Europe has contributed to relative wage decrease for skilled workers in 
some sender countries and increased productivity in host countries1 (Protsenko 
2003, Marin 2010). 
Service offshoring-related impacts – such as outputs, value added, employment, 
foreign direct investments and exports in services – have grown rapidly, particu-
larly in the NMS after 2000. Most of the papers are still dealing with the conse-
quences of offshoring to low-wage countries for the labour markets in the West 
                                                                        
1 Protsenko (2003) finds that German vertical FDI in the Czech Republic has positive effects 
on the productivity of local firms, while horizontal FDI does not have such effects. 
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(Amiti – Wei 2005, Kirkegaard 2005). Fragmentation and “trade in task” theorems 
developed by Jones and Kierzkowski (1990) and Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg 
(2006) examine the new role of services in international trade. Advances in this 
process have made it easier for companies to disaggregate their value chains 
around the globe, and to disperse service production among numerous supplier 
firms even in distant locations. 
The relocation of services also conceptualises the types and impacts of foreign 
direct investments in business services within the Global Production Network 
(Fernandez-Stark – Bamber – Gereffi 2011) A bulk of research examines offshoring 
as a part of worldwide structural shift towards service-based foreign direct invest-
ment (Bryson 2007, Grote – Täube 2006, Bevan – Estrin, 2004, Hardy 2007). How-
ever, current economic statistics do not provide reliable indicators for the scale 
and characteristics of offshoring, therefore our knowledge of the developments in 
services outsourcing/offshoring is limited because of data and measurement 
problems. Due to problems of collecting data on business service investments, 
statistics have been supplemented with qualitative research in recent studies (Har-
dy 2006, Capik 2008, Fifekova – Hardy 2010, Sass – Fifekova 2011). 
This paper attempts to examine the scale and sectoral characteristics of 
services offshoring in six NMS2 (hereafter NMS6) by means of using trade data in 
order to partially overcome the scarcity of consistent empirical contributions in 
measuring the actual significance of NMS in offshoring services. Despite the 
deficiencies of reliable and consistent data sources, balance of payments statistics 
including the exports of services are still the most closely related to offshoring/ 
outsourcing. The paper is divided into three sections. Following the introduction, 
the first section gives an overview of the service offshoring position of CEE and 
discusses the measurement problems of service offshoring. It examines the service 
trade trends in various business and ICT (information and computer technology) 
services, and BoP3 trade data in order to find evidence of offshoring-related service 
intensity in the NMS. The second part explores the reasons for the comparative 
advantages of the CEE region as an offshoring hub. 
                                                                        
2 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and.Slovakia. 
3 Balance of Payment. 
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Central and Eastern Europe as an Emerging Offshoring Hub – Evidence From 
Trade Statistics 
The Increasing Role of NMS in the Global Offshoring Market 
The tradability revolution in services has resulted in a rapid surge of locational 
transfers in service activities. Within Central and Eastern Europe the NMS of the 
EU have achieved the most enormous progress in modernising their service 
industries and following the turn of the millennium they have witnessed a rapid 
shift towards services. Countries of the region have gained importance as 
offshoring locations. The extent of relocation, however, was much smaller than 
perceived on the basis of information from the media (Hunya – Sass 2005). In 
2003, CEE with its $1 billion share in the global offshoring market (which is worth 
an estimated $40 billion) lagged far behind the more prominent locations 
(McKinsey 2005). The share of Visegrad countries in the global business services 
FDI was less than 1% in 2008. Nevertheless, the share of CEE has been rapidly 
growing. In 2003, only 5% of service-related global FDI projects were realised 
there, while in 2006, 22% went to regions in these countries. However, the number 
of current projects in Western Europe continues to exceed CEE projects – 1600 and 
220 respectively (Sass 2008, Gál – Sass 2009). 
CEE is still an attractive supplier for mainly continental European corporations, 
albeit a growing number of outsourcing service seekers from Western Europe have 
found Bangalores in their own backyard. Major companies after having targeted 
India and its Asian companions as the prime destinations for offshoring services 
sector jobs, are now looking towards Eastern Europe to meet their nearshoring 
requirements. During the first stage of service offshoring, captives in the form of 
shared service centres were the main service providers, while recently inde-
pendent global vendors are also opening their new offshore outsourcing centres in 
CEE to serve their European clients (Gál – Sass 2009).  
Measurement Problems of Offshoring Services 
The main driving forces of offshoring to CEE are closely related to the FDI inflows 
as the region became an increasingly popular destination for foreign investors 
seeking to expand their market and to gain access to cheap resources. The NMS 
particularly benefited from the worldwide structural shift towards (business) 
service-based FDI. Fifekova and Hardy (2010) calculated that service-based FDI 
that flew into the Visegrad 44 countries between 2001 and 2008 reached more 
than 60% of total FDI. 
                                                                        
4 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia. 
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Analysing the patterns of service sector investment and trade, indicators 
derived from FDI, trade and employment statistics would be optimal for measuring 
the extent of service offshoring activities in CEE and the relative positions of the 
countries in this process. However, we are facing various measurement and data 
problems (Chakrabarty 2006, Sass 2008). FDI data in services can be problematic 
and vary to large extent depending on the source of the statistics.5 FDI plays an 
important role in offshoring, but it is more difficult to quantify it, instead, services 
trade data provide a more reliable source of measurement. First of all, one has to 
make a distinction between FDI serving the foreign market, offshoring and off-
shore outsourcing. Offshoring is usually connected to FDI, though not all FDI is 
offshoring (Kirkegaard 2005). Sass (2008) discloses that constraints of FDI data lie 
not only in their unreliability, but also in their limited size in services compared to 
manufacturing investments.6 Detailed data on employees involved in different 
types of service activities would provide a good proxy, although these are not 
available in most cases.7 
Considering the shortcomings in different statistical sources, the indecisive 
evidence of the consultancy reports and the lack of a commonly accepted definition 
of offshoring, this paper uses trade data derived from the Balance of Payments 
statistics. This gives a good approximation to indentify the trends in those sections 
of service trade which can be regarded as offshorable, helps to identify the geo-
graphical direction of contemporary relocalisation processes within the region, 
and it also highlights the shifts in county level performances in attracting offshored 
services. In the case of vertical investment, where the motivation is primarily to 
take advantage of the local resources and not to serve the local market, the 
majority of the services produced are immediately exported. These service activi-
ties are highly export oriented and their export intensity is also very high (around 
100%). That is why trade data give the relatively most relevant proxy for calculat-
ing the extent of offshoring and outsourcing these services. The growth of vertical 
                                                                        
5 It is mainly due to definition problems of the service sector in general, and the lack of 
generally accepted and standardised classification of services, which particularly applies to 
the breakdown of subdivisions (e.g. classification of business services). Moreover, various 
names are used for describing the same and similar subgroups (e.g. other business 
services, knowledge-intensive business services, computer and business services etc.). 
6 The invested amount of capital and the costs of setting up service centres (renting office 
space, training and recruiting employees) are negligible to manufacturing investments, 
therefore the volume of services FDI does not reflect the real extent of service sector 
investment. In sum, offshore outsourcing is usually less connected to FDI than to trade. 
7 Labour data can also be misleading due to the problem of differentiating among the 
relevant jobs according to the ownership of companies involved (e.g. independent 
domestic providers are also included in the data) and between service and manufacturing 
activities. 
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investments in the service sector therefore also leads to increased exports in 
services. The majority of exports from the NMS is directed towards the EU (export 
from Visegrad 4 countries to EU reached 70%), which illustrates that service 
centres provide services mainly for customers and subsidiaries within Europe 
(Fifekova – Hardy 2010).8 
Services Offshoring Market in NMS – Evidence from Trade Statistics 
Services trade data, due to their statististical shortcomings, would be indicative 
only and allows us to measure the extent of offshoring and offshore outsourcing in 
an indirect way. Following the international methodology (UNCTAD 2005, Amiti – 
Wei 2005, Ghibutiu – Poladian 2008, Sass 2010) two service categories are suitable 
for approximating the size of trade in offshorable services.9 ICT services and other 
business services (OBS) are the most inclusive categories that can be regarded as 
potentially offshorable services.10 Eurostat data make international comparisons 
possible at a more detailed level. 
Export services data in the case of the six new EU member states (NMS6) 
included in this study provide an approximate method to define the extent of 
offshoring services.11 Exports in services in NMS6 have been expanding from a 
very low base, amounting to 63 billion Euro by 2007, which is almost 3 times 
higher than that in 1996. The share of NMS6 in the global service exports is modest 
(2.8%), illustrating the still low service export capabilities of the region, although 
its growth rate is higher than the global or the EU15 average. In absolute terms, 
shown in Figure 1, Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary are the leaders in this 
field. 
It is widely accepted that offshoring services mean the global sourcing of busi-
ness and IT services from abroad. Therefore to find further evidence of offshoring-
related service development, export data on the so-called “offshorable services”, 
                                                                        
  8 Between 1992 and 2005 the increase in global imports of CIS (computer and information 
services) and OBS (other business services) by EU15 accounted for 9.5%, while their 
imports from CEE over the same period increased by 13.5%. By comparison, the total 
service imports rose just 6.7% (Meyer 2006). 
  9 Sass (2010) explores several methodological problems related to the exact quantification 
of offshoring services, and stresses the difficulties in grouping those particular service 
categories which are affected by offshoring, partially because the NACE classification 
packs together offshorable and non-offshorable service categories. 
10 As Ghibutiu and Poladian (2008) pointed out, it is difficult to distinguish between offshor-
able and offshored service parts because not all service trade is related to offshoring, nor 
is it possible distinguish between affiliated and unaffiliated trade, or differentiate between 
captive and independent providers, respectively.  
11 Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. The share of NMS6 in the 
total service export of NMS10 is 85%. 
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Figure 1. Exports of services in NMS6 in 1996 and 2007 (EUR Bn) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat and IMF BoP data. 
namely on the other business and ICT services, have to be collected for NMS6 using 
the Eurostat database. The increased tradability of these subcategories is more 
visible in the patterns of services trade, and their export/sales intensity is the 
largest among services (Sass 2008). The share of offshorable services within total 
service exports steadily grew from 16% to 24.2% between 1997 and 2007.12 The 
total value of offshorable services in NMS6 was equal to 15.3 billion Euro in 2007 
and within this aggregate the overwhelming dominance of business services (85% 
on average) is striking. In absolute terms, Poland and Hungary are the largest 
traders followed by the Czech Republic and Romania (Figure 2). 
The export of services has grown significantly in the region. In comparison to 
1996, the level of service exports tripled in the Visegrad countries by 2007. Within 
the service sector the growth rate of offshorable service export increased the most 
dynamically (by an average of 20%) and Romania, Poland and Hungary expe-
rienced the highest growth between 2002 and 2007 (Figure 3). This could be ex-
plained by the rapid growth of export oriented vertical investments in the form of 
shared services-centres.  
Due to the rapid growth of offshorable service exports over the period of 2002–
2007, in combination with the slower expansion of imports, the deficits decreased 
steadily and this resulted in net trade gains amounting to 800 million Euros (2007) 
in NMS6. Hungary reached an export surplus by 2004, earlier than the neigh- 
                                                                        
12 At country level some offshorable export shares increased even more between 2002 and 
2007: Hungary from 20% to 32%, Romania from 24% to 30% and Poland from 13% to 
21%. 
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Figure 2. Exports of offshorable services and their sectoral composition in 2002–07 (€ Bn) 
Legend: ICT – Information and Communication Technology Services; OBS – Other Business 
Services.   
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat BoP data. 
 
 
Figure 3.  Average annual growth rates of different export sectors in NMS6, 2002–07 (%) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat BoP data. 
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bouring countries. Poland reduced its trade deficits more rapidly, and turned it 
into a small surplus, while Romania achieved the highest surplus by 2007 within 
the shortest time (Figure 4). 
Service trade statistics are supportive of the preliminary assumption that 
offshoring generated expanding exports in particular service categories and a large 
proportion of business export services in the NMS has been associated with 
offshoring. However, it is obvious that not all this kind of trade is provided by 
offshored services.13 
 
Figure 4. Net trade in offshorable services in NMS6 in 2007 versus 2005 and 2002 (EUR Bn) 
Source: Author’s calculation based on Eurostat and IMF BoP data. 
Future Bangalores? – Offshoring Advantages and Disadvantages of the NMS  
Compapartive Advantages of Nearshoring Services in CEE countries 
Due to the methodological constraints, quantitative data alone are not suitable for 
revealing the complexity of offshoring services. Besides findings based on statisti-
cal data there are qualitative approaches to identify the main motives of compa-
nies relocating service activities in the NMS and to define the comparative 
advantages of regions which arise from the combination of geographical, organisa-
tional and cultural proximity to Western Europe.  
                                                                        
13 These data do not show how much of the offshorable service exports are really provided 
by offshored service centres, neither do they distinguish between the different organisa-
tional forms of offshore outsourcing and captive offshoring. 
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On the demand side, growth and new business strategic directions are encour-
aging more and more European companies to establish service centres in locations 
with strategic geographical position in the CEE region. Strategic locations provide 
good accessibility to potential customers and also indicate the geographical direc-
tion of future market expansion of companies. Another driver is the rise of the 
global service delivery model which creates a pool of global service centres around 
the world incorporating CEE as part of a global system (Gál 2009). The “closer to 
home” strategies of MNCs are applied when investors prefer the establishment of 
services-centres in close proximity to the home country. “Nearshoring” means 
relocating service activities to a foreign, lower-wage country that is relatively close 
in distance and within the same continent or time zone14 (Jahns – Hatmann – Bals 
2006, Bryson 2007). Jensen, Kirkegaard and Laugesen (2006) show that the im-
portance of nearshoring in many cases overwrites cost considerations. Carmel and 
Abbott (2007) emphasise the importance of time zone and distance, which make 
the selection of service centre locations a very important issue. The distance just 
like different time zones will also increase the costs of face-to-face interactions 
(Rao 2004). The preference for nearshoring partly explains the growing particular 
attraction of the NMS in business services offshoring/outsourcing. 
Another important driver of the relocation of services to CEE is the insufficient 
number of qualified labour in home countries. Marin (2010) found that indeed the 
high-skilled jobs are moving to the east due to the scarcity of human capital in the 
sender (home) countries. 
On the supply side, locational advantages determine which countries are cho-
sen as hosts for new or relocated service centres. These advantages are similar to 
those of efficiency seeking investments. The most important of these is the availa-
bility of those factors of production that are used intensively in the production of 
the service in question at a lower cost. It can also be argued that the attractiveness 
of CEE is based on talented, highly skilled labour and geography too, rather than 
simply on low wages and a vast labour pool. Three groups of apparently important 
capabilities drive the nearshoring advantages of CEE. 
First, these countries have close geographical, political and cultural ties with 
Western Europe. The advantages of EU membership not only diminished the ex-
ternal risks, but dramatically simplified the administration cost as well. CEE as a 
nearshoring location scores high marks because of its lower cost for communica-
tion between the costumer and the service provider. Nearshoring locations not 
only reduce costs and risks of working with distant foreign companies, but also 
                                                                        
14 Some companies have special operation requirements within a time zone to provide 24-
hour services for other than  EMEA  (Europe, Middle East and Africa) region (Fifekova – 
Hardy, 2010). 
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simplify personal contacts. Besides close proximity that may improve the efficiency 
of day-to-day information exchange to a service provider, nearshoring allows com-
panies to facilitate control and smooth operation (Abott – Jones 2002). Being in the 
same time zone is a huge advantage, especially if projects require frequent travel-
ling, and also CEE is particularly interesting for companies that require voice and 
customer-facing services in their mother languages15 (Meyer 2006).  
Secondly, the comparative advantages of CEE still lie to a large extent in the 
wage differences, as cost savings are still one of the most important motives for 
offshoring. In CEE labour costs are 40 to 60% lower than in Western Europe, 
although it varies largely within the region. Comparative advantages in wages 
between countries and regions can change relatively fast, although CEE will remain 
relatively cheap in the near future. Ultimately, no low-cost country can remain low-
cost forever. Most of the CEE countries are not among the cheapest locations and 
outpace those of the low-cost Asian and Eastern European countries. However, the 
recent depreciation of the local currencies as a consequence of financial crisis sus-
tains the cost competitiveness of the region for a longer period. Other than labour 
costs are also relevant factors for the selection of service centre locations. Costs of 
infrastructure, operating costs and taxes were the most frequently mentioned fac-
tors by the interviewed companies (Fifekova – Hardy 2010).  
Thirdly, much has been said about the quality of labour in the region, which 
consists of a highly educated, well-trained and motivated workforce, achieving a 
high degree of productivity and flexibility. However, the nature of the skill re-
quirement of the activities has some subtle characteristics. CEE countries do not 
only have factor price advantages compared to more developed countries, but they 
also have a “knowledge advantage” in some submarkets compared to other lower 
priced countries in terms of the knowledge of “smaller” languages and the supply 
of well-educated university graduates. In total, CEE produces a much lower num-
ber of university graduates than its large Asian counterparts. However, the CEE 
graduates turn out to be far more suitable to work for TNCs. According to the 
McKinsey survey, job candidates from CEE had higher suitability rate (around 50% 
on average, whereas 80% in developed countries) across all occupations than their 
Asian or Latin American counterparts (McKinsey 2005).  
Fourthly, other non-cost related factors should be considered as well when 
choosing offshore locations. Good quality telecommunication infrastructure is also 
an important locational factor and the quality of this infrastructure is now high and 
can be used at reasonable prices in these countries. This is also true for office 
                                                                        
15 In Eastern Europe, the share of German speaking graduates can be as high as the number 
of English speaking ones. (Nearly 30% of schoolchildren learn German, while 70% of 
them English.) Romania is a particularly interesting destination for French companies, as 
85% of schoolchildren learn French there. 
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space. In order to ensure smooth functioning of the service plant, certain other ser-
vices (e.g. financial, other business services) must be available. Moreover, a good 
legal and regulatory environment with effective enforcement is important. These 
conditions are now present in the required quality in those NMS countries where 
general levels of legal compliance are high. In some cases protection of intellectual 
property is indispensable, which lends a competitive edge to these countries over 
China or Russia. EU membership also encourages high “trust” in business relation-
ships (Gál – Sass 2009). 
Conclusion 
Offshoring has been a stimulus to develop CEE as an important destination for 
resources seeking services investment. New member states invigorated by EU 
enlargement became important locations for shared service centres. The growth of 
vertical investments in the service sector results in increased exports in services. 
Trade statistics support the assumption that an expanding export in other business 
and ICT services has been associated with offshoring services in the NMS. The 
service export data adopted from the Balance of Payments statistics give a good 
approximation to identify those sections of service trade that can be regarded as 
offshorable. 
The improving net trade position of NMS in offshorable services has moved 
from deficits to growing surpluses, illustrating the shift towards the higher value 
added KIBS (Knowledge Intensive Business Services). The paper also argues that 
due to the discussed measurement problems, calculations based on BoP trade data 
are only indicative and an indirect way of measuring the accelerated pace of this 
process. Determining the actual extent and patterns of service sector investment 
requires a combination of quantitative and qualitative research.  
Besides findings based on statistical data, there are qualitative approaches to 
identify the main motives of companies relocating business and ICT service 
activities in the NMS and to define the comparative advantages of the CEE region 
as a whole. Building on the region’s nearshoring advantages such as geographical–
cultural proximity and on its multilingual graduate supply, CEE is likely to utilise 
more value added and quality-driven services.  
Despite the fact that the service industry is the most promising opportunity for 
the CEE economies, there are a few threats concerning the region’s future pro-
spects as a major offshoring hub. It is not just the steadily raising costs. The size of 
the talent pool is still limited in CEE and, compared to India, the majority of the 
workforce still consists of young and inexperienced graduates. Another aspect of 
the problem is based simply on size. The population of the six largest Central 
European metropolitan areas is only equal to the population of the single Indian 
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city of Mumbai. On the corporate side, local providers in CEE failed to establish 
their global presence on the map, because of their smaller size and fragmentation, 
and they are attached to the local market instead of seeking out the global one. 
Another problem is the bureaucratic environment and the lack of assessment of 
the direct consequences of the financial crisis. However, the pressure to stay com-
petitive is forcing both the companies and the host countries to exploit the further 
advantages of services offshoring and outsourcing. 
The steady growth of services exports during the last decade have exerted a 
positive impact not only on companies’ productivity, but on the host countries’ 
economic performance as well. Services offshoring also generates increased pres-
sures on the NMS to adjust their economies and manage the challenges raised by 
the rapidly changing global offshoring landscape by continuous upgrading of their 
comparative advantages. 
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 TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE IN THE CONTEXT OF RIS3 
SMART SPECIALISATION STRATEGIES 
Jaime del Castillo – Belen Barroeta – Jonatan Paton 
Introduction 
In the current new competitive environment, “Smart Specialisation” has emerged 
as a territorial development model to increase the efficiency and effectiveness of 
economic systems. Smart Specialisation differs from previous models in its special 
emphasis on governance. Within this context, new RIS3 (Research and Innovations 
Strategies) Smart Specialisation strategies represent an opportunity to lay the 
foundations of a new governance approach to promote better co-ordinated, effi-
cient and effective innovation systems. But all this raises a number of important 
and sophisticated questions from the point of view of the system and the process. 
The aim of this paper is to analyse the concept of governance in the RIS3 context, 
offering bot only a critical view of the opportunities, but also the challenges and 
threats that arise. 
The paper seeks to go beyond theoretical definitions of governance and pre-
sents a set of issues dealing with difficulties as well as recommendations arising 
from the implementation of Smart Specialsation. The paper then draws some con-
clusions to be considered by current practices to move towards regional Smart 
Specialisation. This process requires more sophisticated governance that is able to 
respond to theoretical and practical challenges. In the last section we also seek to 
open the door for future research that is unquestionably needed to develop this 
recently born field of research.  
The Competitive Context 
Regions now face an uncertain environment with complex challenges, charac-
terised by globalisation and economic, social and environmental problems. In this 
context, competitiveness has become a central topic of academic, business and 
political debates, related to the ability of the economies to improve the living 
standards and widen employment (Ketels 2006). In developed countries this leads 
to a continuously developing self-positioning through differentiation. Besides, as 
innovation has become the main tool for differentiation, it has also become the key 
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driver of competitiveness (Porter – Stern – Furman 2000). Many studies have 
shown the close relationship between efforts to generate knowledge and innova-
tion and the level of economic prosperity (Romer 1986, Lucas 1988, Freeman – 
Soete 1997, Porter 2003). 
The determinant factors of the current competitive environment can be classi-
fied roughly into four interconnected and interdependent dimensions (Figure 1). 
These can be interpreted along two axes, one of them referring to the logic and 
operation of the new economy (context-related challenges and competitive mecha-
nisms) and at the other representing the territorial aspect (globalisation versus 
localisation) (Paton – Garatea 2012, Del Castillo – Paton 2012). 
 
Figure 1. Major determinants of the current competitive context 
Source: Compiled from Paton – Garatea (2012) and Del Castillo – Paton (2012). 
Thus, along the first axis, the increase in the number of competitors has made 
differentiation and innovation the basis of competitiveness in responding to social 
and environmental challenges. Along the second axis, globalisation has increased 
the uniformity of the rules of the game [see Friedman’s (2007) “flat world”]. But it 
has indirectly enlarged the territorial differences, too, owing to unequal starting 
positions (Bhagwati 2010). It is this “glocal” approach (Beck 2004), which seeks to 
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put the territories into a global context, that has led to the idea of Smart Specialisa-
tion and the importance given to efficiency and effectiveness in the performance of 
the territorial systems (McCann – Ortega-Argilés 2011). The heterogeneity in the 
quality of governance has contributed much to uneven territorial development, so 
Smart Specialisation strategies aim to improve the capacity of each country to 
manage local and territorial processes better (Landabaso 2011). 
Governance in the Framework of Smart Specialisation  
As Williamson (1985) points it out, the objective of governance is to respond to the 
limitations and barriers to optimal co-ordination that exist due to limited rational-
ity, behavioural uncertainty and opportunism of parties in any given setting. 
However, all these elements vary with the changes observed in socio-economic 
contexts. At present, the constraints of the context force governance to follow a 
model of Smart Specialisation that, as noted in the introduction, implies greater 
sophistication and effort in its definition and articulation. 
The New Model of Smart Specialisation 
The concept of Smart Specialisation comes from the realisation of the fact that the 
structural “gap” between Europe and the USA (Pontikakis – Kiryakou – van Bavel 
2009) is the result of lower economic and technological specialisation and less 
ability to prioritise and to dedicate consistent efforts at the regional level. This line 
of thought has been transferred to the new approaches of European regional policy 
in the context of Europe 2020, and has also established itself as one of the condi-
tions for accessing the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) in the 2014–
2020 programming period (EC 2011a, b). Smart Specialisation is still a developing 
concept, initiated mainly by authors who currently advise the Commission itself 
(Foray – David – Hall 2009, Foray 2009, McCann – Ortega-Argilés 2011). We  can 
say that Smart Specialisation is based on the determination of priorities by territory, 
in the field of economic activities or scientific and technological domains that are 
potential generators of new market opportunities in a global context (Del Castillo – 
Barroeta – Paton 2012a). 
In sum, the concept can be broken down into three main points:  
(1) Determining the priorities of specialisation in technology, science, and 
economic activities in which the region is competitive and can concentrate 
its efforts and a critical mass of resources with a high potential return. 
(2) Exploiting the diversity emerging from the relationships between different 
domains and sectors, maximising positive externalities and generating new 
activities with the utilisation of knowledge. 
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(3) Maintaining the consistency of processes by which specialisation takes 
place in that part of the global value chain where the region is a leader and 
has comparative advantage. 
The conclusion by del Castillo, Barroeta and Paton (2012b) is that a good model 
of territorial development must be based on strategic governance capable of 
securing comparative and competitive advantages of the territory's (tangible and 
intangible) assets in a global context. In addition, it must be completed with the 
invention of new economic activities that change the regional economy through 
successive “waves of innovation” (Figure 2). 
The way these principles are put into practice regarding the system (the role of 
components and the structure of their relationships) or the strategic process 
(definition, implementation, and monitoring) can and should vary according to the 
characteristics and conditions of each region. 
 
Figure 2.  Conceptual structure and logic of the model of Smart Specialisation 
Source: Del Castillo – Barroeta – Paton (2012b). 
Smart Specialisation as a Complex System 
The concept of specialisation is not new in economic theory, the novelty is only its 
application in the field of the regional development policies linked to the new 
European cohesion policy legislation (Del Castillo – Barroeta – Paton 2012b). This 
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explains why there are certain gaps between the different approaches related to 
the specific aspects of the policy to be covered, especially when it comes to the 
tools, the role of the agents in the innovation system, and governance in general. 
Up to now, the only references to this field can be found in the guide published by 
the IPTS (2012), in complementary thematic documents (EC 2012a, b, c) and con-
tributions made by certain experts (Del Castillo – Barroeta – Paton 2013a, 2013b, 
EURADA 2012). A key factor of success in the governance of Smart Specialisation is 
how the involvement of the different actors and elements of the innovation system 
is managed, mobilising all its relationships in order to achieve greater efficiency/ 
effectiveness. To do this, the need to move towards more participation in govern-
ance linked to the quadruple helix is emphasised (EURADA 2012, Landabaso 
2011). 
While participative governance was a key element already in the previous RIS, 
in practice it was not always subordinated to a bottom-up approach involving all 
the agents, and at that time the concept of the quadruple helix was not being used 
yet. Therefore, a critical task in Smart Specialisation strategies will be to identify 
those components of the system in each regional case that might play a leading 
role as well as to identify the (formal and informal) relationships and the social 
capital that shape and operate the system. According to del Castillo, Barroeta and 
Paton (2013b) it is important to involve: 
 private-sector representatives related to those economic, technological, and 
scientific specialisation niches which are important in the region;  
 regional R&D agents related to niches of technological and knowledge 
specialisation; and 
 various public administration institutions applying a multi-level (state, 
regions, local administrations) and a multi-departmental approach as these 
institutions should provide the basis for good governance, they should define 
and manage the policies supporting the different actors while monitoring the 
progress of the governance process; 
 other agents, entities, bodies and civic representatives, that is, all direct or 
indirect stakeholders in the process of regional Smart Specialisation.  
Table 1 presents a summary of the role and possible contribution of these 
agents. In any case, the role of each agent in the system and the relationships 
established between them can vary depending on the nature of social capital as 
well as on the actual economic, technological and scientific conditions of the 
territory. As part of the strategy, a consistent differentiation of roles must take 
place, distinguishing merely collaborative roles from those that lead the processes 
and from those executing them. 
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Table 1. Components of an innovation system related to Smart Specialisation 
Component Role/Contribution 
R&D subsystem 
Universities  
R&D centres 
OPIs 
Main generators of basic knowledge that subsequently leads to 
the development of key technologies. They are responsible also 
for the training of high-level researchers. They can give back-
ground to entrepreneurial discoveries, but to fulfil this task they 
must adjust their activity to the demands of the economy of the 
territory in question. 
Technological subsystem 
Technology centres 
Training centres 
Business R&D units 
Agents that generate knowledge according to market needs, 
close to the production network. They can be important media-
tors between science and business while having a clear field of 
expertise. 
Business fabric 
Leading companies 
Micro & SME  
Entrepreneurs 
Main actors  of competition and generators of wealth and em-
ployment. No company can survive without a dynamic environ-
ment. Hence the need to rely on all links of the system to main-
tain and increase competitiveness. To improve the competi-
tiveness of a territory an increasing number of innovative com-
panies (“hidden innovators”) are needed, and entrepreneurial 
innovations have to be commercialised. 
Support Infrastructure 
S&T Parks 
Incubators 
Cluster associations 
Advanced services 
Finance companies 
Infrastructure is the sine qua non of the relations between 
subsystems (science–business–administration–users). Different 
stages of the innovation process (e.g. the transfer of knowledge 
or innovation in existing companies) need different types of 
infrastructure. In the framework of Smart Specialisation its role 
varies depending on the strategic approach, the field and level 
of specialisation of each territory. 
Regional administration 
Government 
Development agencies 
They play a key role in overcoming system failures related to 
R&D and innovation, and they guarantee the institutional 
framework of governance. In Smart Specialisation they should 
supply institutional and strategic resources for the territory and 
ensure that governance is ready to meet the arising economic, 
social, and environmental challenges. 
Communities of users and 
society  
Traditionally, and in spite of being the final “loops” in the value 
chain, users and society in general were the least involved 
actors in governance. In the framework of Smart Specialisation 
we should seek their involvement to reduce the distance 
between the generation of knowledge and its application to 
meet specific territorial challenges. 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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The Strategic Approach to Regional Smart Specialisation Strategies 
(Regional Strategies of Smart Specialisation, RIS3) 
As mentioned in the section above, the process of governance proposed by the 
Commission for the period 2014–2020 is not new but an updated and improved 
methodology used in the development of Regional Innovation Strategies in the 
previous period. Currently we are facing a paradigm shift (Del Castillo – Barroeta – 
Paton 2012a) that will affect both the orientation of the strategy and the instru-
ments and, therefore, governance processes will differ from those in the 1990s. 
This rethinking of the methodology must respond to the difficulties and bottle-
necks encountered in previous strategic processes, and especially to the new chal-
lenges. So it will contribute, from a regional-policy perspective, to the new objec-
tives of Europe 2020 (Landabaso 2011). This new approach includes the corner-
stones of the Smart Specialisation model (specialisation, economic change, and 
globalisation) to maximise the development potential of each region. Also the “ex-
ante” conditionalities required by the Commission as parts of the national and 
regional strategies must be considered. Among them appears the need to develop a 
SWOT, the definition of priorities and actions agreed, the identication of resources, 
and the monitoring and following of the strategy (EC 2011c). Table 2 is a summary 
of these issues in the context of Smart Specialisation. 
Table 2. Elements of an RIS3 strategy 
Elements Implications in terms of RIS3 
Reflection and 
definition 
In this stage of the process there must be a strategic reflection regarding 
– the priority areas in economic, scientific and technological terms;  
– the kind of governance that will assure entrepreneurial innova-
tionacross the process (quadruple helix);  
– the implementation tools; and finally  
– the mechanisms to guarantee the revision of the strategy and the 
improvement of governance with time. 
Implementation  The key is to maintain – based on the tools and procedures developed in 
the first stage – a governance mechanism that identifies entrepreneurial 
innovationand initiatives that generate wealth and employment. During 
the implementation stage, participative governance must allow to 
redefine the strategy according to the changing context – although with 
less intensity that in the reflection and definition phase. 
Monitoring and 
evaluation 
The monitoring of the strategy ensures continuous improvement, 
efficiency and effectiveness. Responsible monitoring needs indicators 
that provide the necessary information so that there be a periodically 
repeated refocusing of the strategy.   
Source: Based on del Castillo – Barroeta – Paton (2012b). 
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Governance under these conditions is a much more complex issue than pre-
viously considered. In the new logic of cohesion policy, RIS3 could play a pivotal 
role in linking regional policy to policies at other institutional levels. It could 
increase the participation of regions in European programmes such as the Horizon 
2020 and COSME (“upstream”), as well as improve the absorption capacity (“down-
stream”). In other words, the RIS3 could be an interface between the funds allo-
cated at the regional level (cohesion policy) and other European policy mecha-
nisms (Horizon 2020, COSME, etc.). 
Key Aspects to be Considered for an RIS3 Governance  
The Smart Specialisation approach was born in response to the realisation of the 
fact that Europe lacks the critical mass and “excellence” of R&D innovation, as well 
as business networks capable of utilising it (Pontikakis et al. 2009). But its transfer 
to the field of regional policy includes a number of nuances that make the process 
of definition, implementation and evaluation of the strategy more complex. In the 
initial postulates of the European group of experts “Knowledge for Growth” (K4G)1, 
Smart Specialisation represented a theoretical model of governance that seemed 
logical and straightforward, but it required taking into account important implica-
tions for its matching with the logic of regional policy (Paton – Barroeta 2012). 
Below there is a description of the main opportunities related to RIS3 structures 
and the potential risks to keep in mind when considering governance within the 
frames of regional Smart Specialisation (Table 3). 
Conclusions 
Searching for the opportunities of regional Smart Specialisation can contribute 
much to building competitive advantages that improve the positions of a country 
or a region in the world economy, and help finding a path of increasing wealth and 
widening employment in a context determined by the processes of globalisation. 
However, there are a number of risks that can turn opportunities into threats if 
there is no appropriate model of governance and the process of specialisation lacks 
coherence in its structure. The most important issue is how to develop this new 
model of governance so that it be able to involve the different actors and elements 
of the innovation system. At the same time, it must follow the priority areas se-
lected in the process of specialisation and allow them to reinvent themselves from 
time to time. In short, it should be a new governance model that responds to 
 
                                                                        
1 http://ipts.jrc.ec.europa.eu/ataglance/knowledge_for_growth.cfm 
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Table 3. Key aspects to be considered in RIS3 governance: opportunities and risks related 
to the process  
RIS3 elements  Opportunities Risks 
Prioritisation 
Selection of priorities 
through specialisation 
patterns 
– Allocating resources and 
efforts to a limited number 
of areas can help creating a 
critical mass in R&D to 
achieve excellence. 
– Prioritising the demands of 
the business network facili-
tates the alignment of re-
gional capabilities of R&D 
with market opportunities. 
– Not all regions start from 
the same level in terms of 
entrepreneurial capability, 
sometimes resulting in the 
creation of bigger gaps be-
tween regions.  
– Reaching a critical mass 
and sufficient excellence in 
R&D to match supply and 
demand is complicated 
when preferences in both 
fields vary. 
– The intermediary infra-
structure must play a pro-
active role and be commit-
ted to the strategy, 
although practice does not 
always allow this. 
Specialised diversification 
Exploitation of regional re-
lated variety 
– Taking into account that 
horizontal specialisation 
contributes to the rest of 
the economy (knock-on ef-
fects). 
– Exploiting the possibilities 
of regional diversity can 
lead to radical innovation 
and “rethinking” of the eco-
nomic processes. 
– A high degree of speciali-
sation also brings further 
weakness in case of a cri-
sis, a technological change 
or related to product/ 
technology cycles. 
– It is difficult to clearly iden-
tify the scope of being 
“diversity-related”, and due 
to the novelty of the con-
cept there are still no clear 
methodologies to clarify 
this. 
– If there is no entrepreneur-
ial critical mass, little social 
capital, little experience of 
the regional administra-
tion, the governance of the 
process may not work. 
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Table 3. (continued) 
RIS3 elements Opportunities Risks 
Global context 
Coherence of priorities 
and the process within 
 the frames of an open 
economy  
– A “global” dimension of 
governance will allow for 
the prioritised specialisa-
tion to be consistent in the 
global context. 
– To define specialisation in 
terms of a global value 
chain multiplies its chances 
of success. 
– Certain types of knowledge 
can be developed only to-
gether with a number of 
advanced regions and, 
therefore, the co-inventor 
and follower regions and 
may experience an uneven 
distribution of benefits, or 
even a “trade-off”. 
– The final results of Smart 
Specialisation are influ-
enced by many internal and 
external dimensions that 
are not always possible to 
be kept under control. 
– This approach of govern-
ance is still not widespread 
albeit the success of the 
model depends on its abil-
ity to reach co-operation in 
a framework of regions, 
countries and Europe. 
Source: Based on Paton – Barroeta (2012). 
current problems of the evolution of regional innovation systems in an open 
economy and, simultaneously, it has to meet challenges related to competition and 
international co-operation. 
There are great differences among European regions, mainly in terms of their 
economic and technological structure, but also regarding cultural features and 
administrative capacity. Thus a commitment to “laissez-faire” governance, as 
proposed by neoclassical orthodoxy, would generate further disparities among 
regions. Therefore, one of the main roles of regional administration is to help 
mitigating inequality between territorial units.  
There are at least two aspects that a Smart Specialisation strategy should re-
flect upon. First, the issue of participative governance, that is, involving key actors 
in the region (companies, organisations of the innovation system, etc.), and not 
only at sectoral level but also across sectors. On the other hand, it should also con-
sider the differences between regions, because the process of planning and imple-
mentation cannot be uniform. 
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Finally, the concept of Smart Specialisation conveys a novelty in the approach 
that governance no longer follows the regional logic only, but is inserted in the 
global context. This makes the process even more complex, because it is not 
enough to identify fields of regional specialisation and to get innovation-system 
agents involved. There may be similar processes in other regions, which imply 
potential competition, but could offer opportunities for co-operation as well. In 
this sense it seems crucial to establish good governance to specialisation, con-
sidering that the regional system is intertwined with the national and international 
levels, so that micro-, meso-, or macro-level actors, institutions and their relation-
ships should all contribute to specialisation in a global context. As history has 
shown, competitive leadership is not so much the matter of resource allocation and 
exogenous capabilities, but of a process based on the comparative advantages 
aiming to “build” competitive advantages. Hence the importance of a governance 
that guides this process, continuously adapting to changing circumstances. With 
such a governance, any region can achieve a leading role in certain domains or 
sectors in the medium and long term. 
However, this competitive–comparative advantage approach has to expand the 
scope of the strategy beyond a simple network of structures to support the innova-
tion-demand of enterprises. It is necessary to consider various policy areas that 
contribute to the development of an environment favourable for competitive com-
panies. On the other hand, elements of this environment influence regional govern-
ance, too. For this reason, it is essential to include the regional quadruple helix 
model in the broadest sense, as an active part of the Regional Smart Specialisation 
Strategy (RIS3) and its governance, while maintaining a co-operative approach 
towards other territories in the context of globalisation. 
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 TERRITORIAL CAPITAL, ATTRACTIVENESS AND THE 
PLACE-BASED APPROACH: THE POTENTIAL 
IMPLICATIONS FOR TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT 
Rob Atkinson 
Introduction 
This paper selectively draws on research carried out as part of the ESPON ATTREG 
project1 on “The Attractiveness of European Regions and Cities for Residents and 
Visitors” (ATTREG 2012). Drawing on this research the paper considers the links 
between territorial capital, attractiveness and the place-based approach in terms 
of how forms of territorial capital (or assets) can be mobilised through a place 
based approach to improve regional and urban attractiveness. The ability, or the 
failure, of regions and cities to utilise territorial capital has implications for the 
wider territorial development of Europe and the EU’s aims of achieving “balance 
development” across the European space, the associated notion of “strength 
through diversity” (EC 2007, 2008), the Europe 2020 aims of smart, sustainable 
and inclusive development (EC 2010). 
The EU recognises across Europe the existence of a range of imbalances at 
different spatial scales; particularly at European level related to the continued 
dominance of the Pentagon and within countries in relation to capital cities and 
growing urban areas. The response has been to propose a more “balanced form of 
development” to reduce these disparities and ensure greater economic, social and 
territorial cohesion (e.g. ESDP 1999, EC 2010). Moreover, cities have increasingly 
been seen as “engines of regional development” and the main competitive hubs 
within a global web of economic, knowledge and physical flows (e.g. EC 2005). 
Central to these processes is the issue of mobility and the attraction and retention 
of different populations, no longer understood as simply determined by produc-
tion structures and accessibility, but also by the quality of places, reflecting place-
specific factors such as inclusiveness, cultural vitality, public service provision and 
“good governance”.  
                                                                        
1 It goes without saying that the views presented in this paper represent those of the author 
and do not reflect the views of the rest of the ATTREG project team or ESPON. 
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ATTREG sought to investigate these issues to gain a better understanding of 
how mobility and its drivers influenced territorial development and thereby 
contribute to the development of a new dimension of EU territorial cohesion 
policy. It did this by analysing the role territorial assets play in structuring the 
“pathways” of regional and local development, by attracting different human flows 
into regions that have important local effects, because they become embedded, in 
different ways, in regional development processes: as citizens, workers, taxpayers, 
consumers, or just visitors.  
However, the relationship between regional territorial capital and mobilities is 
not deterministic and the importance of different elements varies from place to 
place (reflecting diversity and the different mobilisation strategies employed 
to develop and deploy local assets). ATTREG also assumed that the policy capacity 
to mobilise local assets through governance processes played an important role in 
these processes. Thus the analysis of mobilisation strategies was an important part 
of the project. This in turn is related to the notion of a place-based approach as 
advocated in the Barca Report (Barca 2009). 
It is important to acknowledge that attractiveness is a complex and ambiguous 
notion (see Servillo et al. 2012, for a discussion) and its relationship to both terri-
torial capital and territorial development is by no means straightforward. For 
instance, notions of attractiveness, reflecting the influence of Florida’s work (2002, 
2003), increasingly stress “quality of life” factors and the role of culture as a 
“…’soft’ locational factor in attracting knowledge workers” (EC 2005, p. 12). This 
relationship is further complicated by the association with the notion of “competi-
tiveness” which has increasingly become the goal of a range of European, national 
and sub-national policies. More recently this has been attenuated by a recognition 
that “competitiveness” can have negative consequences; not all regions and cities 
can be “winners” and “growth per se” may have a downside (e.g. social exclusion, 
declining social cohesion) if the benefits are not more widely distributed, thus 
cohesion in its various forms has become increasingly important. Thus “competi-
tiveness” has become associated with various forms of co-operation/collaboration 
related to notions such as polycentricity and collaborative planning which function 
both as mechanisms of development and inclusion. In a wider, European sense, 
this approach has become linked with notions of social and territorial diversity and 
the need to balance regional and urban development. In this context the notion of 
“territorial capital” and a place-based approach have become increasingly im-
portant as a way of improving a place’s attractiveness, competitiveness and cohe-
sion within a European framework of “balanced and harmonious” territorial 
development. 
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ATTREG – Basic Approach 
ATTREG demonstrated to some extent that territorial assets matter, that they can, 
when utilised in place-related ways, exercise an influence over regional and local 
development, attracting different human flows (or “audiences” as we called them) 
to regions. These are distinguished by the character of their movement (ranging 
from permanent or long-term, i.e. immigration, to short-term, i.e. tourism) and by 
their nature or motivation, generally defined in terms of a work–leisure binary. 
This investigation of territorial attractiveness was situated within a conceptual 
“model” (see also Servillo et al. 2012) that links the three main components of this 
complex interaction, as illustrated in Figure 1: 
 A set of “audiences” (either targeted explicitly or defined in terms of their 
mobility characteristics) that can be attracted and for which there is a set of 
expectations, each with a different profile in terms of the development 
processes that it is expected to engender locally and in surrounding areas; 
 A set of “endowment” factors or territorial assets that potentially determine 
attractiveness (conceptualised as territorial capital) in either a general sense 
or for one particular audience; 
 A set of processes by which territorial assets may be mobilised to enhance 
attractiveness either for all or for a specific “audience”. 
Within this perspective, territorial capital is a crucial dimension of the 
attractiveness of places. It is intended as a complex system of natural and socio-
economic elements, defining the distinctiveness of local assets (Deas – Giordano 
2001, Camagni 2002, Camagni – Capello 2009). A place’s attractiveness derives 
from the combination of different assets and the way(s) they are mobilised by the 
governance system. This approach offers a dynamic perspective on territorial 
capital, since the relationship between assets and attractiveness is contingent, 
albeit potentially mutually reinforcing through an on-going process of mobilisation 
that seeks to enhance the existing stock of assets. Governance is crucial to the 
mobilisation and use of assets and requires the existence of links, often articulated 
through organisational arrangements (e.g. partnerships) between stakeholders, 
local authorities, agencies and citizens in order to identify, create and mobilise 
assets and develop policies to achieve specific strategies. 
Mobilisation, Policy and Attractiveness 
The notion of attractiveness in policy making and in the literature is largely related 
to economic development strategies. However, our analysis of attractiveness, with 
its focus on the wider aim of territorial cohesion, implies the need for a somewhat  
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Figure 1. ATTREG – Model of territorial attractiveness 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
broader approach. This requires the introduction of attractiveness into both the 
analysis and strategy of territory as an explicit factor affecting mobility of popula-
tions, suggesting a need to think differently, and more holistically, about a region’s 
territorial assets and their mobilisation through specific policies (or combinations 
of policies that we termed policy bundles). 
In addition to the statistical analysis (see ATTREG 2012 for more detail), we 
carried out case studies from which it is possible to derive insights into the policy 
making process and the capacity to mobilise territorial assets to address territorial 
attractiveness in a more coherent and explicit way – i.e. one having long-term 
balanced territorial development as its aim. 
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However, there is a question as to what extent many of the policy approaches 
that influence attractiveness explicitly recognise the significance of territorial capi-
tal and/or develop an explicit “mobilisation strategy” directed at it. This “deficit”, 
which we found in some case studies, may reflect a wider tendency across Europe 
suggesting a lack of understanding of territorial capital and its potential signifi-
cance in terms of urban and regional development.  
Policy makers and other stakeholders in the case studies had various opportu-
nities to invest in the attractiveness of regions and cities for residents and visitors. 
However, there were a relatively limited number of “policy levers” for cities and 
regions to affect/deploy vis-à-vis attractiveness policy and mobilisation of assets. 
In some cases particular audiences were identified and addressed. In terms of the 
transition to a global knowledge-based economy particular importance has been 
attached to attracting the so-called creative class, which has become the main-
stream target in recent decades, especially for urban areas, within the framework 
of the EU smart-growth strategy. Some metropolitan areas have succeeded in 
building a critical mass of the creative class to support greater competitiveness in 
the knowledge economy. However, the success of creative-oriented and smart 
strategies cannot be guaranteed simply by attracting members of the creative 
class, attraction policy needs to be developed as part of a wider regional or urban 
strategy related to local potentials and the place-based approach. It is essential not 
to adopt a “scatter-gun” approach, but a more targeted one that relates to the po-
tentials and territorial capital of a city/region. 
Where the focus is on younger workforce and the knowledge-based economy, 
the key is access to (higher) educational institutions, particularly in declining and/ 
or peripheral regions. This was the case, for example, in Cornwall. Supported by 
Objective 1 and Convergence Funding, a long term strategy was developed to bring 
about a switch from a low-wage, high unemployment regional economy largely de-
pendent on tourism and decline industries (e.g. fishing, agriculture, mining) 
towards a knowledge-based economy building on the specific strengths of the 
region (e.g. high-tech environmental developments). One of the key deficiencies of 
the regional economy identified was a lack of adequately qualified young people 
caused by the lack of adequate higher educational institutions in the region. This 
was part of the long-term strategy associated with EU funding; investments were 
made in higher education provision – specifically the Combined Universities in 
Cornwall (CUC) project. This project not only aims to attract and retain students, 
but also to stimulate the development of a regional knowledge-based economy 
(e.g. through a Research Knowledge Transfer Team and the establishment of Inno-
vation Centres). Even though its peripheral location and poor access to other parts 
of the UK (and Europe) are still significant factors explaining the underperfor-
mance of the Cornish economy, it is reasonable to argue that this represents a 
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long-term place-specific attempt to build relevant forms of territorial capital that 
will support the region’s development. 
However, evidence indicates that it is not only work-related mobility that pro-
duces positive outcomes in regions. ATTREG identified the “silver migration” of 
more (northern) affluent groups to certain southern regions (e.g. the Algarve) or 
certain coastal areas in northern countries. This led to the development of an econ-
omy which goes beyond the traditional forms of tourism (“sun and sand”) that 
arguably is more sustainable and adds higher value to the regional economy. In 
such situations, the provision of appropriate and adequate levels of services and 
the influence of the housing sector are important factors that policies need to 
address to ensure that the needs of new migrant populations are satisfied in ways 
that support retention and the attraction of additional migrants. 
In terms of tourism the activity that regions and cities were most frequently 
engaged in was a place-marketing strategy. However, it was rarely targeted and 
related to the “promotion” of particular forms of territorial capital or directed at 
particular audiences. While a few regions were more selective, targeting specific 
groups, most regions had no explicit (targeted) policies to attract particular audi-
ences. Some of our case studies indicate that the targeting of a specific audience is 
feasible; but, rather than being the outcome of a specific analysis, this often results 
from an ex-post recognition of a trend that then became a policy objective. In the 
Algarve, for instance, the case study provided evidence of the presence of a “silver 
migrant” group, but the region had been slow to recognise this and its marketing 
strategy failed to address this group. It could improve the ways in which this audi-
ence’s needs are addressed, e.g. through the provision of dedicated services to 
attract and retain this group. Moreover, it appeared that local authorities were 
unaware of the significance of their actions (e.g. on social provision) for this audi-
ence and did not take them into account when deciding on service provision. This 
emphasises the importance of integrating local authorities into wider strategies. 
It was clear from our case studies that there is little explicit recognition among 
policy makers of the importance of territorial capital. This requires cities and 
regions to assess their position in terms of assets, identify positive and negative 
factors and then develop policies to bring about change. Regional and city authori-
ties can take actions related to forms of territorial capital through planning policies 
which may address traditional topics (e.g. protection and valorisation of environ-
mental assets), investment in appropriate forms of infrastructure (e.g. health care 
and transport), the creation of more efficient administrative systems (enhance-
ment of institutional capital) as well as investments in human capital such as edu-
cation for particular audiences.  
However, as Cornwall illustrates this must be part of a long-term strategy 
related to a clear vision of where the region is going. It is also likely to require the 
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injection of significant additional funds from the national level and where relevant 
(e.g. areas qualifying for Structural Funds) from the EU. This also suggests the im-
portance of a system of multi-level governance that is able to integrate and co-
ordinate the actions of different levels of governance. Cornwall provides an 
example of how the long term availability of significant EU funds combined with 
national and regional resources facilitated the development of a long term regional 
strategy aiming to bring about fundamental change in the region’s economic base. 
Here the EU was able to act as a catalyst that allowed the region to develop its 
strategy; without such support it is unlikely that CUC or the wider strategy would 
have come into existence.  
Some of the other ATTREG case studies highlight the potential problems that 
may be encountered when engaging in forms of mobilisation. For instance the 
Lille–Kortrijk–Tournai euro-metropole (LKT) case study highlighted some of the 
difficulties in developing appropriate governance structures, particularly in cross-
border regions, and the need for European and national support to facilitate devel-
opment. At the same time it also points to the role of local leadership in driving this 
process. The Algarve case study on the other hand suggests that while change can 
take place without a strong governance system and associated regional policy, 
more could be achieved with a clearer regional focus and better regional govern-
ance that engaged with relevant stakeholders.  
EU policies can play an important role in making regions attractive for particu-
lar audiences; this was the case, to a greater or less extent, in the cases of Cornwall 
and LKT. However, these examples also made it clear that regions need to develop 
appropriate governance structures that involve a wide range of stakeholders to 
mobilise the resources of different sectors (e.g. the private sector and civil society) 
in pursuit of long-term goals. 
In general terms the case studies highlighted two main factors in facilitating 
mobilisation of assets. First the role of public authorities and their capacity to stra-
tegically instigate and direct the mobilisation processes. This necessitates a govern-
ance system able to identify the existing strengths and weaknesses of an area’s 
territorial capital and develop an appropriate strategy to enhance/develop the 
different forms of territorial capital through a mobilisation strategy. Second, the 
identification and integration of relevant stakeholders/actors that provide the 
necessary inputs and knowledge.  
Overall the capacity to mobilise assets in a multi-level governance framework is 
an important factor determining the ability of mobilisation strategies to achieve 
their goals. Thus governance and the local networks through which mobilisation is 
possible are central to the process. Without these it is unlikely that long-term 
change can be brought about.  
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In this framework, two important dimensions of mobilisation strategies can be 
identified: a demand-led and supply-led approach. In the demand-led approach 
local and regional authorities support an integrated strategy for the development 
of territorial capital and its mobilisation to retain the resident population and 
attract short and mid-term migrants. The scheme on the left of Figure 2. shows 
how stakeholders mobilise territorial capital; this can be done in a variety of ways 
which are not mutually exclusive and which need to be combined in an integrated 
strategy developed in relation to particular places (i.e. a place-based approach).  
 
Figure 2. Determination of attractiveness (left) and of attraction (right) 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
One approach is to emphasise what exists (for instance through the identifica-
tion and valorisation of certain qualities of a territory such as an area’s historical 
heritage). Another is that of taking deliberate actions to develop/enhance an area’s 
territorial capital. This can take the form of investment in physical assets, what 
might be termed “hardware interventions”, such as increasing accessibility 
through investment in a new airport. Another approach relates to what are termed 
“soft factors” (e.g. enhancing the perception of the tolerance of a place) that are 
increasingly recognised as contributing to the quality of a place. However, again it 
is important to stress the need to combine a range of different approaches within 
an integrated strategy related to a place. In this way, public authorities and stake-
holders have the capacity to develop and articulate the “offer” by identifying ele-
ments of the territory that could be used as factors of attractiveness. 
The scheme on the right of Figure 2. represents the capacity of stakeholders to 
target specific users (or audiences) by implementing a particular vision of the 
territory and its future development. It may concern specific actions such as 
territorial marketing and/or branding targeted at presenting a particular image 
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aimed at specific audiences. This may also be supported by accompanying actions 
(e.g. environmental schemes/legislation or social provision related to heath care) 
designed to “preserve” and “enhance” that image. 
These two schemes indicate two processes that are most of the time, albeit at 
times unconsciously, articulated and integrated with one another, the coherence of 
which may vary. This is determined by the capacity of a place’s governance system 
to develop a shared strategic vision and an associated set of integrated measures 
and policy bundles. In what might be termed “best cases” there will be a clear 
strategy, while in other cases the strategy will be implicit and the aims unco-
ordinated, leading to potential disagreements among stakeholders – which in turn 
may produce divergent measures and contradictory policies. 
In terms of policy, the combination of these two schemes represents the ca-
pacity over the short term to steer the attractiveness and attraction process. This is 
represented in Figure 3. as the synchronic dimension (left side) of the mobilisation 
processes, which illustrates the combination processes that steer the offer (attrac-
tiveness) and the demand (attraction). 
 
Figure 3. Synchronic (left) and diachronic (right) dimension of mobilisation processes 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
However, in diachronic terms these processes are related to the development of 
territorial capital through actions on the capital assets as well as the cultural 
construction of places (the right side in Figure 3). It is this dimension of the 
mobilisation process that occurs over the longer term. It represents the process 
through which on the one hand territorial capital increases or decreases, and on 
the other particular fashions, myths, tendencies that become “hegemonic” at a 
particular point in time (e.g. the Barcelona “leisurescape” model). However, there 
is a need for the two sides to be integrated so that short term actions are part of, 
and designed to achieve, a longer term strategy. 
To conclude, in terms of the mobilisation of territorial capital and strategic gov-
ernance processes, three key issues can be highlighted. 
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First, the importance of a multi-level governance system given that it is unlikely 
regions and cities will have the necessary powers and resources to activate 
integrated attractive policies themselves. Thus, regions need to secure national 
and where possible European support and co-ordination. Some regions are able to 
take greater control of their own development (e.g. Trento), while other regions 
are much more dependent on state-led policies, often implemented by Regional 
Bodies (e.g. Algarve). In general the mobilisation of regional attractiveness is a 
combination of top-down EU and state policies and bottom-up initiatives of local 
and regional stakeholders such as municipalities, universities and businesses. This 
suggests the importance of a system of multi-level governance that is able to 
integrate and co-ordinate the actions of different levels of governance. 
Secondly, EU policies play an important role in making regions attractive for 
particular audiences by providing resources and creating the opportunity to create 
overarching, long-term strategic partnership. Especially the role of cohesion policy, 
by focusing on particular places, is important given its longer term nature. 
However, we did not find evidence of a capacity to integrate other EU sectoral poli-
cies into a place-based approach and this must be considered a genuine policy 
dilemma that needs to be addressed at EU and national levels alike. 
Thirdly, policymakers need to bear in mind that mobilisation strategies tar-
geting the development or enhancement of capital assets as well as the construc-
tion of place brands can only be successful in the medium-long term. This requires 
the combination of specific policy measures, related to a clear territorial strategy 
that addresses the mobility and retention of population; this is what we have 
termed policy bundle(s) that are part of a place-based approach. Such a strategy 
must combine a ‘nested’ and integrated set of policies aimed at achieving short-, 
medium- and long-term goals supported by appropriate monitoring and evaluation 
systems to allow for any necessary reorientations. 
Conclusion 
The discussion of the nature of the relationships between place-based assets and 
their influence on the location decisions of particular interests/stakeholders sug-
gests three main variables need to be taken into account: (1) the different factors 
that constitute attractiveness, (2) the audiences related to them, and (3) the dif-
ferent scales at which they are considered. For instance, the audiences which are 
the focus of attention or the particular scale at which the analysis is conducted will 
produce different results both in terms of our understanding of how “attractive-
ness” functions vis-à-vis a particular group(s) or with reference to the “attrac-
tiveness” of a given territory (e.g. neighbourhood as against city-region). This in 
turn will (or should) influence the territorial assets that need to be mobilised by 
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governance systems deploying particular policy bundles in order to enhance 
attractiveness vis-à-vis particular audiences. 
The concept of territorial attractiveness provides important insights into, and 
understanding of, the (endogenous) development potentials (in a spatially specific 
sense) of places. It is the complex relations (interactions) between different forms 
of territorial capital that explain the differential ability of places to attract and 
retain different mobile populations. However, the mere presence of the necessary 
territorial capital does not automatically lead to attraction and retention of popula-
tion. Of major importance is the capacity of local governance systems to mobilise 
these assets, both with regard to existing residents and potential future residents, 
and various types of visitors. This approach is based on both the identification of 
what brings about changes in how a place is perceived and the trends in popula-
tion mobility, as well as the consideration of the different ways in which assets can 
be utilised to make places “different” and “unique”. This requires the identification 
(and definition) of problems and opportunities and the development of longer 
term strategic and integrated policies that simultaneously address a number of dif-
ferent issues and audiences in order to enhance the attractiveness of a place 
through the creation of new development paths and visions.  
It is important to recognise that governance processes have a crucial role to 
play through the mobilisation process. Governance is important because by 
bringing together the different stakeholders in a place, a strategic and action 
dimension can be developed which is necessary to mobilise the assets that consti-
tute territorial capital, with the exception of course of those assets that are related 
to un-modifiable aspects of the areas (climate, natural resources, etc.). This 
requires more flexible and inclusive modes of governance and leadership that 
focus on a range of issues including the identification of “deficiencies” (in assets) 
and what exists (in terms of assets) and how these can be developed to enhance 
the quality of place without sacrificing particular (e.g. marginal) groups to the per-
ceived need to enhance competitiveness or generating spatial and social conflicts. 
It also introduces a time-perspective issue, because the mobilisation processes 
imply a variety of time-scales (from the short-term, e.g. changing environmental 
legislation on the protection of environmental resources, to the long-term, e.g. 
creation of institutional assets).  
A final, general point, relates to the role of mobility and the need to develop 
policies that facilitate the conditions for supporting territorial attractiveness at EU 
level. The uneven development of EU regions and the associated mobility patterns 
taking place in relation to changes in perceptions and regional opportunities 
should reinforce the idea of creating an agenda dedicated to supporting mobility in 
its various forms, thereby helping make effective the EU aim of creating a frame-
work for the free circulation of both goods and people. Under the banner of social 
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and territorial cohesion the EU should place a greater emphasis on the social di-
mension, addressing population mobility through the deployment of wider and 
more innovative approaches. 
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 TRANSFERRING TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE 
PRACTICES IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
Giancarlo Cotella – Umberto Janin Rivolin – Marco Santangelo 
Introduction 
The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (EU) (Art. 174) mentions 
that, in order to promote its overall harmonious development, the EU shall develop 
and pursue its actions leading to the strengthening of its economic, social and 
territorial cohesion. The recent establishment of the aim to strengthen territorial 
cohesion as a shared competence with the member states has reinforced the 
ongoing political debate on how policies of different administrative levels can be 
co-ordinated. The organisation of territorial development is rather complex as 
decisions related to territories are made at different administrative levels, for 
different sectoral policies, and by different types of public and private actors. The 
concept of territorial governance would describe the political ambition to co-
ordinate policies, programmes, and projects in the interest of territorial de-
velopment. Thus, especially at the time of restricted public budgets, policy-makers 
in the field of territorial development feel a strong need to understand how policy 
actions can become more effective in their daily practice and how synergies can be 
exploited through vertical and horizontal co-ordination of public policies, 
programmes and projects. In particular in complex policy-making contexts where 
different levels and sectors are involved, practical advice and good examples 
providing inspiration for decision-makers, policy-makers and practitioners are 
needed.  
Aiming at providing an insight into the matter, our contribution presents a part 
of the interim results of the ESPON project “TANGO – Territorial Approaches for 
New Governance”1, in particular those related to the identification of peculiar 
elements of good territorial governance and their transferability. In doing so, we 
first briefly give an overview of the ESPON TANGO approach, presenting the 
                                                                        
1 The ESPON TANGO project is pursued by a consortium led by Nordregio, involving the 
following partners: Delft University of Technology, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, 
Politecnico di Torino, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (Hungarian Academy of 
Sciences); University of Ljubljana. See more at:   
http://www.espon.eu/main/Menu_Projects/ Menu_AppliedResearch/tango.html 
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working definition of territorial governance adopted by the project, and the evi-
dence base the latter is built upon. We then introduce an analytical model framing 
the process of policy transfer in the domain of EU territorial governance. More in 
detail, building on the evidence collected through the analysis of case studies, the 
authors discuss a number of “features” of good territorial governance, reflecting 
upon the main modes of transfer, too. The final section presents some interim con-
clusions on the basis of discussed results, and provides some ideas on future 
research perspectives. 
Unpacking Territorial Governance – The ESPON TANGO Approach 
Studies on governance and in particular on multi-level governance abound in 
political science and the theory of spatial planning. The majority of these studies 
are based on methods such as constructing narratives around particular cases and 
components of governance. While these inductive approaches confirm that 
“governance does matter” and contributes to a deeper understanding of the role it 
plays in achieving a certain outcome, there seems to prevail a need for “generating 
hypotheses about how, why and under which circumstances it matters a little, a lot 
or not at all” (ESPON 2012, p. 6). Aiming to provide a contribution to this line of 
thought, the ESPON TANGO project is pivoted, among others, on two main objec-
tives, both of which are further reflected upon in the subsections below: on the one 
hand, it delves deeply into the conceptualisation of territorial governance while, on 
the other hand, it provides empirical evidence to support future territorial de-
velopment policies in the EU. 
Territorial Governance – a Working Definition 
A very wide scope of research aims to explore the general notion of governance 
(e.g.: Pierre – Peters 2000, Stoker 1998), mainly focussing on various “models” of 
governance based on empirical observation and showing how the shift from 
government to governance has shaped decision-making and planning processes 
with the inclusion of many new types of actors and institutional frameworks. 
Moreover, the European integration literature went deeply into the discussion of 
multi-level governance in terms of the allocation of responsibilities and competen-
cies, as it follows from Hooghe and Mark’s distinction between Type I and Type II 
governance systems, whereby Type I has a limited number of non-overlapping 
multi-issue jurisdictions and Type II is composed of many flexible, sometimes 
overlapping jurisdictions that are often task-specific (Hooghe – Marks 2001 and 
2003). 
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The concept of territorial governance is more recent in origin compared to gov-
ernance and multi-level governance, and theory focuses more on how the concept 
has infiltrated into and been interpreted in the territorial debate (Janin Rivolin 
2010, Faludi 2012). Territorial governance has become an increasingly important 
aspect of policy actions in Europe, related to the concept of territorial cohesion, 
together forming an integrated policy goal and a political and planning process 
including the means to achieve efficient, equitable and sustainable development in 
all types of territories in the EU. In spite of recent achievements, however, the 
debate on territorial governance continues to build on traditional governance dis-
courses. For instance, when defining territorial governance as “[…] the process of 
organisation and coordination of actors to develop territorial capital in a non-
destructive way in order to improve territorial cohesion at different levels”, Davoudi 
et al. (2008, p. 37) conceptualise the term largely on the basis of “regular” govern-
ance theories, at the same time making a call for the development of a theory of 
territorial governance to be tested through new empirical analysis. 
In order to partially provide an answer to this need, and to develop a working 
definition of territorial governance upon which various research activities could be 
built, the ESPON TANGO consortium collected the cornerstones from literature 
with regard to what is perceived as being most essential and inherent in the notion 
of territorial governance. The starting point was the argument by Davoudi et al. 
(2008, pp. 352–353) who, building on the results of the ESPON 2.3.2 project 
(ESPON 2007), claim that territorial governance implies both horizontal and 
vertical co-ordination and can be analysed by looking at three main types of 
factors: (1) the structural context, (2) the policies delivered by the institutions, and 
(3) the results and processes of actions, programmes, and projects for territorial 
cohesion. This leads to consider territorial governance as the organisation of new 
“constellations of actors, institutions and interests” (Gualini 2008, p. 16) both 
between units of government and between governmental and non-governmental 
actors and, in turn, it raises the questions related to the integration of relevant 
policy sectors and to the co-ordination of such actors, in particular in a multi-level 
perspective. 
In addition, the consortium addressed the recent debate about the concept of 
resilience of social systems and their adaptability to changing contexts (e.g. 
economic crisis, natural disasters), building on the idea of Gupta et al. (2010) about 
“adaptive institutions”, i.e. institutions that encourage learning among actors by 
questioning the socially embedded ideologies, frames, assumptions, roles, rules 
and procedures that dominate problem-solving efforts. 
Another key dimension of territorial governance has been emphasised by the 
spatial planning literature since the late 1980s (cf. Healey 1997), namely the 
importance of enhancing stakeholder participation, thus activating their specific 
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knowledge and concerns in the formation and implementation of territorial de-
velopment policies, programmes and projects. Similarly, being sensitive to Jordan’s 
argument about the lack of geographical specificity in the contemporary concep-
tualisations of governance (2008, p. 21), the consortium devoted particular atten-
tion to the extent to which place-based/territorial specificities and characteristics 
are addressed in the frame of territorial governance practices. 
Based on the above elements, the ESPON TANGO working definition of territo-
rial governance has been formulated as follows: 
Territorial governance is the formulation and implementation of public 
policies, programmes and projects for the development2 of a place/ 
territory3 by: (i) integrating relevant policy sectors, (ii) co-ordinating the 
actions of relevant actors and institutions, particularly considering multi-
level interplay, (iii) mobilising stakeholder participation, (iv) being 
adaptive to changing contexts, (v) addressing the place-based/ territorial 
specificities and characteristics (ESPON 2012, p. 11). 
The Evidence Base of the Project 
The evidence base for the research questions the ESPON TANGO project attempts 
to answer is constituted by twelve case studies from various parts of Europe (see 
Table 1). The case studies have been selected by a number of criteria, including 
geographical distribution, scope of governance, diversity in the sectoral policies 
studied, and the way they address particular territorial challenges. 
In helping to elaborate and concretise the applied notion of territorial 
governance, the twelve case studies explore the concept in a diversity of European 
contexts. Geographically, they include cases from Southern Europe with a focus on 
the Western Mediterranean and the Southern Alps. Central and Eastern Europe is 
represented by studies on Pécs (Hungary) and Ljubljana (Slovenia), in addition to a 
broader study on the Management of Structural Funds in Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Romania. The Baltic Sea Region (BSR) case study, dealing with 
climate change governance, covers parts of Eastern, Central and Northern Europe. 
The study on Stockholm also represents the North, while two other studies target 
English cities and other two the Netherlands and a part of Germany. 
                                                                        
2 Development is defined here as the improvement in the efficiency, equality and environ-
mental quality of a place/territory, in line with the Europe 2020 strategy. 
3 Territory/place means here a social construct, not necessarily limited by legally deter-
mined boundaries. 
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Table 1. ESPON TANGO case studies 
Case studies Geographical coverage Short name 
Territorial Climate Change Governance in the Baltic 
Sea Region 
Baltic Sea Region BSR 
Territorial Governance as a Way to Resource 
Efficiency in Urban Development 
Stockholm (SE) Stockholm 
Co-ordination of Land-use and Transport 
(StedenbaanPlus) 
Southern Randstad 
(NL) 
Stedenbaan 
Cross-border River Management: Rhine River Basin NL, DE RhineBasin 
Target-based Tripartite Agreement between the 
European Commission, the Italian Government and 
the Lomardy region 
Italian Government, 
Lombardy Region (IT) 
TRIP 
Innovative Economic Development Strategies in 
Saint Étienne within the South Loire SCOT 
Framework 
Saint Etienne (FR) SCOT 
Greater Manchester City Region Governance Manchester, England Manchester 
North Shields Fish Quay: Neighbourhood Planning 
in the UK 
Newcastle, England Newcastle 
Management of Structural Funds in Central and 
Eastern European Countries 
H, PL, SK, RO ERDF 
European Capital of Culture Pécs, (H – EU com- 
parison) 
Pécs 
Formulation and Implementation of Spatial Planning 
Strategies and Regional Development Policies in 
Ljubljana Urban Region 
Slovenia, Ljubljana 
Urban Region 
Ljubljana 
Governance of Natural Areas in the Alpine-Adriatic 
Area 
SI, IT, AT, HU, HR AlpAdria 
Source: Authors’ elaboration on ESPON 2012. 
As far as their territorial scope is concerned, the case studies range from the 
intra-municipal level through the municipal, to inter-municipal and metropolitan 
levels. Cross-border processes are explored through the Rhine Basin case on cross-
border river management and the case dealing with the governance of natural 
spaces in the Alpine-Adriatic Area. The regional and national levels are repre-
sented by the TRIP case and the one concerning Structural Funds management, 
while the BSR case offers an example of macro-regional territorial governance. 
Furthermore, nearly all of the cases address some aspect of “bottom-up” terri-
torial governance, where the impetus of territorial development was born at local 
and/or regional level.  
Finally, territorial governance challenges dealt with in the case studies include 
developing territorial strategies involving different governance levels and various 
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sectors; horizontal governance, with a focus on co-operation and competition; pro-
moting engagement among a range of actors, particularly in promoting bottom-up 
initiatives; co-ordinating the regulation of issues in fields such as transportation 
and water management; and vertical and horizontal policy integration. 
Promoters and Inhibitors of Good Territorial Governance 
Through the analysis of case studies it was possible to identify “good” territorial 
governance principles and criteria, keeping in mind the main question of how they 
become operational (or not) and thus how they contribute to the success of the 
development of a place or territory. The research questions for the analysis were 
driven by the “five dimensions” constituting the working definition of territorial 
governance presented above, looking for aswers to e.g. how the barriers to cross-
sectoral integrations are being overcome, how gaps in multi-level co-ordination 
are being addressed, how stakeholders are mobilised and how their input is used 
in decision-making, etc.  
Below we present the results of the analysis, finding a number of generalisable 
features of good territorial governance. Building on the assumption that each case 
would include practical characteristics of territorial governance and thus could 
help define what features may contribute to “good” governance and what may 
undermine it, each analyst was required to identify a set of territorial governance 
promoters that emerged from his/her case study, and classify them into one of the 
five listed dimesions of territorial governance. Similarly, they were required to 
identify one or more inhibitors, i.e. specific negative features that hamper the 
proper working of territorial governance. 
To simplify the interpretation of the many promoters and inhibitors gathered 
in the course of analysing the twelve case studies, the authors aggregated their 
information contents in more abstract promoters and inhibitors that may be 
considered to affect good territorial governance in a specific context, leading to a 
smaller number of factors to be classified (see Tables 2 and 3). 
While the territorial governance inhibitors constitute a set of “warnings” for the 
different stakeholders active in the field of territorial development and cohesion, 
representing a “to-be-avoided” list of elements that may undermine good territo-
rial governance, promoters represent features the adoption of which may con-
tribute to successful territorial governance processes. However, the issue of their 
effective transferability from one context to another, as well as the possible modes 
through which their transfer may take place, is a particularly complex issue that 
will be addressed in detail in the rest of the paper. 
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Table 2. List of territorial governance promoters 
TG Promoter Case studies 
1. Integrating policy sectors  
Acknowledgement of, and integration with, a multi-
level policy framework 
Stedenbaan, RhineBasin, TRIP, 
AlpAdria 
Political support to policy integration at the appro- 
priate territorial scale 
RhineBasin, Manchester, Ljubljana 
Spatial tool favouring sectoral integration  ERDF, Pécs, Ljubljana 
Rationale catalysing integration Stockholm 
Involvement of relevant public and private 
stakeholders 
Stockholm, Stedenbaan, 
RhineBasin, Manchester 
Organisational routines favouring cross-sector 
“fertilisation” 
SCOT, ERDF, Ljubljana, AlpAdria 
Strong political commitment towards a shared 
territorial vision 
BSR, Stockholm, SCOT, Newcastle 
Balance between flexibility and legal certainty RhineBasin 
2. Co-ordinating actions of actors and institutions  
Stability of co-operative experiences Stockholm, RhineBasin, 
Manchester, AlpAdria 
Pro-active public organisation Stedenbaan, RhineBasin, Pécs 
Motivation  RhineBasin, TRIP 
Capacity of negotiation Newcastle, Ljubljana 
Clear and uncontested leadership Stockholm, Stedenbaan, SCOT, 
Manchester, Ljubljana, AlpAdria 
Self-committed leadership BSR, RhineBasin 
Effective strategic framework RhineBasin 
Political committment ERDF, Ljubljana, AlpAdria 
Framework flexibility enhancing subsidiarity Stockholm, RhineBasin 
Vertical division of responsibilities  BSR, RhineBasin, Manchester 
3. Mobilising stakeholder participation  
Involvement of local actors RhineBasin, ERDF, Pécs 
Political commitment  Stockholm, RhineBasin 
Usage of various mechanisms of participation Newcastle, AlpAdria 
Mix of indirect and direct democratic legitimacy Stedenbaan, Ljubljana 
Mechanisms allowing for broad stakeholders’ 
involvement 
BSR, Stockholm, Ljubljana 
Information flow ensured ERDF, Manchester 
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Table 2 (continued) 
TG Promoter Case studies 
Effective means of communication/dissemination 
of information 
Stockholm, Stedenbaan, 
RhineBasin, SCOT, Pécs, Ljubljana 
High level of accountability Stockholm 
4. Being adaptive to changing contexts  
Co-production of knowledge, knowledge transfer RhineBasin, ERDF, Ljubljana, 
AlpAdria 
Institutional mechanisms that favour learning Stockholm, Manchester, Pécs 
Feedback procedures BSR, Stockholm, Stedenbaan 
Shared understanding of problems RhineBasin, Pécs 
Institutional mechanisms supporting adaptivity SCOT, Manchester 
Role of people in charge of responsibility Stockholm 
Flexibility of governance structure Stedenbaan 
Experience in complex programming Ljubljana 
5. Realising place-based/territorial specificities and 
impacts 
 
Awareness of territory Manchester, Newcastle, Pécs 
Involvement of different levels of government Stedenbaan, AlpAdria 
Spatial tool for co-ordination Stockholm, RhineBasin 
Acknowledgement of, and integration with, a spatial 
context 
Stockholm 
Acknowledgement and use of territorial potentials Stockholm, Stedenbaan 
Co-production of knowledge, knowledge transfer RhineBasin, Ljubljana 
Existing shared territorial knowledge Manchester, AlpAdria 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
Table 3. List of territorial governance inhibitors 
TG Inhibitor Case studies 
1. Integrating policy sectors  
Lacking or inappropriate mechanisms of co-ordination TRIP, ERDF, Pécs, Ljubljana 
Sectoral rationale dominating BSR, Stockholm, RhineBasin, 
AlpAdria 
Lack of institutional capacity/stability ERDF 
Scarce cohesion among actors Newcastle, Stedenbaan, 
Manchester, Pécs 
Lack/inefficiency of integrating spatial tools RhineBasin, ERDF, Ljubljana 
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Table 3 (continued) 
TG Inhibitor Case studies 
2.  Co-ordinating actions of actors and institutions  
Lack of institutional capacity/stability Stockholm, RhineBasin, SCOT, 
Newcastle, ERDF, AlpAdria 
Scarce co-operation between public authorities SCOT, Ljubljana 
Lack of financial autonomy ERDF 
Power struggles RhineBasin, Pécs, Ljubljana 
Unclear assignation of responsibilities TRIP, SCOT, Stockholm, 
Stedenbaan, Newcastle 
Scarce capacity of partnership-making ERDF 
Centralisation  ERDF, Pécs, Ljubljana 
Lack of shared motivation SCOT 
3. Mobilising stakeholder participation  
Late or no involvement of stakeholders Stockholm, Pecs 
Involvement of non-co-operative stakeholders SCOT, Newcastle 
Exclusion/limited involvement of certain stakeholders SCOT 
Hegemony of politicians over the process Stockholm, Pécs, Ljubljana 
Limited communication among stakeholders  SCOT, Pécs, Ljubljana 
Limited communication towards the outside world Stockholm 
Weak involvement of civic actors  ERDF 
4. Being adaptive to changing contexts  
Absence of feedback procedures Stockholm 
Lack of institutional capacity/stability Pécs, ERDF, Pécs 
Prejudice or limited strategic thinking Stockholm, Newcastle 
Uncertain/blurred strategy BSR 
Rigidity of the governance structure Newcastle, ERDF 
Negative influence by people in charge of 
responsibilities 
ERDF 
5. Realising place-based/territorial specificities 
and impacts 
 
Territorial scope disputed BSR, TRIP, SCOT, Stockholm, Pécs 
Lack of structured institutional framework ERDF, AlpAdria 
Time constrains Ljubljana 
Limited use of existing territorial knowledge BSR, Stockholm, SCOT, Pécs 
Excessive complexity of programming tools AlpAdria 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
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Transferring Territorial Governance Practices: a Conceptual Framework 
The transferability of good territorial governance practices is a field characterised 
by a high degree of complexity and risk of failure, among others due to: 
 the lack of verified and tested universal models for policy transfer, because 
of the significant number of variables at stake (Dolowitz – Marsh 2000); 
 doubts related to the reproducibility of best practices, especially where dif-
ferent institutional contexts are concerned (James – Lodge 2003, Vettoretto 
2009, Stead 2012);  
 the nature of territorial governance, which is not a policy per se, but rather 
the result of a complex process integrating several policies. 
In the light of all this, the present section aims at framing the institutional con-
text for policy transfer in the domain of territorial governance in the EU, with the 
purpose of reducing conceptual complexity as far as possible. Types and typologies 
of territorial governance, as well as the complexity of factors inherent in their defi-
nitions, are witnesses to the “institutional nature” of this subject. According to a 
proficient debate concerning institutions in/for spatial planning (Bolan 1991, 
Healey 1999 and 2006, Gualini 2001, Moulaert 2005, Hohn – Neuer 2006, Verma 
2007), territorial governance as an institutional phenomenon can be described as 
the end-product of a creative selection process of trial and error based on “(i) the 
generation of variety (in particular, a variety of practices and rules); (ii) competi-
tion and reduction of the variety (of rules) via selection; (iii) propagation and some 
persistence of the solution (the system of rules) selected” (Moroni 2010, p. 279). 
These inputs have recently been applied by the authors for the purpose of con-
ceptualisation in comparative analysis. This led to the development of a conceptual 
framework composed of four analytical dimensions – namely practices, discourse, 
structure and tools. These describe the operation of territorial governance in any 
institutional context as occurring through cyclical processes representing stages of 
social experience, political sharing and institutional codification, in which the 
aforementioned dimensions are in interaction (Figure 1).4 
A tentative application of the above analytical model in the wider context of EU 
territorial governance (see Figure 2) has served to cast some light on the process 
of the “Europeaniszation” of territorial governance (Knill – Lehmkuhl 1999, 
Radaelli 2004, Lenschow 2006, Böhme – Waterhout 2008). Whereas the mecha-
nisms that lie behind the “Europeanisation” of territorial governance are not 
                                                                        
4 The diagram does not aim to present a detailed picture of territorial governance opera-
tions, since they are results of an infinite variety of factors, circumstances and individual 
behaviours. It rather proposes a consistent analytical approach to discuss territorial 
governance as an institutional phenomenon subject to permanent social evolution. 
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addressed by the ESPON TANGO project, their connections with the processes of 
policy transfer are rather clear (Radaelli 2000, Wishlade – Yuill – Mendez 2003, 
Holzinger – Knill 2005). Namely, they are both framed by two interrelated and 
shared processes: one based on a selective (and thus voluntary) recognition of 
common problems and possible solutions, usually known as “lesson drawing” 
(Rose 1991 and 1993); and another based on the more or less coercive transfer of 
rules, methods and ideas from one place or institutional context to others 
(Dolowitz – Marsh 2000). 
 
Figure 1. Stylised pattern of territorial governance 
Source: ESPON 2012, based on Janin Rivolin (2012). 
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Figure 2. Stylised pattern of EU territorial governance 
Source: ESPON 2012 on Cotella – Janin Rivolin (2010; 2012). 
Basically, the hypothesis addressed here is that the EU territorial governance 
context offers a wider range of opportunities for policy transfer than “multina-
tional” contexts in general. More explicitly, problems of policy transfer in the case 
of EU territorial governance concern an institutional context in which “the appa-
ratus of policy diffusion and development has been transnationalised in such a pro-
found and irreversible way as to render anachronistic the notion of independent, 
‘domestic’ decision-making” (Peck 2011, p. 774). If so, the proposed model may 
help in conceptualising possible paths of transferring good practices from certain 
contexts to others, also indicating which modes of policy transfer should be 
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applied in principle for operational purposes. The identification of these modes is 
based on the assumption that the ESPON TANGO project plays an active role in the 
discourse about the formation of EU territorial governance, namely engaging in a 
“policy assessment” of the practices emerging from the case studies, to identify 
their “promoters” and the useful ways of transferring them to different domestic 
contexts. 
First, a direct mode of transferring good territorial governance practices from 
one context to another is related to the dimension of practices (p) and is mainly 
open to practitioners involved in territorial development activities. It concerns the 
possibility to translate features of good territorial governance, retrieved from the 
case studies as identified in the third section, through e.g. practices, joint projects, 
or interaction that may stimulate the potential interest of practitioners operating 
in diverse institutional contexts.   
Then, the discursive mode of transferring good territorial governance practices 
in the EU context is linked – as a “target dimension” – to various domestic dis-
courses (d), where the word “discourse” refers to the complex activity of territorial 
knowledge communities in reducing the variety of solutions to a few “hegemonic 
concepts” (Adams – Cotella – Nunes 2011, Servillo 2010). This concerns the oppor-
tunity to translate features of good territorial governance retrieved from the case 
studies through ideas, principles, or philosophy that match the interest of domestic 
actors operating in diverse institutional contexts. In both the direct and the 
discursive modes, transfer depends on social learning mechanisms, and may 
happen easier when the match between voluntary motivations for change and 
potential solutions triggers an immediate “peer to peer” process of policy transfer. 
A technical mode of transferring good territorial governance in the EU may be 
used by policy-makers at both domestic and EU level, and concerns the oppor-
tunity to translate the features of good territorial governance retrieved from the 
case studies via e.g. methods, techniques, and know-how. These can be extended to 
both domestic and EU-level policies, programmes and projects. When this takes 
place at the EU level, many territories could be affected through mechanisms of 
fiscal conditionality for the potential borrowers.  
Finally, the institutional mode of transferring good territorial governance 
practices is a set of tools for both domestic and EU-level decision-makers and con-
cerns the opportunity to translate features of good territorial governance retrieved 
from the assessment of case studies as different kinds of rules, codes, and laws that 
could be codified either at the level of the member state or at that of the EU. When 
this takes place at the EU level, a wide range of territories and domestic relations 
could be affected through legal conditionalities within the Community. 
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Modes and Components of Transferring Territorial Governance Practices 
The above discussion showed that the transfer of good practices in territorial gov-
ernance is not merely a matter of copying or imitation. It is still in question at what 
conditions may good practices trigger learning in other contexts, how they could  
be transferred and by what means.  
In order to summarise what has been learnt from the individual ESPON TANGO 
case studies, that may be relevant to different groups of stakeholders within the 
various domestic contexts, an additional step was made, focusing on the various 
modes (and components) of experience exchange.5 Each case study analyst was 
required to link the identified promoters of good territorial governance to one of 
the transfer modes that have been introduced in the section above, namely: 
 the direct mode (with components of practices, joint projects, and interac-
tion);  
 the discursive mode (with components of ideas, principles, and philosophy);  
 the technical mode (with components of methods, techniques, and know-
how); and 
 the institutional mode (with components of rules, codes, and laws). 
More in detail, they were asked to identify which component(s) might poten-
tially be helpful to transfer each of the promoters from one context to another. In 
this way, aggregating the obtained information following the same logic as the one 
adopted in the third section for the abstraction of the territorial governance 
promoters, it was possible to link each of them to a specific set of components of 
experience exchange and, therefore, to a specific mode of transfer (see Table 4). 
It may be stated that the aforementioned institutional and technical modes rep-
resent more “coercive” types of policy transfer (Dolowitz – Marsh 2000), while the 
discursive and direct modes are framed by more voluntary “lesson drawing” pro-
cesses (Rose 1991 and 1993). Furthermore, as previously indicated, each of the 
identified modes of transfer may be directly, albeit not exclusively, related to a 
main target audience. The institutional mode implies the capacity to transfer fea-
tures of good territorial governance into rules, codes, and laws, addressing 
decision-makers. Conversely, the technical mode of transfer implies the oppor-
tunity to translate features of good territorial governance in terms of methods, 
techniques, and know-how primarily addressing policy-makers. On the other hand, 
the discursive mode of lesson drawing is particularly concerned with the identify- 
                                                                        
5 For additional information on the adopted transferability components (ideas, principles for 
action, philosophy, methods, techniques, know-how, operating rules, programmes, insti-
tutions, modes of organisation, practitioners, joint projects) please refer to OECD (2001, p. 
35) and ESPON (2012, p. 37). 
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Table 4.  Territorial governance promoters organised by transfer modes 
Direct mode Discursive mode Technical mode Institutional mode 
Organisational rou-
tines favouring cross-
sector “fertilisation” 
Political commit-
ment 
Effective strategic 
framework – strate-
gies 
Political support to 
policy integration at 
the appropriate terri-
torial scale 
Involvement of rele-
vant public and pri-
vate stakeholders 
Win-win situation – 
interest 
Institutional 
capacity – qualified 
staff 
Spatial tool favouring 
sectoral integration 
Common goals, com-
mon history 
Compatible policy 
sectors 
Follow-up – moni-
toring 
Balance between 
flexibility and legal 
certainty 
Motivation Rationale catalysing 
integration 
Stability of co-
operative experi-
ences 
Code of conduct – 
guidelines 
Capacity of negotia-
tion 
Acknowledgement 
of, and integration 
with, a multi-level 
policy framework 
Pro-active public 
organisation 
Leadership at the 
right level 
Effective means of 
communication/dis-
semination of infor-
mation 
Quality of motiva-
tion  
Mechanisms allow-
ing for broad stake-
holders’ involve-
ment 
High level of 
accountability 
How to motivate 
stakeholder (vision, 
benchmarking, 
learning) 
Clear and uncon-
tested leadership 
Information flow 
ensured 
Multi-annual pro-
gramming 
Usage of various 
mechanisms of par-
ticipation 
Self-committed lead-
ership 
Feedback proce-
dures 
Power to decide 
change at the right 
level 
Exchanging best 
practices to under-
stand the right 
amount of adaptation 
Ownership of ques-
tions 
Structure/No struc-
ture 
Role of people in 
charge of responsi-
bility 
Involvement, partici-
pation, commitment 
Adaptive manage-
ment (small steps, 
flexibility, room to 
change direction) 
Methods for attract-
ing change 
Institutional mecha-
nisms that favour 
learning 
Co-production of 
knowledge and 
knowledge transfer 
Integrative holistic Territorial impact 
assessment 
Institutional mecha-
nisms supporting 
adaptivity 
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 Table 4 (continued) 
Direct mode Discursive mode Technical mode Institutional mode 
Experience in com-
plex programming 
Being conscious and 
being inspired  
 Involvement of differ-
ent levels of govern-
ment 
Existing shared terri-
torial knowledge 
Evidence of larger 
territorial context 
 Functional regions 
Acknowledgement 
and use of territorial 
potentials 
Territorial 
challenges 
 Eliminate barriers to 
co-operation 
Building trust – per-
manent co-operation 
Awareness of terri-
tory 
 Spatially differenti-
ated policies 
Source: Authors’ elaboration. 
cation of specific features of good territorial governance that may constitute ideas, 
principles and philosophy to be taken on board by the territorial knowledge com-
munities active in a specific context. Finally, the direct mode of transfer requires 
the consolidation of practices, joint projects and interaction through which practi-
tioners involved in various domestic contexts may learn from each other. 
Concluding Remarks and Future Research Perspectives 
In this paper we have presented some of the preliminary results of the ESPON 
TANGO project. Trying to understand how practices and institutions of territorial 
governance can contribute to achieving territorial cohesion, the project gathered 
relevant “good practices” from all around Europe. Having been given the mandate 
to address specific questions like how territorial governance is linked to territorial 
development outcomes or to a larger policy goal such as territorial cohesion, the 
project team not only had to consider territorial governance from an analytical 
perspective, but also had to integrate a normative approach, in terms of what con-
stitutes “good” territorial governance, related to the working definition adopted as 
a pivotal basis of the research. On the basis of the experiences collected via case 
study analysis, we were able to identify some generalisable lessons on “what to do” 
and “what not to do” in territorial governance. This resulted in a list of general pro-
moters and inhibitors of good territorial governance that may potentially provide 
fuel for the policy debate on the matter. 
However, when it comes to policy-relevant implications, it is important to 
stress that the various case studies constituting the evidence base of the project 
dealt with policies, programmes, and projects of various governance levels, located 
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within different institutional and geographical contexts. Therefore, particular 
attention must be paid to reveal “for whom” the identified territorial governance 
promoters and inhibitors are considered to be “good” or “bad”. This raises chal-
lenges in any in-depth discussion concerning the extent of their transferability into 
other contexts. Whereas our paper presented a preliminary classification of these 
territorial governance promoters by the main modes of transfer and, in turn, by 
the potentially addressed target audience, such a classification is by no means 
exhaustive and requires further empirical research. 
More in detail, as various critiques of theories of policy transfer and lesson 
drawing (James – Lodge 2003, Bulkeley 2006, Vettoretto 2009, Peck 2011, Stead 
2012) clearly remark, the “filtering out” process of transferring various features of 
good territorial governance from one context to another is a complex one that 
implies different degrees of adaptation. Similarly, the “filtering in” process through 
which specific territorial governance features may be taken on board in a certain 
domestic context appears to be related to two intertwined dimensions, namely a 
process of adoption that gives birth to policies/actions according to changes in the 
context, and a degree of territorialisation, that is, the relationship between these 
possible policies/actions and specific place-based issues.  
Finally, the authors would like to stress that neither this contribution, nor the 
ESPON TANGO project aim at searching for “one-size-fits-all” solutions concerning 
the transferability of territorial governance, but rather at building an evidence-
based set of opportunities for innovation in territorial governance practices at dif-
ferent levels/in different contexts, from which various stakeholders may draw 
lessons according to their own peculiar needs and will. 
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 ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS – WHAT IS THE DRIVE FOR 
URBAN SUSTAINABILITY? 
Andrea Suvák 
Introduction 
Urban areas are focal points of environmental pollution resulting from current 
production-consumption practices and lifestyles. Cities are furthermore both 
generators and victims of natural degradation. Urban environmental sustainability 
is a complex problem, with interlinked lines of causality (both in time and in 
space), ambiguous delimitations of responsibility bearers and beneficiaries, and 
different and conflicting levels of interests. Sustainability and sustainable urban 
development have been suggested as paradigmatic solutions to urban environmen-
tal problems, however it has become evident that these terms are too broad and 
that they conceal certain conflicts inherent in their realisation. The main problem 
with the vast majority of urban sustainability definitions, theories, premises or 
practices is that the underlying value set of the concept in question is hidden, and 
in most cases not referred to even implicitly (Davoudi 2000, Blowers 1997a). 
The aim of this study is to come to a manageable number of ethical concepts 
that are well delimited from each other, consistent and cover the full array of pos-
sible ethical attitudes. It is hoped that this delimitation can help provide an insight 
into the environment-related value sets and underlying ethics of urban decision 
makers. Based on the works of philosophers of environmental ethics, three groups 
of ethics will be defined: ethical egoism, humanism and holism. Whatever the hid-
den or semi-revealed value sets might be, the concepts seem to be anchored in the 
common understanding that urban sustainability covers three main concerns: 
economic, social and environmental. Some of the explanations state that there is a 
hierarchy among these interests, others insist that they should be regarded as 
equally important. This paper focuses on the environmental concern of urbanised 
life however it is inevitable to make reflections to the other two as well. 
The paper departs from the notion that the question “how” should be preceded 
by the question “why”. Many of the practical or even theoretical writings about 
urban environmental sustainability try to provide solutions to certain problems – 
either within cities, or in urban areas, or within some aspects of urban life (e.g. 
transport, energy, green areas, biodiversity, etc.), or embracing the environmental 
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problems caused by urbanisation globally. Still, many of these concepts trace back 
along lines of causality in order to discover the “real” causes of what they see as 
problems. However, without raising ethical question of what is “good” or “wrong” 
at the most elemental level of values, proposed solutions can become inconsistent 
and in conflict with other solutions and interests. 
This study aims to reveal the possible underlying values behind the question as 
to: “why is it important to consider environmental issues in urban development”. It 
echoes the findings of Frankena (1979) that state that it is not a single ethics that 
drives environmentally conscious actions but that every ethics has its own conse-
quence on the way people act towards the natural environment. Based on the 
works of critical thinkers and commentators of the 1970’s and on, this paper dis-
tinguishes between three lines of ethics that are tested for their appropriateness in 
representing different attitudes towards the natural environment. 
Environmental Ethics 
Environmental ethics is a line of philosophy that surged forth in the 1970’s. It de-
veloped in an era when dissatisfaction and disenchantment with the workings of 
consumer society – mainly because of its social and environmental consequences – 
first manifested itself on a large scale in North America, Western Europe and Aus-
tralia. The initial thrust of these environmentalist discourses was the question 
whether there exists an ethic that can be drawn from nature (and in this case can 
indeed be called “environmental” ethics), or whether human attitudes towards 
nature should be deducted from classical ethical lines. More precisely, the question 
was raised whether a new ethics should be created in order to foster better atti-
tudes towards nature.  
Retrospective interpretations of these contemplations blur the discussions of 
environmentally proper ethics with the advocacy of a new ethics, referring to them 
collectively as “environmental ethics”. In one such interpretation, all philosophies 
are included that study human attitudes toward nature. Another approach refers 
to theories according to which there exists an ethics drawn from the principles of 
nature. The present paper supports the claim – without challenging the possibility 
of a purely environmental ethics – that every kind of ethics has some environmen-
tal consequences. It uses the term environmental ethics in the broader sense, i.e. 
referring to all ethics that deal with human attitudes towards nature. The most 
widespread and referenced typology of environmental ethics is provided by 
Frankena (1979), but before coming to his ethical typologies and grouping 
methods, let us first deal briefly with  key concepts and dilemmas of environmental 
ethic discourse and theories of early thinkers of human attitudes towards nature. 
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Classical Ethics and the Environment 
The reason for the existence of environmental ethics has its roots in the is-ought 
problem, which interrogates the ethical or essential content that bridges a present 
state and a desired future state, – the values according to which an “is” requires an 
“ought”. Rolston III (1975) claims that information about the state of the natural 
environment (“is”) stems from the natural sciences, however, science itself is 
unable to point out desirable states and ends. The basis of labelling something 
good or bad, desirable or better to be avoided is always related to ethics. 
Theories about human attitudes towards nature regard the anthropocentric 
approach of Western civilisation an original evil, and blame ancient Greek phi-
losophy and the Judeo-Christian traditions for its formation and prevalence. Strong 
anthropocentrism holds that humans alone have intrinsic values, and non-human 
things do not. Weak anthropocentrism states that non-human things can also have 
intrinsic values, but prioritising human interests to non-human interests is admis-
sible, justified. The intrinsic value of humans is higher than that of non-human 
beings. Intrinsic and instrumental values are closely related to anthropocentrism 
and the whole debate about values behind attitudes towards nature. The different 
branches of environmental ethics can be distinguished along the things (human or 
non-human) they attribute intrinsic values and along the priority they make 
among the importance of human and non-human beings. The distinction between 
intrinsic and instrumental values also presumes that the things that do not hold 
intrinsic values are to be used as means for the benefit of things with intrinsic 
values. 
There are multiple classical explanations for the origin of intrinsic value. 
Humanist philosophy regards will and corresponding action as attributes that raise 
a person or an entity to the pedestal of being intrinsically valuable. Other ap-
proaches consider the ability to suffer and the ability for joy as key motives for 
self-value. According to Feinberg (1974), those persons or entities have self-value 
that have interests and that are able to represent their own interests or are able to 
be represented. This concept has evoked criticism (see for example Golding, M. P. – 
Golding, H. 1979, Goodpaster 1980). However, its impact can be detected in the 
arguments of environment-sceptics who insist that non-living things (e.g. land-
scapes) or collective categories of living creatures (e.g. species) have no interests, 
therefore there is no rational ground of their protection. 
During the evolution of notions and conceptions, the sphere of beings to which 
Western civilisation attributes intrinsic value has continuously widened, first 
embracing barbarians and slaves, then infants, women, imbeciles, people of colour 
and nowadays foetuses. Such an extension, according to Goodpaster and Sayre 
(1979), will not change the basic logic of thinking. He argues that that this exten-
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sion is a mere projection of human egoism to other persons or non-human beings, 
which does not resolve the inherently individualistic approach in which only 
beneficiaries and “not relevant” things exist, and the interests of the former. This 
approach, which regards each thing independently from its environment, is the 
strongest barrier that inhibits environmental protection to receive a logically 
approved explanation and to become a “normative ethical behaviour” (Goodpaster 
1979, p. 30).  
“New” Environmental Ethics 
A typical feature of new theories in environmental ethics is that they presume a 
“golden age” in which man lived in perfect harmony with himself, his fellow-beings 
and Nature. (This approach has roots in ancient philosophies, myths and tra-
ditions.) The consequence (or cause?) of the dropping out of this idealistic state is 
man’s secession from Nature, defining himself as an individual entity not as a part 
of Nature any more. As for the intrinsic value of human and non-human beings, the 
new theories also distinguish between the intrinsic value of individual beings and 
systems. The most general branch of the new ethics, called Holism, holds that it is 
not only the elements of the ecosystem that bear intrinsic value, but the system as 
a whole, and this whole is more than the mere sum of its parts. The Holism branch 
developed from the 1970’s in Northern America, Australia and North-West-
Europe. 
It is also important to mention here “shallow- and deep ecology”, a concept 
attributed to the Norwegian philosopher (and mountaineer) Arne Næss (1973). In 
the beginning of the 1970’s he collected and formulated the main attributes and 
principles of the then evolving deep ecology movement, and defined its distin-
guishing motives in opposition to “shallow” ecology. At the same time, he reflected 
on the moral roots and basic values of nature protection activities. He pictured 
shallow ecology as an environmental protection direction that corresponds to the 
anthropocentric paradigm, which: “fights against pollution and resource depletion, 
with the central objective [to ensure] the health and affluence of people in the 
developed countries” (Næss 1973, p. 1). 
In contrast, Næss (1973) characterised deep ecology as a holistic approach that 
considers every living thing as an interdependent part of a coherent whole. Næss 
distinguished between seven different principles of deep ecology: rejection of the 
man-in-environment image in favour of the “relational, total-field image”; bio-
spherical egalitarianism (in principle); diversity and symbiosis; a non class-based 
posture; the fight against pollution and resource depletion; complexity instead of 
compilation (holism); local autonomy and decentralisation. He affirms that these 
principles were not drawn directly from, but inspired by science (ecology).  
 Andrea Suvák 332 
Frankena and Rolston 
A conclusion about the types of ethics that can be used in this study as underlying 
attitudes towards the natural environment is reached through the analysis and 
comparison of the theory of two dominant thinkers, Frankena and Rolston. The 
widely cited work of Frankena (1979) does not embrace all big dilemmas of 
nature-related ethical theorisations, however, the approaches and viewpoints of 
the above concepts fit in his categorisation. He does not harmonise with the views 
that disapprove the traditional (“western”) types of ethic and call for a new one to 
support a proper treatment with nature. He holds that exploitive and irresponsible 
treatment with nature is not a consequence of the absence of an ethics for 
responsible attitudes, but the misuse of existing ones. It is not new ethics but new 
morals that are needed, ones that respect existing ethics. 
Frankena categorises and analyses different strands of ethics and intends to 
define the ones that are capable of serving as the basis of an environmentally 
proper attitude. 
[…] every ethics that is at all complete is or includes an ethics of the 
environment, since every such ethics, new or old, tells us, at least 
indirectly, what we may or may not, should or should not do about 
plants, lakes, minerals, etc.; and, therefore, the main question is not 
which are old and which are new, but which is the most satisfactory 
(Frankena 1979, p. 4). 
Frankena uses the “agent-patient” moral philosophical categories to support his 
distinction. In Frankena’s approach it is rational creatures that are the actors of all 
actions of ethical relevance, i.e. they are the moral agents in all case. What makes a 
difference between the types of ethics is the moral patient, i.e. the creatures that 
are subject of the rational creatures’ actions or value judgements; the beings that 
the rational creatures have duties to. In the understanding of Feinberg, it is not 
only that rational creatures have duties in connection with patients, but patients 
must be capable of vindicating their rights, to make agents account for their duties. 
Enforcement of rights is not regarded as a determining factor in Frankena’s 
classification. However, he stresses that: 
there are certain sorts of facts about certain sorts of things that are 
the ultimate considerations in determining what is morally good or bad, 
right or wrong, and the question now is: what sorts of things are such 
that certain sorts of facts about them are the final determinants, directly 
or indirectly, of moral rightness or virtue? (Frankena 1979, p. 4.) 
Thus Frankena searches for the patient in all types of ethics, and distinguishes 
between eight “families” of ethics based on it: 
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(1) Ethical egoism: The patient and the agent is the same being, that is an 
action is right if it is good for the actor itself. 
(2) Humanism or personalism: What matters morally is what happens to hu-
man being or persons. In judging the moral consequence of an action all 
human beings or persons should be taken into account, but only humans. 
This attribute distinguishes this principle from egoist ethics (and fuels an 
accusation of being humanist chauvinist). 
(3) The third type of ethics holds that all consciously sentient beings are to be 
regarded patients. Being sentient is approximated by the capacity to suffer. 
(4) The next family extends the class of moral patients to include everything 
that is alive. This entails that every manifestation of life (flora and fauna) 
should be respected and should be harmed by human interference to the 
least possible extent, independently of their capability for sentiments and 
the value they hold to the agent. This view holds that life as such is sacred. 
(5) The fifth type extends moral “patiency” for not only things that are human, 
conscious or alive, but to everything. There are two branches of this group: 
one that assigns intrinsic value to existing things on their own right 
distributively, and another that contends that all existing things are 
elements of an all-embracing entity or system, and this whole has intrinsic 
value, it is the patient of actions (holism). Frankena expresses that this 
latter group is most commonly envisioned in terms of a “new” ethics. 
(6) According to theist ethics, the ultimate value standard is God, and certain 
facts about God define the rightness or wrongness of an action (inde-
pendently of God believed to be transcendent or immanent in the given 
religion). The only moral patient in this ethic is God. 
(7) Frankena takes notice of the combination of various ethics as an individual 
group. For example, he cites a basic moral of the Bible: “love the Lord Thy 
God with all thy heart and love thy neighbour as thyself”. 
(8) Frankena names his last group “Naturam sequere”, an ethic that follows the 
rules of nature. According to the ethic of this group, humans should not 
interfere with the processes of nature, they should obey its laws, and 
imitate its workings to be in harmony with it. Following the mechanisms 
and rules of nature is a base of not only ecological but also general morals. 
Frankena emphasises these eight families in his quest for environmentally 
“satisfactory” ethics. However, he quickly concludes that only two ones are apt for 
a more thorough consideration: the third family (in which consciously sentient 
beings are the patients) and the holist branch of the fifth family. To reject the holist 
approach Frankena applies the statement of Rolston III, who claims that since 
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there is no strict boundary between the self and the whole, human “interests” coin-
cide with the “interests” of the whole. However, while in Rolston’s interpretation 
this is the coincidence of egoism and altruism, in Frankena’s view this attitude is 
purely egoistic. He insists that the self only regards the interests of the whole if he 
is either identical with the whole or a part of it, and thus the interest of the self are 
not lost in the interest of the whole. At the same time Frankena disregards that in 
Rolston’s concept the coincidence of the interest of the individual self with the 
interest of the whole is not a precondition of the (this way only seemingly) altruist 
behaviour, but is automatically fulfilled if the individual regards the ecosystem 
laws as underlying values. Rolston argues that it does not entail any sacrifice, since 
the elemental interests of the individual are fulfilled. Humans’ elemental state is to 
be a part of nature and to have nature as a part of their existence. Their elemental 
interest is to come closer to this state. Man can only get to this state if he attributes 
intrinsic value to nature and obeys its laws. 
At this point it is necessary to elaborate on the contradiction of the two other-
wise consistent approaches. Frankena comes to the conclusion that the application 
of classical humanist ethics is sufficient in our goal to reach a satisfactory attitude 
towards nature. His starting point is that only humans are capable of defining what 
is “good”. The value statement evolves according to the types of ethics: in egoist 
ethics good is what is for the benefit of the self, in humanist ethics something is 
good if it is good for the humankind. Since “goodness” can only be defined along 
human interpretations and human-made value sets, this line of thought cannot get 
further than the second (humanist) family.1 
The notion that goodness is defined by human judgment entails two supposi-
tions. Firstly, that it is decided by human judgment what is good for humankind, 
secondly, that it is decided by human judgment what is good in general. That is, 
there is no “ultimate good”, independently from human judgment. However, there 
is such in Rolston’s conception (likewise in theist ethics2). The ultimate good, 
according to Rolston, is derived from the laws of nature. What is elementally good 
for humans is determined upon the “value judgment” of nature. This value judg-
ment is approximated in most of the holist approaches by the working laws of the 
ecosystem. The contradiction of Rolston’s and Frankena’s approach therefore roots 
back to the acceptance or denial of the existence of absolute good. Furthermore, 
 
                                                                        
1 It should be mentioned here that the third group of Frankena is basically the same as the 
second, since it supposes that those beings are rationally sentient whose expression of 
feelings is similar to that of humans. However, it is not proven that other beings are inca-
pable of suffering. 
2 The common features with theist ethics is the reason why Frankena sees the holistic 
branch as problematic and does not express a real concern for it. 
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the two approaches are different in their suppositions about what is good for hu-
mans. Based on these arguments, this paper rejects the accusation of Frankena that 
the holistic approach is nothing else but a veiled version of a humanistic if not 
egoistic approach. Considering the fundamental differences discussed above, it can 
be stated that in the holistic approach the moral patient is effectively the ecosys-
tem and not humankind or the actor itself. 
Ethics and Urban Sustainability 
The distinction of different urban environmental sustainability approaches based 
on ethics is not very commonly made. However, there are a few analyses that 
theorise urban sustainability motivations based on specific kinds of values. For 
example, Blowers (1997a/b) and Davoudi (2000) use a distinction in which 
technology-based (industrial) modernism intertwined with current production-
consumption practices represent one course for environmental sustainability 
solutions (“ecological modernisation” theory), while the other direction calls for a 
radical shift from the market-based approach to ecosystem priority (“risk 
society”). Both authors characterise the ecological modernism approach as utili-
tarian and risk society as one with strong linkages to morality. Davoudi describes 
ecological modernisation as optimistic, technocratic, utilitarian, market-based, in 
line with consumer society and economy, elitist and neoliberal. She sees the risk 
society thesis as raising skepsis about technological solutions and emphasising 
irreconcilable conflicts between current production-consumption practices and 
environmental interests. Instead of a merely enabling state it calls for interven-
tionism while, at the same time, it champions greater participation in policy-
making at the local level. Partly using the aspects of comparison used by Davoudi, 
the different characteristics of urban sustainability as understood within the three 
types of ethics are summarised in Table 1. 
Conclusions 
There has been increasing global concern about the state of the environment dur-
ing the last four decades. Urban areas are focal points of environmental degrada-
tion – they are large polluters and sufferers at the same time. There are a large 
array of theories and practices about solutions, however, many approaches risk 
being inconsistent and detached from other urban development concerns. The 
quest for the underlying value set of different environmentally conscious 
approaches leads to an evaluation of ethical perspectives. Based on debates within 
the field of environmental ethics, the paper has distinguished between three types 
of ethics that influence our  attitude toward nature: ethical egoism, humanist ethics 
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and holism. These three ethics result in divergent interpretations of urban envi-
ronmental sustainability. However, it is not only eventual modes of intervention 
but the relation to the global market economy, modern technology and consumer 
society that are fundamentally different in the three approaches. Understanding 
these contrasts is step towards their reconciliation. 
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 ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY INTEGRATION – A NEED FOR 
A COMPLEX UNDERSTANDING OF “ENVIRONMENTAL 
COHESION” 
Viktor Varjú 
Introduction 
The concept of “sustainable development” in the 1980s and 1990s emerged as a 
central element, but the environmental sector alone would not be able to secure 
environmental objectives, therefore each sector would have to take on board 
environmental policy objectives (Lafferty – Hovden 2003, p. 1).  
Taking into consideration the interaction between regional policy/territorial 
cohesion and environmental policy, EU has made several attempts to integrate 
environmental policy into cohesion actions. While, for example, strategic envi-
ronmental assessment (SEA) integrates environmental interests into regional de-
velopment, on the other side, based on financial activities, EU forces environmental 
related investments to be financed by the Cohesion Fund (former ISPA) (e.g. 
investment in sewage systems or waste management). Implicitly these different 
types of tools can improve the integration of environmental cohesion into the 
territorial one, however, in order to achieve greater environmental justice, we 
have to take into consideration the differences in the institutional settings of the 
implementation. The will of the member states to equalise social and territorial 
injustice is common. However, its implementation and success are different, de-
pending on cultural, social differences and on the path-dependency of their socio-
cultural entity.  
This paper, via two overall cases, is looking for the most important peculiarities 
of institutional settings that determine the success, the efficiency of cohesion and 
the implementation of environmental efforts. In order to achieve explicit environ-
mental cohesion, complex understanding is needed. 
Under the umbrella of the 6th research framework programme called G-FORS1 
we analysed the operational programmes of the National Strategic Reference 
Framework (NSRF) 2007–2013 of Hungary, focusing on the South-Transdanubian 
                                                                        
1 G-FORS – Governance for Sustainability – EU 6th Framework Programme (2006–09) Re-
search Coordinator: Metropolitan Region of Hannover, Regional and European Affairs. 
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Regional Operational Programme, in a case study. In the research project inter-
views were made with the stakeholders and important documents were analysed 
concerning legislation, planning and the SEA process. 
The (country) report of the ex-post evaluation of Cohesion Fund (CF)2 presents 
an overview and summary evaluation of the management and implementation of 
the ISPA and CF in Hungary from 2000 to 2011. The report is based on research 
conducted (mainly by the author) at national level, comprising a review of docu-
ments and data, interviews with stakeholders whose collective experience span-
ned the period of the evaluation, and a workshop where all levels of Hungary’s 
Cohesion Fund delivery system were represented. 
Environmental Policy and Cohesion 
In this section the most important notions, expectations and connections of the 
relevant policy forms will be defined. 
With the strengthening and far-reaching effect of environmental policy, the idea 
of Environmental Policy Integration (EPI) came to the forefront in the last decades 
(Lenschow 1997). The reforms of Structural Funds, the extension of cohesion 
priorities and the need for a paradigm change in environmental sustainability 
resulted in environmental policy having become not a standing alone policy, but an 
integrated one. It is taken into account by sectoral, development and cohesion 
policies alike. 
Environmental Policy in Territorial Development 
Besides the 5th Environmental Action Programme, the development of the ex-ante 
evaluation and the rising crescendo of environmental policy (e.g. the Cardiff 
process, see Feldmann and Vanderhaegen 2001) brought forth the need for a 
separate evaluation tool for integrating environmental interests more deeply, 
hence EU introduced the SEA in its Directive (2001/42/EC). The goal of this initia-
tive was also to integrate environmental policy in an earlier phase of the program-
ming–planning procedure.  
Determining whether an environmental policy initiative and integration is 
“effective” is problematic. The reason for this is that there are different types of 
effectiveness to consider (Theophilou – Bond – Cashmore 2010). Sadler (1996) 
distinguishes three types of effectiveness: 
                                                                        
2 Ex-post Evaluation of Cohesion Fund (including ISPA) – Work Package D: Management & 
Implementation. Research leader: University of Strathclyde with the contribution of Fraser 
Associate. Reports, including Hungarian Report, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/regional_ 
policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/expost2006/wpd_en.htm 
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“Procedural – Does the environmental assessment (EA) process conform to 
established provisions and principles? 
Substantive – Does the EA process achieve the objectives set, e.g. support well-
informed decision-making and result in environmental protection? 
Transactive – Does the EA process deliver these outcome(s) at least cost in the 
minimum time possible, i.e. is it effective and efficient?” (Sadler 1996, p. 39.) 
Evidently, the complexity of the environmental system should be reflected in 
the substantive planning approach. Besides substantive, procedural planning 
issues need to be considered, too (Partidário – Voogd 2004, p. 287).  
In order to consider substantive integration in planning by means of SEA, 
Partidário and Voogd (2004) defined four types of integration. In full integration, 
“environmental factors and concerns are an intrinsic element in the formulation of 
actions amenable to strategic decisions”. In environmental shape, assessment of the 
importance and magnitude of potential positive and negative effects on the envi-
ronment is missing. In concurrent assessment and “staple” integration, iterativity is 
totally missing. “Full integration is the most desirable means by which sustainable 
development can be achieved” (Partidário – Voogd 2004, pp. 291–292). 
Territorial Cohesion 
Territorial cohesion, as a complement for economic and social cohesion, is sup-
posed to moderate imbalances by decreasing centre–periphery disparities, and it 
aims at the equal dispersion of goods and services for all EU citizens with equal 
accessibility (Faludi 2007). 
In a reappraisal of the performance of the Structural Funds, Bachtler and 
Gorzelak (2007) suggested to reconsider the concept of cohesion, understanding it 
in functional terms as a dynamic entity. They argued that cohesion would involve a 
policy focus on three elements: economic cohesion, social cohesion and territorial 
cohesion (that was new in the official EU language, and had not been approved in 
treaty form at that time (2006–2007) (Bachtler – Gorzelak 2007, p. 321).  
In 2007–2008 the German and French Presidency attached central importance 
to developing the idea of territorial cohesion (TC). TC added a new dimension to 
the European Social Model. It means “that individuals life chances are not only 
shaped by the extent to which individuals are subjected to and protected from 
typical biographical risks (unemployment, disability, poverty, illness, old age) 
throughout their life course” (Martin – Ross 2004, p. 12). “They are also shaped by 
where they live and work; in other words, by the location and quality of places and 
territories” (Davoudi 2009, p. 273).  
The gist of the paradigm of New Regionalism is the approach where political 
actions (e.g. regional development, cohesion) are “beyond the state” and this ap-
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proach is “based on a ‘spatial relationship of territories’ rather than on administra-
tive and legalistic frameworks” (Scott 2009, p. 3). The focus is on regions as a 
spatial scale of governance and economic development. The accomplishment of the 
place-based approach can be expected during the EU programming period of 
2014–20. The integrated territorial investment (ITI) and the community-led local 
development (CLLD) are the new tools for including bottom-up participation and 
wide-range local co-operation in the mentioned new approach and cohesion poli-
cy, which can facilitate the emergence of new forms of governance. 
Environmental Cohesion 
Layard and Holder (2010) argue that environmental cohesion (as a new EU para-
digm for a place-based interpretation of environmental justice) has a clear connec-
tion to territorial cohesion. In their new approach they suggest that advantages for 
people “could include not only advantages of greater economic development and 
growth, including equal opportunities to engage in entrepreneurial activity and to 
receive services, but also a concern for an equitable distribution of environmental 
protection and access to environmental services… While environmental justice has 
conventionally been conceptualised as a human-centred harm, it is fundamentally 
a collective concern, premised on location” (Layard – Holder 2010, p. 10).   
In non-EU countries regional environmental cohesion is used as an instrument  
to accelerate accession to the EU and it may be manifested as a declaration of 
environmental diplomacy. The reason for environmental cohesion is the pollution 
of the environment caused by the destruction of industrial installations, military3 
and other waste (Mihajlov 2008, Nagy 2011). 
Based on the above, we argue that the fulfilment of environmental cohesion 
needs a proper management structure not only in a procedural, substantive, but 
also in a place-based sense. It means that bottom-up approach, local knowledge 
and local actors are essential in achieving environmental cohesion. Having come to 
that we return to the well-known slogan: “Think globally, act locally”. 
Results of Case Studies 
The mentioned G-FORS project aimed to assess how different governance arrange-
ments in different countries may be enabled to generate, transfer different 
knowledge forms (e.g. institutional, expert, steering, milieu etc.), accompanied by a 
certain KnowledgeScape (cf. Heinelt et al. 2006, Matthiesen 2005).  
Hungary is a strongly centralised, unitary country where, especially subsequent 
to the systemic change, medium tier governance became the weak point. Planning 
                                                                        
3 On the territory of former Yugoslavia. 
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at regional level, the elaboration of regional operational programmes (ROP) met 
the legal and personal requirements of the EU and the Hungarian central govern-
mental orders. The newer and newer versions of the OPs “pursued” the continu-
ously changing central expectations. The ROPs were made according to the “re-
sidual principle”, and their content was determined at the National Development 
Agency (NDA). The Government has concentrated on the planning and implemen-
tation work at the NDA, the ROPs were prepared in similar linear processes, even 
though the local organisations played a significant role in the preparatory phase 
(Pálné Kovács – Varjú 2009). 
Regarding the modes of interaction, in the planning process of the SEA prepara-
tions were carried out in a sorely formalised way. Here a hierarchical, multi-level 
governance model was detected which nevertheless had to be supplemented by 
elements of networking (partnership).  
During the SEA public participation process, the NDA provided a multi-channel 
option for partner’s comments: partly on the website of the NDA and partly 
through a web interface. The planner, however, did not seek stronger co-operation 
with the SEA makers and the consultation partners, instead concentrated only on 
the proper “ready made report”.  
If we take a look beyond the formal procedures, we can see that the desirable 
philosophy of SEA has been injured from several aspects. First, the SEA makers 
were not authorised to conduct direct negotiations with the different planner 
units, only through the NDA (Figure 1). On the other hand, the SEA report was 
prepared after finishing the public debate on the ROP and therefore its own debate 
was also delayed. Hence centralisation and the lack of integrated planning were 
the main crucial points of the process, which have major influence on efficiency. 
Also, time management was not feasible in a proper way; for the environmental 
assessment itself (including public participation) the time was very short.  
The mentioned ex-post evaluation analysed the management and implementa-
tion of ISPA/CF. Beside the need of integrating environmental policy into regional 
development, an effective way to improve environmental quality is to continue the 
implementation of cohesion funds, as it resulted in 828 environmental projects in 
the planning period of 2000–2006. In the period 2007–2013 an allocated budget of 
133 million euros to “green economy” included environmental protection projects 
as well (Layard and Holder 2010). 
Having regarded the baseline position of ISPA/CF implementation in the envi-
ronmental sector, the Ministry of Environment was responsible for infrastructure 
project management and implementation. Project implementation was performed 
by the local level government departments and companies. Here, experience and 
competence in organising and managing projects were lacking, learning was simul-
taneous with the implementation. 
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Figure 1. The SEA procedure and the interaction between players of the action arena 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Since project management experience was missing in the environmental sector, 
technical assistance (TA) and foreign external experts were involved, although 
their lack of local knowledge could be problematic. This discrepancy existed at 
intermediate body level as well. 
At the level of beneficiaries there were three typical project implementation 
arrangements regarding the management and implementation architecture. In 
those projects where several local governments were involved in implementation, 
a new organisation was created for implementing the project. There were projects 
where a representative of the local government co-operated with the supplier in 
implementation, in other projects implementation and management were out-
sourced to a third party.  
The most serious cause of significant deviation in project implementation was 
the weakness of the preparatory stage, especially at the beginning of the period, 
and this had a significant effect on implementation. The effects appeared in delays 
and the fact that gaps had to be bridged during the implementation phase. Inexpe-
rienced project managers (especially in the environmental sector) inherited prob-
lems arising from weak project development.  
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Especially at the beginning of the period there were significant deviations from 
financial plans. Usually the solution was not the extension of the budget but the 
mitigation of the technological content. Inflation, changes in the euro exchange rate 
and the cost of archaeological excavations were among the main underlying rea-
sons.  
By the end of 2011 almost all of the major projects had been physically finished, 
however, financial settlement was expected after that. The reasons for the delays 
and other discrepancies are manifold and include: 
 Archaeological excavations could cause half a year or more delay. 
 Civil protests. For instance, in the waste-management project of North-East 
Pest finally the 14th location was chosen because of the different local 
political interests and local civil protests.  
 The process of getting permits from different public utility companies (elec-
tricity, gas providers) and authorities (e.g. Green Authority). For instance, 
the enlargement of a transformer together with the process of getting permit 
for it caused 13 months delay in one case. 
 Lacking human capacity (in both qualitative and quantitative sense) to carry 
out the construction. This is the consequence of the failure of public pro-
curement to consider “value for money”. The cheapest bidder can win the 
tender, however, they do not have the capacity to carry it out. 
 Overall national sectoral strategies were being made simultaneously with 
the project development/preparation, or in some cases after the project 
preparation/development had taken place. 
 Issues relating to the late start of the projects, and overrunning the budget 
having resulted in reduced outputs, suggest that that the quality of project 
preparation was not appropriate, at least in relation to the time horizon of  
project implementation. There was no effective project pipeline in the early 
stages. 
 Involvement and co-ordination of local governments. As most of the environ-
mental projects affected local levels, there were some leadership related 
issues during implementation, as a number of municipalities were not 
motivated to take responsibility for project implementation. Co-ordination 
and difficulties in territorial orientation caused difficulties in delivery.  
The regulatory environment for infrastructure, planning and implementation 
and its changes also caused deviation in projects. The change of regulations neces-
sitated new technological requirements, which added new costs in the implemen-
tation phase. 
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Discussion and Conclusion 
A case cannot be understood without the concrete physical, social, cultural envi-
ronment (attributes of a community) and the general model of governance, the 
evolution and characterisation of institutional arrangements (Ostrom 2005). A key 
aspect of addressing sustainability is simultaneously a problem of the co-ordina-
tion/integration of actions at different levels of governance (Atkinson – Klausen 
2011). 
SEA is a novelty for the Hungarian land use planning system requiring decen-
tralised governance, partnership of non-public actors, networks for arguing, meas-
urement of the quality and efficiency of decisions, and respecting the normative 
value of sustainability. The implementation of CF (former ISPA) has a longer tradi-
tion, however, the lessons to be learned are similar to those of SEA. 
Although there was already some experience in SEA, the volume of the recent 
one was much higher. As follows from the examples, bad time management and the 
hierarchical and centralised way of communication led to SEA and ISPA/CF imple-
mentation having been separately tailored. Although the available expert know-
ledge was enough, the dominant knowledge form was the institutional knowledge 
of the central actors. What we have just said relates to territorial level, local res-
pect and milieu knowledge have been dominantly missing. 
Experience shows that EPI not only depends on legislation and planning 
method, but also on the decision mechanism of actors. Apparently this planning 
period (2007–2013) was the first when SEA was made on a mass scale (NSRF, its 
Operational Programmes and their Action Plans). Therefore the reasons for the 
negative aspects were the lack of experience, the bureaucratic institutional setting, 
and the fact that although environmental policy brainstorming and plan prepara-
tions were going on at the same time (concurrently or when the priorities in the 
plan had already been defined), the procedures were going on separately, and not 
in an iterative way.  
In ISPA/CF implementation strategic planning was underdeveloped and adjust-
ment was needed to meet the requirements of ISPA/CF. In general it can be con-
firmed4 that the process was sometimes too complicated, the scope of responsi-
bility was not unambiguous, and the continuous changes in the institutional and 
functioning framework caused significant delays. 
Overall fund management and governance, though requiring development 
especially at the beginning, was not found to be a significant obstacle to delivery. 
The areas with greatest impact on the performance of the system were strategic 
planning in the early stage, project development and procurement. 
                                                                        
4 Also stated by KözOP (2009). 
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The above-described research revealed that in the field of effectiveness there 
were several deficiencies. For example, iterativity, a principle of SEA, was unsuc-
cessful in the course of procedures. In a substantive sense the implementation of 
the CF project achieved the objectives, but in its procedures it was deficient. 
Assessing the substance of the process, on the basis of our research results we 
can say that bureaucratic difficulties (hierarchical institutional setting, the domi-
nance of institutional knowledge) resulted in making “concurrent assessment” or 
“staple integration” (in the sense of Partidário – Voogd 2004) instead of the prefer-
able “full integration” in the course of SEA. It occurred that after the planning 
period had been finished, the environmental assessment was still going on. In such 
a situation there is no chance to reflect on the plan from an environmental aspect.  
Wider participation of society and the socio-economic partners in the main 
phase of CF planning, procurement and implementation would help to increase the 
quality of decision-making. Although legally financial responsibility belongs to the 
implementer of the project, it would be useful to share the responsibility in prac-
tice, as a major investment implementation depends not only on the beneficiary, 
but on other actors of the delivery system as well. It can also be noted that there 
were too many actors in the system and it would be useful to decrease their num-
ber.  
Environmental policy has been integrated into territorial cohesion, however, in 
a general sense the actual appearance of environmental cohesion is rare. Although 
the notion is new, it is becoming strong in an implicit manner. However, EU cohe-
sion policy should deal with environmental cohesion explicitly. The primary 
reason for this is that a certain level of environmental protection, the application  
of EU environmental standards and guidelines are preconditions of accession. 
However, as our research has shown, within the EU – and not only in Hungary, as 
other Central and Eastern European Countries have similar problems5 – there are 
crucial management problems. Not in connection with environmental protection 
but in the implementation of the environmental policy initiatives. 
In order to achieve the full integration of environmental policy, its effective im-
plementation, and the convergence of the institutional settings of its implementa-
tion, there is a need for environmental cohesion to appear explicitly. 
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REGIONAL STRUCTURES AND 
POLICIES IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN 
EUROPEAN AND BALKAN COUNTRIES 
 INGREDIENTS FOR THE DRAWING OF EAST-CENTRAL 
EUROPE’S SPATIAL STRUCTURE 
János Rechnitzer 
 
This paper has a daring title. It was chosen based partly on the research project we 
are now completing1 and partly on the research we have been conducting for 
decades on spatial policy. The referenced research project’s goal is not fully con-
nected to the topic in the title, given that it concerned the vehicular industry situa-
tion of two Hungarian regions – Western Transanubia and Central Transdanubia. 
The research team conducted analyses of various combinations of East-Central 
European countries and their regions (NUTS 2), comparing economic and social 
situations primarily to interpret the service conditions for hosting economic 
organisations and also the given territorial-level classification. As leaders of the 
research project we had the opportunity to overview the analytical methods and to 
review the results, allowing us to gain knowledge of and to investigate East-Central 
Europe and its complex and rather interesting regional structure. 
Another aspect of our interest in regions motivated us to write a monograph on 
the theory, application and methodological framework of territorial policy 
(Rechnitzer – Smahó 2011). This nearly five-hundred-page summary book reviews 
several concepts used in territorial research, looking for how different interpreta-
tions affect various communal and private interventions in spatial processes. In 
this way we encountered the concept of spatial structure, which is often used and 
interpreted in several ways. The same holds for theories related to the concept. We 
ourselves attempted to define and describe this concept as used in systemisation, 
analysis and development interventions. Furthermore, the review of territorial 
policy led us to the acknowledgment of the numerous specificities and divergences 
observable in the territorial structures of the countries of East-Central Europe. To 
a degree some of these have already appeared or have played out in the western 
half of Europe, while others are characteristic of the given macro-region, and can 
only be observed and interpreted here. 
                                                                        
1 In this research project we relied on the results of the project entitled “TÁMOP-4.2.1./B-
09/1/KONV–2010-0003 Mobility and Environment: Vehicular, Energy and Environmental 
Research Projects in Central and Western Transdanubia”. 
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This paper connects two dimensions, i.e., two research projects, and harmo-
nises the results thereof to allow us to attempt to describe the spatial structure of 
East-Central Europe. 
The Region under Examination 
What exactly is East-Central Europe? Attempts to define this region of Europe have 
given rise to several theories (Szűcs – Hanák 1986), and thoughtful analyses 
attempting to record the characteristics of this group of countries have been 
written. Valuable analyses of the development of social and economic structures 
after the regime changes are available (Ehrlich – Révész – Tamási 1994). Some 
studies have tried to describe territorial characteristics (Horváth 2000, Illés 2002) 
or the system of municipal networks and the characteristics of their definitive 
centres (Csapó – Balogh 2012, Csomós 2011, Enyedi 2010, Tagai 2010). Publica-
tions have appeared on the development of structural policies (Fábián 2011), the 
territorial policies of specific countries, their tools (Mezei 2006, Rechnitzer – 
Smahó 2011), the modelling and transformation of economic and industrial 
structures (Kuttor 2012, Lux 2009, Molnár 2012) and the definition of regional 
competitiveness (Lengyel 2012). The past few years have seen a dramatic increase 
in the number of Hungarian and international investigations and studies on East-
Central Europe, indicating that this group of countries has become a focus for 
professional researchers. 
A review of publications reveals that there are differences and divergences in 
drawing the borders of the region. One group of researchers focuses on the coun-
tries of the Visegrad Co-operation initiative established in 1991 (Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland, Slovakia), while many researchers add Austria and call the region 
Central Europe. Other analyses attach the eastern counties of Germany, or Bavaria, 
and also include western Balkan countries (Horváth – Hajdú 2010) like Slovenia 
and Romania and thus speak of East-Central Europe. 
We prefer this more encompassing approach, given that the countries all joined 
the European Union at about the same time, or are about to join (Croatia in 2013, 
while Serbia’s accession date remains uncertain). From a Hungarian point of view 
this group of countries has a number of historical similarities, while in the 20th 
century the given countries and by extension the region formed millions of 
economic, trade and historical-cultural threads that entwined them. Furthermore, 
the countries of the region experienced similar political systems, and the collapse 
of these regimes occurred at roughly the same time throughout the region, giving 
rise to similarities in regime transformation. Last but not least a unique geopoliti-
cal situation characterises these countries. 
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As such, our study incorporates a bigger, and in our view more intensive, collec-
tion of countries that is similar in terms of development and catalysts thereof. We 
thus view East-Central Europe as the southern and eastern counties of Germany, 
Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Slovenia and Romania. It is within 
this group of countries2 that we attempt to describe a spatial structure and its 
changes. 
On Spatial Structure 
In his outstanding study (Szabó 2009) and later habilitation (2012) Pál Szabó sum-
marises Hungarian interpretations of spatial structure. He provides three ap-
proaches to the use of the term. In the first instance the elements (creation factors) 
and their spatial arrangement are viewed as the foundation of the definition, while 
a second interpretive approach categorises based on statements emphasising spa-
tial component elements. Finally, the third approach is found in investigations 
where the relation of spatial elements to one another, i.e., the divergences in struc-
tures and analysis of their spatial distribution are focal points. 
Spatial structure is thus the defining of territorial units based on groups or 
combinations of distinguishable development paths independent of a country or 
group of countries’ spatial position, and further based on groups of primarily eco-
nomic, social, settlement-network factors (Rechnitzer – Smahó 2011). Its charac-
teristics, e.g., differentiated structural, organisational units, form unique combina-
tions that can be characterised and evaluated according to given criteria. These 
characteristics define the economic, social and settlement-network factors in one 
or several time periods. The units of spatial structure thus can be described as the 
state of a developmental path, evaluated according to expectations (e.g., develop-
ment, separation), and defined in order to achieve changes according to territorial 
policy goals (desired future development directions, transformation of situations 
and states, means and modes of intervention). 
Spatial structure units are the concentrated appearance of similar or seemingly 
similar (interconnected), determining economic, social and settlement-network 
factors. Space has several layers and fields which pile on top of one another and 
which can strengthen or weaken one another (Rechnitzer – Smahó 2011). The 
specificities and differences of spatial fields depend on the geographical charac-
teristics of various territories, their economic, social and political evaluation, or 
                                                                        
2 We considered the inclusion of Croatia and Serbia, given that these Western Balkan coun-
tries have strong and reinforcing historical, economic, infrastructure-related and cultural 
connections to the other countries in the study. However, access to data was problematic. 
This situation should improve with Croatia’s accession to the EU (2013), while in Serbia’s 
case its candidate country status will make data better available. 
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their level of support. In this way their role in the transformation of spatial struc-
ture can vary. One of the goals of spatial policy is to influence and contribute to the 
transformation of these spatial fields. 
The various fields are layered upon one another in space, but their effect and 
strength in given spatial points (settlements) can vary. Some intensify and become 
concentrated, while the presence of others wanes. Meanwhile the fields affect, 
build, destroy and weaken one another. The relations and destinations between 
fields change over time. Within a given span of time some gain in value, others 
become dormant or lose their previous significance and role. In the next span of 
time they can reappear in a new light or correlation, establish a relation with a 
further field and affecting those create new synergies. Change in the entirety of the 
spatial structure follows transformation of the fields or the appearance of new 
points of view and interrelations in the valuation of fields. 
The goal of analysing spatial structure is thus to determine the composition of 
the examined territorial unit – be it a country or group/association of countries 
that displays common characteristics as regards units and unifying criteria in 
space – in terms of definable composite elements, with an eye to the future direc-
tion of their change and development. A further goal is the orientation of develop-
ment and the review of what possible interventions are necessary to change or 
modify the described states. Such spatial structure analyses can encompass the 
registration of current states, the description of a desired future state, or the estab-
lishment/prediction of a developmental level. These analyses can be viewed as 
tools of territorial policy used to define the direction of interventions. It follows 
that spatial structure analysis can be viewed as an analytical tool of horizontal 
developmental policy. Given the above, spatial structure types can be defined as 
developmental levels, or differentiable spatial characteristics. We can move from 
states seen as developed toward undeveloped or – in terms of given conditions – 
designate them as lagging or peripheral. The degrees, or the placement of de-
marked territorial units on a ladder of development, can change according to 
analyses and in light of territorial policy goals. 
Finally, a definitive question is that of the mode or methodological foundation 
for designating spatial structure units or development types. Numerous analytical 
methods for qualifying territorial levels, registering their states or comparing them 
to one another are known or are being developed. To simplify, there are two paths 
we can take. 
The first path is classification according to indicators of development. In such 
cases we utilise one or more well known indicators (these are usually indicators of 
territorial economic potential, e.g., GDP per person), separate the territorial units, 
and then using our further gathered knowledge refine and increase the precision 
of our picture. The other solution is to collect various economic, social and munici-
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pal indicators characterising territorial units – essentially the field characteristics – 
and analyse them using complex evaluation methods (e.g., multivariable analyses, 
projection methods, simulation techniques, etc.). 
Both approaches can be used successfully, while the combination of the two can 
also be a solution. We should not forget that the goal of spatial structure analysis is 
the orientation of development and the establishment of its possible directions. 
Hence, territorial analysis requires experience in synthesising, creative problem 
solving and knowledge of the given territorial units. The method of presenting 
results is map diagrams, but this only helps envision observations in spatial terms. 
These – as spatial structure units – must be described with great precision and 
based on development-supporting relations.  
East-Central Europe in European Spatial Structure 
Spatial structure models of Europe appeared in the eighties and nineties of the 
previous centuries, with the goal of illustrating the developmental direction of 
European space. Illustrations and grandiose spatial demarcations were based on 
the classic principles of the centre–periphery model. Central spaces – whose nodes 
were the large centres of Western Europe – housed concentrated economic 
resources as well as all institutions of political decision-making, and this well-
defined space was the starting point of economic renewal and the concentration of 
innovation. This is how the Blue Banana3 came to be, as Europe’s economic – and 
historically interpretable – belt, which contained Western Europe’s dominant 
centres and their spheres of influence (Brunet 1989). Rethinking of the models 
results in the expansion of this belt through the inclusion of agglomerations and 
new centres. The forming developmental zone now stretches from London and 
Paris through the Ruhr area to Milan, encompassing Europe’s definitive centres 
and their areas of influence (Kunzmann 1992).  
The outlining of developmental zones continued in the 1990s. The South 
European developmental zone appeared, encompassing the centres of Barcelona, 
Lyon, Marseille, Genoa, Milan, Venice and Rome, along with their agglomeration 
zones. This developmental axis – having unique functions (service orientation, 
tourist, strengthening local economies, new type production systems and regional 
connections) – was named the North of the South, Europe’s Sunbelt or the Second 
Banana (Lever 1995). 
                                                                        
3 Pál Szabó (2009) impressively reviewed models of European spatial structure, including 
their various variables (polygons, shapes), labels, and the possibilities of their change and 
variation. 
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In addition to these was the outline of Europe’s high-tech ring, which began in 
Glasgow, went through Barcelona and Milan to Vienna, broke in Central Europe, 
and then closed the circle from Malmo to the original starting point. This is where 
Vienna first appears, then as Europe’s last stop, beyond which peripheral areas like 
East-Central Europe – which are unknown and undocumented – are to be found 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. The spatial structure model of Europe in the 1990s 
Legend: 1 – Blue Banana; 2 – The expansion of the Blue Banana, inducted zones; 3 – North of 
the South (Sunbelt); 4 – High-tech ring; 5 – Undeveloped regions ring; 6 – Problem region. 
Source: Rechnitzer (1998 p. 67). 
At the beginning of the 1990s regional processes clearly showed that the eco-
nomic integration of East-Central European countries would inevitably give rise to 
a regional integration form (Enyedi 1996). The established Visegrad Co-operation 
initiative, the countries of which had economic and institutional principles that 
made economic integration possible, could have initiated a concurrent territorial 
integration process not just with neighboring countries in what was then the Euro-
pean Community, but with eastern, post-socialist neighbour countries as well. 
Some signs of such an integration process were recognisable in the emerging 
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macro-regional structure of East-Central European countries4 (Gorzelak 1996, 
Rechnitzer 1998), which displayed several particularities and at the same time 
certain directions of development (Figure 2). 
In the mechanism of macro-regions it is urban regions that embody connec-
tions. In Hungary this means the Budapest agglomeration; the agglomerations of 
Prague and Brno in the Czech Republic; Warsaw, Poznań, Wroclaw, Gdansk and 
Krakow in Poland; and the Bratislava area and the Kosice region in Slovakia. The 
west–east developmental slope in these countries was already present at the time, 
although approaching the eastern borders this continuity was broken and we 
experience a sharp drop to another level of development that is markedly 
unfavourable compared to the previous one. Therefore the studies viewed the 
countries of the East-Central Europe region as the border zone of the west, which 
could lay a foundation for macro-regional and cross-border co-operation, whereas 
the eastern regions were the true periphery, with little chance for catching up. 
The western developmental zone of East-Central Europe, which encompasses 
the major cities of Gdansk, Poznań, Wroclaw, Prague, Brno, Bratislava, Vienna and 
Budapest, was seen in analyses as the “Central European Banana” (or boomerang). 
This zone has a high concentration of capital cities and significant industrial and 
administrative centres. Their organisations are directly connected to the Austrian 
and German economies. Major and mid-sized investors have settled in these 
regions. Furthermore, these centres were able to absorb services and shopping 
tourism from the west in the middle of the 1990s. It is another unique aspect that 
in this zone the relatively developed areas of East-Central Europe – which largely 
had industrial potential and advantageous infrastructure – merged with the rela-
tively underdeveloped Austrian and German regions (which showed significant 
transformations). As a result, a natural situation of competition arose among the 
areas. This not only covered Austrian–German relations, but also affected intrare-
gional relations in the given countries. By this we mean that as a result of the 
inflow of western capital into these western-located or capital city-based regions 
the transformation of the economy was quicker – i.e., more successful – and hence 
the west–east or capital city–countryside division increased instead of diminishing. 
The Central European banana (or boomerang) can launch two potential de-
velopment zones or expansions. One of the zones begins in Prague and includes the 
large industrial cities of former East Germany (Berlin, Leipzig), connecting to 
Berlin, and then turns to Poznań and back to the Czech capital. The Berlin–Warsaw 
 
                                                                        
4 In this model it is too early to speak of East-Central Europe. The countries mentioned 
above are not present or are present only tangentially. However, the hope for and neces-
sity of expansion in spatial structure analyses is clear. 
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Figure 2. The spatial structure model of East-Central Europe in the 1990s 
Legend: 1 – Internationally significant city; 2 – Potential internationally significant city; 3 – 
Transnational significant city; 4 – Regional centre with international significance; 5 – Cur-
rent development zone; 6 – Potential development zone; 7 – European transportation 
corridor; 8 – North–South future co-operation region with development opportunities; 9 – 
Potential multiregional co-operation; 10 – Tourism region; 11 – Peripheral area; 12 – Multi-
regional co-operation; 13 – Development core area; 14 – Traditional industrial area; 15 – 
Co-operation direction. 
Source: Rechnitzer – Smahó (2011. p. 55). 
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axis is forming at a spectacular rate, not only as a new transportation and commu-
nications corridor (Pan-European Transport Corridor No. 2) in the near future – 
opening toward Minsk and Moscow – but as a new innovation axis as well. This 
may result in a shift in the centre of gravity in the spatial structure of East-Central 
Europe, as much of the transportation of goods can be “lured” here and new 
economic directions can be established that devalue and diminish earlier spatial 
connections. The entire spatial structure could be transformed as a result. 
Another potential expansion of the Central European banana (or boomerang) is 
along a north–south axis that can connect the coast of the Adriatic Sea with the 
North Sea. This possible expansion can emphasise the Berlin–Warsaw axis, and can 
also activate Slovenia, Croatia and the eastern and southern counties of Austria. 
Due to the unique aspects of spatial structure it can be assumed that the future 
fusion of East-Central Europe’s northern and southeastern development areas will 
take place along the Prague–Brno–Vienna–Bratislava–Győr–Budapest axis. An eco-
nomic and spatial structure turntable can form here (East-Central European 
mushroom) which can fuse East-Central Europe’s future renewal zones with East-
ern Europe (mainly eastern Slovakia and the Ukraine) and the Balkans (largely 
Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria), transferring capital, knowledge and innovation to 
the latter two areas and their centres. 
Beyond current and potential future development zones, transitional areas 
with various characteristics were also present in East-Central Europe in the 1990s. 
Some of these were traditional industrial districts, transformational agricultural 
districts, mountainous zones with active tourism or large cities or peripheries 
hoping to utilise cross-border co-operation. One could draw an “eastern wall” that 
broke the developmental slope and encompassed the peripheral border areas – 
those touching Belorussia and the Ukraine – of the eastern part of the group of 
countries. Characteristically most of these areas were provincial, based on agricul-
ture, contained a village and small-city settlement network, were unfavourably 
developed, and had poorer infrastructure than the national average. In other pro-
vincial cities the inner resources for renewal were lacking, there was scant interest 
on the part of foreign capital, and tensions in employment and society were sharp. 
Beyond the numerous disadvantages of being on the periphery, the fact that the 
post-Soviet areas bordered so-called “western” regions made it possible for them 
to activate various elements of resources and to establish new areas for relations. 
The dismantling of the “eastern wall”, however, was obstructed by dilapidated and 
narrowly cross-sectioned transportation (and border crossing) infrastructure, by 
the slow development of post-Soviet state institutions, by the increased defense of 
the eastern borders of the European Union, by the flowering of the black market, 
and by markedly poor public safety. 
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The Competitiveness of the Regions of East-Central Europe 
We conducted research on the regions (NUTS 2) of East-Central Europe by ana-
lysing competitiveness. Our aim was to locate – economic, social and institutional – 
factors that strongly determined the whole of the examined region and its inner 
structure (which would determine its relations to other regions). Furthermore, by 
ranking regions we could make recommendations to improve their position and 
strengthen their competitiveness. 
Readings of theoretical models of competitiveness and related studies contrib-
uted to our research by allowing us to build new elements into our existing model 
(Lengyel 2000 and 2012). Classic labour force productivity and employment cate-
gories were refined, and as a result we moved beyond the factors of research and 
development, of human capital and operating capital to also incorporate parame-
ters related to factors like social capital and the trading sector (branches produc-
ing for exports). 
We compared the NUTS 2 units of eight countries for a total of 93 regions. We 
used 25 variables as a starting point, which we examined by various mathematical-
statistical methods. 
Analysing factors underlying competitiveness like labour productivity and em-
ployment allow us to state that the East-Central Europe area is strongly differenti-
ated and includes a well-defined cleavage. The separation can generally be de-
scribed as a division between the developed western market economies (Germany, 
Austria) on the one hand and the developing regions of East-Central Europe on the 
other. These areas diverge from one another in an unambiguous way. The former 
is characterised by a pairing of high employment with high productivity, while 
regions in the other group are the opposite, where low employment goes hand in 
hand with lower productivity. 
That this area is deeply divided is made visible by clear west–east differences. 
The former socialist countries have a concentration of resources in their capital 
cities and marked differences between their own regions. Thus there are just a 
small number of recognisable developmental zones (series of regions with con-
tinuous development), whereas poorly developed and largely peripheral regions 
are present in large blocks (Figure 3). 
In comparison to the regions of other post-socialist countries the regions of 
Hungary are not in an advantageous situation. Only the Central Hungary and West 
Transdanubia regions display measurable competitiveness, while the other regions 
are lagging behind significantly and fall into the weak competitiveness category. 
This is further confirmed if the key components of competitiveness – as concen-
trated expressions of the analysed factors – are compared with GDP per person; 
these relations are systematised in a two-dimensional diagram (Figure 4). 
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The division in the region is even more pronounced and evident when we 
observe that significant developmental differences have appeared in East-Central 
Europe. Beyond the above-mentioned German and Austrian regions, the cleavage 
was only transgressed by the regions of Prague and Bratislava (among all the 
regions of the post-socialist states).5 The Hungarian capital’s competitiveness is at 
a moderate borderline level and has an advantageous specific GDP. The West 
Transdanubia and Central Transdanubia regions have GDPs that approach the 
average, but with low competitiveness. This holds even more true for the rest of 
the Hungarian regions, which are ranked more in the middle than in the lower end 
of the underdeveloped sector. 
 
Figure 3. The competitiveness of the regions of East-Central Europe 
Source: Lengyel (2012, p. 214). 
                                                                        
5 The latest regional-level GDP data confirm this result. Of the European Union’s 20 most de-
veloped regions the Bratislava region (Bratislavsky kraj) is at 178% of the EU average and 
ranks fifth, while the Prague regions (Praha) reached 175% of the EU average in 2009 and 
ranked seventh. 
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Figure 4. The relationship between the key components of competitiveness and economic 
development (GDP per person) 
Source: Lengyel (2012, p. 215). 
Further studies – inner analyses on factors affecting competitiveness – came to 
the conclusion that two factors define a region’s position in competitiveness 
ranking. The first can be called human capital – this factor includes the develop-
ment of the labour force, the ability to attract labourers and the existence of 
patents – that strongly divides the grand area but gives a subtler picture when 
differentiated. Among the Hungarian regions the two mentioned above (West and 
Central Transdanubia) are similar to the Czech and Polish border regions. The 
other Hungarian regions lag far behind and are similar to peripheral Romanian and 
Polish border regions. The other factor is that of research and development – 
research and development spending, proportion of workers in the high-tech sec-
tor, accumulation of capital assets, winning framework programmes – that sym-
bolises the knowledge-based economy and the presence of innovative sectors. 
These factors are better spread across the East-Central European region. In this 
mushroom-shaped division the Hungarian regions lag further behind primarily the 
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Czech but also the Polish regions. The analysis confirms the Hungarian – but also 
East-Central European – specificity whereby the capital city is markedly different 
from the rest of the regions – in our case Budapest’s situation is clear – and values 
here are closer to those of the Western European region, or to the “head” of the 
mushroom. The “stem” is a lagging group in which we find a block of Hungarian 
regions, signifying that their research potential is disadvantageous and as such 
their competitiveness in East-Central Europe is markedly weak. 
Summary of the Experiment 
Researchers’ interest in East-Central Europe has grown over the past few years. 
The reason for this is that the majority of countries in this region has joined or will 
soon join the European Union, and as such have become members of the European 
economic space and political community. Transition in the economy has been 
completed – though we encounter numerous corrections, new solutions and ex-
periments – in these countries, but the spatial structure transformation has been 
slow to be initiated. Existing differences and anomalies are yet to be dismantled. 
An increasing number of signs point to the fact that territorial processes have not 
sped up. We cannot register cohesion and equalisation which are European politi-
cal expectations. 
We can observe a development level split between western and eastern regions 
within the countries in question. Generally the capital cities and wider agglomera-
tion regions have high concentration of resources and stand out in terms of their 
country’s income generation and human potential. Beyond the capital cities only 
some large cities and regional centres are able to produce faster dynamic, largely 
those in which progressive branches capable of producing for the world market 
(e.g., vehicular, electronics industries) have undergone renewal, or where such 
branches recently took root, and where transportation processes are multifaceted. 
Among provincial regions built around smaller centres only those able to utilise or 
transform tourism advantages or unique agricultural cultures have seen conver-
gence beginning. These regions can successfully participate in integration pro-
cesses. We can further observe the gathering momentum of border-area relations 
and manifestations of forms thereof [e.g., macro-regional development strategies 
(Danube Strategy), construction of organisational systems (Euroregions), creation 
of new institutional frameworks (EGTC)] and the spread of spheres of influence 
and the attraction of large cities located near national borders to cross-border 
areas. This trend is getting more and more pronounced. 
The region as a whole is deeply divided. It is clear that the spatial structure 
manifestations of the processes mentioned above affect specific countries in dif-
ferent ways. There are some where territorial development is more even, while 
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others have long-term and divisive structures having been developed. Competition 
between the countries and regions of East-Central Europe is increasingly visible 
and is actually further fuelled by the drawn out economic crisis and its effects, 
along with the diverging reactions to it. 
Research on the geopolitical situation, the economic and social structure, the 
institutional systems and most importantly the spatial structure (settlement 
network) of East-Central Europe is necessary and indispensable. This study ought 
to be seen as a way to increase interest and spark debate. 
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 DIFFERENTIATED FORMS OF EUROPEAN TERRITORIAL 
CO-OPERATION: A CASE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 
STRATEGY FOR THE DANUBE REGION 
Tamás Kaiser 
Introduction 
Cohesion policy, as always, has once again proved to be an “experimental labora-
tory” for developing and testing the future public policy system of the EU, even if 
its relations with the prevailing competitiveness strategy, the so-called “Lisbon 
Decade” and the following Europe 2020 (thereafter EU 2020) are analysed. The 
preparation process for the next programming period (2014–2020) was linked to 
the harmonisation of territorial development policies, an exclusive competence 
exercised by member states, and to a strong intention to form common principles, 
priorities and actions for establishing the post-2013 cohesion policy in the 
framework of the Territorial Agenda 2020 (thereafter TA 2020) as one of the key 
strategic development policy documents. Answers to challenges in a changing 
environment and new paradigms can be traced back to the necessity of rescaling 
territory usage and, as a consequence, to a growing demand for cross-border, 
international and macro-regional co-operation initiatives. Thus, thanks to the 
Lisbon Treaty, the acquis on the concept of territorial cohesion meant the most 
essential pillar of this new place-based development paradigm and the most sig-
nificant intersection of competitiveness and solidarity (Ágh et al. 2013, Ágh et al. 
2011, Mendez et al. 2011, Notre Europe 2011). 
Debates on the meaning of territorial cohesion defined vigorously the prepara-
tion process of the post-2013 cohesion policy. However, the issue of the influence 
of territorial dimension in the EU 2020 has remained open as it has also been 
equivocal whether the “benevolent negligence” of the first half of the “Lisbon 
Decade” would dominate without taking account of its well-known consequences 
and correction mechanisms (Ágh – Vértes 2010, Ágh 2011, Copeland – Papadi-
mitriou 2012). Although, according to the starting point of this paper, post-2013 
cohesion policy planning made flying start in the first half of 2007 and was linked 
closely to the steady improvement of the review of strategic orientations for Euro-
pean territorial development, it was not able to have a significant impact on the 
preparation process of the EU 2020. In addition, territorial dimension has ap-
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peared in differentiated forms in the draft legislative package on cohesion policy 
issued on 6 October 2011, especially within one of its core objectives, the relatively 
low-budget and “top-down driven” European Territorial Co-operation (ETC). Func-
tional macro-regions (FMRs), partly emerging due to this objective, represent 
several elements of the overall but differentiated concept of territorial cohesion, 
while establishing distinct co-ordinative and co-operative forms of multi-level 
governance (MLG) through the process of implementation that broadens the scope 
of practical understanding of territorial governance.1 
The EU 2020 and the Territorial Dimension: The “Lisbon Paradox” Repeats 
Itself?  
The preparation of the TA 2020 and the post-2013 cohesion policy went hand in 
hand from 2007 to 2009, so a favourable environment was created in order to 
develop the post-Lisbon (EU 2020) strategy trying to address some of the main 
shortcomings of its predecessor. However, the problem to be solved cannot be 
regarded as a brand-new one. Already in 2005, policy papers and debates gener-
ated by the re-launch of the Lisbon Strategy made it clear that one of the main 
bottlenecks – the so-called “Lisbon paradox” – was the extreme neglect of the 
territorial dimension in spite of the fact that regions and cities participated in 
almost each and every policy field of the Lisbon Strategy. However they hardly 
experienced that the strategy would contribute to regional or local development. It 
is underlined that in the EU27 average, more than 66% of regional and local 
stakeholders take part in the realisation of public investments (Committee of the 
Regions 2008). Overcoming this paradox is one of the main preconditions of 
reaching the Lisbon targets, not to mention that it has a great chance of being a key 
element in defining the framework of the post-2013 cohesion policy as well. 
Nevertheless, the end of the “Lisbon Decade” was quickly approaching and that 
called for urgent action, with a consequence that the first version of the EU 2020 
came before the European Council on 3 March 2010, after a relatively short consul-
tation period. Thus, the decision of the informal meeting of General Directors par-
ticipating in the European Territorial Agenda held in Seville on May 10 emphasised 
the importance of strengthening the common goals of growth policy and those of 
territorial development (“Territory matters” 2010). Interestingly, reforms of the 
TA 2020 slowed down in this period, as the European Commission, following the 
adopted legislative calendar of the EU, was to prepare the Fifth Report on Eco-
                                                                        
1 This paper is supported by the “New forms of multi-level governance in the European 
Union and Hungary” four-year research project (OTKA ID: 81553). 
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nomic, Social and Territorial Cohesion in connection with thepost-2013 cohesion 
policy (EC 2010).  
The final approval of the TA 2020 under the Hungarian Presidency happened in 
a period characterised by a significant progress in negotiations regarding cohesion 
policy and the Multiannual Financial Framework 2014–2020. In order to clarify the 
correspondence between growth and cohesion, the Polish Presidency published a 
detailed analysis based on the TA 2020 concerning the possibilities of strengthen-
ing the territorial dimension of the EU 2020 and other EU and national policies. 
The report clearly indicates that no serious attempt has so far been made to link 
them effectively, so it is a real possibility that the “Lisbon paradox” will repeat 
itself in the new programming period. To avoid this, six priorities of the TA 2020 
were compared with the three objectives of the EU 2020 in a double-entry matrix 
(Böhme et al. 2011, p. 6). The final outcome indicates that synergic effects can be 
anticipated in the case of smart growth with almost all TA 2020 priorities, while 
sustainable and inclusive growth do not show direct correspondence with territo-
rial strategy in five cases. The report consequentially lists the linking issues of the 
EU 2020 and the TA 2020 strategies, which form the following five groups, termed 
territorial keys: accessibility, services of general economic interests, territorial 
capacities/endowments/assets, city networking, and functional regions. 
In the light of these factors, the report formulated three main proposals for 
strengthening the territorial dimension. Firstly, the concept of territorial cohesion 
should be applied in the definition of the objectives of the Structural Funds and in 
the implementation criteria as well. Secondly, ex-ante conditionality should be 
secured especially in order to examine and properly outline the EU 2020 strategy-
strengthening specific characteristics of a given territory. And thirdly, it should be 
essential to mainstream a specific principle called “strengthening territorial 
dimension” among the thematic priorities of cohesion policy, which could replace 
the assistance for geographically disadvantaged territories with a place-based 
paradigm grounded on the regional differences in the accessibility of specific re-
sources, growth potential and vulnerability even within the same country. 
All in all, the formal recognition of the territorial dimension brought about the 
precondition for providing better complementarity and synergy between various 
EU policies. It was likely to happen between 2007 and 2009 when cohesion policy 
planning and the review of the European territorial development strategy went 
hand in hand. However, it is still a real danger that the current economic and finan-
cial crisis will result in the continuing of the Lisbon paradox that inevitably deep-
ens the inequalities between the regions. Further, reducing investments in devel-
oping competitiveness and innovation may result in a vicious circle: growth will 
not be able to increase cohesion and measures of crisis-management to maintain 
cohesion will limit sources available for competitiveness. 
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In order to estimate how many of the preliminary proposals made in the prepa-
ration process of the post-2013 cohesion policy have been realised, it is worth 
examining the appearance of territorial dimension in practice within the frame-
work of the draft legislative package. 
The Appearance of the Territorial Dimension in the post-2013 Cohesion 
Policy 
The above-mentioned debates and working documents significantly contributed to 
the fact that thematic priorities of the EU 2020 strategy became strongly high-
lighted in the draft legislative package within the scope of the two core objectives: 
(1) Investment for Growth and Jobs (IGJ); and (2) European Territorial Co-opera-
tion (ETC). On the contrary, many questions arise regarding the interpretation of 
territorial dimension, and respecting the operational elements of its planning and 
implementation.2 
Community-led Local Development (CLLD) is based on integrated, multi-
sectorial, area-based, and sub-regional (cities, districts, urban-rural territories, and 
cross-border functional areas) strategies supported by a co-ordinated assistance of 
several funds and led by local action groups similar to those of the LEADER 
methodology. Integrated Territorial Investments (ITI) allow to bundle funding 
from several priority axes of one or more operative programmes  for the purposes 
of urban development and other local intervention. 
However, concerns have been raised about these new programming tools 
(Mendez et al. 2011). Many fear that the thematic objectives of the EU 2020 will 
significantly overwrite territorial dimension and blur the basic elements of the 
catching-up which could result in sectorial OPs suppressing regional ones. Besides, 
the compulsory application of CLLD or ITI tools and their “top-down” approach 
have not much in common with the original sense of cohesion policy, which could 
thus become more and more fragmented by a stronger presence of the so-called 
“earmarking”. Sustainable Urban Development, funded by the European Regional 
Development Fund (ERDF), doubts that cities listed in the Partnership Contracts 
have sufficient institutional and administrational capacity to manage ITI or any 
other integrated initiatives. CLLD programmes seem to be rather deficient from 
the angle of territorial claims, selection criteria, and implementation timetables; 
furthermore, it is also improbable that using the methodology of LEADER con-
tributes to the EU 2020 goals. 
                                                                        
2 The main findings of this sub-chapter builds on the draft legislative package on post-2013 
cohesion policy. 
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The role of cohesion policy in the support of territorial co-operations as a main 
pillar of territorial cohesion is first of all the construction of energy and transport 
networks, immigration management, the defence of the outer borders, environ-
mental security and the stimulation of economic relations. A model experimental 
programme of such formations is unfolding under the emerging FMRs, namely the 
European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBR) and the European 
Union Strategy for the Danube Region (EUSDR). 
In the first programme planning phase it turned out that the geographical di-
mensions and the development priorities of the macro-regions mostly overlapped 
traditional macro-regional co-operation projects; like the cases of EUSBR, some 
objectives of the Baltic Sea Region Programme 2007–2013 (environmental protec-
tion, supporting business environment), and its flagship initiatives show. Ongoing 
programmes of the aforementioned strategies are realised mostly by sources from 
the Structural Funds. However, the utilisation of these funds cannot be considered 
untroubled as they – especially the European Social Fund (ESF) – are not suitable 
for specific macro-regional development initiatives. Adapting the multi-criteria 
system and the proceedings of cohesion policy to macro-regional strategies is also 
problematic, particularly on the subject of thematic priorities, entitlement and the 
extent of allocation. Nevertheless, not only mobilising and involving external 
sources of finance, donor organisations, international monetary institutions, and 
individual capital, but also securing essential institutional and administrative ca-
pacities seem to be the greatest challenges. 
The guidelines of the draft post-2013 cohesion policy bottlenecks the proper 
funding of macro-regional strategies since even ETC regulations mention macro-
regions only in the context of transnational co-operation. Although the Commis-
sion would increase the ETC support from 2.5% to 3.5%, this apparently restricts 
the opportunities of macro-regions as this is still the lowest budget objective in the 
system of cohesion policy. If there are strong intentions for implementing macro-
regional strategies by means of growing cohesion sources, then naming macro-
regional priorities in ERDF regulation should be considered, or earmarked 
resources should be separated via a more radical solution. 
This problem arises regarding thematic concentration as well. According to 
draft guidelines, transnational and cross-border initiatives have to focus on only 
four thematic priorities of the EU 2020 strategy. This concept not only disregards 
the special situation of co-operation programmes that are based on at least two 
national approaches, but also makes it almost impossible to finance several macro-
regional objectives, leaving these latter ones to donor organisations. Thus, a 
“patchwork financing” may evolve that encumbers the realisation of the priorities 
of macro-regional strategies in a common framework. The ETC interpreting macro-
regional priorities as a horizontal approach to the four thematic objectives, or 
Differentiated Forms of European Territorial Co-operation 371 
ensuring more flexible conditions during the selection process of thematic objec-
tives may be possible solutions. On 26 July 2012, the General Affairs Council 
agreed on a proposal advising that 80% of the programme expenditure should 
cover the four thematic objectives, and the 20% remainder could be used á la carte 
as participants wish. This recommendation can anticipate a remarkable achieve-
ment in harmonising macro-regional strategies throughout planning the Instru-
ment for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) and European Neighbourhood and Part-
nership Instrument (ENPI). 
The concept of the FMR clearly shows that territorial co-operation is a major 
tool to achieve territorial cohesion, not only in the form of co-ordinating planning, 
but also by co-ordinating development in various public policy sectors. Neverthe-
less, it is important to raise the question whether the integrated approach brings a 
truly innovative and effective method with respect to the new place-based para-
digm. In this case emphasis falls on the introduction of the practice of MLG which 
has been present in EU literature for over a decade and a half, with a decisive role. 
New Forms of Governance in the Making: Enhanced Co-ordination in the 
EUSDR Process 
The EUSDR was confirmed by the GAC on 13 April 2011. The formal decision of 
support took place in the European Council on 24 June 2011. This made it step into 
the implementation phase, which raised the necessity of creating a special type of 
governance. The institutional structure based on the Action Plan clearly follows the 
pattern of the EUSBR (EC 2009). However, at this point it is useful to remind 
ourselves that the practical functioning of governance is the co-ordination and 
steering of co-operating sectorial policies. Co-ordination includes capacity-building 
and mobilisation, various forms of problem solving and conflict management; 
adaptation and learning may also be mentioned here. As a result, governance 
exercised in a perpetually changing environment exists in the innovative forms of 
co-ordination and capacity-building under the conditions of a necessary “institu-
tional consensus”.  
Practically it leads to the emergence of the vertical and horizontal dimensions 
of the MLG built on the relation systems of “geographical space” and “functional 
spaces”. The latter ones are built on the interdependences and relations of actors – 
e.g. in the case of the business sphere or the civil sector – whose scope of action 
does not necessarily coincide with geographically delineated areas. In addition, a 
number of empirical analyses have shown that territorial embeddedness and geo-
graphical proximity may be regarded as important catalysts with respect to reach-
ing the optimal “institutional thickness” in an area (Sykes – Show 2008, Koller 
2012). So the most important distinguishing feature of MLG from governance in 
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general lies in the territorial nature of its functioning and, through this, its integra-
tion of a large number of stakeholders. It may basically be grasped as territorial 
governance that allows for more task-specific jurisdictions, with tailored member-
ship and a flexible design, more likely to be found in cross-border regions and 
widespread on the local level (Marks – Hooghe 2004, p. 29).  
When discussing perspectives for 2013/2014 at the overall level of the EUSDR, 
it should be considered that further implementation requires both an evaluation of 
a “state of play” of the current governance structure as well as the established 
“next steps” towards an enhanced territorial/regional development co-operation 
in the area.3 
Strategic, policy-level co-ordination is done by the experts of Priority Area Co-
ordinators (PACs), National Contact Points (NCPs), and the European Council.4 The 
task of the NCPs is the co-ordination of national level civic administration 
organisations involved in the implementation; they also provide advice and 
information. National partners do play an important role in embedding the EUSDR 
into the domestic context, but mutual exchange between NCPs about good practice 
and “failures” would be also very useful. Two important elements of strategy co-
ordination are reporting and evaluation. Responsibility for these is mainly held by 
the Commission, in partnership with PACs and other stakeholders.  
In order to promote the efficiency of implementation and vertical co-
ordination, Steering Groups are organised under all 11 PACs on the principle of 
wide-range stakeholder involvement and partnership. The Steering Groups also 
make up a platform for the definition of common priorities and targets and the 
related debates. The point of departure is clearly the pinpointing of actors and 
projects relevant for the EUSDR. The biggest task, however, is the ranking of the 
submitted projects, which serves as a “letter of recommendation” for the donor 
organisations. This of course does not guarantee the outcome of the decision; all 
projects must undergo the evaluation process set up by the donor organisation. 
This also means that PACs do not run selection and evaluation mechanisms 
parallel to funding bodies, but provide professional assistance to applicants so that 
they are able to meet conditions prescribed by the Structural Funds and National 
Financial Institutions. So both PACs and Steering Groups do play a crucial role 
during the implementation phase, in particular in providing platforms for debate/ 
co-operation among “multiplayers” and stimulating co-ordination/co-operation on 
key issues/actions. 
                                                                        
3 In this sub-chapter I heavily relied on Priority Area Co-ordinators’ annual reports for 2012. 
4 An important milestone in the implementation of the EUSDR was the first joint meeting of 
PACs, NCPs and the European Commission, held in Gödöllő during the Hungarian 
Presidency in May 2011. 
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Flexibility for PACs to adapt their work to the specific context of the given 
priority area and of the partners involved has to be ensured. In addition, the scope 
and possibilities to co-operate on single projects differ among priority areas. Flag-
ship project leaders are the major actors in implementation, monitoring and feed-
back on the one hand and on the other hand they actively contribute to the search 
for co-operation partners and funding opportunities together with the NCPs and 
the Steering Groups. As a result, member states that are involved in the implemen-
tation of the particular project, non-EU member states and regions are mainly 
responsible for the implementation. This ensures high levels of ownership in the 
course of implementation, which is complemented by the policy-level facilitator 
and co-ordination role of the European Commission. 
Horizontal and at the same time operative co-ordination is performed by the 
LabGroup (set up in March 2011) jointly with the INTERACT programme. Their 
activities are centred around the facilitation, co-ordination and creation of the 
required communication surfaces. The task of the LabGroup as an informal think 
tank is to be the “missing link” between the PACs, the Steering Groups, and poten-
tial funding bodies (Structural Funds, IPA and ENPI programmes, International 
Financing Institutions) (Novello 2011, p. 4). Their activity is largely built on the 
experience of the ETC and the EUSBR. The most important point here is that the 
Action Plan must be translated into operative measures, determining the contents 
of the various phases of the policy-making process on the one hand and ensuring 
access to different funding sources on the other.  
Last but not least, the “roof” of the High Level Group, consisting of high-ranking 
officials of member states, is placed over vertical and horizontal co-ordination as 
territorial governance. An imaginary horizontal counterpoint, an Annual Forum is 
organised by the Commission (similarly to the EUSBR) to discuss and evaluate 
planned or implemented actions. 
Looking at the emerging EUSDR-governance arrangements, it seems to be still a 
transition period when modalities of specific governance are currently invented 
and tested. This process requires time, and a high sense of pragmatism should be 
important in this respect. In any case, implementation arrangements have to 
remain flexibly adaptable to contexts, must not be too rigidly pre-defined and 
could not be organised along the logic of funding programmes only. 
Concluding Remarks 
A clear paradigm-shift has occurred in cohesion policy since 2007: in addition to 
traditional convergence priorities, targets of competitiveness have emerged. This 
has led to many distortions in the present (2007–2013) programming period while 
original Lisbon objectives have been realised to minimal levels. In the light of this, 
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it is doubtful or at least uncertain if the planning and implementation of cohesion 
policy, as a tool for the EU 2020 strategy that replaces the Lisbon strategy, may be 
completed free of the errors of the former period: mostly the phenomenon that 
competitiveness programmes are too sector-specific and do not give proper con-
sideration to their territorial dimensions. 
At the same time it is a major lesson learned in the past decade that the co-ordi-
nation of cohesion and growth targets requires great efforts. Economic and social 
cohesion are specific EU targets; it is therefore unwise to create the impression 
that in a new global context only growth has ways of improving cohesion and for-
get that cohesion may also usher in growth. 
Despite the fact that preliminary professional materials and the TA 2020 
strategy place heavy emphasis on the importance of the territorial approach, not 
much is mentioned in the proposals for EU 2020 and cohesion policy about how 
the territorial approach should be carried out in practice. There is also an existing 
danger that the thematic priorities for the implementation of EU 2020 may push 
the territorial dimension and cohesion into the background. The Commission, the 
member states and regions must make it clear how to apply the integrated ap-
proach of territorial development in planning and execution. It must also be clari-
fied how the territorial approach is put into practice in a system still dominated by 
EU 2020 objectives. Without this, territorial policy strategy approaches may well 
be pushed into the background and emphasis might fall on public policies mixed 
with sub-regional and local developments. 
It is yet unclear whether macro-regional strategies embodying several aspects 
of specified integration truly represent a more effective organisational form than 
pre-existing inter-governmental institutions in the given region or they only sup-
plement the tools of cohesion policy. The third case may be that of a quite con-
scious duplication where projects supported by cohesion policy and other national 
resources in fact co-finance developments based on macro-region strategies. 
Macro-regions in this latter approach may be interpreted as partially overlapping 
interregional networks of functional units. This in turn clearly indicates the im-
portance of an institutional framework that can handle co-ordination and conflict 
management, is able to co-ordinate efforts and to manage conflicts arising from the 
nature of public policies and stakeholders’ special interests. 
The creation of macro-regions is an organic part of the new territorial para-
digm, an important element of which is an integrated and functional approach that 
intersects public administrative borders. A new, bottom-down integrated place-
based form of MLG may be named territorial governance, to use previously 
existing terminology. Territorial governance in this sense is a tool for the 
realisation of territorial cohesion in which highly institutionalised, hierarchical and 
looser, network-based co-ordination forms of governance coexist. In sum, macro-
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regions as a new form of territorial governance have already come into existence, 
but all is changing with respect to post-2013 cohesion policy and everyone is 
looking for its place in the system. Nevertheless, it should be by the end of this 
year. 
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 INDUSTRIAL RESTRUCTURING IN CENTRAL AND 
SOUTH-EASTERN EUROPE: DIFFERENCE OF DEGREE 
OR KIND? 
Gábor Lux 
Introduction 
The territory of post-socialist Europe is a space fragmented by old (historical) and 
recent (post-socialist) divisions. The frameworks of integration and directions of 
orientation have changed multiple times within one century, but there are also 
long-running differences which continue to affect development processes. Like all 
macro-regions of Europe, overall development trends are characterised by strong 
path-dependency, and are formed by socio-economic as well as political condi-
tions.  
The first decade of post-socialist transformation was characterised by a sharp 
increase in territorial disparities at both national and sub-national levels. Some 
catching-up has taken place in the Visegrad countries and Slovenia, while the 
process has been more protracted in Romania and Bulgaria, and especially in some 
Western Balkan states where transformation-related recession was coupled with 
the destruction and other economic consequences of the war, leading to 
accelerated de-industrialisation in states involved in long conflicts (Vojnić 1994). 
Of the increase in national and sub-national differences, the first one has proven to 
be the more significant. 
In reviews of the post-socialist transition process, the question of the region’s 
peripheral situation in Europe is often discussed: Sokol (2001) places the whole of 
post-socialist Europe on a geographical and economic “super-periphery”, but, in 
respect of its internal division, considers the Western Balkans as favourably placed 
(next to Central Europe) in comparison with the Soviet successor states. Both 
Sokol and Petrakos (2002) emphasise that the “creative destruction” of production 
systems was not always followed by substantial recovery. Bartlett (2009) suggests 
that Slovenia and, to some extent, Croatia have successfully integrated into the 
European economic order as peripheral actors, whilst other Western Balkan states 
have remained on the super-periphery. Similar questions are raised with respect 
to Romania and Bulgaria as well. 
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In this paper, I examine the industrial development of South-Eastern Europe 
from a comparative perspective, in contrast with the development processes seen 
in the Visegrad states. De-industrialisation and disintegration, as well as reindus-
trialisation and reintegration processes will be studied. My main question con-
cerns the nature of development: if we consider both Central and South-Eastern 
Europe a part of the European periphery, are the two showing the same processes 
in industrial development, or are the models fundamentally different? Can we 
speak of a simple development lag (difference of degree), or do the differences 
amount to something qualitatively different (difference of kind)? The answers to 
these questions have far-reaching implications for both the region itself and to 
broader Europe. 
Patterns of De-industrialisation 
The fall of industrial production and employment as well as the tertiarisation of 
the economic structure have played a considerable role in post-socialist spatial 
restructuring. These processes were not entirely specific to transition countries, as 
they had also taken place in Europe’s core regions as well as on its southern 
periphery; however, the main differences could be found in the extent of structural 
problems, as well as in the new conditions of systemic change. Without the 
financial and political capital to undertake complex restructuring strategies, the 
main feature of the transition was passive, market-led adaptation, instead of active, 
policy-driven intervention, accompanied by a territorially uneven tertiarisation 
process widening both national and sub-national disparities – where higher 
tertiarisation did not automatically correspond to a higher level of development 
(Lux 2010). 
In the period immediately following 1990, all states in Central Europe 
experienced a fall in industrial employment, but the loss of industry over the two-
decade transition period differed significantly among national economies (Figure 
1). Long-term decline was much less prevalent in the North-Western than in the 
South-Eastern states. These differences can be traced back not just to the common 
features of transformation-related recession, but also to historical factors; 
underdeveloped states were more affected by the destructive forms of de-
industrialisation, whilst they saw fewer of its advantages. While the Visegrad 
countries, Slovenia and, to an extent, Croatia could reorient their economies to 
western export markets, transformation recession was particularly severe in 
Serbia, Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In Romania, the GDP share of industry 
declined from 46.2% in 1989 to 25.2% in 2000. 
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Figure 1. Employment changes in industry and construction, 1990–2008 (%) 
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks and EUROSTAT. 
In the former Yugoslavia, the continuing impact of the war forms a particular 
feature of industrial transition: isolationist tendencies which had already been 
apparent before 1990 got greatly strengthened in the course of nation-building, 
and the impact of this conflict could also be felt in the destruction of physical and 
human capital. The collapse of the federal market weakened regional specialisation 
and contributed to the disintegration of product chains, hampering the reorganisa-
tion of economic relations and, ultimately, the entire transition process (Vojnić 
1994, Schönfelder 2005, Miletić 2006, Bartlett 2009, Gulyás 2009, Mezei 2010). 
The war had caused lasting damage in the institutional and human milieus under-
pinning industry, which are now crucial components in higher forms of industrial 
competitiveness. In addition to casualties, we must mention losses due to dis-
placement and mass migration, even long breaks in the production of industrial 
complexes. These situations are similar to long-term unemployment, leading to the 
decay of professional skills, technical know-how, and the ability to work, and con-
sequently, to destructive de-industrialisation patterns. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
much of the arms and chemical industry was destroyed or dismantled; in 1996, 
only 10% of the pre-war industrial capacities of the now-divided state were in 
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operation, and the projected post-war recovery did not materialise – the condi-
tions for industrial development were no longer present. 
A second difference of industrial transition can be seen in broader South-
Eastern Europe. In the early phase of transformation, the absence of a tertiary 
sector, which could provide employment during the shift from industry to services, 
led to a temporary surge in the role of agriculture as a source of self-sustenance: 
post-traditional ruralisation (Kovács 2003) took place. The temporary spread of 
subsistence farming could be seen in all countries except Croatia, the FYR 
Macedonia and Slovenia, and was most significant in Albania where, according to 
data from Petrakos and Totev (2000), it grew from 38 to 55% of the GDP between 
1990 and 1995, while industry saw a drop from 48 to 22%. Nevertheless, as 
Büschenfeld (1999) proves, tertiarisation was both more significant and more 
long-lasting in the region. At the sub-national level, the harshest examples of de-
industrialisation (close to total collapse) were seen in Bosnia-Herzegovina, North-
Eastern Montenegro, Southern Serbia, North-Eastern Macedonia and Kosovo; later 
research on labour markets have shown a very limited return towards the formal 
economy (Bartlett 2009, Zeković 2009). 
The Regional Restructuring of Industry 
As the previous section has shown, the processes of de-industrialisation affected 
the entire space of post-socialist South-Eastern Europe, but their degree, not to 
mention the real meaning (the effect on development and regional competitive-
ness), varied widely. This part of the paper aims to distinguish the differentiating 
role of industry at the level of country groups (North-Western vs. South-Eastern) 
and regions (among different region types) on the basis of cross-sectional data. 
This image, of course, has to consider gaps in data, differing methodologies in 
available sources1, the role of informal employment, and transfers from immigrant 
workers that can amount to 40–50% of the labour force in some countries, with a 
significant effect on representativeness. For these reasons, industry plays a slightly 
less, while services a greater role than may be apparent from the following statis-
tics. 
The results of two decades of industrial restructuring are shown in Figure 2. 
During this period, de-industrialisation processes had redrawn industrialisation 
differences among countries, whilst they had had a comparatively weaker effect on 
sub-national structures. The most relevant change is the realignment of the 
dividing line between the Visegrad and South-Eastern country groups. 
                                                                        
1 For instance, Serbian employment figures treat the small enterprise sector (about 26% of 
all employees) separately from larger companies. 
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Figure 2. The share of employment in industry and construction in Central Europe, 1990 and 
2008 (%) 
Note: Regional data for Serbia are from 2009.  
Source: Author’s construction based on national statistical yearbooks, EUROSTAT and Ser-
bian employment statistics. 
In 1990, industrialisation in the South-East exceeded that in the North-West due to 
extensive development campaigns; the ratio of industrial employment was the 
highest, in descending order, in Romania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria (in the first and 
last, the severe underdevelopment of the service sector, and in Yugoslavia, steep 
unemployment played a part). This industrialisation did not correspond to a high 
development level; it had in fact led to the establishment of capacities which had 
already been obsolete and inefficient at the time of their foundation, and, con-
sequently, meant exposure to the subsequent crises. A high level of industrial 
employment had simultaneously existed in relatively advanced core regions as 
well as in newly industrialised peripheries. By 2008, the macro-regional dividing 
lines had been redrawn, and the emerging structure reflects the outcome of a long 
and varied transformation process: the decline of transformation recession, the 
long-term restructuring of industry through creative and not-so-creative destruc-
tion, as well as the slow reindustrialisation and industrial reorganisation processes 
generated by the spread of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). As already seen in 
Figure 1, the South-Eastern countries had seen a much worse industrial decline 
than those in the Visegrad group, whilst the inflow of FDI remained much more 
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limited. A significant share of industrial capacity was lost without any chance to 
rebuild it. 
The major concentrations of industry are found, on the one hand, in a “Central 
European manufacturing core” (based mostly on machine industry), and in a lesser 
zone covering industrial centres in Southern Transylvania (Romania) and Serbia. 
Both of these regions have traditions stretching back to before World War One. 
The second is in a less advantageous position, struggling with serious structural 
problems and characterised by the greater presence of capacities in the light and 
food industry sectors. Even so, it is in a relatively favourable position in South-
Eastern Europe, since its surviving professional milieux, knowledge and institu-
tions can provide better conditions for new investment than the areas which, 
through long de-industrialisation, have lost much or all of this potential. 
The differences between the Visegrad group and the South-East are also 
illustrated in Table 1. In South-Eastern countries, the contribution of industry is 
much lower in the production of Gross Value Added than in the more developed 
North-West, while agriculture has a stronger role. If we only look at the sig-
nificance of industry, it becomes apparent that there is a similarity between these 
South-Eastern states and the EU average. Naturally, this is not a structural 
equivalence, but rather a sign pointing to the lack of competitive industry. By 
contrast, the Visegrad group’s strong industrial specialisation shows some similari-
ty to the economic development of Southern Germany (Czirfusz 2007, Paas – Sepp 
– Scannel 2010), although there is a development lag in modern, high value added 
service activities if compared with advanced EU economies. 
The differences in industrial growth may be seen not just at sectoral, but also at 
regional level. The most successful locations of European reintegration are capital 
cities and their agglomerations, and, to a much lesser extent, the regional centres 
whose economy is mainly tertiary, but which occupy favourable positions in 
advanced industrial functions (Pavlaković-Koči – Pejnović 2005, Zeković – Spasić – 
Maričić 2007, Zivanovic 2009, Rácz 2011, Faragó – Rácz 2011). Old industrial 
regions (mining areas, heavy industrial and some processing industrial centres) 
are still struggling with problems of their mono-functional economic structure, 
persistent social ills and the inadequacy of investment (Stiperski – Lončar 2008, 
Spasić – Jokić – Maričić 2009, Marot 2010). The most significant problems are, 
however, concentrated in traditional peripheries and some former conflict zones 
where the collapse of socialist industry has resulted in a “post-industrial vacuum” 
– an economy without modern productive or service functions. As Hardi (2011) 
notes, poverty, low education levels and depopulation (due to migration into large 
cities and abroad) are persistent in these areas, and only centres with advanced 
light or food processing industry experience development. 
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Table 1. The sectoral structure of Gross Value Added (GVA), 2007–2008 (%) 
Country Agriculture, 
forestry and 
fisheries 
(NACE A–B) 
Industry 
(NACE C–E) 
Construction 
(NACE F) 
Services 
(NACE G–Q) 
Albania 19 9 15 57 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 9 21 6 64 
Bulgaria 7 22 9 62 
Croatia 6 20 8 65 
Czech Republic 2 31 7 60 
Hungary 4 25 5 67 
Macedonia 11 26 7 56 
Montenegro 9 14 4 74 
Poland 4 24 8 64 
Romania 8 26 12 55 
Serbia 10 24 5 61 
Slovakia 3 30 8 59 
Slovenia 2 26 8 64 
Visegrad group + Slovenia 3 27 7 63 
South-East 10 20 8 62 
EU27 2 20 6 72 
Source: Author’s calculations and construction based on EUROSTAT. 
Forms of Industrial Reorganisation 
Whilst the decade following the systemic change most often meant the disintegra-
tion of former productive structures, after the turn of the millennium the processes 
of reintegration into the European economic space have gained momentum. In 
reintegration, the common characteristics of Central European industrial develop-
ment have also become typical in South-Eastern Europe: the inflow of FDI, indus-
trial upgrading (the shift from resource-intensive and labour-intensive towards 
scale-intensive production, specialised supplier and, to some extent, science-based 
industrial activities; Guerrieri 1998 and Szalavetz 2012) and the spread of new 
industrial formations supported by public development policy. All of this has taken 
place in different national or sub-national contexts, with strong path-dependency 
between the new processes and the recent or long-standing historical patterns; 
still, there has been no significant decline in regional disparities. 
With the partial exception of Slovenia, FDI has appeared to be the most signifi-
cant factor of reindustrialisation in post-socialist Central Europe, and its location 
decisions have had a far-reaching effect on the spatial structure of industry. In the 
case of South-Eastern Europe, Croatia enjoyed an advantageous early position; 
other states could only benefit from the second, post-2000 wave of FDI inflows. 
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The effects so far have been less significant than in the Visegrad country group, 
although a catching-up process is evident (Table 2). There is a definite and strong 
link between FDI inflow and export potential as well as economic performance. 
With a banking sector showing emerging market characteristics (Gál 2011), do-
mestic capital is insufficient to create the conditions for endogenous growth. 
Table 2. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) per capita (USD) 
Country 1995 2000 2005 2008 2011 
Albania 67 80 323 892 1,462 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 293 609 1,607 1,791 
Bulgaria 53 338 1,790 5,804 6,400 
Croatia 106 621 3,275 6,990 7,026 
Czech Republic 712 2,113 5,935 10,906 11,889 
FYR Macedonia 44 269 1,024 2,013 2,291 
Hungary 1,094 2,240 6,058 8,781 8,473 
Montenegro n.a. n.a n.a 5,330 9,178 
Poland 204 894 2,381 4,299 5,158 
Romania 36 313 1,186 3,146 3,281 
Serbia n.a. n.a n.a 1,927 2,321 
Serbia and Montenegro n.a 94 597 n.a n.a. 
Slovakia 242 881 4,368 9,379 9,375 
Slovenia 897 1,457 3,626 7,748 7,442 
Visegrad group + Slovenia 630 1,517 4,474 8,223 8,467 
South-East 51 287 1,258 3,464 4,219 
Source: UNCTAD. 
The industrial areas of the South-East are integrating into the European divi-
sion of labour in different positions. Contrary to the pessimistic expectations of 
Guerrieri (1998) and Sokol (2001), FDI-based growth in post-socialist states did 
not stay restricted to the low wages – low technology model, instead, industrial 
integration has led to a general increase of factor intensity. However, both lower 
and higher value added industrial forms are present. The differences between 
industries which encourage the development of human resources and the spread 
of high technology, and those which represent peripheral modes of integration 
with low technological and knowledge content, are still in danger of preserving or 
even radically increasing development gaps. Regions which can only supply an 
uneducated labour force may not be able to attract high-grade investment or 
benefit from endogenous growth, and may retain their underdevelopment. The 
relevance of these questions for Croatia and Serbia has been discussed in papers 
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by Bartlett (2009), Kovačević (2009) and Campestrin – Clarence (2011). Similar 
dilemmas can be raised with respect to Croatia: apart from a few success stories, 
the external trade deficit was highest in high value added industrial branches and 
lowest in low value added (resource- and labour-intensive) ones. After 1990, even 
previously successful, relatively advanced industries experienced “de-specialisa-
tion”, the loss of their potential competitiveness (Buturac 2009). 
One of the most interesting questions of industrial integration pertains to the 
traditional light industries, especially textiles. They represent a large part of the 
industrial structure in the least developed areas, and are also traditional engines of 
world market integration between core and periphery (Kalantaridis – Slava – 
Sochka 2003, Smith et al. 2005). Industrial co-operation encompassing different 
parts of the value chain has typically integrated producers from South-Eastern 
Europe in smaller production segments, while intermediary functions have often 
been supervised by Greek or Turkish companies operating a form of triangular 
trade (Labrianidis – Kalantaridis 2004). At the turn of the millennium, Yoruk 
(2001) anticipated the increasing coverage of the value chain, but in Bulgaria, 
there were no strong signs of textile companies expanding into higher value added 
production (Evgeniev 2008); and in Croatia, producers focusing on the whole value 
chain have not been more profitable than simple subcontractors (Anić – Rajh – 
Teodorović 2008). 
The long-term perspectives of the reintegration process are heavily influenced 
by the possibilities of knowledge-based development. Here not only innovative 
knowledge-based industries, but even the basic conditions for a functional 
knowledge economy are on a weak footing. Looking at the figures of the World 
Bank’s survey on knowledge-development potential, it is apparent that relative 
performance in both exploiting knowledge (Knowledge Economic Index) and 
potentially useable knowledge (Knowledge Index), as well as their component 
indices show serious underdevelopment (Table 3). In the South-Eastern group of 
post-socialist countries, only the supply of info-communication technologies was in 
a relatively good position. Croatia, although its indicators are somewhat below the 
North-Western group’s average, demonstrates a greater structural similarity to 
them than the South-Eastern states. The low level of achievement in knowledge-
based development mirrors the disruption of the relatively developed Yugoslavian 
research network after the systematic change (Dubarle – Horváth 2011) and the 
general collapse of corporate applied research in broader post-socialist Europe. 
This situation is a long-term development risk: knowledge assimilation and adap-
tation capacity are increasingly relevant in modern industry, and innovation 
increasingly pervades the entire production process. 
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Table 3. Knowledge economy indices in Central and South-Eastern Europe 
Country Knowledge 
Economy 
Index 
(KEI) 
Knowledge 
Index 
(KI) 
Economic 
incentives 
and institu-
tional re-
gime 
Innovation 
system 
Education 
and 
human 
resources 
Info-
communi-
cation 
Albania 4.0 3.9 4.1 2.8 5.0 4.0 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
4.6 4.7 4.3 3.1 5.7 5.2 
Bulgaria 7.0 6.9 7.1 6.4 7.7 6.7 
Croatia 7.3 7.3 7.3 7.7 6.6 7.6 
Czech Republic 8.0 7.9 8.2 7.8 8.2 7.7 
Hungary 8.0 7.9 8.4 8.2 7.7 7.7 
Macedonia 5.6 5.7 5.3 4.7 5.4 6.9 
Poland 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.0 8.0 7.1 
Romania 6.4 6.3 7.0 5.7 6.5 6.6 
Serbia 5.7 6.3 4.0 6.2 5.8 7.0 
Slovakia 7.5 7.4 7.8 6.9 7.3 8.0 
Slovenia 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.3 8.3 7.9 
Visegrad group + 
Slovenia 
7.8 7.8 8.0 7.6 7.9 7.7 
South-East 5.8 5.9 5.6 5.2 6.1 6.3 
EU15 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.8 8.6 8.7 
Source: Author’s calculations and construction based on data from the World Bank’s 
Knowledge Assessment Methodology. 
The industrial policy of the South-Eastern European states follows the typical 
Central European trajectory with some delay. The foundations of capital attraction 
were originally general macroeconomic advantages (investment freedom, the legal 
environment and tax benefits), easy market access and low wages (Radenkovic-
Jocic 2004), and only after a few years following the turn of the millenium did the 
emphasis shift on targeted and network-based system development, whose most 
important instruments, the special economic zones, the industrial estates (parks) 
and clusters have since become generally used as means of reindustrialisation 
(Juhász 2004,  Zeković 2006, 2009,  Zeković – Spasić – Maričić 2007, Komarek 
2010, Molnár 2010). Romania, Croatia and Serbia have built a network of indus-
trial estates covering their entire state territory. The network is more concentrated 
in Serbia where there are 64 units. The national regional development strategy 
also encourages the use of public funds for the establishment of 14 new industrial 
estates in the underdeveloped areas, mainly in Southern Serbia (Strategija Prostor-
nog Razvoja Republike Srbije 2009–2013–2020, 2009). In Croatia, a total of 106 
entrepreneurial zones providing services typical of industrial estates are in opera-
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tion, but an additional 15 free trade zones have also been created near sea-, river- 
and airports as well as at some of the main transport routes (www.zone-
mingorp.hr; Sheane 2006). In Romania, after early bottom-up development, a 2002 
government programme encouraged the development of industrial estates; a 
network developed which had 11 units in 2003 and 65 in 2010, mostly concen-
trated around the capital and in the Western region. However, the range of ser-
vices they offer and their quality have been very limited. 
Summary 
The industrial transformation of South-Eastern Europe after the systemic change 
was characterised by an increase in the already significant territorial differences. 
During the period when the politico–economic space got fragmented, national 
differences proved to be more significant. In sub-national terms, historical 
development gaps and core areas have re-emerged: territories with stronger 
industrial traditions were more resistant to decline and benefited more from 
reindustrialisation than did their peers. Meanwhile, traditional peripheries and 
war zones, which have undergone an industrial collapse, have experienced similar 
forms of decline as the regions struggling with structural crises, and in their case, 
even the long-term potential for rebuilding has been damaged. 
Regions’ dependency on external capital will remain a long-term issue of 
development. In post-socialist countries, where reindustrialisation is closely tied 
to Foreign Direct Investment, its absence or scarcity can preserve underdevelop-
ment, and this can be seen as a potential threat to South-Eastern Europe. This is 
particularly the case if the long-lasting global and European crisis leads to a chillier 
investment climate. Unfortunately, the conditions for knowledge-based industry 
are rather weak outside a few privileged centres (capital cities), and endogenous 
growth strategies cannot count on the sufficient availability of domestic capital in 
the foreseeable future. 
Nevertheless, with the possible exception of South-Eastern Europe’s super-
peripheries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo), the author is of the opinion 
that the differences between the Visegrad group and South-Eastern Europe 
amount to differences of degree: while strongly path-dependent, development 
processes show a sort of convergence, and a slow closing of the development gaps. 
In industrial restructuring, we can see not only the evidence of EU-integration, 
more effective development policy and new investments, but increasingly also the 
movement towards industrial upgrading and higher forms of competitiveness. 
Time heals all wounds – but will we have enough time? 
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 TRANSFERRING THE LEADER MODEL TO NEW 
MEMBER STATES: SUCCESS OR FAILURE? 
Marie-Claude Maurel 
Introduction 
The implementation of a new European policy based on integrated rural develop-
ment is an entirely new experiment in the Central European countries, which for-
merly belonged to the communist system. The paper attempts to explore the con-
ditions and the context in which the Local Development Model is being transferred 
from former member states to new ones, and the way this model was imple-
mented. To examine this issue, we consider the European Union’s LEADER pro-
gramme (an acronym of Liaisons Entre Actions de Développement de l’Economie 
Rurale) which has become the fourth axis of European Rural Policy (2007–2013). 
The LEADER approach is usually presented as an original way of supporting local 
development. How does such a policy model transfer take place and what effects 
does it imply? This paper attempts to assess the institutional context of its recep-
tion, examining the responsiveness of five member states (Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, German New Länder, Lithuania and Poland).1 Does the LEADER model fit the 
interests and the policy preferences of these countries? Our hypothesis is that the 
transfer process and its outcomes will be dependent on the whole “institutional 
opportunity structure” both at national and local levels. Downloading policy to the 
local communities takes place via various hierarchical modes of governance. 
Domestic authorities (or transfer operators) transpose and implement European 
rules and norms which are rather flexible. Looking at the main differences among 
the five countries we are going to explore how the original model is being distorted 
by domestic institutional factors. The LEADER model is experimented in various 
                                                                        
1 The research project “Local Action and Territorial Development in Central Europe” has 
been co-ordinated by Marie-Claude Maurel and Pascal Chevalier. Started in 2008, the 
research project lasted for four years. It has involved several research teams, the Trans-
danubian Research Institue of the Centre for Regional Studies belonging to the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences (Hungary), the Institute for Agriculture and Rural Development in 
Warsaw (Poland), Vilnius University (Lithuania) and the French Research Centre for Social 
Sciences in Prague (Czech Republic) and the Research Centre ART-Dev (UMR5281) in 
Montpellier-Perpignan (France). 
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territorial and social contexts, more or less receptive to this new way of thinking 
and managing local development.2 
A Policy Transfer: Experimenting LEADER in the New Member States 
Our approach focuses on the methods and the effects of transferring a new form of 
public action proposed by the EU to the Central European member states. The 
rationale of transferring the European LEADER model refers explicitly to the con-
ceptual framework defined by the policy transfer studies. For Dolowitz and Marsh, 
policy transfer is understood to mean the process by which the policies and/or 
practices in one political system are fed into and used in the policy-making arena 
of another political system. More exactly, these authors define policy transfer as “a 
process in which knowledge about policies, administrative arrangements, institu-
tions etc. in one time and/or place is used in the development of policies, adminis-
trative arrangements, institutions in another time and/or place” (Dolowitz – Marsh 
1996, p. 344). The latter working definition has to be completed by supplementary 
questions: What is transferred and how is it transferred to the new member 
states? Who are the actors involved in the decision-making of the transferring 
process? How is it operated?  
The transfer cycle extends from the moment when the LEADER model is 
designed to the moment when it is actually implemented. During the whole trans-
fer cycle there is a pluralist configuration of actors, namely EU institutions, mem-
ber states, and local interests. The transfer cycle could be broken down into three 
distinct sequences: selection, transposition, reception.  
In the selection sequence we have to specify what is transferred, namely the 
LEADER model, referring to the specific concept of endogenous development. As a 
source of inspiration, the endogenous model of development took shape in the 
Western member states where various forms of programmes had been first tried 
out. Since its creation the Local Development Model has evolved considerably, both 
in the definition of its objectives and in the regulation mechanisms. These include 
the LEADER initiatives incorporated in European policy. For the period 2007–
2013, it has taken the shape of the fourth axis of the CAP’s second pillar.3 At the su-
pranational level, different European institutions are responsible for the normative 
and funding regulations shaping the LEADER axis of the European Rural Develop-
                                                                        
2 The paper is based on the relevant academic literature, on official national sources and 
field research surveys. It is a cross-national comparative work that takes into account 
national and local variations in order to highlight similarities and differences in the 
transfer of a policy model.  
3 LEADER+ was introduced as a measure during the period 2004–2006 and from 2007 it 
became an axis of the Rural Development Policy. 
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ment Policy (ERDP). The transposition sequence is about how the LEADER model is 
transferred to the 27 member states. Each member state has to transpose the 
second pillar priorities into their national strategic plans. Domestic authorities 
download the guiding principles and adapt them to their own juridical and norma-
tive rules. The regulative policy framework is then directly or indirectly (by re-
gional institutions) forwarded to the local level.  
Finally, the reception sequence is the result of the involvement of local authori-
ties who are in charge of disseminating information to the local stakeholders. What 
are the distribution channels and how do they mobilise people? What are the fac-
tors favouring, or alternatively hindering, the implementation of the LEADER 
approach? In which way do the actors adopt this form of public action? What are 
the policy outcomes?  
At National Level: Downloading the Policy Model  
Transposing Rural Development Policy into National Strategy Plans  
The EU could be considered as the “process manager” of the policy transfer. In Sep-
tember 2005, the European Council adopted Council Regulation (EC) N° 1698/ 
2005, a new Rural Development Regulation for the financial programming period 
of 2007–2013.4 Thus the development policy for rural areas largely depends on the 
strategic guidelines and the multiannual financial programming established on a 
European level. For 2007–2013, greater emphasis was put on consistent strategy 
for rural development across the EU as a whole. Within the framework of the 
objectives established in the Rural Development Regulation, the strategic guide-
lines have identified rural development priorities. On the basis of these guidelines, 
the member states design their own national strategy plans for the preparation of 
rural development programmes. According to their own policy preferences, they 
are allowed to draw from the EU menu of support measures, those best fitting to 
the needs of their rural areas. Every member state must prepare a rural develop-
ment programme specifying the funding to be spent on supporting measures in the 
period 2007–2013. To help ensure a balanced approach to policy, member states 
and regions are obliged to divide up their rural development funding among four 
axes.5 Downloading policy to the member states takes place via a more or less 
                                                                        
4 Known as the second pillar of the CAP, the Rural Development Policy is financed by the 
European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development (EAFRD). 
5 Within the regulatory minimum funding limits for each axis (10% for axis 1.25% for axis 2, 
10% for axis 3 and 5% for LEADER axis, reduced to 2.5% in the case of the new member 
states), member states can spend resources depending on their specific context. It is a 
further requirement that some of the funding must support projects based on the “LEADER 
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hierarchical mode of governance in which softer rules are transposed and 
implemented by domestic authorities (Bulmer et al. 2007). The EU’s governance 
regime is based on “soft” rules (strategic guidelines offering measures) which can 
generate discretionary forms of transfer. The ERDP places considerable control in 
the hands of individual member states and regions. The transposition of the 
LEADER axis offers the new member states a chance to try out a new instrument 
for use in public actions. This form of transfer is flexible and voluntary, with the 
“importing” countries enjoying relative autonomy and retaining a degree of free-
dom allowing for the possibility of modifications to the model. The LEADER model 
is transferred through an institutional process, the mechanisms of which will be 
examined below, along with their political and practical effects on the new 
members’ institutions and policies. 
Are the general guiding principles enough to ensure compliance with the origi-
nal endogenous development model inspiring the LEADER approach? What does 
the implementation of this single EU intervention tell us about rural development 
policy in each national context? How do domestic authorities appropriate the new 
approach that relies extensively on local initiative? 
Domesticating the Implementation 
At the national level, the state administration is the principal actor implementing 
the policy transfer. In practice, the institutional mechanism brings together the 
Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development (MADR), the payment agencies in 
charge of financial management, and ad hoc foundations. Several similarities can 
be mentioned in the experiences of the countries involved: the predominant role of 
the MADR in the interpretation of regulations and the management of the pro-
gramme, and the formulation of the normative mechanism. In the Central Euro-
pean states, MADRs, usually dominated by farming interests, have shown weak 
capacity in managing non-agricultural programmes. The centralised nature of the 
whole process is another common feature, leading to weak transparency and 
relative slowness of the evaluation procedures, the selection and financing of the 
strategies proposed by the (Local Action Groups) LAGs. The institutional con-
figuration inherited from the centralist tradition has accentuated the hierarchic 
character of domestic governance. The version of the LEADER programme imple-
mented in the new member states is from top to bottom and it gave the domestic 
authorities a decisive function in institutional mediation. 
                                                                                                                                                                     
approach” to rural development (that is, individual projects designed and executed by local 
partnerships should address specific local problems). 
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Because of their normative role (in particular the formulation of action princi-
ples, definition of procedures, adoption of the criteria for eligibility), domestic 
authorities in fact possess considerable power to intervene. As the main actors 
implementing the transfer, the MADRs control the information and the channels by 
which it is disseminated. In addition, they initiate the programmes for training 
people in the LEADER method, relying on the support of various levels of public 
administration (in the regions and/or the districts).6 Thus a strong asymmetry is 
established in the relationship between the national operator and the local actors. 
In the tradition of subordination inherited from the former communist regime, the 
local actors continue to depend on the goodwill of the central administration and 
its various devolved bodies. The latter ones play a role in disseminating infor-
mation and transfering solutions in the form of public actions. This is supple-
mented by the role of the “facilitators” of the transfer, who take part in dissemi-
nating ideas; here we can mention the network of NGOs working in the rural areas 
and also the consulting bureaus, genuine entrepreneurs of the transfer, which can 
contribute to the success of the programme by creating favourable conditions for 
its reception.  
The Transfer Effects at the National Level: Similarity or Distortion? 
Under “adaptive pressure” from the EU, the transposition of the CAP second pillar 
(rural development policy) into each national institutional system has determined 
a plan of public action, i.e., a set of norms, rules, methods and procedures. Does this 
policy transfer strengthen the Europeanisation process?  
The domestic authorities interpret the model so as to make it compatible with 
the forms of regulation specific to the national political system. We are going to 
examine how the domestic authorities make use of the measures. What ideas 
underlie the choice of methods for implementing the LEADER approach? Do they 
intend to guide public action or direct it with those techniques of political domina-
tion that only a state authority can mobilise? What is the nature of the political 
goals that lead the state operator? 
On the basis of criteria specifying the form of regulation for LEADER action, the 
Table 1 presents two opposing rationales for implementing the LEADER instru-
ment. The distinction between “soft” and “hard” rules provides an analytical grid 
for describing the governing directions in which the LEADER programme is imple-
mented. Neither of these rationales is applied completely, but they do correspond 
to dominant trends identifiable in each country. 
                                                                        
6 In Poland, regional self-governments are in charge of managing the whole process of 
assessing and selecting the LAGs. 
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Table 1. Typology of forms of regulation 
LEADER 
action tools 
Germany Czech 
Republic 
Poland Hungary Lithuania 
Guiding 
approach 
Bottom-up Bottom-up Bottom-up 
(through voi-
vodeship 
level) 
Top-down Top-down 
Contract 
procedures 
Incentives Incentives and 
instructions  
Incentives be-
coming hard-
ened 
Injunctions Injunctions 
Rules for 
shaping 
partnership  
Stakeholders’ 
free choice 
Stakeholders’ 
free choice 
Binding (de-
pending on 
voivodeships) 
Binding Binding 
Territorial 
pattern 
Mixed Mixed Mixed Uniform Uniform 
Coverage of 
rural areas 
Relatively ex-
tensive 
Moderate Variable (de-
pending on 
voivodeships) 
Almost com-
plete 
Almost com-
plete 
LAGs’s 
selection 
process  
Highly 
selective 
Moderate Moderate Slightly selec-
tive 
Slightly selec-
tive 
Allocation 
of funding 
to LAGs 
Differentiated 
funding 
Differentiated 
funding 
Differentiated 
funding 
Equal distribu-
tion  
Equal distribu-
tion  
Dominant 
form of 
regulation 
Mainly soft 
rules  
Mainly soft 
rules  
Mixed rules 
(depending on 
voivodeships)  
Predominantly 
hard rules  
Predominantly 
hard rules  
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Softer rules comply with the LEADER paradigm of public action. The process 
starts from the bottom up, presupposing local stakeholders’ capacity for initiative, 
and their ability to build voluntary partnership and outline their area for action. At 
national level, this type of guidance leads to a spatial arrangement that only partly 
covers all rural areas, because LAGs are selected on a competitive basis. 
Hard rules come from the government operator’s intention to use the LEADER 
instrument for achieving its own specific goals. Consequently, it is a top-down 
command and control institutional system. Procedures lay down strict rules (or 
injunctions) for shaping partnerships and defining action areas on the basis of the 
administrative unit’s network. The central authority’s intention is to impose rules 
that best fit its objective of using the LEADER programme as a tool for the central 
planning of rural areas and the top-down distribution of development subsidies. 
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Between the German Federal Government’s true compliance with the principles 
underpinning the LEADER instrument and Hungary’s adoption of an interven-
tionist approach, an entire range of situations can be observed. This variety may be 
related to the political systems and traditions of member states. Soft rules ra-
tionale prevails in the decentralised political systems (whether federal or uni-
tary).7 Guidance based on hard rules predominates in the highly centralised politi-
cal systems where regionalisation has been limited to an administrative devolution 
of powers (Hungary). In Hungary, the MADR has used the LEADER programme to 
implement its own planning policy by regrouping at least two micro-regions into 
one large rural community endowed with a LAG and by extending the LEADER 
programme in order to reach a complete coverage of rural areas. This uniform 
network of rural communities also became the operative framework for managing 
the third axis’s projects of the ERDP. 
The intervention of the domestic authorities is shaped by the institutional 
context of the new member states. They introduce some distorting effects on the 
original model that is transferred to the local stakeholders. 
Receiving the LEADER Model at the Local Level 
Involvement of Local Actors  
The “recipients” of the LEADER model, who are encouraged to become involved in 
putting it into practice, are at the bottom of the transfer cycle. The originality of 
LEADER lies primarily in the method on which the decision-making and the initia-
tives arising from it are based. In a bottom-up process, the LEADER method is 
based on the principles of subsidiarity and partnership. These two principles 
underlie the creation of a decision-making body, a LAG, constituted of public and 
private stakeholders (self-governments, associations, entrepreneurs). The part-
nership principle implies the participation of local stakeholders in designing the 
development strategy and its implementation.  
Learning the LEADER approach depends on receptiveness at the local level, 
which in turn depends on mobilising the elites and their perception of its useful-
ness for meeting local problems. This local context may have a specific impact on 
implementation. Will the experimental method of the LEADER approach be suffi-
cient to re-awaken the capacity for initiative of local actors in the new member 
states where social capital is weak in the rural areas?  
What are the outcomes of the LEADER model experiment? A number of ques-
tions arise relating to the conditions of the reception of the LEADER model by local 
                                                                        
7 Such is the case with the German Länder, where procedures may vary between incentives 
and prescription, and in Poland, currently decentralising, with the voivodeships. 
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stakeholders, their capacity to mobilise, and the degree of involvement of the local 
society. 
Strong Control by Mayors over Local Development 
Our field research has revealed the key role played by local elites in implementing 
the process. Having examined partnership formation we have found that only a 
handful of elected officials took part in the construction of the LAGs. Professional 
mayors have been the main catalysts in this process.8 The rules laid down for 
forming partnerships (representation of the three sectors) are formally obeyed, 
but may be adjusted or even manipulated in the Czech Republic and Hungary to 
strengthen the clout of mayors in the LAG’s decision-making bodies. Since the 
more influential mayors recruit the managers, they can guide the design and im-
plementation of strategies. They usually do it in line with their own idea of public 
interest. Project funding from the LEADER programme is a supplement to the local 
self-government’s scarce budget. Most of the projects are designed for the pre-
ferred  areas of the local self-government and their impact is usually restricted to 
the needs of the village inhabitants (renovation of public buildings, facilities and 
services).9 Few projects cover more than one municipality and even fewer are 
jointly implemented by separate municipalities. The LEADER instrument serves 
meeting the local expectations. Since mayors have the political ability to mobilise 
resources (information, administrative competencies) and propose project de-
signs, they tend to guide the initiatives towards benefits for the improvement of 
their villages or small cities. The behaviour of mayors is at best that of good 
managers of collective amenities and services relating to public welfare. 
Traditional Ruler–Ruled Relationship 
The above use of the LEADER instrument by local elected officials is based on a tra-
ditional conception of the ruler–ruled relationship, mainly inherited from the 
communist time. Although representative democracy has been consolidated in the 
course of two decades of local self-government and it operates on a pluralistic 
basis, it is not yet fully open to citizens’ participation. Furthermore, despite re-
forms promoting decentralisation, the political systems of the post-communist 
                                                                        
8 In most cases studied, the catalyst was the impetus given by a mayor, firmly based in his or 
her municipality within a network of local personalities at the micro-regional level. The 
typical profile of an initiator is a firmly established, “charismatic leader”, heading a 
relatively large municipality, who has formed a network of patronage relations with his or 
her opposite numbers in neighbouring municipalities. 
9 This is also true in Lithuania, where projects are proposed by rural communities, and in 
Poland, where thy are proposed by villages (sołectwa, sing. sołectwo). 
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countries bear the mark of centralising traditions that, in the case of Hungary, have 
been firmly reasserted by top–down government practices. The political capacity 
of local elites to improve the economic and social conditions of their territories is 
more uncertain and fragile where the decentralisation of powers has not been 
completed (Lithuania).10 In post-communist systems in general, the implantation 
of participative democracy is hampered by a stereotyped view of the ruler–ruled 
relationship and a lack of mutual trust among citizens. As our surveys have shown, 
the stakeholders involved in LAGs, particularly the elected officials, are convinced 
that their citizens want to be properly governed without necessarily participating. 
At the same time, the vast majority of these elected officials say that they want to 
take part in managing public affairs. The local elite’s conception of the ruler–ruled 
relationship, inherited from the previous system, practically restricts the repre-
sentatives having been elected in exercising participative democracy. All attempts 
to widen the scope of deliberation to local residents (forums, public meetings) 
quickly collapse because the hopes for participation initially aroused by the nov-
elty of the LEADER approach have already been lost. Local democracy emerges 
strengthened only where a more “inclusive” approach radically alters local govern-
ance. However, scope for action remains limited to only a small number of project 
applicants (mainly municipalities and associations in their direct sphere of influ-
ence) and does not inspire the entrepreneurs and farmers whose projects would 
help diversify economic activities.  
Where LEADER principles are poorly disseminated within local society and 
stakeholders are only moderately involved in preparing strategies and projects, 
the limitations of the transfer mechanism are apparent. 
The Transfer Effects: Absorption, Transformation or Rejection of the LEADER Model? 
To describe the prevailing effects of the policy transfer on the Europeanisation of 
public action11, we can best express them in terms of absorption, adaptation and 
rejection of the policy model. Cross-tabulating the forms of regulation as defined at 
                                                                        
10 In Lithuania, where self-government has not been established at the local level, the local 
elites are recruited from the “rural communities” (Dedeire – Mačiulytė 2012). 
11 Once integration is completed, Europeanisation advances via common programmes and 
policies in a more flexible manner than with the transposition of the acquis communau-
taire. It takes the form of Europeanising the rules, practices and instruments of public 
action. Radaelli states that these may be seen as “processes of (a) construction (b) 
diffusion and (c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first 
defined and consolidated in the making of EU public policy and politics and then incor-
porated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public 
policies” (Radelli 2003, p. 30). 
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the national level with the way of reception by local stakeholders, we may define 
these different transfer effects as shown in Table 2. 
Table 2. The transfer effects of the LEADER model 
 Mainly soft rules Predominantly hard rules 
Extensive participation of 
local stakeholders 
Model absorbed 
(Germany: Henneberger Land 
LAG) 
Model adapted 
(Lithuania: Joniškis LAG) 
Limited participation of a 
“project class” (local elite) 
Model adapted 
(Czech Republic: Podlipansko, 
Ostrožsko a Horňácko, Úhlava 
LAGs) 
(Poland: Kraina Rawki, Dolina 
Karpia) 
Model distorted (even 
rejected) 
(Hungary: Zengő-Duna, 
Mecsekvidék LAGs) 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
Maximum effect is achieved where soft rules and incentives encourage exten-
sive participation of the local stakeholders, as it occurs in the new Länder, where 
learning has gone on for over two decades. The projects and the achievements of 
the Henneberger Land LAG give evidence of the absorption of the European model. 
Other countries are on a path of adaptation of the LEADER model. Stakeholders 
are attempting to overcome the institutional obstacles. In the studied Czech LAGs 
the experiment is quite successful despite limited citizen’s participation. Moreover, 
some stakeholders have seized the opportunity to consolidate their own particular 
interests. This is especially the case with a number of mayors, exercising political 
leadership, who have taken over the system to strengthen their legitimacy. Other 
social groups, well organised in the voluntary sector, may also adopt an elitist atti-
tude. In Lithuanian LAGs the strong engagement of “rural communities” is coun-
terbalancing the influence of a top-down management style. 
Only the Hungarian experiment presents an effect of rejection, produced by a 
top-down management that blocks any channels that might disseminate the ideas 
and values of the LEADER model. The use of the LEADER instrument is confiscated 
for the benefit of local self-governments and their political leadership. 
Conclusion 
Across the new member states in Central Europe, the processes of implementing 
the LEADER instrument are just as varied as they are in the old member states that 
have had longer experience with it. The form of public policy transfer promoted by 
Transferring the LEADER Model to New Member States: Success or Failure? 401 
the EU gives all member states leeway to adapt the LEADER instrument to the ra-
tionales for action that meet their own public policy objectives. The adaptive 
pressure applied by the EU is variously perceived and integrated into the national 
frames of reference and leads to differential rationales for action.  
Although the process of implementing the LEADER model has undoubtedly 
strengthened local capacity-building and initiative, the rationale that underpins 
governance at the local level may vary considerably. Where LEADER principles are 
poorly disseminated within local society and stakeholders are only moderately 
involved in preparing strategies and projects, the limitations of the policy transfer 
mechanism are apparent. 
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 CHALLENGES OF REGIONAL AND METROPOLITAN 
POLICY IN POLAND1 
Iwona Sagan 
Introduction 
The issue of regional development, and the complexity of the notions of “region”, 
“regionalisation” or “regionalism” are among the subjects that are constantly de-
bated by theorists, as well as by those working in the practical field of regional 
policy. The exceptional liveliness of the debate on the subject of regions, that has 
been observed in the last decade, comes as a consequence of different socio-
economic policies applied by individual countries, as well as of the uniting Euro-
pean policy. The European characteristics of regional development are, to certain 
extent, a result of the impact of global conditions on the continent and in the Union. 
Their dominant nature is a consequence of the global range that modern society 
and economy have. As Poland has been a part of the EU since 2004, the global in-
fluences on Polish regions are “filtered” through EU policy: in some respects they 
are weakened, while in others they are strengthened or modified. 
A state’s conditions regarding its economic and social spheres have a significant 
impact on the shape of its regional policy. After 1945 Poland, similarly to other 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, followed the communist model of state 
socialism. After its collapse, the aim of the system transformation was to create 
democratic capitalism, however, what has come about is rather a model of political 
capitalism. This is a result of the weakness of civil society and the state structures. 
The state’s incapacity is best reflected in the lack of professional civil service, 
legislative chaos, invariably high level of financial and political corruption, that 
have made citizens feel distrust in state institutions.  
In 1999 a territorial reform was carried out, based on the logic of creating a 
limited number of strong voivodeships – the regions. A total of 16 voivodeships 
were created. The reform, realised as one of the first determinative restructuring 
reforms, was partially forced or accelerated by Poland’s preparatory actions for EU 
accession. EU formal and administrative regulations, tightly related to financial 
                                                                        
1 This text contains parts of the following publication: Sagan, I.: Polnische Regional und 
Metropolenpolitik: Koherenz oder Konkurrenz? Jahrbuch Polen 2012 – Regionen, Wiesba-
den, Harrassowitz, 2012. pp. 29–39. 
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support systems, obliged practically all the new member states to modify their 
existing territorial administration systems to comply with the Nomenclature of 
Units for Territorial Statistics (NUTS). The voivodeships established in 1999 con-
form with the size requisitions for the second level units (NUTS  2), which allows 
them to receive financial support in the form of structural funds dedicated to 
modernising and restructuring regional economies. Therefore one of the aims of 
the reform and the posterior regional policy was to balance the level of economic 
development of the regions and to overcome disproportions between them, both 
within Poland and on a European scale. 
Rich Regions and Poor Regions – The Split of Polish Territory 
In spite of applying numerous regional policies in the post-war history of Poland, it 
has never been successful to overcome the developmental differences – especially 
between the socially and economically better developed western part, commonly 
known as Poland A, and the lagging eastern part, called Poland B. The borderline of 
this division is marked by the Vistula river. The duality stems from the history of 
the lands that now constitute the Polish territory. The Partitions of Poland (1772–
1918) proved to be the most determinative historical factor. The traces of Parti-
tions can be clearly seen in the level of urbanisation, the transport infrastructure’s 
density, agricultural structure, and the concentration of industrial and services’ 
centres. It is a direct consequence of the fact that all these fields of the economy 
developed under different governance systems of Russia, Prussia and Austria. The 
dissimilarities in the level of development of these zones are also reflected in 
different attitudes and mentalities of their inhabitants. Political preferences also 
show clearly the Poland A and B division: Poland A seems more liberal, while the 
latter inclines towards more rightist and nationalist tendencies. Neither the short 
period of independence between the World Wars, nor the almost half-century-long 
communist period did succeed in diminishing these differences. 
Analysing the different forms of social capital in the historical regions of Poland 
reveals that the concentration of bonding social capital is significantly higher in 
less urbanised regions and, generally, in Eastern and Southern Poland (Działek 
2010). Meanwhile, in highly-urbanised regions and in Western Poland, it is the 
bridging social capital that predominates (Gittell – Vidal 1998). To make proper 
assessment of social capital in a region, it is necessary to distinguish between 
bonding and bridging social capitals, as they have distinct impact on the socio-
economic development of the region. These two forms of social capital relate to 
different natures of human relationships. Bonding social capital brings together 
people who already know each other, while bridging capital binds individuals and 
groups who previously may not have had any closer relations. Bonding social capi-
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tal acts inwards, is exclusive, and focused on strengthening the internal identity of 
a group. Local communities, ethnic and religious groups, elite clubs provide 
examples for this type of capital. Bridging social capital is inclusive, promotes 
creation of open networks, brings together people of different social statuses and 
origins. Associations, foundations, social movements, and community organisa-
tions serve as examples of this type of capital. Bridging social capital is based on 
citizens’ attitudes that are much desired in today’s processes of increasing the 
socio-economic development of regions. This type of capital has the capability to 
create firm and partner relations between social structures and the authorities. 
Strong regional economic disproportions favour polarisation of social attitudes. 
The sense of cultural inferiority – when experienced by entire social groups – 
encloses them in conservative, xenophobic structures of social capital. This relates 
both to regions of Eastern Poland and to those regions that are currently becoming 
peripheral compared to the new, highly developed metropolitan areas being 
created. Wide discussions over the new National Strategy of Regional Development 
2010–2020, approved by the government in July 2010, have focused largely on the 
matter of overcoming these inequalities as well as on seeking how to increase 
regional development on a national scale. The essence is described in three specific 
aims of the regional policy, namely: (1) supporting competitiveness of the regions, 
(2) building territorial cohesion and counteracting marginalisation processes in 
the catching-up areas, and (3) raising the efficiency of regional developmental 
actions. These issues may be reduced to an essential triad of competitiveness–
cohesion–efficiency. 
Competitiveness 
For the purpose of acquiring high competitiveness while economising on expendi-
tures, the strategy implies that regional policy should address regions with best 
perspectives (i.e. the urban zones) to increase competitiveness on an international 
scale. Such a concept marks a polarisation-prone nature of regional development, 
which leads to increasing developmental dissimilarities, eventually growing ine-
qualities, between the regions. The policy of cohesion, on the other hand, aims to 
counteract the negative impact of polarisation by using and amplifying the effects 
of the expected diffusion of innovation, progress and economic growth that will 
spread from the fast developing metropolitan areas. This is expected to balance the 
developmental disproportions between the regions. Therefore, this polarisation–
diffusion model of regional development will initially increase the disproportions, 
but in later phases, through the process of spreading developmental impulse from 
the centres, it will overcome disparities and will balance the general level of deve-
lopment in the country. 
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Nevertheless, the practical application of such a model is highly limited. It is not 
easy to challenge the logic of economical efficiency that implies investing exclu-
sively in a country’s strongest centres and regions. Furthermore, a developmental 
impulse should be preceded by an infrastructural one, since communicational and 
telecommunicational development in the areas that are to absorb the effects of 
such an impulse are essential. A lack of well-balanced road infrastructure, espe-
cially the expressways and motorways, and a virtual collapse and dismantling of 
the railway infrastructure obstruct rapid transportation and commuting which are 
among the key factors in overcoming inequalities between regions. 
Commuting, even on long, interregional distances, is an integral part of labour 
markets in highly developed countries. Usually commuting has a daily, but 
increasingly a weekly, cycle. Commuting prevents regions from depopulating 
through the permanent moving of inhabitants to areas with more attractive labour 
markets. The creation of “flight from blight” regions is the most undesirable 
phenomenon in regional policy, since it causes social and economic degradation. 
The possibility to live in a region, without the necessity to work there, creates 
opportunities for the region’s development. The incomes from residents’ taxes, 
goods consumption and services stimulate the development of residential and 
residential-related functions in the region. This can be extremely beneficial, espe-
cially in cases of municipalities and suburban centres that flourish thanks to the 
processes of suburbanisation. Although this is a phenomenon on a local scale, it 
well illustrates the general mechanism. The suburban municipalities owe their 
development to the fact that the cities’ inhabitants seek more attractive living con-
ditions. It should also be noted that keeping or attracting working-age residents 
creates potential for the business development of the area in the future. The 
resources of human capital retained in the region may be used for recovering the 
economy in the area.  
A second fundamental obstacle in migrating freely between the regions in 
search of job is the lack of a balanced housing market. Strong inequality between 
the demand and the supply of housing is a legacy of the socialist system. Housing 
prices are disproportionately high in relation to average wages in Poland. This 
particularly applies to large cities. Regulating the housing market through support-
ive instruments of governmental policy is a practice often used in economically 
developed countries. The state’s housing policy in the social field is justified by the 
profits it brings in the economic sphere. Up to now none of the governments has 
ever taken effective actions aimed at elaborating stable support mechanisms for 
housing policy that would generate economic benefits from the inhabitants’ 
mobility. As a result, it is still their flats that attach people to the regions in Poland, 
rather than their jobs. 
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Cohesion 
Having in mind the shortcomings of hitherto governmental policy in the field of 
centrally managed actions, the regions should not be exclusively blamed for their 
poor development. Applying the economically effective policy of supporting polar-
ised development, concentrated around the strongest areas – without a consistent, 
long-term policy of eliminating developmental barriers that are external to regions 
– may lead to the aggravation of disparities in regional development. Reaching a 
certain level, the disparities will destabilise the entire national system, causing an 
economic and social crisis. It is difficult to find more convincing evidence that a 
polarised system impedes smooth functioning and stable development, than the 
consistently realised EU support policy itself. It aims to diminish the dissimilarities 
between European regions. Poland fully participates in the European projects 
dedicated to improving social, economic and spatial cohesion of the regions. Still, 
comparative studies of the directions and scale of expenditures, co-financed by the 
EU, demonstrate unfavourable tendencies in the pace and the nature of develop-
ment in the poorer, eastern counties of Poland B, in comparison to the much 
wealthier, western regions of Poland A. The average per capita value of projects co-
financed from the Cohesion Fund was 3.5 times lower in Eastern Poland than in 
the rest of the country. In terms of calculation per county, the level of investments 
was 4.5 times lower in Eastern Poland than in the rest of the country. Another 
characteristic feature of the projects carried out in Eastern Poland is their signifi-
cantly lower singular worth compared to the others – slightly less than half of the 
national average (Miazga – Sagan 2011). These indices prove how difficult it is to 
stimulate development in peripheral regions, even with financial means at hand. 
To be successful, such policies require clearly focused, long-term, state-level 
policies. Once they fall into a spiral of socio-economic degradation, seldom are the 
lagging regions able to break out of it by themselves. Therefore it is much desired 
not to allow regions to succumb to such a spiral, thus preventing the appearance of 
strong developmental differences between the regions. Eventual overcoming of 
such disparities is much more costly. 
Metropolises and their Regions  
Deficiencies in infrastructure – commented in the context of barriers for the  com-
petitiveness of regions in Eastern Poland – create obstacles for the diffusion of 
developmental impulse from the growth centres, expected in the cohesion policy. 
This problem is best visible on the intraregional scale, i.e. at the level of relations of 
urban metropolises with their surrounding regions. 
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The new type of relations between a metropolitan area and a surrounding re-
gion is disadvantageous for the latter. It is difficult, if not impossible, to become 
regionally successful without dynamic collaboration with the metropolis which 
offers the most favourable economic, social, technological, and institutional envi-
ronment for development. Therefore if a region lacks such developmental driving 
force, achieving success is virtually impossible or extremely complicated at best. 
Current trends indicate that a metropolis is able to grow without direct links to its 
immediate regional surroundings, while a region without connections to a 
metropolis is bound to become peripheral. This stems from network type spatial 
relations that allow creating decentralised, non-hierarchic links, independent from 
physical neighbouring and based on supra-regional space of flows. It is the 
metropolitan areas and the urban regions that constitute hubs of this network, not 
the vast and territorially diverse areas of the regions (Sagan 2009, Sagan – 
Canowiecki 2011). 
Big developmental disparities between a metropolis and other territorial units 
in a region – combined with a lack of active policy aimed at creating infrastruc-
tural, communicational, institutional, and social channels for the transmission of 
growth – result in aggravating intraregional disharmony. A research for the Minis-
try of Regional Development (Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego 2009) clearly 
shows that the principal borderlines of regional divisions in Poland – based on the 
level of social and economic development and on that of material infrastructure – 
do not run along the boundaries of administrative units, but rather along the 
borders between rural and urban areas. An analysis of the GDP per capita in the 
metropolis and in its regional surroundings in the years 1994–2005 indicates a 
significant growth of inequalities. In 2005, the dispersion coefficient, based on the 
GDP per capita relations, was 12% higher in the case of intraregional developmen-
tal disparities than in the case of interregional ones. Relatively strong – and 
constantly growing – differences between territorial units within the voivodeships 
have been observed not only by the analyses made for the ministerial report, but 
also by the international OECD regional report. The OECD report confirms that, 
among the member states, Poland has one of the highest, and growing, intrare-
gional disparities, deriving from the increasing inequalities between urban areas – 
mainly the cities – and the predominantly rural and town areas. Warsaw has the 
highest GDP per capita growth rate among the OECD metropolitan regions. 
Together with Cracow they also have the highest labour productivity growth. The 
GDP per capita in urban areas is twice as high as in rural areas in Poland (OECD 
2008). 
It should be stressed that the growing disparities between metropolitan areas 
and regions do not necessarily imply stagnation or socio-economic degradation in 
the regions. Research shows (Smętkowski 2009) that the increasing inequalities 
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are a result of different speeds of developmental processes taking place in these 
areas. At the same time, the regions having strong metropolitan areas tend to 
develop much more dynamically than those set around smaller cities. 
Taking into consideration that the disparities are not caused by the pauperisa-
tion of the least developed territorial units, but are simply an effect of their slower 
development rate, it is reasonable to ask whether the discussed stratification is an 
actual problem. Actually this turns out to be a more comprehensive dilemma, 
related rather to social than economic polarisation. As the research indicates, 
strong inequalities in the level of development have an impact on the subjective 
perception of quality of life in the slower-developing units. Consequently, this 
intensifies emigrational processes, human capital drainage, and in the long term, 
leads to the stagnation and degradation of the area, which eventually decreases the 
efficiency of the entire system. 
The ongoing legislative and administrational negotiations with the objective to 
legally settle the future shape and functioning of metropolitan areas, may be a 
unique chance to strengthen the regions’ position in the future territorial struc-
tures. This will only be possible with the active participation of regional authorities 
in the creation of metropolitan administrational and organisational structures. 
However, all the current controversies and debates on the metropolitan system 
focus on the conflicts within the limits of the potential metropolitan areas. The 
debate has been dominated by the notion of reaching a consensus between the 
more-or-less-willing-to-collaborate metropolitan partners. Neither the central ad-
ministration – both responsible for the cohesion policy and conscious of the 
growing intraregional disparities –, nor the local governments of the regions ven-
tured to discuss the matter of selecting a form of the metropolitan system and 
examine its impact on the region–metropolis relations. Albeit it is the form of the 
territorial and administration system that will be crucial for shaping the links bet-
ween the metropolis and its surrounding region. The current lack of governance at 
the metropolitan level constitutes a significant obstacle in Poland’s regional policy. 
Efficiency 
Raising effectiveness and efficacy of regional developmental activities – in one 
word: the efficiency – is the last of the three main objectives of regional policy. 
Doubtlessly, it should be accompanied by creating institutional embeddedness for 
the regional policies’ efficiency in the regions – this implies building a high-quality 
public sector – and as a result by the creation of good governance.  
The reform of Poland’s territorial system carried out in 1999 gave birth to a 
unique situation of actual bipolarisation of local governance. At the regional level, 
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it consists of the highest tier self-government unit2 and the lowest tier of state 
governmental administration structure.3 Poland’s territorial organisation at a 
regional level has a dualistic nature and is set in between the models of territorial 
state administration and territorial self-government. In a territorial state ad-
ministration, the regions are governed by the central administration’s governors 
who posses limited competence, strictly control budgets, and control counties and 
municipalities. In a territorial self-governance the regions, counties and munici-
palities have the right to self-governance, although their competences are limited, 
and the budget is centrally controlled. At the regional level, Poland applies a model 
of partial territorial self-governance. Regions are still strongly limited financially 
and are controlled by governmental administration. The most severe is the lack of 
self-governance at the metropolitan level. 
The duality of administration at the regional level could theoretically lead to the 
strong political representation of this level. However, for effectively supporting the 
regional system, it would be essential to establisha clear hierarchy between the 
two administrational entities, the Marshal’s Office and the Voivode’s Office, with a 
slight domination of self-governance represented by the Marshal’s Office. At the 
same time, due to struggles for power, competences and prestige, the duality 
rather causes system disintegration, and as a consequence, is detrimental to the 
region’s development. 
The ministry’s policy is crucial in building coalitional relations between the two 
centres of power in a region. A proper approach to Voivodeship Offices should 
stimulate their collaboration with Marshal’s Offices, rather than antagonise the two 
entities. Voivodeship Offices should not serve as regional political infiltration 
“channels” for the central administration in power. Although the office of the 
Voivode is not a political one, there is strong temptation to select candidates by 
political criteria, since it is the central government administration that nominates 
them. The political dependence of the Voivodes complicates their co-operation 
with the democratically elected Marshals. It is especially the case when the heads 
of these two entities come from different political backgrounds. Therefore, without 
central government’s policy aimed at overcoming the deficiencies mentioned, the 
dualistic system more often obstructs a region’s development than intensifies it. 
Lack of co-operation between the two main centres of power in the region can 
become an element of weakening the negotiating position of the region as against 
the central government. 
                                                                        
2 Marshal’s Office, presided by the Voivodeship’s Marshal. 
3 Voivodeship Office, presided by a Voivode. 
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Conclusion 
The high complexity and networking nature of connections in today’s economic 
systems, the dynamism of processes and a need for quick reactions to meet new 
challenges require the optimisation of methods in regional and local administra-
tions. At the same time the quality of Poland’s state, regional and local tier public 
institutions continues to be inadequate to face European and global challenges. 
Although in the first years following the political transition the quality of public 
institutions was gradually improving, this process has been halted by power strug-
gles between different governing political parties. To persist in the model of politi-
cal capitalism would not only be detrimental to the Polish nation as a whole, but 
also to the regional and local communities. Their successful development under 
the circumstances of economic globalisation and the internationalisation of state 
policies requires the proficient and flexible application of public intervention 
instruments and the co-ordinated participation of citizens. 
Political capitalism in its post-transformation stage – where the strong players 
(social groups, economic entities or individuals) exploit  the lack of regulations and 
the weakness of the state –  has given rise to strong, fossilised sectoral structures 
stemming from the deeply rooted legacy of the previous political system. The 
commonly stressed need to replace sectoral organisation in nearly all fields of 
socio-economic life with territorial task- and problem-oriented collaboration has 
so far not been reflected in any reform of the national organisational structures. 
The domination of sectoral structures over the regional ones has a decisive effect 
on the distribution of funds dedicated to development and investments by the 
central administration. The “territorial contract” – a solution proposed by the 
Ministry of Regional Development as part of the National Strategy of Regional 
Development 2010–2020 programme, which would involve the relocation of 
significant funds – has practically not been carried out. Sector-thinking and sector-
acting obstruct the harmonisation of socio-economic structures and the overcom-
ing of disparities in development of regions and localities. They impede benefiting 
fully from the regions’ developmental potential. It should be stressed that the 
necessary changes do not simply form a strategic objective of national regional 
policy, but above all, they are demanded by the inhabitants of all regions.  
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 (ETHNO) REGIONALISM IN UPPER SILESIA 
Nóra Baranyai 
Introduction 
The current territorial division of Poland is based on the law accepted on 24th July 
19981, which recreated the three-level2 administration system in the country. The 
new voivodeships were mainly established by union of former, smaller units; while 
in some areas the previous regions were divided and attached to different 
voivodeships (Figure 1). The upper sub-national administrative units are directly 
elected political regions but having administrative and planning-statistical func-
tions as well. Besides administrative regions, ethnic/linguistic–cultural, traditional 
territorial units can be found in the country as well, being also the base for Polish 
regionalism. The motivations, objectives and activities of regional movements 
depend on the type of the region: there are demands for ethno-linguistic and cul-
tural rights, higher degree of self-government or at times autonomy. In this regard 
Silesia is a special area, because it is an ethnic/linguistic–cultural and historical 
region at the same time; therefore its regional aspirations can be interpreted along 
these characteristics (Jałowiecki 1999). As per the strong Upper Silesian cultural 
identity, two unequivocally isolated trends appeared in the 1990s: one of them 
aimed to continue the fight for certification of the Silesian nationality and language, 
the other to restore the autonomy granted in 19203 (Wódz 2010). 
The aim of this study is to analyse the increasingly important process of 
(ethno)regionalism in Upper Silesia, various concepts of the Silesian Autonomy 
                                                                        
1 Act on the three-level division of the country (Ustawa z dnia 24 lipca 1998 r. o 
wprowadzeniu zasadniczego trójstopniowego podziału terytorialnego państwa). 
2 Voivodeship (województwo), county (powiat) and local (gmina) levels. 
3 Upper Silesia was annexed to Poland after World War One. It was undoubtedly the most 
developed and most industralised part of the country. The economically and culturally dis-
tinct region, the Silesian Voivodeship did not have to fit in the unitary state structure. In 
1920 the Polish government granted autonomy to the voivodeship, thus the region had its 
own parliament with legislative power and through the Treasury it could independently 
manage certain segments of local revenues (Szczepański – Śliz 2012). Accordingly, the Sile-
sian Voivodeship – which at that time meant Katowice and its wider area – could decide on 
the administrative structure of the region. In addition, the Silesian Sejm had the authority 
to create laws on regional education, health, social services, infrastructure, transport and 
police forces. The autonomy ended in practice with the expansion of the Third Reich in 
1939; however, it was in 1945 only when it was legally abolished by the National Council. 
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Movement (Ruch Autonomy Śląska, hereinafter RAŚ) and to outline the possible 
consequences of these ideas, based on the results of national censuses and political 
elections, the documents and draft laws of the movement. 
 
Figure 1. The structure of voivodeships since 1999  
Source: http://www.adam.krynicki.net/lo/mapy/pol_1999.jpg 
Struggle for Registration of Silesian Nationality and Language 
Minorities and their cultures were completely ignored in the state-socialist period, 
therefore the political, cultural, and scientific dialogue about Upper Silesian society 
could only begin after the transition. In the first years of the 1990s, due to the 
appearance of “minority” organisations, Upper Silesia was rediscovered and the 
region moved towards institutionalisation. In order to create Silesian regional 
identity several actions were taken, and the importance of Silesian language was 
revived again. The unique Silesian identity in the culturally and ethnically mixed 
region was formed by regular boundary changes, the permanent “feeling strange” 
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and by social-political stigma; after the transition Silesians expected certification of 
their minority rights (Janicki 2009). Several exhibitions have been dedicated to 
accentuate the region’s multiculturalism, multi-nationalism and the “heroic indus-
trial past”. Therefore this is the way for Silesia to find its position in Europe, high-
lighting its difference from the rest of Poland (Bialasiewicz 2002). 
The most famous Silesian organisation, the RAŚ was established in Rybnik in 
1990. The organisation's activities extended to the territory of historical Silesia 
including the current Silesian and Opole Voivodeships and the southern part of 
Lower Silesian Voivodeship as well. Although the current goals and aims of RAŚ are 
not significantly different from the organisation’s previous conceptions (Statut 
1990), regarding the tone and the activities a caesura can be found around 2010, 
when the last regional and local elections were held. 
Due to the results of the national elections in 1991, RAŚ had two mandates in 
the Sejm, but after the introduction of the five per cent threshold in 1993, the 
organisation lost its parliamentary representation. In order to represent the 
interests of Silesians, the movement tried to establish an alternative organisation, 
The Union of the Population of the Silesian Nationality (Związek Ludności 
Narodowości Śląskiej, hereinafter ZLNŚ). It aimed to reach the certification of 
Silesians in order to develop national identity and protect their language and 
culture in regional and local ethnic schools (Kamusella 1999), and to benefit from 
special voting laws4 for minorities (Buchowski – Chlewińska 2012). Although the 
lower court registered the organisation, the higher court – due to the appeal of the 
voivode – rejected the registration claiming that there was no such thing as 
Silesian nationality, Silesians are an ethnic group. The ZLNŚ appealed to the 
Supreme Court which shared the previous justification. Following this decision the 
ZLNŚ turned to the European Commission of Human Rights which initiated an 
inquiry in the European Court of Human Rights. It discussed the appeal in two 
trials and finally agreed with the Polish state in its judgement5 (Halász 2007). The 
statements of the judicial decisions, that Silesians are an ethnic or regional group, 
had no impact on Polish legislation, since in the Act of Minorities (2005) Silesian is 
not mentioned either as an ethnic minority or as a regional language. 
The legislature’s decision is rather surprising if we take into account the results 
of the 2002 census (Figure 2). Almost 97% of the population identified themselves 
as Polish, and only 1.23% of the remaining 3.26% denominated a minority 
                                                                        
4 According to provisions of The Law on Elections to the Sejm and Senate (2001), national 
minorities benefitted from positive discrimination, as they automatically got into the Sejm 
if they collected enough votes for a mandate. This preferment did not concern ethnic mi-
norities and regional languages. 
5 The ZLNŚ had a subsequent attempt at registration in 2004, but in 2007 the application 
was denied again (Buchowski – Chlewińska 2012). 
(Ethno) Regionalism in Upper Silesia 415 
(Kaźmierczak 2003). Silesian became the largest minority group6 (173,153 people) 
in Poland, while the number of people declaring German identity decreased signifi-
cantly (to 152,897 people), which supposedly meant identity change and transition 
between the two groups. 
In 2011, 94.8% of the population marked solely Polish as identity, while the 
remaining 5.2% had twin identities (occasionally neither was Polish) or non-Polish 
identities. The number of Silesians was more than 846,000, being not only the 
most populous ethnic group in Poland, but also representing 57.6% within non-
Poles. The expected number of Silesians was only about 600,000, therefore it is no 
wonder that the publication of the results shocked both the Silesian organisations 
and the whole society. The number of people with Silesian identity has un-
doubtedly grown all over Silesia7, partly because the Germans mainly chose 
Silesian identity instead of German in 2011 (Sakson 2012). 
The unique nature of Silesian identity can be characterised by the language 
used at home, which varies among those who declared themselves Silesian. In 
2002, 77% of Silesians used Polish only, 16% used Silesian and 5% German for 
everyday interactions within the family. Interestingly, from all Silesian-speakers 
only about 52% identified themselves as Silesians, at the same time their language 
was used by Poles (35%) and Germans (13%) as well (GUS 2002). During the 2011 
census, just as in 2002, the respondents could have marked three languages. In 
2011 the most often used non-Polish language was Silesian (529,000) followed by 
Kashubian (108,000). Although detailed analysis of the published data (e.g. rela-
tionships between ethnicity and language) is still not possible, it can be concluded 
that the number of Silesian-speakers significantly exceeded the number of people 
with Silesian identity in the last ten years. 
                                                                        
6 According to the accusation of minority organisations – their most prominent spokesman 
was the RAŚ – in the first period of the 2002 census the “other” categories of nationality 
were not recorded by data collectors. Nevertheless, the president of the Central Statistical 
Office permitted the marking of non-registered minorities as well. Accordingly, the esti-
mated number of Silesians was much higher (350,000) than the official data based on the 
census. The suspicion seemed to be corroborated, as the proportion of the “non-specified” 
is the highest in Opole and Silesian Voivodeships, which could have been a result of the 
refusal of marking (Janicki 2009). These questions are still unanswered and the complaints 
remained uninvestigated. However, during the national census in 2011 both primary and 
secondary identity pledge and the marking of non-registered minorities were possible 
(due to this fact the number of Kashubians increased with more than 200,000 people). 
7 Unfortunately the current census data does not allow regional analyses, but it is certain 
that the geographical distribution of Silesians has not changed significantly. Similarly to the 
results of the previous census, most Silesians can be found in the Upper Silesian regions 
and principally in the Silesian Voivodship. 
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Figure 2.  The most populous minorities in Poland, 2002 
Source: GUS (2002). 
Based on the results of the 2002 census, Silesians launched an appeal to the 
parliamentary Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities for recognition in the 
Act of Minorities. After consulting with ethnologists, sociologists and linguists, the 
Commission denied acknowledging both the minority and the regional language 
status, since “Silesians have a distinct social identity, but they sustain different na-
tional identities, i.e. Polish, Czech and German” (Buchowski – Chlewińska 2012, p. 
13) and their language cannot be considered as an independent language, only a 
dialect of Polish.8 In 2007, members of parliament from the Silesian Voivodeship 
presented a cross-party initiative on the amendment of the Act of Minorities. 
Although this group distanced itself from the activity and objectives of RAŚ, the 
legislature was concerned that the regional language status would be the first step 
towards autonomy. In 2010, 51 parliamentarians from all over the country partici-
pated in the preparation of the amendment of the Act, but the proposal was not 
discussed in the Sejm. In March 2012, referring to the results of the 2011 census, a 
64-member group9 initiated another amendment which defined Silesian as a re-
gional language. The proposed amendment was supported by linguistic studies 
defining Silesian as an independent Western Slavic language as opposed to pre-
vious views which mentioned it as a Polish dialect only (Projekt 2012). The amend-
                                                                        
8 The Silesian language (godka) is a Slavic language combined with German words. Its 
grammar often follows German as well (Buchowski – Chlewińska 2012). 
9 The group contained parliamentarians from the following parties: Civic Platform, Demo-
cratic Left Alliance and Palikot’s Movement. 
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ment was addressed to the Commission on National and Ethnic Minorities for first 
reading in July 2012, but since then there has been no further action taken. 
The registration of The Association of People of Silesian Nationality (Stowarzy-
szenie Osób Narodowości Śląskiej, hereinafter SONŚ) had great importance for the 
ethnic–linguistic group. The SONŚ was established in Kotórz Mały (in the Opole 
Voivodeship, where the number of Silesians is much lower than in the Silesian 
region) with the aim to unite declared Silesians and to create Silesian regional 
identity. These two objectives were somewhat contradictory, as the national and 
the regional identity had different goals: the former created ethnical, while the 
latter regional representation. For successful registration some preconditions 
were necessarily fulfilled. First, the SONŚ stated that the organisation did not wish 
to enter the elections (Statut 2012, §5); secondly, based on the Law on 2011 Cen-
sus, the initiators effectively argued with the definition of nationality in court 
(Buchowski – Chlewińska 2012). 
Struggle for Silesia’s Autonomy 
Although RAŚ urged the expression of Silesian identity during the 2002 and the 
2011 censuses, the organisation recognised that the estimated number of Silesians 
would not be sufficient to create an autonomous unit based on ethnicity. Accord-
ingly, in 2010 RAŚ replaced the formally represented ethno-regional and nostalgic 
argument with the idea of modernisation and deeper decentralisation in Poland. 
Distancing from the ethnic argument has become visible under the leadership of 
the current president, the charismatic Jerzy Gorzelik, who has unambiguously tried 
to create a movement with regional character. The major change in the organisa-
tion’s rhetoric took place during the local, county and regional elections in 2010, 
which coincided with the 90th anniversary of adjudication on Silesian autonomy. 
Now the main goal of the organisation was to create real regional representation, 
besides national parties, which can emphasise regional issues and protect the 
interests of the area.10 
During regional elections, the members of RAŚ ran for mandates in each elec-
toral district in the Silesian Voivodeship and the organisation successfully nomi-
                                                                        
10 The key elements of the campaign focused on education, including regional education, 
culture and cultural heritage as well as infrastructure and public transport. Of course, the 
question of autonomy played a leading role in the campaign; however, instead of the con-
tent elements the organisation emphasised only the substantial features of self-govern-
ment. On the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of local governments the RAŚ has-
tened finishing the reform of the administrative system, whose final stage will be the truly 
decentralised, namely regionalised, state with autonomous regions. For the implementa-
tion of the new administration reform and for the creation of the autonomous Upper Sile-
sia the determined deadline is 2020. 
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nated candidates both for mayoralty and for membership in self-governments at 
territorial and local levels as well. Based on the results of regional elections in 
2010, support to the movement undoubtedly increased since the votes for RAŚ 
more than doubled between 2006 and 2010 (Table 1). With 8.62% of the valid 
votes the organisation – contrary to former elections – got representation in the 
regional self-government. Due to this result, RAŚ became the fourth strongest 
political group in the Silesian Voivodeship after the Civic Platform (PO), Law and 
Justice (PiS) and the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). Moreover, in three electoral 
districts RAŚ overtook the leftist party. The political support of the organisation 
was especially high in areas where the number of people declaring Silesian identity 
(n 2002) was also high. The winner PO has governed the region together with its 
national coalition partner, the Polish Peasants’ Party (PSL) and with RAŚ. In addi-
tion, Gorzelik was elected to the five-member executive body of the region.  
Table 1.  Results of RAŚ at the regional elections in 2010 (Silesian Voivodeship) 
Electoral district Number of votes Average of valid votes (%) 
2006 2010 2006 2010 
Bielski 1,815 3,570 0.87 1.58 
Katowicki 15,805 35,264 7.69 15.96 
Rybnicki 16,778 32,068 8.14 14.57 
Gliwicki 11,700 17,719 5.93 8.70 
Chorzowski 11,139 29,851 6.95 17.50 
Częstochowski 662 1,263 0.41 0.69 
Sosniowiecki 1,020 3,046 0.48 1.37 
Total 58,919 122,781 4.35 8.62 
Source: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2010. 
During the parliamentary elections in 2011 RAŚ entered for mandates of the 
Senate as a so-called registered voter election committee. They nominated six can-
didates, one in the Opole and five in the Silesian Voivodeship (Table 2). Although 
the results of the last two elections are not comparable due to the divergent elec-
toral districts, it is clear that political support to RAŚ increased significantly. The 
number of votes increased by 18,292, which means that the political base of the 
movement is still growing. Relying on the results of Katowice and Rybnik electoral 
districts – although none of them had mandates – RAŚ can be considered as an 
important political element of the future and the movement will probably be able 
to get mandate(s) in the Senate in the next parliamentary term. Although the 
achieved 7% in the Opole Voivodeship is much lower than in the other region, the 
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result can still be evaluated as a success.11 The supporting base of RAŚ and other 
Silesian organisations will probably continue to grow also in this region in the 
following years. 
Table 2. Results of RAŚ at the parliamentary (Senate) elections in 2011 
Electoral district Number of 
votes 
Average of valid 
votes (%) 
Rank (Number 
of commissions) 
Opole Voivodeship    
53rd district, Opole 6,637  7.06 5 (7) 
Silesian Voivodeship    
70th district, Gliwice 25,037 14.93 3 (4) 
73rd district, Rybnik 26,303 21.92 3 (5) 
74th district, Katowice 41,003 25.30 2 (6) 
75th district, Katowice 34,527 32.35 2 (3) 
78th district, Bielsko-Biała 14,203  6.78 4 (5) 
Source: Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza 2011. 
In order to reveal the background of the organisation’s ideas, the European 
Free Alliance (EFA) should be mentioned as well. RAŚ is a full member (since 
2003) of this umbrella organisation which unites progressive, nationalist, re-
gionalist and autonomist parties in the European Union. Its members are fighting 
for democratic rights and autonomy for different European regions and stateless 
nations, as well as for deeper regionalisation of the member states (Riedel 2006). 
Since the demands of the EFA go beyond the “regionalisation” or “autonomy” 
framework and in view of the recent Scottish and Catalan processes, the fear from 
independence plans of RAS is understandable. Its main goal is now to change the 
current state structure based on the French model towards a Spanish-based re-
gionalised model. In order to clarify their ideas, the organisation prepared a draft 
amendment of the existing Constitution based on the most essential elements of 
the Spanish state system. To avoid separatist accusations, RAŚ lays down in the 
amendment that “the basis of the Constitution is the indissoluble unity of the 
Republic of Poland […] and [the Constitution] recognises and guarantees the right 
for autonomy” (Projekt 2010, Art. 3.), which refers to the establishment of the 
regionalised country.12 The chapter on territorial organisation of the state comple-
                                                                        
11 Earlier RAŚ was not able to nominate candidates even to the regional elections in the 
Opole Voivodeship. 
12 To maintain the unity of the state and prevent separatist accusations, RAŚ tried to build 
such guarantees into the draft which hamper closer co-operation between regional units. 
These, on the one hand, forbid confederation of regions in the interest of independence 
ambitions, on the other hand, apply rigorous terms of collaboration. 
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ments the missed opportunity in 1997 and ensures constitutional status for the 
districts and the autonomous voivodeships as well. The competencies of the 
autonomous voivodeships are more widely defined than in the current Constitu-
tion, but – and that is the unique element in the proposition – the list of functions 
does not mean general commitments for each region. Similarly to the Spanish 
model, namely asymmetric decentralisation (Wódz 2010), the regions can them-
selves define the tasks listed in the Constitution in accordance with the capabili-
ties, opportunities and interests of the area. 
RAŚ worked out a draft statute for the autonomous voivodeship, which would 
regulate the region’s internal functions. Both the planned regulations and the pro-
posed regional institutional systems would base on the Catalan model, although 
some elements would follow the Polish tradition. The draft gives detailed infor-
mation on the institutional, administrative system and the symbols of the autono-
mous voivodeship, but the region’s borders – probably on purpose – are not deter-
mined. As the Statute points out: “the Autonomous Silesian Voivodeship is created 
by counties connected with the region historically, culturally and economically” 
(Statut 2010, Art. 3.). However, this definition – because it is too vague – can lead 
to misunderstandings. It is obvious that RAŚ’s ideas go beyond the existing ad-
ministrative boundaries. A previous draft (Gazeta Wyborcza 2010) specified the 
western and eastern borders of the future region, whereas in the current docu-
ment Opole is the seat of the Administrative Court. From all these a union of the 
Silesian and Opole regions seems to emerge.13 
Although the draft statute does not regulate the physical boundaries of the 
voivodeship, it elaborates on the content of autonomy, namely the institutional 
system, the tasks of each organisation, public policy, public ownership and 
property; and it corresponds to the draft Constitution. Based on the draft statute, it 
can be definitely stated that the organisation’s current projects are not unrealistic. 
The declaration of the strategy was preceded by a long planning process in which 
RAŚ tried to so summarise the demands and needs to be ready for adoption in 
2019, the definite time of the constitutional amendment. In order to achieve this 
goal, a long-term schedule has been elaborated to inform both the country's 
leading political forces and society about the essential elements of the conception. 
RAŚ announced “the Polish Regions” programme, and as a first step they want to 
revive the former organisation, the League of Regions, which joined the fight for 
                                                                        
13 The idea of integration of the two voivodeships raises several problems itself, but there are 
questions about the fate of the Częstochowa area as well, which has no historical or 
geographical links to Upper Silesia, and RAŚ does not vindicate its territory at all. Despite 
several attempts, this area has not been able to successfully integrate into the Silesian Voi-
vodeship and its population is ready to join the Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship (Kaczmarek 
2009). 
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deeper regional processes. RAŚ plans to organise a demonstration March of 
Regions in 2015 in Warsaw, which will be hopefully followed by a referendum on 
constitutional amendments in 2019. The first step of establishing bottom-up 
regional movements in the voivodeships and historical regions seems to be suc-
cessful, since it has visible results. Besides the Unia Wielkopolan, established in 
1990, there are now several organisations fighting for regional autonomy within 
their own voivodeship. Some of them have legal status with statute and member-
ship14, but the majority is still in a chaotic stage and has only a Facebook-profile.15 
However, later these quasi-organisations may become regional political forces 
similar to RAŚ. The nationwide network will definitely exceed current actions and 
civil approach. Supposedly RAŚ is working on the establishment of a national 
political party which could become a real representative body of regions’ interests. 
If the organisation wants to be ready for the national elections in 2015, they have 
to create a national base as soon as possible. 
Conclusions 
RAŚ fights inexorably for political rights. First the organisation tried to vindicate its 
interests by using the minority argument, then – when the recognition of Silesians 
seemed to be unsuccessful – turned indirectly to the political sphere with the aim 
of creating a regionalist party and a regionalised state. The evolution of the 
organisation and the development of its ideas parallels with the Western European 
ethno-regionalist parties, like the brother parties Republican Left of Catalonia 
(Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya) and Scottish National Party. The attempt to 
adapt Western European path in Poland can be theoretically successful, but it is 
doubtful that the regionalised or federal model comes true in Poland. First, it has 
no traditions of decentralised state organisation, secondly, the Scottish referendum 
on independence in 2014 and the growth of separatist aspirations in Catalonia 
since 2009 strengthens the fear in the society of losing the unity of the state. 
The present-day ambitions and doubts of the  ethnic–linguistic trend and its 
claims render decisions of the legislature more difficult. The independent existence 
of Silesian nationality, ethnicity and language are unverifiable unequivocally, but 
Silesian masses of almost one million people cannot be ignored any longer. In this 
situation, the desired decision would be the recognition of Silesian ethnicity 
and/or language, but this has only slight chance because the amendment of the Act 
of Minorities could awake minority consciousness among other unrecognised 
                                                                        
14 Masurian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomii Mazur), Podlasia Autonomy Movement 
(Ruch Autonomii Podlasie). 
15 E.g. Mazovian Autonomy Movement (Ruch Autonomii Mazowsza). 
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groups (such as Kashubs, Górals, Mazurs) and it could strengthen the activity of the 
regionalist–autonomist movement, from which the government undoubtedly 
wants to keep distance.  
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 SPATIAL AND TEMPORAL DISTRIBUTION 
OF ECONOMIC GROWTH AND STAGNATION AREAS 
IN POLAND 
Challenges for Polish Cohesion Policy after 2013 
Paweł Churski – Anna Borowczak 
Introduction 
The process of socio-economic development is characterised by the lack of  spatial 
balance. Due to various conditions and volatile factors endogenous and exogenous 
development processes do not appear with equal intensity in each area. However, 
too large spatial differentiation between development levels may result in a bar-
rier to the course and optimisation of development processes. One of the general 
objectives of the European Union rests upon creating favourable conditions for its 
balanced territorial development. Since the very first years the European Commu-
nities were founded, the necessity to pursue economic and social cohesion has 
been taken for granted. Unfortunately the subsequent extensions of membership 
resulted in deepening the internal developmental differences, entailing a sys-
tematic reinforcement of interventionism targeted at efficient improvement of 
cohesion, while broadening the content of this concept. As a consequence, there 
has been a change in orientation of the EU’s regional policy towards cohesion 
policy, seting its goal for attaining the highest cohesion possible in three dimen-
sions: economic, social and territorial, while abandoning the compensation ap-
proach. A prerequisite underlying this new path is that achieving cohesion does 
not necessarily mean equalising spatial differences, it only means a state where 
these differences are socially and politically acceptable (Faludi 2006, Molle 2007). 
In conclusion, the co-existence of economic growth and stagnation areas is no 
longer considered a development barrier per se. A barrier exists when there are 
very large inequalities in the development levels accompanied by a lack of linkages 
which are substantial for the proper functioning of the spatial system according to 
polarisation and diffusion theories. Adopting this prerequisite to interventions in 
regional policy may impact its objectives, reorientating them from levelling out to 
taking advantage of the endogenous resources through employment, territorial co-
ordination of policies, and multi-level governance (ESPON 2006, European Parlia-
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ment 2008). The change of policy paradigm from compensation to polarisation–
diffusion is widely acclaimed, among others by both the OECD and the World Bank 
(OECD 2008, World Bank 2009, OECD 2010, EC 2011d). However, it becomes con-
troversial when discussing the distribution of the cohesion policy budget. The 
lagging countries and regions are apparently afraid of the compensation paradigm 
to be abandoned, leading to a partial loss of structural allocations, which now may 
be directed to core regions.  
This paper aims at identifying the current state and dynamics of socio-
economic development discrepancies in Poland, that may be challenging for eco-
nomic policy at both country and regional levels in terms of complying with the 
EU’s cohesion policy after 2013. It will analyse: 
(1) characteristics and objectives of EU cohesion policy after 2013;  
(2) analysis of the discrepancies in the socio-economic development in Poland 
at regional and subregional levels;  
(3) and finally it will give conclusions and recommendations for targeting the 
cohesion policy in Poland with respect to identified spatial differences and 
EU cohesion policy in 2014–2020.  
The analysis will be carried out in two spatial dimensions: regional – NUTS 2 
(16 Polish voivodeships) and subregional – NUTS 4 (379 Polish poviats), its scope 
being determined by the accessibility of statistical data. It is the official database of 
the Polish Central Statistical Office that is used. The analysis covers  the period of 
2000–2010.   
The results presented here are those of the project “Socio-Economic Growth 
and Emergence of Growth and Economic Stagnation Areas”, financed by the Na-
tional Centre of Science (N N306 791940). This project is undertaken by the 
Research Focus Group, Regional Analysis Department, Institute of Socio-Economic 
Geography and Spatial Management Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań. 
Scope and Objectives of the EU Cohesion Policy after 2013 
The new programming period of the EU’s budget is challenging for member states. 
First, the united Europe shows low resistance to the consequences of the world 
economic crisis, its position is even weakening on the global markets. Secondly, 
member states constantly attempt to stabilise the economic situation of the Euro 
Zone and elaborate efficient mechanisms of monitoring the macroeconomic poli-
cies preventing crises from deepening in specific member states, which would 
affect the whole European Union. Thirdly, there is a lack of satisfying effects of the 
present cohesion policy in mobilising the European Council, Parliament and Com-
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mission together with governments to search for better solutions in programming, 
implementing and monitoring the policy.  
On 29th June 2011 the European Commission adopted a draft of “Multiannual  
Financial Frameworks 2014–20” (EC 2011b) and “A Budget for Europe 2020” (EC 
2011a). Here the EU Commission presented assumptions underlying the new pro-
gramming period of 2014–20 and defined their relationship to the Growth Strategy 
in Europe (EC 2011d). In order to specify the assumptions underlying cohesion 
policy, the European Commission initiated a legislative package proposal for con-
sultation on October 6th 2011 (EC 2011c). According to it, cohesion policy in the 
new programming period is to support not only actions stimulating economic 
growth, but also the levelling out of differences and the consequences of economic 
crisis. The policy is simplified and its orientation must be determined upon the 
momentary effects. It is a significant change that a common conditionality rule is 
introduced as one of the basic instruments boosting the efficiency and effective-
ness of interventions co-financed from the EU public funds amounting to 339 bil-
lion euros.  
The new programming period 2014–2020 of cohesion policy is targeted at  
accomplishing two general objectives (EC 2012a): 
Objective 1: Investment in growth and jobs – covering actions financed from 
European Regional Development Fund, European Social Fund and Cohesion Fund – 
96.5% of input planned. 
Objective 2: European Territorial Co-operation – actions financed from Euro-
pean Regional Development Fund – 3.5% of input planned. 
Reducing the number of objectives from three to two versus the financial 
perspective of  2007–2013 signifies the further concentration of means, confirmed 
by the spatial (geographic) and substantial scope of the policy.  
Geographic concentration, while generally encompassing all EU territories, still 
includes some preferences for lagging areas. In Objective 1 all European regions 
are to be classified according to GDP per capita into three groups (EC 2012b):  
 lagging regions: with GDP per capita <75% of EU average – 50% of resources 
allocated to Objective 1, covering 119.2 million EU citizens; 
 phasing in/out regions with GDP per capita ranging from: >75% to <90% – 
11.1% of resources allocated to Objective 1, covering 72.4 million EU citi-
zens;  
 well-developed regions: with GDP per capita >90% – 16.9% of resources 
allocated to Objective 1, covering 307.1 million EU citizens. 
In addition to the interventions framed within Objective 1, regions of countries 
having GNP below 90% of EU average will be supported from the Cohesion Fund 
(21.6% of means allocated for Objective 1). The intervention will be complemented 
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by special actions for remote or low-dense territories, specified in Article 349 of 
the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union and in the Treaty of Accession 
of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union, supported by 0.4% of the 
resources allocated in this objective. Objective 2 will be implemented in cross-
border and other geographically indicated areas covering supranational territorial 
co-operation. With regard to its limited budget, this intervention will be of comple-
mentary and local significance (EC 2012c).  
Apart from the two aforementioned objectives, the substantial concentration 
can be found in the implementation of Europe 2020 – a strategy for smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive growth (EC 2010). As a result, the interventions undertaken 
in the regions of the united Europe will have to fulfil the requirements in this most 
important EU strategic document. In order to orientate the activities of the bene-
ficiaries of cohesion policy, the European Commission proposes 11 thematic objec-
tives (EC 2012d), corresponding to Europe 2020 on one hand and being the vital 
development challenges of the EU on the other: 
(1) strengthening research, technological development and innovation; 
(2) enhancing access to, and use and quality of, information and communica-
tion technologies; 
(3) enhancing the competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
the agricultural sector and the fisheries and aquaculture sector;  
(4) supporting the shift towards a low-carbon economy in all sectors; 
(5) promoting climate change adaptation, risk prevention and management; 
(6) protecting the environment and promoting resource efficiency; 
(7) promoting sustainable transport and removing bottlenecks in key net-
work infrastructures; 
(8) promoting employment and supporting labour mobility; 
(9) promoting social inclusion and combating poverty; 
(10) investing in education, skills and lifelong learning; 
(11) enhancing institutional capacity and an efficient public administration. 
The indicated scope and objectives of the new cohesion policy for 2014–2020 
will also be supported by many organisational changes, the most important being 
the integrated strategic programming in territorial dimension based on multifund, 
common strategic frameworks and partner contracts (EC 2012e). The conditionali-
ty rule may bring fundamental improvement in effectiveness. It will rest upon both 
ex-ante conditionality (accession, including concentration of actions) and ex-post 
conditionality (reward bonus), and what matters most with regard to the current 
financial situation in Europe also macroeconomic conditionality (possibility of 
suspending payments). The procedures will become more flexible and simple, and  
financial instruments more accessible; there will be Joint Action Plan and e-
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administration decreasing the costs of cohesion policy implementation will be pro-
moted. 
Analysis of Differences in Socio-economic Development and Dynamics at 
Regional and Subregional Levels in Poland 
Analysing the differences in socio-economic development and dynamics requires a 
procedure enabling us to identify points (objects) in multidimensional space. In 
this case objects are identical with territorial units as defined in the Nomenclature 
of Units for Territorial Statistics – NUTS 2 voivodeships and NUTS 4 poviats. 
Dimensions describing the position of these objects in multidimensional space are 
identical to the values of indices defined for each moment in time. Indices express 
the specific characteristics of the process of socio-economic development, covering 
the following aspects: population and settlement, labour market and economic 
structure, technical infrastructure and spatial accessibility, financial situation and 
the level of affluence, innovative economy and business environment, and in 
general systemic approach, too. In our research a Z-score index and k-smooth 
cluster analysis were applied. Z-score index was used to determine an average 
standardised value of all indices (characteristics describing the position of objects). 
It is thus a synthetic metaindicator measuring the socio-economic development 
level for each territorial unit. Based on the Z-score index values, territorial units 
were then classified with the use of k-smooth cluster analysis. This method helped 
identify clusters of similar Z-score values with regard to the lowest possible 
variance of index values in each cluster (Morrison 1990, Szymla 2000). The 
econometric analysis was employed to distinguish three groups of objects: the 
ones having 
  the relatively lowest values – identified as stagnation areas,  
  average values, and 
  the relatively highest values – identified as growth areas. 
The analysis covered the time period between 2000 and 2010, and included all 
data for these territorial units made available by the Central Statistical Office’s 
Local Database. 
The research procedure was composed of three basic steps: selection, clus-
tering and classification. At the stage of selection, characteristics describing the 
socio-economic development were scrutinised with autocorrelation procedure and 
submitted to a content-related assessment of their merit. The first assumption 
underlying this stage was to eliminate all characteristics that displayed the auto-
correlation of r2>0.5 in the period of at least seven years. However, all characteris-
tics that were to be removed from further analysis were also assessed in terms of 
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their actual content-related merit for conditioning the socio-economic develop-
ment process  and their meaning in the process in a general approach. The result of 
content-related assessment was therefore deciding in the selection procedure. The 
second assumption underlying this stage was to eliminate at least 50% of the ini-
tial number of characteristics in the database. Clustering the objects – territorial 
units – led us to divide them into three groups according to the relatively high 
similarity with k-cluster analysis. At this stage four methods were tested: stand-
ardised k-clustering of mode values, smooth k-clustering of Z-score index, smooth 
k-clustering of the first three PCA-values and smooth k-clustering of Z-score index 
with averaged clusters’ thresholds applied for all 11 observations in the period of 
2000–2010. With regard to various advantages and disadvantages of these meth-
ods, a smooth k-clustering of Z-score index with averaged clusters’ thresholds was 
finally chosen for the purpose of further research (Churski – Hauke 2012). Classifi-
cation of the objects (territorial units) rested upon the interpretation of three 
groups (clusters) in the context of stagnation and growth areas.  
The research has been conducted separately for each level of analysis: regional 
and subregional, and the results obtained are illustrated in Figures 1 and 2.   
On the basis of the regional approach the following conclusions can be drawn: 
 Mazovia (Mazowieckie Voivodeship with the capital city of Warsaw) is a 
single object clustered in the group corresponding to growth areas, and it did 
not change during the analysed period of 2000–2010. 
 The cluster of regions characterised by the lowest development level  is not 
diverse; these regions are located at the eastern border, i.e. the poorest area 
of Poland, but also at the the western border, Lubuskie Voivodeship, close to 
the EU, however, despite their convenient location they do not benefit from 
the positive impacts of the Berlin and Poznań agglomerations. In most cases 
regions located at the Eastern border belong to stagnation areas from par-
ticular aspects, implying a relatively low efficiency in using structural funds 
allocated to them. 
 Growth and stagnation areas are mostly characterised by  various levels of fi-
nancial possibilities and innovation. Diversification of the labour market and 
economic structure or the availability of technical infrastructure seem to 
have a relatively lower impact. 
 The highest polarisation at regional level was found in the financial situation 
and the level of affluence: the capital of Mazovia region in 2000–2010 and 
Lower Silesia (Dolnoslaskie Voivodeship) only in 2010. 
 The most balanced spatial distribution was noted in the case of population 
and settlement. 
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The regional approach led to the following conclusions: 
 Clustering of growth areas is the least numerous and includes three catego-
ries of units (poviats). To the first category belong cities and towns classified 
as urban poviats. The second category includes “resource-rich poviats” with 
large plants of mining industry and  characterised by the best financial situa-
tion among all units in Poland. To third category belong poviats with profita-
ble enterprises, operating primarily in the chemical industry.  
 Complementary to these categories are land poviats located in the direct 
neighbourhood of urban poviats, together constituting metropolitan areas. 
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Figure 1. Socio-economic differences at regional level in Poland in 2000–2010 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Figure  2.  Socio-economic differences at subregional level in Poland in 2000–2010 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 Clustering of economic stagnation areas is far more numerous than that of 
growth areas. In this group land poviats located especially in the eastern and 
central part of Poland dominate. The spatial distribution reflects historical 
boundaries (political boundaries from 1815–1919), which clearly divide the 
socio-economic space of Poland even today. Moreover, this cluster also in-
cludes poviats having suffered from deep structural problems resulting 
from: a high share of formerly (in the communist era) state-owned agricul-
tural farms (the north-western and north-eastern parts of Poland), dispersed 
and small agricultural farms (poviats in the eastern part of Poland), and 
monofunctional labour markets, because the local economy was based on 
one enterprise and thus depended on its situation, and also bankruptcies 
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impacting the socio-economic development of the whole area (occurring all 
over the country).  
 Urban poviats belong to the cluster of growth areas from all the  analysed 
development aspects. The influence exerted on the development of their 
economic background is clearly visible in the aspects of population and 
settlement as well as labour market and economic structure.  
 There are various stagnation areas depending on the development aspect 
concerned. Their largest number was found when their financial situation 
and level of affluence was measured, whereas the lowest when their com-
bined situation in population, settlement, labour market and economic struc-
ture was examined (a high share of these units displayed average develop-
ment levels).  
Conclusions and Recommendations 
The outcomes of this research allow us to make the following conclusions and  
recommendations for the future (2014–2020) cohesion policy in Poland:  
(a) Interventions used so far in the framework of regional policy in Poland 
have led to rather ambiguous development effects at both regional and 
subregional levels (Borowczak – Churski – Perdał 2012). 
(b) All Polish regions, whether they are growth or stagnation regions, are iden-
tified in the EU cohesion policy 2014–2020 as lagging or phasing-in (capital 
of Mazovia) regions, requiring development incentives and levelling out the 
discrepancies. 
(c) Content-related orientation of actions should be based on identified dif-
ferencesin development impacted by particular aspects: 
 Strong concentration of means for improving networks as well as the 
scope and ranges of functional linkages both at regional and subregional 
levels, which will probably strengthen spill-over effects, now only ob-
served in the direct neighborhood of the biggest agglomerations. 
 Among the goals, including the 11 thematic objectives of cohesion policy 
2014–2020, special attention should be paid to improving the level of 
innovativeness and developing the business environment, as these fac-
tors highly differentiate the economic space of Poland. as Attention 
should also be paid to developing the financial support for 
entrepreneurs, as it is substantial for them under the conditions of 
growing indebtedness of the public finance sector and their decreasing 
absorption potential. The use of non-grant, i.e. recyclable assistance is 
strongly recommended to boost the effectiveness of this measure. 
 It is recommended to improve intervention directed at human capital, 
as it has not brought effective results, which is confirmed by the slightly 
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differentiated situation in the area of population, settlement, labour 
market and economic structure. 
(d) Spatial orientation of actions should be based on conclusions drawn from 
the spatial distribution of  socio-economic development at regional and 
subregional levels:  
 maintaining compensation support for regions in East Poland; 
 intensifying support for big urban agglomerations and also subregional 
centres in order to strengthen their development capacities with special 
attention to broadening the functional linkages; 
 supporting rural areas threatened by permanent marginalisation, ena-
bling them to develop endogenous capitals as a base for their multifunc-
tional development on one hand and to shape their linkages with 
growth areas on the other. 
(e) New instruments of cohesion policy envisioned for 2014–2020, and espe-
cially integrated territorial investments, may bring a relevant contribution 
to  shaping the functional linkages between growth and stagnation areas, 
while creating efficient conditions for a polarisation-diffusion model from a 
bottom-up perspective. 
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 HISTORY AND PRESENT OF REGIONAL AND 
MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE IN SLOVAKIA 
Jan Buček 
Introduction 
More than ten years have passed since the Slovakian public administration reform 
(2002), and our regions look back to a past of fifteen years from their 1996 demar-
cation. Such a time-span allows us to pose questions whether our preliminary ex-
pectations have been fulfilled. Could regional-level governance contribute to the 
development of the respective regions, mitigating the deep social and economic 
disparities among them? What is the current political status of regions and 
regional governance in Slovakia, and what do citizens think about it? If we just take 
a look at the main social and economic indicators or the extremely low electoral 
participation levels, we could find unsatisfactory answers to both questions. The 
development of regions and regional institutions has not taken place without con-
tradictions. Though certain experiences signify that the importance of regions and 
regional governance has been growing, their role in the promotion of regional 
development, their position in political life, and especially their recognition by the 
citizens is clearly insufficient (based on e.g. Buček 2011). 
Our paper investigates the possible roots of these problems, aiming to find 
solutions. Our approach could be characterised by the combination of temporal, 
spatial and institutional aspects. First, we focus on the stability, spatial dimension 
and horizontal linkages of regional governance based on considerations of old and 
new regionalism, regional space, and issues of regionalisation as presented for 
example by Paasi (2011), Griffin (2012), or Zimmerbauer and Paasi (2013). 
Secondly, we address the issue of multi-level governance, that is, the vertical con-
nections concerning primarily the influence of other levels of public administration 
on regional bodies. As in the case of many other countries, it is questionable 
whether we can talk about a “layer cake” or a “marble cake” organisation of public 
administration (see e.g. Hooghe – Marks 2003, Entwistle et al. 2012), and to what 
extent vertical relations in governance develop in favour of regional self-govern-
ance. 
We argue that the inappropriate spatial demarcation of regions causes difficul-
ties both in the healthy development of horizontal governance linkages and in the 
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identification of citizens and institutional entities with their regions, leading to low 
activity and participation at the regional level. The institutional vacuum between 
the current eight regions and the small local governments call for revision, in the 
course of which the traditional territorial structure should be taken into account. 
Finally, we emphasise that the role and position of the regional level is under 
permanent pressure by the better established and more influential national and 
local levels. Although the relevance of the region in governance is seemingly 
growing, in practice it continuously faces “opposing forces”. The initial effort to 
build a layered model of quasi-autonomous levels of government without strong 
vertical links could not make its way through. Though formally regions are self-
governing, the “layer cake” is strongly supplemented by indirect multi-level gov-
ernance. 
The “Dual” and “Layer Cake” Model of Regional Self-governance 
Regions in Slovakia would represent the typical meso-level in the spatial structure 
of governance. However, in spite of the general effort to build a governmental 
structure combining a “dual” (separate lines of state administration and self-
government at the same territorial level) and a “layer cake” model (vertically 
separated levels of governance with clear responsibilities), the role and position of 
regions is under permanent pressure of the better established and more influential 
levels of government. Both local governments and the central state have strong 
participation in regional-level decisions through their representatives in the re-
gional bodies, and the central state is reluctant to delegate further powers and 
resources to the spatial meso-level. 
After the change of regime, first a clear preference was given to the dual model 
of public administration, introducing two parallel but separate lines at the same 
territorial level – those of the state administration and the formally self-governing 
regions. In the early years of the state building process in the 1990s, state 
administration had dominant influence, and also the formation of the meso-level 
was determined by state centrist views instead of a vision of partly independent 
regions. Later another key approach emerged, to build a vertical governmental 
structure, in principle as a “layer cake”, at three levels – central, regional, and local. 
However, certain weaknesses of the regional level compared to the other two have 
been identified already before the introduction of regional self-governing institu-
tions. The lack of constitutional background of the regional level had to be changed 
by an amendment to the Slovak Constitution (in February 2001). As a result, 
legally speaking the region was granted the same independence as the settlements, 
having both sub-national levels defined as separate legal entities, not accountable 
to each other. This attempt to strictly distribute powers and resources among the 
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territorial levels pointed towards giving preference to a “layer cake” model of 
governance. On the other hand, it has to be underlined that while state administra-
tion at the regional level started operation already in 1996, regional self-governing 
institutions were introduced only in 2002 and, as “latecomers”, they have to fight 
for consolidating their positions within the system of power distribution. 
Due to their strong identification with the functioning of the communist regime, 
former regions were ceased immediately after 1989. Though their reconstitution 
was under constant debate, the region was established as a level of political and 
territorial organisation of the country only in 1996, and only with state administra-
tion bodies (during the government of V. Mečiar). This meant the establishment of 
eight Regional Offices of state administration with powers deconcentrated by the 
state. However, after a short period they started to lose their positions and op-
erated as offices of the general state administration, or as offices of the so-called 
“specialised” state administration. From 2002 on, they lost their importance step 
by step due to the transfer of powers in favour of the newly established regional 
self-governing bodies, keeping only residual functions (business registration, civil 
protection, crisis management, general state administration) up to 2004. Then, 
“Regional Offices” (Slov. Krajský úrad) were replaced by so-called “Regional Offices 
of the general state administration”, partly because there had been more or less 
parallel networks of regional offices of “specialised” state administration (subordi-
nated to respective ministries). However, the limited scope of powers led to their 
full cessation in 2007, while a set of specialised regional offices survived. 
The latest change concerning state administration at the regional level started 
to be introduced in January 2013. Existing regional offices of the specialised state 
administration were partly integrated, but mostly closed. To simplify the structure, 
their powers have been generally transferred to territorial offices in the cities. 
These changes concerned 64 regional offices mostly with reduced powers in edu-
cation, environment management, military administration, land administration or 
forestry. Reorganisation is expected to generate savings of about EUR 700 million 
between 2013 and 2016, increasing governance efficiency also by integrating the 
previously fragmented specialised offices of territorial-level state administration. 
The nature of this reorganisation influenced the perception of regions and regional 
self-governance, too. On the one hand, the retreat of regional state administration 
is good for the independence of regional bodies which have become dominant 
actors at the regional level, but on the other hand it may result in less respect to 
the region at least among certain groups of actors at the central political level. 
Regional self-governing bodies started operation in 2002, following the election 
of their representatives in 2001. The first period (2002–2005) of operation could 
be interpreted as “the beginnings”, focusing mainly on issues of establishment 
(buildings, staff, property), coping with the transfer of powers (mostly from the 
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regional state administration), and circumscribed by the missing autonomy in 
financial matters. The fight for respect, and building the image of an efficient level 
of government were left to later periods. 
After the first electoral term (from 2006), the region was increasingly gaining 
importance both in the political sphere and within society. This was expressed in 
the stabilisation of powers, the completion of fiscal decentralisation, and a more 
intensive policy involvement. Directly elected regional chairpersons have been 
much more active in the media and in solving problems related to sensitive politi-
cal issues. Regions have started to be perceived as an attractive field of political 
action. Central-level politicians (members of parliament, ministers, deputy minis-
ters) as well as local political representatives started to appreciate this level of 
government much higher, especially since the second term (after the decentralisa-
tion of powers and fiscal decentralisation). Regional councils have become attrac-
tive not only for numerous mayors, vice-mayors, and regional leaders of the politi-
cal parties, but also for “political strata” previously focusing only on central-level 
policy-making. The post of regional chairperson (directly elected chair of a region) 
attracted former ministers, members of parliament, or mayors of the largest Slovak 
cities. In fact, all regional chairpersons elected in 2009 had experiences at other 
levels of the public administration and policy-making. Five out of eight had been 
members of parliament, one had experiences as the mayor of the second largest 
Slovak city (Košice), and the rest had been serving as regional chairpersons in 
earlier electoral periods (Buček 2011). However, neither the representatives of 
local governments are missing: Krivý (2010) evaluated the composition of all 
newly elected regional councils (2009 elections), and found 26.7% of the mayors 
among the members (and also 4.4% of the members of parliament). 
In contrast to the above-presented evolution of regional independence, the 
dominance of the central level in political life and low respect for regionalisation 
are visible in the existence of only one single electoral district for parliamentary 
elections. It seriously limits the possibility of deeper identification with regions as 
politically influential entities. It seems now hard to imagine any further change, e.g. 
establishing 8 or even more electoral districts for parliamentary elections, or at 
least four electoral districts as was the case at the beginning of the 1990s. The 
missing direct representation of regions in country-level political decisions limits 
the representation of regional social and political interests as well. 
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“Old” and “New” Regions – the Absence of Continuity 
Regions as territorial units and regional governments were subjects to constant 
“destabilisation” in 20th-century Slovakia. Following the terminology of Zimmer-
bauer and Paasi (2013), the numerous changes in the demarcation of regions and 
in the roles of their institutions could be interpreted as frequent “de-institutionali-
sation” of the meso-level, questioning the substance and sense of regional-level 
governance, and leading to unstable relations between regions, their governments, 
and the citizens. Especially since the beginning of the communist period, regional 
institutions have been strongly influenced by political decisions, based on pre-
vailing economic and ideological assumptions. Regions were split as well as inte-
grated into different units on several occasions, with changing borders and radical 
institutional restructuring. Issues like regional identity, regional consciousness or 
citizens’ participation as factors of economic success of a region and potentials for 
widespread activism and mobilisation were set aside. The spatial, complex geo-
graphical aspects of regions became downgraded with a focus on resources and 
powers, resulting in simplified notions of regional development and competitive-
ness. 
Thus in the case of Slovakia we can identify discontinuity between “old” and 
“new” regionalism. Traditional, historical regions that functioned until the 
formation of Czechoslovakia could be regarded as institutions of “old regionalism”. 
Not even the tempests of history could ruin the deeply rooted regional structure 
and consciousness, especially in certain parts of the country. Traditional regions as 
cultural regions can still be found in Slovakia, following more or less the old 
regional borders (see e.g. Beňušková 2005, presenting 17 regions). As a contrast, 
by “new regionalism” we mean the unstable variants of regional division and 
structures applied during the 20th century, whether we speak of the large regions 
of the communist era or the current regional structure. We link new regionalism to 
“regional spaces”, economic growth and competitiveness. Old regionalism is closer 
to “spaces of regionalism”, bottom-up formation of regions, activism and mobilisa-
tion, a widely perceived regional culture and regional consciousness. We suppose 
that this division in the regional approach can partially explain the slowly growing 
efficiency and respect of regional self-governance, the moderate participation of 
citizens and weaker social identification with the regions.  
As regards the historical antecedents, on the territory of current Slovakia there 
had been a long-lasting tradition of meso-level governance. Since the Middle Ages, 
many forms of public administration had existed on the regional level until the 
formation of Czechoslovakia. Nevertheless, we can find a quite solid territorial 
structure of 17–21 regions. During the 20th century this level of government faced 
many challenges, having to adapt to various goals and external influences. Under 
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the communist regime, regions were strongly linked to central control over the ter-
ritories and citizens, expressed by the dominant role of the communist party in the 
regions. The so-called “large regions” (three, and later four regional units in 
Slovakia from 1960 to 1990) were in fact artificial administrative units, playing im-
portant economic roles strongly incorporated into the central planning system, 
subordinated to the socialist economic planning logic, without any stronger link to 
the traditional regional division. They were internally diversified, with inherent 
conflicts between sub-regions and their leading cities. This subordination of re-
gions to dominant political goals was the main reason why regional-level govern-
ments were ceased immediately after 1989.  
The unclear fate of meso-level governance in Slovakia during the first years of 
post-communist transition was related to various factors. Contrary to official 
declarations, the strong political interests and capacities to form a meso-level 
political–administrative system were missing after 1989. Political parties were 
“young”, without clear structures of regional representation. Efforts were focused 
on two major and stable levels of political and administrative organisation: the 
central and the local levels. Public services delivery and administration were easier 
to organise at the local (area, district, settlement) and the central levels as natural 
fields of political action and the mobilisation of citizens. These two levels could 
play a much more important role in the success of post-socialist transition than the 
regional one. Moreover, to eliminate uncertainties of the transition process (e.g. 
pushing the proponents of the previous regime into the background), the simplest 
way was the immediate termination of regional bodies after 1989. Though it was 
accompanied by proclaimed intention to create new regional institutions later, at 
the very early years of transition the regional level had no strong political advo-
cates. Having had bad experiences with subordination to and dependence on 
higher levels of administration including regions during the communist era, 
neither local governments happened to be interested in regionalisation. The 
picture was complicated further by the consensus that the new regional structure 
should differ from the previous one, leading to a lasting debate on demarcation. 
The decision was finally taken in 1996, when less space was provided to “voices 
from below” and to the political opposition supporting a higher number of regions. 
Based on the experiences during the communist regime, we could expect a 
turning-back to “old” regionalism after 1989. There emerged a quite wide recogni-
tion of traditional regions, resulting in two attempts to exploit important ad-
vantages of old regionalism. The first one appeared logically already at the begin-
ning of 1990s, however, the proposal for territorial division closer to traditional 
regions remained as an alternative that did not survive the frequent political 
changes at the central level. The traditionalist, conservative and at that time in-
fluential Christian Democratic Party (then led by Prime Minister Ján Čarnogurský) 
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decided to initiate preparatory works on a proposal with 16 self-governing regions 
(and 77 districts serving state administration). It was supported also by the Union 
of Towns (an association of larger cities), however, the position of the more 
influential Association of Towns and Communities was not so equivocal. Argu-
ments for and against the proposal were mostly geographical and historical in 
nature, having been inspired by traditional and cultural regions. The short-lived 
alternative lost political support after 1992. 
The second attempt to apply a territorial administrative division closer to “old” 
regions was even stronger. At the turn of millennium, a proposal came to light in 
the framework of the public administration reform executed by the first govern-
ment of Prime Minister Mikuláš Dzurinda (1998–2002), aiming to establish 12 
regions as key actors in public administration. Considerable efforts were dedicated 
to build a wide consensus and to reach an acceptable compromise on the issue 
(especially thanks to the responsible Government Plenipotentiary V. Nižňanský), 
also within the regions and with representatives of the local level. Unfortunately, 
though this “territorial” part of the reform package attained wide support, it did 
not pass in the Slovak Parliament. Finally, due to the loss of political support of a 
part of the then governing coalition, a large-scale public administration reform 
became adopted without any changes in the regional division of the country, with 
the chances for getting closer to the “old” regions lost probably for a long time. 
As a result of developments in the post-communist period, we can consider the 
spatial organisation of governance in Slovakia unbalanced, with an obvious 
functional vacuum between fragmented local governments and the eight regions. 
Neither the position of other traditional (e.g. districts) and functional territorial 
levels (e.g. urban regions) is clear. The weakness of functional territorial units 
seems problematic especially from a regional development and regional govern-
ance point of view. In areas without stronger urban centres and sufficient 
capacities, the absence of certain regional bodies has led to inefficient operation. 
It seems that proponents of the adopted regional structure did not take into 
account the possible consequences of the deviation from deeply rooted regional 
traditions. The role of identity, memory, roots, developed linkages and perception 
have been underestimated for decades, and they still are, although with a better 
perspective for positive change. Restructuring brought fundamental institutional 
changes and the weakening of the earlier framework and relationships. To a cer-
tain extent we can accept that this was “part of the game”, that is, there was real 
interest to eliminate the “socialist” regions and their institutions in order to “de-
throne” those who used them as a source of power, while it was neglected that 
“tacit values of old regionalism” and continuity could be useful in future, in the next 
stages of regional development.  
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Conclusions 
Although there is a strong tradition of and respect for the territorial meso-level in 
Slovakia, recent reforms have underestimated some of its important aspects, pri-
marily regional identity and consciousness, and the role of regional governing 
bodies in the development of the region and in mobilising the citizens. It seems 
that these functions are considered as ones that cannot be helpful in progress. 
Instead, a modernisation logic prevailed – a new region should be economically 
strong, competitive, large enough, and led by urban centres. This also means that 
traditional regions have no important integrating institutions. They have been 
fragmented into smaller units, and have remained only as mental borders in the 
mind of citizens. In fact, the current regional structure rather serves state-level 
policy-making than local or regional interests and the related tradition. 
The central state dominates over the regions, and limits their scope of action. 
The political structure is too centralised, political parties are not really regional-
ised. Regional functions have been destabilised, “de-institutionalised”, rendering 
current regions more or less artificial constructions. The position of regions could 
be strengthened e.g. by the reintroduction of regional electoral districts at the na-
tional parliamentary elections. Without such changes, decades would pass without 
any real progress in regionalisation, and regional identification. Probably a model, 
or elements of a model, somewhat closer to the old regions would still have bene-
fits. 
Present Slovak regions, especially in representing the territorial division of the 
country, constitute one of the most solid and still working “monuments” of the 
government of the controversial prime minister, Vladimír Mečiar. Their borders 
have not been modified by later reforms, mainly owing to the fragmentation of 
political space and to the reluctance to reopen the debate on demarcation. Unfor-
tunately, the reform of Dzurinda’s government did not pass, and now we can 
hardly expect any quick change. A few years ago arguments against a regional 
reform were based on the already adopted regional development documents 
necessary for the absorption of EU funds, now the lack of resources and capacity 
resulting from the financial and debt crisis are referred to as main obstacles. 
Nevertheless, the current regional structure and the mechanisms of regional 
governance have to be reconsidered and adjusted in the future. At least a few steps 
should be taken, among them filling the gap between local governments and 
regional-level administration. This could be carried out by the formation of larger 
local units (e.g. by amalgamation), or by informal institutional actors. Certain tradi-
tions are still alive in existing regional associations of towns and communities. We 
look forward to a future attempt to search the possibilities of a successful compro-
mise on the integration of specific aspects of old and new regionalism in Slovakia. 
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 FRAGMENTED STRUCTURE OF MUNICIPALITIES IN THE 
CZECH REPUBLIC – AN ADVANTAGE OR A PROBLEM? 
Michal Illner 
 
Compared with many other European countries, the Czech Republic’s settlement 
structure is highly fragmented, distinguishing itself by a particularly large propor-
tion of small settlement units – villages and small towns more-or-less evenly dis-
tributed over the country’s territory. The fragmented settlement structure plus 
further factors to be mentioned later resulted in a highly fragmented structure of 
local government. In a country with 10.5 million inhabitants there existed (as of 
1.1.2012) 6251 municipalities of which more than one half (3485) had fewer than 
500 inhabitants (Malý lexikon obcí České republiky 2012). Among the EU member 
states only in Cyprus was the average population size of a municipality (1521 in 
2007) smaller than in the Czech Republic (1675 persons). There are two other 
countries that approached this figure: France with 1754 and Slovakia with 1872 
average population in their municipalities (Loughlin – Hendriks – Lidström 2011, 
Appendix 1, p. 743). 
The Czech municipalities consist of altogether 15,067 local parts, mostly spa-
tially separated localities, on average 2.4 local parts per municipality. All munici-
palities – irrespective of their size – are self-administering entities with their own 
elected municipal councils and mayors, they own property and budgets, and enjoy 
other  privileges guaranteed for them by the Constitution of the Czech Republic 
and by further legislation (Table 1). 
Besides geographic and historical circumstances, the present fragmented struc-
ture of municipalities is an unplanned by-product of the democratisation of 
Czechoslovakia after the collapse of the communist regime in 1989. Namely, there 
was a spontaneous reaction to perceived injustices caused under that regime to 
smaller localities by their forced administrative amalgamations in 1950–1960 and 
then again in the 1970s and early 1980s. As a consequence of those mostly forced 
measures the number of municipalities dropped by 25% between 1950 and 1961 
and then by another 53% until 1989.  
After the demise of the old regime a reverse process took place and the number 
of municipalities increased by one half during the years 1989–1993 (from 4120  
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Table 1.  Size structure of municipalities in the Czech Republic, 2012 
Population size categories Municipalities Population 
N % N % 
 – 199 1,468 23.5 181,851 1.7 
 200 – 499 2,017 32.3 658,207 6.3 
 500 – 999 1,366 21.8 962,918 9.2 
 1,000 – 1,999 727 11.6 1,017,529 9,7 
 2,000 – 4,999 400 6,3 1,215,137 11.6 
 5,000 – 9,999 142 2.3 971,336 9.2 
 10,000 – 19,999 68 1.1 954,676 9.1 
 20,000 – 49,999 42 0.7 1,217,062 11.6 
 50,000 – 99,999 16 0.3 1,137,171 10.8 
100,000 – 5 0.1 2,189,558 20.8 
Total 6,251 100.0 10,505,445 100.0 
Source: Malý lexikon obcí ČR 2012, Český statistický úřad 2012 [Small Lexicon of Munici-
palities in the Czech Republic 2012, Czech Statistical Office 2012]. 
units in 1989 to 6196  in 1993), mostly due to the disintegration of formerly amal-
gamated communities. The process of disintegration continued at a declining rate 
until 2001 when it came to a standstill: 337 new municipalities were established in 
1992, 104 in 1993 and 36 in 1994, after which the number of municipalities has 
stabilised at about 6250, with slight oscillations around this figure (see Table 2). 
This situation has persisted until the present time. An overwhelming majority of 
the new municipalities were small communities – about half of them with fewer 
than 200 inhabitants (Vajdová – Čermák 2006, p. 32). 
This fragmentation was a spontaneous process driven mostly by local ambi-
tions to make up for the injustices mentioned above and  was a component of the 
general process of rectifying the political and administrative damages caused by 
the communist regime. In late 1989 and most of 1990, when new municipalities 
mushroomed, splitting was a more-or-less unregulated process. The chance to 
restore their administrative and political independence of which they had been 
deprived in the previous decades activated local initiatives and civic participation 
in many villages. Other motives for separation were a desire to escape the real or 
imagined discrimination the seceding communties had experienced as parts of the 
central villages or townships, locally specific personal tensions, traditional antipa-
thies between neighboring settlements and, rarely, also an expectation of eco-
nomic gain (Illner 2010a, pp. 221–223). The symbolic value of the administrative 
and political autonomy of their own village or township, however small it was, 
often appeared more important to their inhabitants than the potential benefits of 
being part of a larger and stronger municipality. The small is beautiful attitude 
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Table 2. Number of municipalities in the Czech Republic, 1950–2012 
Year Number of municipalities 
1950 11,459 
1961 8,726 
1970 7,511 
1980 4,778 
1989 4,120 
1991 5,768 
1993 6,196 
1995 6,232 
2001 6,258 
2007 6,249 
2010 6,250 
2012 6,251 
Source: Czech (Czechoslovak)  Statistical Office. 
frequently prevailed over the economy of scale logic promoted by the top-down 
local government reforms in 1970–1980s. 
Let me illustrate this (now already historical) development by two real life ex-
amples. The first one describes the damages village XZ suffered by its forced  mer-
ger with a nearby township in 1975, the instability of this merger and its eventual 
abolition. The other example shows the perseverance of the mayor of ZY in de-
fending his village’s autonomy against the threat of a forced administrative amal-
gamation with neighboring municipalities by entering into co-operative relations 
with them.  
XZ is a village in Central Bohemia. According to historical records it was 
founded in the Middle Ages and, in spite of many turbulences, has survived until 
the present time. After the late 19th-century political and administrative reform of 
local administration in Bohemia XZ became a self-administering municipality with 
its own elected municipal council, mayor, budget and responsibilities. This situa-
tion, although modified several times, lasted for the next hundred years until the 
1970s. At that time, still partly an agricultural place, XZ had about 450 inhabitants 
and a relatively rich infrastructure: a nursery, four classes of an elementary school, 
a municipal library, a shop, a pub with a dancing room used also for meetings and 
cinema performances, a fire brigade, a football team and clubs of hunters and gar-
deners. People in XZ were proud of their village’s history which was carefully 
recorded in the municipality’s chronicle. 
Then, in 1975, as a consequence of the reform which introduced the central 
places system in Czechoslovakia, XZ was deprived of its autonomy and declared to 
be a local part of a nearby township with a population of about 2500. It lost its 
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local government and, instead of it, was represented by just two deputies in the 
township’s local authority. Over time, the cinema performances, the library, the 
elementary school had been closed in XZ and its customers and schoolchildren had 
to rely on the township’s facilities. Children had to be bussed to the school there. 
Further population growth, housing and infrastructure development took place 
mainly in the central township whose position was purposely strengthened at the 
expense of its stagnating peripheral local parts. 
Unsurprisingly, inhabitants of XZ, dissatisfied with their situation, availed 
themselves of the “revolutionary” atmosphere of 1989–1990 and seceded from the 
township, renewing the administrative and political independence of their village. 
Similar development took place at that time in hundreds of other municipalities in 
the Czech Republic (see Table 2), sanctioned in autumn l990 by a permissive 
clause on splitting of municipalities in the new democratic Law on Municipalities1 
and its liberal application.  
The second case illustrates the perseverance and tenacity of a mayor in another 
small village (acronym ZY), at a distance of some 60 kilometres north-east of 
Prague, in defending the village’s survival as an independent political and adminis-
trative entity. ZY, with an origin dating back to the 16th century, had a stable popu-
lation of 310. Although a small place, it was spared – as a seat of a communist era 
collective farm – amalgamation with the neighbouring villages. A majority of its 
active citizens commute to work in a nearby town, the rest staff local services, 
work in a private farm and in a small local industrial enterprise. There are two 
pubs, a petrol station and a few shops along the main road which cuts the village 
into two halves. Similarly to XZ, there is a nursery, a fire brigade, a soccer team and 
a hunters’ club. The elementary school was closed ten years ago, children commute 
to a nearby town. Every year a number of social events tooke place – dancing par-
ties, discoes, a fair, Christmas and Easter Monday ceremonies, sports competitions. 
The municipal council has five members, except for the mayor mostly young 
people. The strongest and most influential local personality is the mayor himself 
on whose shoulders rests the main burden of running the local government and its 
agenda. An energetic man in his fifities, he manages to combine his political role 
with a full-time job in an engineering firm at another locality and with running a 
small business of his own. He spends one afternoon weekly in his small office 
located in the village’s firestation to attend the increasingly voluminous mayoral 
administrative agenda, most of it imposed on small local governments by the state 
bureaucracy, failing to differentiate between small and large municipalities. 
Assisted only by an administrative assistant for a few hours a week, the mayor 
                                                                        
1 Law No. 367/1990 CoL. on Municipalities (The Municipal System), substituted in the year 
2000 by the still valid Law 128/2000 Col., many times amended since then. 
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admirably manages to cope with these responsibilities requiring sometimes spe-
cialised knowledge usually available only to administrative officers of larger 
municipalities. On weekends he talks to local people, listens to their proposals and 
complaints and takes part in local events. 
In spite of this stressing situation, the mayor, assisted by several young coun-
cillors, enjoyes his role, bursts with activity and is a source of ideas and initiatives 
stimulating and animating local life. When asked about the possibility of merging 
his village with adjacent communities to establish a larger unit which would have 
larger budget at its disposal and could hire a professional secretary, the mayor 
resolutely rejected such an option.  
“I wholly disagree with the amalgamation of small municipalities with larger 
units – some kind of central places. This would happen at the expense of small 
municipalities – money and development would be channelled only to such central 
places, while the small villages will be neglected.  Instead, I support voluntary co-
operation of independent communities in implementing mutually beneficial projects.” 
Preservation of the political and administrative autonomy of his community 
was a priority not just for him, but also for mayors of the neighbouring communi-
ties. Instead of a merger they joined forces on an ad hoc basis to finance and 
operate joint infrastructural projects: water supply, filtration and  sewage systems 
and a communal dump.  
The two above-mentioned cases illustrate the importance Czech villages, even if 
small ones, attach to their political and administrative independence, regardless of 
the fact that such independence can only be relative in contemporary society and 
has to be paid for by various disadvantages. Geodemographic, historical and cul-
tural factors – such as the country’s dispersed settlement structure, Czech society’s 
rural, petit-bourgeois and provincial roots, the rural population’s ingrained dis-
trust of those from elsewhere and of townspeople in general, particularly of in-
habitants of the capital, and feuds with neighbouring communities – may be part of 
the explanation. 
Surveys and other analyses in 2009–20112 confirmed the notorious fact that 
local politics in the Czech Republic’s small rural municipalities is different from 
that in the large ones. It is less party-oriented, citizens’ political participation is 
more intensive, particularly as regards their turnout at local as well as parliamen-
tary elections, people tend to trust local politicians and to be more satisfied with 
                                                                        
2 An intensive longitudinal participant observation of the social and political life in three 
small rural municipalities combined with repeated interviews of their mayors and several 
councillors. Interviews of mayors and councillors in other nine small municipalities. A 
standardised questionnaire survey of mayors in 209 small municipalities. A questionnaire 
survey of residents in twelve villages. Analysis of statistical data available from the Czech 
Statistical Office. 
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them. The relationship between citizens and local governments is more immediate 
and the legitimity of local politicians is typically based more on their integration 
within local community and their social networks than on their performance and 
party membership (Bernard et al. 2011, p. 65).  
Yet, in the second half of the 1990s some adverse features of the extremely 
fragmented territorial structure of local governments in the Czech Republic 
became visible and started attracting criticism. Due to insufficient human and 
financial resources and lack of administrative expertise, some of the very small 
renewed municipalities found it difficult to function properly as administrative, 
economic and political units. The primary concerns related to their economic sus-
tainability, administrative efficiency and the quality of their financial management. 
Some suffered also from an insufficient human potential: the inability to elect or to 
maintain the necessary minimum number of local government members.  
Under these circumstances the national goverment looked for a policy which 
would permit to move some of the local agenda of small municipalities to a higher 
level without infringing upon their political independence. The possibility of 
establishing and institutionalising intermunicipal co-operative structures was 
incorporated into the Law on Municipalities in 1992. Municipalities got empow-
ered to cluster (without losing their administrative and political independence), to 
form voluntary Unions of Municipalities with the aim of protecting and promoting 
their joint interests. It was expected that the Unions could be the first step in a 
bottom-up process of developing tighter and more permanent intermunicipal co-
operative structures and thus reducing the fragmentation of local governments. 
For territories of the individual unions the term micro-regions was coined. The 
project drew great attention: 474 Unions were registered in 2005 according to the 
Ministry of Interior, involving altogether 4680 municipalities, more than 70% of 
their total number (Illner 2010b, p. 229). 
 Municipalities appreciated the voluntary character and the flexibility of the 
Unions and also that by entering them they did not have to sacrifice any of their 
independent powers. Yet, the Unions’ attractivity was seriously diminished by 
scarcity of financial means necessary for supporting their activities. Although 
legitimate recipients of potential financial support from differents sources, most 
Unions had to rely on modest membership fees contributed by their members. As 
most of them were small municipalities with small budgets, such contributions 
were usually modest, allowing to support only small projects. There was no 
scheme that would have made financing the projects from the state budget 
possible (Vajdová – Čermák – Illner 2006, Illner 2006, pp. 60–61, Bernard et al. 
2011). Thus, in ten years’ retrospect, the Unions were only partial success and they 
did not solve the problems brought about by fragmentation. 
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Since 1993 the number of municipalities (around 6250) and the proportion of 
those with less than 500 inhabitants (around 60%) have been more or less stable 
(see Table 1). Also the proportion of urban population in the Czech Republic (70%) 
has not changed much during the last years.3 Apparently, there have been factors 
at work stabilising the scattered structure of municipalities, factors which were 
stronger than the potential advantages of large amalgamated units with their more 
substantial economic, administrative and political capacity, but at greater distance 
from the local authority and the citizens; units which would disregard the histori-
cally anchored and defended municipal structures. In spite of their fragmented 
structure, municipal governments in their present form and within their present 
territorial delimination have been repeatedly appreciated by respondents in the 
national representative opinion polls which are the Czech Republic’s second most 
trustworthy political institution, ranking better than the parliament and the 
national and regional governments.4 Such strong political and social capital would 
be risky to waste. 
Promoting nowadays a straightforward consolidation of local governments in 
the Czech Republic by fiat – for example, by a reform similar to the one  imple-
mented recently in the German Land Sachsen-Anhalt – would be politically im-
passable, bringing more damage than benefit. The memory of forced consolidation 
of municipalities in the 1970s–1980s is still alive.5  
Instead of consolidating territorial self-governments, the state prevented fur-
ther fragmentation by three provisions: (1) by tightening the rules applying to 
separation of municipalities6, (2) by making it easier for municipalities to merge 
voluntarily or to associate on a temporary or permanent basis in order to carry out 
                                                                        
3 The relative stability of the proportion of urban population (meaning population with 
domicile within the administrative boundaries of cities) can be explained by the balance of 
imigration to cities and out-migration from them to suburban localities, most of which are 
classified  as rural in the official statistics. 
4 Center of Public Opinion Research (CVVM), periodical polls “Our Society – Trust in the 
Institutions of the State”, quota sampling, N=1020–1065 respondents aged 15 and over. 
5 Although aware of the handicaps resulting from the small size of their municipalities, 
mayors and councillors, interviewed in 2010 during an in-depth survey of local politicians 
in twelve rural villages, unanimously rejected the idea of obligatory mergers of their mu-
nicipalities with the neighbours. What they did not reject was the possibility of voluntary 
mergers for executing selected administrative agendas – such that demand specialised 
knowledge (accounting, legal services, applications for European and other grants etc.). 
6 An amendment of the Law on Municipalities stipulated that for a split to be permitted a 
local part intending to break away from an existing municipality as well as the municipality 
from which it wanted to separate must each have at least 1000 inhabitants. Moreover, 
separation must be approved in a local referendum by citizens of the local part which 
intends to separate. The final decision on permitting separation belongs to the Regional 
Office. 
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joint projects (while mergers were extremely rare, the possibility to associate has 
been used on a large scale), (3) by centralising the execution of its own administra-
tive competencies at subregional level.7 A hierarchical three-layer structure of 
local authorities was established depending on the scope of their delegated tasks, 
and associated with a concomitant differentiation of their administrative territo-
ries.   
In his recent analysis of the factors influencing the developmental potential of 
rural municipalities in the Czech Republic, Josef Bernard has found that the popu-
lation size of municipalities is indeed an important predictor of some of their de-
velopmental chances, but the relationship between size and development is non-
linear (Bernard et al. 2011). Mostly non-linear relationships were identified also 
between municipality size and their demographic characteristics, job opportuni-
ties, the range of services available, the amount of associative activities and the 
level of political participation. While the smallest municipalities with just several 
hundred inhabitants were often the most disadvantaged in the above respects, 
municipalities with large population did not improve significantly as the number of 
their inhabitants increased. However, a municipality’s size does affect four inde-
pendent components of its situation: (1) economy and education, (2) age and re-
production, (3) local public life and political participation, and (4) settlement 
stability. But the different spatial factors influence different dimensions of develop-
ment and do so in different ways. 
The analysis also proved that, beyond their size, the geographical position of 
rural municipalities vis-a-vis larger cities also has an impact on their development 
potential. Rural municipalities in the vicinity of larger cities are distinguished by 
above-average levels of human capital and economy. Clusters of such municipali-
ties can also be found in the vicinity of smaller, economically prosperous cities, 
particularly in regions with larger density of such smaller centres, as well as in the 
vicinity of cities attractive for tourists. At the same time, Bernard et al. (2011) 
confirmed the existence of compact rural regions with below-average values of 
developmental characterists. A significant part of such substandard municipalities 
exist in economically under-developed regions, such as parts of south Moravia or 
the territorial belt separating Bohemia and Moravia, and in regions handicapped 
                                                                        
7 Depending on their population size, centrality and geographic location, all municipalities 
were divided into three nested categories differentiated by the scope of their delegated 
administrative tasks and the size of their concomitant administrative territories. The cate-
gory with the most extensive delegated responsibilities and the largest administrative 
territories consists of 205 urban municipalities, the medium category embraces 392 urban 
municipalities and the third category, fulfilling just the basic transferred responsibilities 
and only within their own administrative territories, includes the remaining (rural) mu-
nicipalities.  
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by structural economic problems, like, for instance, the north-west and north part 
of Bohemia as well as Silesia. Relatively handicapped are also small municipalities 
located in the internal peripheries of the Czech Republic, mostly the territories 
situated along the perimeters of the metropolitan regions and of the administra-
tive regions which often overlap. Among them, the belt separating Central Bohemia 
and South Bohemia is the most distinctive (Musil – Müller 2008).  
Conclusions 
The fragmented structure of local governments in the Czech Republic, one of the 
two most scattered in the EU, is both a problem and an advantage, or a fact with 
ambivalent consequences. 
A problem because small local governments, unlike the large ones, cannot by 
themselves apply the economies of scale in their activities, cannot afford to sup-
port ambitious developmental projects, have difficulties in coping with administra-
tive rules, do not have the means to employ professional administrators, are 
usually weak in negotiating with the state administration, may be more easily 
disabled by personalised internal feuds etc.  
An advantage because political participation of citizens in small municipalities 
is significantly higher than in the large ones, the citizens tend to be more satisfied 
with their local representatives and trust them more than inhabitants of large 
communities, local patriotism plays an important role here and citizens can be 
more easily mobilised to take part in beneficial local activities. Studies of local 
politics in small (mostly rural) municipalities in the Czech Republic, past and pre-
sent, proved that local politics in smaller municipalities often did not follow party 
lines and missed many of the features characterising the institutions of representa-
tive democracy in cities and at supra-local levels.  
Ambivalent is the fact that local politics in the small municipalities is to a large 
degree structured according to other cleavages and relationships than in the larger 
and more differentiated urban milieus. Cleavages such as kinship, inter- and intra-
family relations, neighbouring, traditional sympathies and animosities, property 
differences, old feuds and friendships, joint or conflicting interests of different local 
parts etc. can play a more important role here, either in positive or negative sense. 
See also Keating (1995) on size, efficiency and democracy in local politics. 
Moreover, it also turned out that the developmental chances of small munici-
palities are as much determined by their size as by their geographical position vis-
a-vis important urban centers. Besides the structural and geographic circum-
stances, there are sometimes singular factors too that may influence local develop-
ment. These may be either positive, such as an enterprising mayor with extra-local 
Fragmented Structure of Municipalities in the Czech Republic  453 
connections able to secure European money for his municipality, or negative, for 
example, a quarrelsome or unstable local council. 
There are no known plans by the state at present to reorganise the system of 
local self-government in the Czech Republic, anchored in the Constitution, either to 
amalgamate the small municipalities or to reduce their competencies. The present 
trend is rather to support intermunicipal co-operation and to concentrate the exe-
cution of the transferred responsibilities of municipalities in larger urban centres. 
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 2007–2013: HUNGARIAN MULTI-LEVEL GOVERNANCE 
WITH OR WITHOUT REGIONS? 
Zsolt Pálmai 
Different Approaches to Multi-level Governance 
In this chapter multi-level governance (MLG) findings of different scholars will be 
introduced, with special focus on NUTS 2 regions not having public administration 
nature. 
Foreign and Hungarian Scholars on MLG 
Hooghe and Marks (2001) defined MLG against national state-centric governance. 
Whilst national state-centric governance (especially in terms of European integra-
tion studies) strengthens the national level, allowing only supranational bodies to 
facilitate operation or aid the member states, MLG (in terms of the polity creating 
process) is shared among multiple levels of government such as subnational, 
national or supranational. In the national state-centric model states are the ulti-
mate decision-makers, devolving only limited authority to supranational institu-
tions in order to achieve specific (national) goals. According to MLG, the decision-
making competencies are shared by actors at different levels, rather than monopo-
lised by national governments. MLG supports that the different levels of govern-
ment (as part of internal sovereignty) also contribute to international politics (to 
external sovereignty) of the nation state.  
Governance as understood by Kjaer (2004) could be defined in different 
domains. Governance within public administration means policy networks and 
meta-governance; within international relations the neo-realist state-centred ap-
proach versus the emerging multinational actors and transnational networks 
standpoint is discussed. In European integration studies it also varies from a neo-
liberal position to heterogeneous models as territorial units within the state, 
networks of state, market and networks. Governance is present in comparative 
politics and economic development as well. In our present study we shall use it as 
it is in European integration studies: it presents territorial units as contributors to 
the operation of the European Union (EU) within its member states. 
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Scholars often deal with MLG as a theory supporting the idea that European 
integration has weakened the state (Marks – Liesbet – Blank 1996). From another 
angle, Van der Kolk (2008) describes MLG as a concept meaning that the break-
down of competences is exercised according to functional and territorial dimen-
sions. According to his view Europeanisation1 reflects the supra-national character 
of MLG, towards the European Union and the supranational organisations. The 
direction of competence flows up to the top reflects centralisation, whilst the ones 
to the bottom decentralisation. Therefore, the shift from monolithic government 
towards multi-level governance could be a consequence of territorial strategies 
being more effective than others, or simply because territorial modes of organisa-
tion are more effective than others. This approach of MLG very much supports the 
principle of subsidiarity, namely that European NUTS2 regions could exercise 
different functions at their territorial level, provided it is more effective or it is 
strategically appropriate. 
Schmidt (2006) researched EU and national policy-making in the case of 
statist/etatist countries. She pointed out that in most countries Europeanisation 
had an influence on how the national state organised its (EU) institution system. 
EU policy (the implementation of the rights and obligations of EU membership) has 
always had a significant impact on the member-states’ national institutions, result-
ing in establishing the institutional system at different territorial levels. Therefore, 
following the framework Schmidt described, territorial units embedded in EU 
policy could play an active role in Europeanisation. 
After these foreign approaches to MLG in terms of NUTS2 regions, this section 
of the paper is going to be closed with the views of two Hungarian scholars. The 
reason for this is that regions in Hungary do not have strong identity because from 
their very inception they have been subjects of continuous debates, without a 
stable consensus on them. 
Pálné Kovács (2003) writes that in modern democratic states the tool of terri-
torial division of powers is the self-government of municipalities, despite that 
these municipalities are not fully able to deal with all of the different interests at 
their territorial level. The different governance models (see above) have already 
gained ground and they included the regional aspects of exercising the powers. As 
the constitutional and institutional bases of regionalism had been missing, the 
Hungarian NUTS2 regions have never been part of the state administration, their 
role was defined within the framework of EU membership. According to the con-
clusions of Pálné, territorial governance in Hungary did not have an adequate 
                                                                        
1 Europeanisation means here the process through which the European Union’s political and 
economic dynamics become part of the organisational logic of national politics and policy-
making. 
2007–2013: Hungarian Multi-level Governance With or Without Regions? 457 
vision of either EU policy or politics. Hungarian NUTS2 regions were proper units 
of the Hungarian institutional system established in favour of EU cohesion policy, 
but – in spite of not being territorial administrative units of the state – they faced 
incomprehension and were perceived as continuous threat to the historically very 
strong county level.  
Kaiser (2009), however, is rather optimistic about the changing role of Hun-
garian regions to be played in terms of MLG. He emphasises the new forms of poly-
centric and multi-level governance, and sees new channels opening for the Hun-
garian regions in intra-state (national) and extra-state (supranational) politics. In 
this context he defines the basic problem as a choice between democracy and 
effectiveness. He also names tools for supporting the role of regions, such as part-
nership (more responsibility, better co-ordination), or the increase of system ele-
ments fostering participation. According to these operating circumstances and the 
direction of MLG at EU institutions, Kaiser identifies the structural (cohesion) 
policy elements of the EU and Brussels’ presence in the Hungarian regions as their 
fields of operation. Based on his above views, Kaiser, in comparison with Pálné, 
sees opportunities for the Hungarian regions to be part of territorial administra-
tion as well. 
The “in House” MLG of the EU: The Committee of the Regions 
The main engine of MLG is the Committee of the Regions (CoR) within the architec-
ture of the EU (CoR 2013). Its relevant slogan is: MLG – building Europe in partner-
ship. This not only means the fostering of the culture of MLG, but also adding mo-
mentum to encouraging a wide-ranging debate on the future of Europe beyond the 
EU institutions. The priority areas of the CoR in this process are: (1) implementa-
tion of the Lisbon Treaty, (2) review of the EU's financial framework, (3) focusing 
on the overarching strategies such as Europe 2020, (4) keeping track of the reform 
of structural policies, influencing the future policies of territorial cohesion, (5) de-
mographic change, (6) energy and climate change. From 2008 onwards CoR regu-
larly organises workshops and consultations, issues the White Paper on MLG and 
organises the so-called MLG Scoreboards (offering opportunity for innovative 
thinking and real partnership building) to monitor the annual pace and achieve-
ments of development within MLG. In a scientific sense (Warleigh 2003) CoR is 
considered as a laboratory in terms of defining and forming MLG. In this role it not 
only influences the way MLG will be put in practice, but its views also reinforce the 
EU regions towards more intensive lobbying for their extended regional decen-
tralisation in their nation states. CoR as a consultative body within the architecture 
of the EU can also take action in this latter direction. 
 Zsolt Pálmai 458 
Summary of the Quoted MLG Approaches in Terms of NUTS 2 Regions 
Table 1 summarises the quoted definitions/interpretations of MLG and their rele-
vance as regards (in some cases Hungarian) NUTS 2 regions. 
Table 1. Different MLG concepts – different roles of NUTS 2 regions 
Scholar MLG as NUTS 2 relevance 
Hooghe and Marks tool for EU integration NUTS 2 regions contribute to the 
operation of the state at sub- and 
supranational levels  
Kjaer subject of European integration 
studies 
Van der Kolk concept according to functional 
and territorial dimensions 
NUTS 2 regions – in subsidiarity – 
exercise state functions at the 
territorial level where these 
functions are the most effective 
Schmidt tool for Europeanisation NUTS 2 regions play smaller or 
bigger role in EU policy 
Pálné Kovács place for the regional aspects of 
exercising power 
Hungarian NUTS 2 regions are 
better suited for EU cohesion 
policy than regional 
administration 
Kaiser choice between democracy and 
effectiveness 
Hungarian NUTS 2 regions with 
possibilities towards regional 
administration 
CoR building Europe in partnership NUTS 2 regions are supported by 
the MLG culture CoR proposes for 
regional decentralisation 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
Hungarian Processes Influencing the NUTS  2 Regions in 2007–2013 
First of all we have to differentiate between the ways the EU and the Hungarian 
Government defines their NUTS 2 regions. According to EUROSTAT (EUROSTAT 
2013), NUTS 2 regions are basic regions for the application of regional policies. 
Moreover, regions eligible for aid from the Structural Funds (European Regional 
Development Fund and European Social Fund) have been classified at NUTS 2 
level. The current NUTS classification, valid from 1 January 2012 until 31 Decem-
ber 2014, lists 270 European regions at NUTS 2 territorial level. NUTS 2 regions in 
the EU are characterised by a population between 800,000 and 3,000,000 in-
habitants. In the current, 2007–2013 programming period Hungary has seven 
NUTS 2 regions. 
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According to Law 1996/XXI on regional development and spatial planning 
(Hungarian Parliament 1996) and its later amendments, regions were defined in 
two senses: as planning-statistical (or so called “macro”) regions and as develop-
ment regions. The difference between the two lies in their relation to the geo-
graphical borders of state administration. Whilst the “great” regions exactly follow 
the administrative borders of their counties, the borders of development regions 
are defined according to the social–economic–environmental nature of the de-
velopment they were created for. As “macro” regions may play role in MLG, 
whereas development regions do not, the latter ones are not discussed below 
(Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1. Planning-statistical (or ”macro”) regions of Hungary with their capital cities 
Source: Author’s elaboration. 
At the time of their inception, “macro” regions were not defined as administra-
tive regions but as territorial units for planning-statistical purposes, in their main 
part subordinated to EU programming logic and processes. Issues cited by the 
majority of scholars, such as better governance at territorial level, competences in 
jurisdiction, exercising power, choice between democracy and effectiveness, can-
not be defined in this context. It is not a mere coincidence: with its decision the 
Hungarian Parliament did not want to create a new level of territorial politics 
within the country. This position of Hungarian decision-makers has not changed, 
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despite the fact that the 2002 and 2006 programmes of the Hungarian Government 
announced the establishment of regional administration. Even a legislative 
package was brought to the Hungarian Parliament which finally did not decide in 
favour of regional administration. Until the time of writing this paper there has not 
been any further improvements in this field. 
Strengthening the Hungarian NUTS 2 Regions (1996–2011) 
Following the adoption of the 1996 law, three of its amendments were passed, 
namely Law 1999/XCII, Law 2004/LXXV and Law 2011/CXCVIII. It is common in 
these modifications that, on the one hand, the competences/obligations of the 
NUTS 2 level units became better regulated, and on the other – as a clearly visible 
and trendsetting phenomenon – the possibilities of the Hungarian “macro” regions 
got continuously narrowed. Table 2 includes  the bodies established by the respec-
tive law, the amendments of their competences (+ if extended, – if decreased) as 
described in the laws mentioned above. 
According to the will of the legislators, the main focus of Hungarian NUTS 2 
regions is on regional development, the most important part within that being the 
planning and implementation of development programmes. This entitlement has 
nothing to do with politics, but much with EU policy and Europeanisation. 
Looking thus back on the 2004–2006 programming period, it provided limited 
space for regions: the Operative Programme for Regional Development (OPRD) 
was centralised, regions – within their geographical borders – could indirectly sup-
port this process by initiating and generating project proposals for receiving EU 
co-financing. Similarly, some domestic grant schemes were also available for 
regional level implementation. These latter funding opportunities were open espe-
cially for county (NUTS 3) and regional (NUTS 2) level implementation, and aimed 
at developing basic and communal infrastructure of the municipalities. The broad-
er scale social and economic roles of the regions were also exercised, but this 
activity was far less in the focus. Overall, during these three years NUTS 2 units in 
Hungary gained experience in development programming and implementation. 
On preparing for the 2007–2013 programming period, regions were considered 
by the central government meriting closer involvement in the Europeanisation 
process. This was also a result of the 2004 modification of the law further broaden-
ing the competences of these regions. Regional development councils and their 
regional development agencies were operating country-wide, and were mostly 
accepted in their regions by the experts, technical organisations and politicians, 
though caused anxiousness at the county level (NUTS 3 units). Their professional 
records comprised of several successfully implemented Phare Programmes, 
domestic grant schemes (such as the Preparatory National Development 
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Table 2. The main steps of strengthening NUTS 2 regions in Hungary 
Law NUTS 2 level bodies Competences 
1996/XXI regional develop-
ment council 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
regional develop-
ment agency 
bodies of bottom-up nature (more members from 
territorial than from central level – in South Trans-
danubia: 3 counties, 3 chambers of commerce and 
industry, 6 local government associations, 11 line 
ministries: 12 territorial vs. 11 central), the establish-
ment of the council is optional; 
operate in concordance with the county development 
councils; 
elaborate regional development concepts, take part in 
the preparation of spatial plans 
defined as the “working organisation of the regional 
development council” 
1999/XCII regional develop-
ment council 
–  bodies of centralised nature (more members from 
central than from territorial level – in South Trans-
danubia: 3 counties, 3 cities of county rank, 3 local 
government associations, 1 regional tourism com-
mittee, 11 line ministries: 10 territorial vs. 11 
central), the establishment of the council is 
compulsory; 
+ co-ordinates the economic development of the 
region; 
+ harmonises the interests of the different (level) 
stakholders; 
+ takes part in  the implementation of development 
programmes (intermediary body tasks, allocation of 
grants), for this purpose enters into contracts with 
the competent line ministries; 
+ intervenes in the case of social and economic crises 
2004/LXXV regional develop-
ment council 
+ right to express own opinion on the allocation of the 
domestic and EU grants (in the case of EU grants the 
highest level involvement was expressing its own 
opinion, allocation decisions were not taken by 
these councils); 
+ for the purpose of developing the region it may 
enter into agreement with foreign regions and could 
be partner in such projects; 
+ makes proposals for the (central) government on 
the representatives of the CoR; 
+ can take part in the implementation of the EU co-
financed Operative Programmes 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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Programmes) and – regional development agencies as – territorial agents sup-
porting the implementation of the 1st National Development Programme (NDP) 
and the OPRD. The composition of the regional development councils represented 
majority influence played by the central government, with minority presence of 
counties, county seat cities, towns and micro-regions. By the end of 2006 regional 
decisions necessary for the preparation of regional OPRDs were made, in 2007 the 
main documents regulating the operation of regional development councils and 
regional development agencies were adopted to enable the Hungarian regional 
development agencies to become  intermediary bodies of their own OPRDs in 
2007–2013. In this period every Hungarian NUTS 2 region had its own OPRD, 
though there was only one Managing Authority operating within the National 
Development Agency (NDA) in Budapest. This was the starting point and the 
environment describing the highest level entitlement of Hungarian NUTS 2 regions 
in EU policy focusing on MLG. 
Case study one: The South Transdanubian OPRD 2007–2013 
The South Transdanubian OPRD (National Development Agency, 2007), having a 
budget of 195 billion HUF (830 million EUR), implies the implementation of the following 
tasks: (1) elaboration of the calls for proposals, in co-operation with the NDA, (2) or-
ganising information days, receiving the applications, (3) eligibility and technical evalua-
tion of the applications, in co-operation with external experts and with the NDA, (4) 
supporting decision-making on the allocation of funds, involving the South Transdanubian 
Regional Development Council (STRDC) and the NDA2, (5) preparing and entering into 
Grant Contracts with the beneficiaries, (6) project implementation, on-site checks, project 
payments with a deadline of end 2015 (n+2 rule), (7) monitoring the implementation and 
maintenance of the projects following project closure. 
Another novelty or result of the 2004 amendment to the law was the embed-
ding of the Hungarian regions in European Territorial Co-operation3 (ETC) and 
Community Programmes.4 Though, before 2007, it was also possible for regions to 
go international, this was rather limited in scope: Hungarian regions were only 
observers in European umbrella organisations (such as the Assembly of European 
                                                                        
2 Decisions on the allocation of the fund are made at national level with regional support 
from STRDC. 
3 Cohesion policy encourages regions and cities from different EU member states to work 
together and learn from each other through joint programmes, projects and networks. In 
the period 2007–2013 the European Territorial Co-operation Objective (formerly the 
INTERREG Community Initiative) covers three types of programmes: cross-border co-
operation, transnational and interregional programmes. 
4 Community Programmes are actions underpinning the implementation of Community 
policies covering almost every area of social and economic life. 
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Regions), could not enter into bilateral agreements with other European regions, 
and were not represented at the European (Brussels) level. Following the 2004 
amendments, all these became possible for them, which was especially beneficial 
in the 2007–2013 period when EU grants in the framework of ETC and Brussels 
Programmes often supported the internal regional development processes. The 
participation in such programmes contributed to the presence of Hungarian re-
gions in Brussels.  
Case study two: Brussels Representation of the South Transdanubian Region 2006–2011 
Based on the initiative of the Hungarian Government, Hungarian regions were given 
the opportunity to join the Representation of the Regions of Hungary, to represent them-
selves and to strive for the assertion of their own interests in Brussels. South Transdanu-
bia was among the first NUTS 2 units responding to it (in July 2006). These regional rep-
resentations were independent, but they were subordinated to their regional develop-
ment councils and agencies in terms of employment and financing. During its five years of 
existence, the self-reliant Brussels Representation of the South Transdanubian Region 
underwent significant changes. Namely, dependence from the central state gradually 
weakened, and the operation of the office depended more and more on its ability to raise 
funds from ETC and Community Programmes. In the final stage, the office left the prem-
ises of the Representation of the Regions of Hungary and co-shared the office of the 
Slavonia Baranja Region of Croatia until its own financial means lasted (June 2011). The 
portfolio of the office, however, offered a considerable scope for manoeuvring. The repre-
sentation office dealt with several issues of regional relevance (cohesion policy prepara-
tions for 2014–2020, supporting the regional members and alternates of the CoR, fund-
raising for the counties, NGOs and universities of South Transdanubia, contributing to the 
success of the Pécs 2010 European Capital of Culture programme, etc.) in partnership 
with domestic agents such as the county councils, some innovative SMEs, public utility 
companies. The results of this five-year work were utilised especially by STRDC and its 
regional development agency (they were the owners of the office), whereas further actors 
enjoyed the benefits mostly indirectly, e.g. attending Brussels programmes, exhibitions, 
information days and other events (Pálmai 2011). 
The extension of the competences of the Hungarian planning-statistical regions 
was a real success story. It meant not only the creation of a new territorial unit 
from virtually nothing, but also its entitlement with exercisable tasks, which was 
acknowledged both within the country and in Europe. Regions therefore suc-
ceeded in EU policy, in Europeanisation, but NUTS 3 units still felt anxious as they 
were left out of these processes. In political terms, more were against than for the 
regions, as their NUTS 2 units did not have a real political profile, having been 
responsible only for the EU money they received.  
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Centralisation and Weakening the Hungarian NUTS 2 regions (2012–) 
The definition of territorial units is always a domain of party politics and hence of 
state administration. As in 1996 a left-wing and liberal coalition passed the law on 
regional development, they were governing the country between 2002 and 2010 
as well, they provided a relatively wide range of NUTS 2 contribution to the plan-
ning and implementation of EU co-financed development programmes under the 
supervision and management of the NDA. From this aspect, the 1998–2002 period 
was a slight detour, when a right-wing coalition governed the country and amend-
ed the law in 1999 so that regional development councils became centralised and 
lost their bottom-up character. This process received momentum again after the 
2010 Hungarian parliamentary elections when the biggest right-wing party won 
with two-thirds majority. As this political regime is very much in favour of the 
NUTS 3 units (not only in an administrative, but also in a historical-cultural sense), 
they passed amendments to the law at the end of 2011, re-drawing the competen-
cies of the Hungarian NUTS 2 regions. 
The last amendments have been in force since 1 January 2012. They abolished 
the regional development councils, subordinated the regional development agen-
cies to the responsible line ministry and simultaneously established the regional 
development consultation fora. These latter bodies more or less substitute for the 
tasks of the former regional development councils, but they are headed by the 
presidents of the counties the NUTS 2 regions belong to. Their main competence is 
harmonising the decisions of the county councils, and if unanimous, forwarding 
them to the Government as the position of the NUTS 2 regions. With some other 
similar competences (see Table 3), all these are steps towards a strong central 
administration, with real powers delegated to county (NUTS 3) level. As the ma-
jority of contracts defining the operation of the programmes of cohesion policy in 
the current (2007–2013) period have not changed – due to the protocol of the 
operation of EU programmes – the real changes will be coming into force between 
2014 and 2020. Actually, the short-term “result” is a weakened regional institu-
tional system, fulfilling the same tasks as it did from 2007, but under stronger state 
control. 
Hungarian NUTS 2 Regions after 2014? 
Presently – at nearly the first half of 2013 – several things are visible to support a 
foresight for the 2014–2020 programming period regarding Hungarian NUTS 2 
regions. Further centralisation of resources in Hungary is very likely. This implies 
that NUTS 3 counties will play a decisive role in both EU policy and politics, given 
that regional development councils will not be established again. The expertise, the 
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experience, the human resources available at the regional development agencies 
will support the further planning and delivery of EU cohesion programmes. 
Decisions on the allocation of EU grants will be either (1) fully centralised or (2) 
most probably further supported by the information available at, and co-decision 
of, the county level. The EU grants will be addressed to the counties, not to the 
regions, and there will be no regional OPRDs, instead only one centralised OPRD 
with still unknown territorial division. As a result, strongly and more directly 
controlled EU cohesion policy is foreseen, with weak, but due to the planning logic, 
still existing NUTS 2 units. 
Table 3. The main steps of weakening NUTS 2 regions in Hungary 
Law NUTS 2 level bodies Competences 
2011/CXCVIII  regional develop-
ment council 
–  ceased to exist 
 new: regional devel-
opment consultation 
forum (successor, in 
some respects, of 
the regional devel-
opment council, but 
without legal per-
sonality) 
– manages issues in need of regional level decision, 
position 
– co-ordinates the decision-making of county self-
governments 
– advocates the common decision of county self-
governments as the position of the region 
– makes proposals for the (central) government on 
the representatives of CoR 
 regional develop-
ment agency 
– ceased to exist as a working organisation of the 
regional development council, became a 
background institution of the Ministry for 
National Development – actually, before the 2011 
amendment, through different contracts, it was de 
facto subordinated to the NDA 
+ keeps continuous contacts with the bodies of 
administration, in order to map development 
needs and resources 
+ organises the management of (development) 
programmes, keeps  up-to-date record on their 
implementation 
+ in the framework of separate agreements, 
manages (development) programmes 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
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 COHESION POLICY IN ROMANIA: INTENSIFIED FAILURE 
László Csák 
Introduction 
In the present paper we are going to provide an insight into Romania`s planning 
system, focusing on factors which had influenced the cohesion policy as introduced 
in Romania, like e.g. the origins and changes of the planning framework and 
regional trends. 
In the first section, an attempt is made to identify the stages of Romanian 
territorial planning, by means of analysing the legal context and practice from 
1950 up to now. All legal texts are taken from Acte Oficiale – Intralegis v6.2 (2013). 
In the second section the time series, based on data sources available from TEMPO-
Online time series (2013) of the National Institute of Statistics, will be analysed. All 
main findings are shown on maps, in order to help a spatial understanding of the 
trends. 
Although the author is fully aware of the risks implied in any kind of modelling 
for regional planning (Wong 2006), a simple model will be constructed for esti-
mating regional development potential, in order to formulate policy options for the 
next programming period. 
The approach of the present paper is mostly influenced by the concept of spa-
tial planning (Faludi 2010, Haughton et al. 2010), and in this context, we hold the 
opinion that a necessary precondition of effective planning is a collaborative ap-
proach (Healey 2006), based on citizen participation and partnerships, as stated 
also in the policy documents of the EU (see Regulation CSF 2012). The quality of 
planning is greatly affected by the governance of development, a fact neglected by 
Romanian planning practice. There is strong need for a major change in planning 
approach in Romania, as stated also in the Position paper of the Commission 
Services (2012). 
Territorial Planning in Romania: Four Stages 
In order to clarify the context, it seems necessary to identify the main periods of 
development policy in Romania. After the 2nd World War, Romania had faced 
serious issues regarding development and planning. The main obstacles of de-
velopment were: 
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 low level of urbanisation (mostly in the East and the South), 
 low quality and density of transport related infrastructure, 
 rural localities with lack of water supply, sewage system, roads, services, 
 underdeveloped industry. 
The first five-year plan, a national level planning policy document usual in the 
Soviet bloc at that time, was approved in 1950, see picture below. It laid great 
emphasis on modernisation and was based on well detailed territorial analyses. 
 
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej voting for the first five-year plan in 1950 
Source: Fototeca online a comunismului românesc, Fotografia #GA156 
The problems could not be solved at the time due to insufficient funding. The 
modernisation of Romania faced a new start in the period of 1972–1974, when the 
communist party decided to implement the so-called sistematizare at its congress 
in 1972. The Law no. 58/1974 on systematisation was voted in 19741, and was 
applied continuously until the revolution in 1989: it was repealed on the 26th of 
December 1989 by the very first Law Decree of the Council of the National 
Salvation Front2 (Law Decree no. 1/1989). 
                                                                        
1 LEGE nr. 58 din 1 noiembrie 1974 privind sistematizarea teritoriului si localitatilor urbane 
si rurale. 
2 Consiliul Frontului Salvarii Nationale, DECRET-LEGE nr. 1 din 26 decembrie 1989 privind 
abrogarea unor legi, decrete si alte acte normative. 
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The main objective of the systematisation of Romania was a just territorial 
system for the country, including its counties and communities, indifferent if they 
were rural or urban. Besides general development directives, the law referred to 
basic urban planning and land use rules. Environmental issues were also taken 
into consideration. The systematisation was fiercely criticised by intellectuals from 
the West, because it was associated with the demolition of villages, taken as part of 
the built cultural heritage. In fact, the systematisation was not only applied to 
villages, but a part of Bucharest was also demolished and a new, Stalinist design 
city centre (Kostof 1991) was built there, including the House of the People and the 
Victory of Socialism avenue. 
One may say that the criticism of systematisation was misleading. The prob-
lems identified in the 1950s remained, and with low level of financing opportuni-
ties, it was very unlikely to offer at least acceptable housing conditions for rural 
Romania. The systematisation of the urban structure tried to raise housing stand-
ards from unacceptable to low quality blocks of flats, poorly designed and with 
very low comfort level, due to financial restraints. The way it was handled did not 
take into consideration the viewpoint of the people living in dwellings below every 
standard. 
The urban system in the western part of Romania was totally different com-
pared to other regions of the country. There was a rapid change in this respect: in 
1930 there were only 142 towns, it increased to 148 by 1950, and nearly doubled 
by 1975. And this increase has been going on: in 2001 and 2012 the figures were 
265 and 320 respectively. 
In the 1974–75 plan, the density of the urban system was supposed to grow, 
with minimising the rural character and raising the localities` level of urbanisation. 
The system was conceived as a hierarchic framework, with polarising towns of 
national, regional and zonal influence. The plans had to deal at once with strength-
ening the development of major polarising towns and with establishing lower level 
urbanised localities. Every intervention, no matter at what level (county, zone or 
local), was based on deep studies of social, environmental, economic and demo-
graphic issues. The quality of these plans and also of the framework guidance 
documents was fairly good, even if the outcomes can be really contested (Figure 1). 
The county was divided into functional zones, not reflecting the administrative 
system of that time. But zoning was applied to lower levels too. It was stated in the 
law on systematisation that urban development plans should take into con-
sideration the functional area around the town, so urban–rural links were sup-
posed to be taken seriously. The main areas of intervention in urban design were: 
services for the population, economic activities and housing. 
Rural localities with administrative power were seen as areas of public inter-
vention and also as possible urban poles. One must not forget that at that time  
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Figure 1. Functional zones of Romania in the period of systematisation 
Legend: a) – Capital of Romania; b) – Towns with more than 100,000 inhabitant; 1 – Cris and 
Upper Somes; 2 – Marmatie and Highland; 3 – North-Central Moldavia; 4 – Banat, South-
West; 5 – Central Transylvania of Inner Valahia; 6 – Barsa Land and Ciucs; 7 – Carpathian 
Danubian East Valahia; 8 – Danubian and Maritime; 9 – Carpathian Danubian Oltenia; 10 – 
Carpathian Danubian Central Valahia. 
Source: Author’s compilation. 
there were rural communities without appropriate buildings for public admin-
istration, social services and health care, cultural activities – besides the housing 
and infrastructure related issues. Sparsely populated and outermost rural settle-
ments were out of focus, because they were seen as localities with no development 
opportunities: any public intervention in these settlements was supposed to be 
avoided. 
The systematisation from 1975 to 1989 changed the character of Romanian 
towns and rural settlements definitely, so that the overall architectural view of 
Romanian localities is still characterised by the buildings and systems designed 
and built in that period. These blocks of flats, huge public buildings, oversized 
avenues and other features of that time are not really nice, but these achievements 
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help Romania functioning even nowadays, because no public investment of that 
scale has taken place since the revolution either in urban or in rural context. 
The next planning period was between 1989 and 2001. This era can be charac-
terised by no or low level of intervention. Planning as a whole was seen as a scape-
goat for all sufferings Romanian people had, so systematisation and planning 
became a taboo in Romania. A total economic and social collapse of Romania took 
place – evidently not caused by the lack of planning, but some planning could help 
Romania reducing the economic and social costs of the crisis. There was no plan-
ning save at local level – the Law no. 50/1991 on building permits is from 1991 – 
so between 1989 and 2001 there were no national, regional or sub-regional level 
plans. 
The beginning of the next period seems hard to identify. European integration 
was launched in 1995 (Gallagher 2010). Turning towards market economy is dated 
from 2003 when private property became a constitutional right. The first law on 
regional development was adopted in 19983 (Law no. 151/1998) as part of the 
harmonisation process. The new law on regional development is from 20044 (Law 
no. 315/2004). However, from the aspect of regional development or cohesion 
policy, the real beginning of the fourth period is marked by the law on territorial 
development and urban planning5 (Law no. 350/2001). 
The reason why 2001 is suggested as a turning point6 is that European integra-
tion in itself does not necessarily imply any type of territorial planning policy, be-
cause territorial planning is an exclusive authority of member states and candidate 
countries. Market economy is not a precondition of regional development: as we 
have seen, Romania had, even before the revolution, a detailed development policy 
with spatial character, without any features of a market economy. The same can be 
stated for private property and other fundamental rights. So these milestones do 
not apply here. But the law on territorial development and urban planning con-
tains real regional and urban development principles, goals and means. Mostly due 
to bad feelings about systematisation in the past, it took a decade to reintroduce 
planning to Romania’s development. The question may arise why not take 2007 as 
a starting point of a new period, when Romania joined the EU. But accession has 
had an effect only on the funding opportunities, and not on the planning and de-
velopment system itself. The main characteristics of Romanian development policy 
as part of the EU cohesion policy will be discussed later. 
                                                                        
3 LEGE nr. 151 din 15 iulie 1998 privind dezvoltarea regionala in Romania. 
4 LEGE nr. 315 din 28 iunie 2004 privind dezvoltarea regionala in Romania. 
5 LEGE nr. 350 din 6 iulie 2001 privind amenajarea teritoriului si urbanismul. 
6 The four periods of Romanian territorial planning are: (1) 1950–1974, (2) 1975–1989, (3) 
1990–2000, (4) 2001–. 
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The terminology of the law is a bit strange, because while speaking about 
master plans with rules and land use regulations, it uses the term “amenajarea 
teritoriului” (Law no. 350/2001), which is very similar to the French development 
policy`s major direction: aménagement du territoire (Brunham 2009). In fact, if we 
look at the meaning of the term, it is clear that it does refer to an approach similar 
to that of systematisation: planned territorial development, land use and building 
regulation. However, it is clear why it cannot be named systematisation. 
The law is purely regulatory, even if the principles and objectives of regional 
and spatial development are set out as guidelines for planning. The national 
territorial development plan, approved by different laws, deals with transport, 
environmental and urban systems, as well as cultural heritage and infrastructure. 
The regulatory framework is very sophisticated, dealing with different planning 
issues which may occur at different levels of a territory. The levels of territorial 
planning are: 
 national, 
 regional (NUTS7 2), 
 county level (NUTS 3), 
 zonal. 
Zonal plans offer flexible means of planning for areas covered by different 
counties or municipalities. For urban areas including rural settlements, zonal plans 
can be used as a good planning tool for harmonising urban regulatory plans of 
different local administrative units. 
The regulatory framework seems efficient and flexible enough to deal with all 
kinds of territorial planning issues, like urban–rural linkages, the urban system, or 
well balanced spatial structure. Nevertheless, the proof of the pudding is in the 
eating, so it must be carefully analysed how the law is put into practice. 
As already mentioned, at national level the territorial master plan exists. The 
problem is at lower levels in the hierarchy, at regional and county levels where in 
the majority of cases the plans have either expired or have not been prepared at 
all. So the system is not really efficient if it has not been applied completely after 
more than a decade. There are other concerns about the planning system as well: 
 lack of participation of the public in planning, 
 scarcity of funding available for public investments in this field. 
There is no good news in this respect. These plans are designed by experts, ap-
proved by public bodies, but there is a total lack of citizen participation in the 
planning process. Neither local and regional partnerships, nor those affected by the 
                                                                        
7 NUTS: Nomenclature des unités territoriales statistiques, as stated in Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 1059/2003. 
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plans are involved in planning, so one can hardly talk about awareness, ownership 
or integration of needs and objectives identified when using a bottom-up ap-
proach. 
In the context of funding, it is hard to say that a policy can be taken seriously 
without public investment into that sector. Between 2001 and 2007 only projects 
based on the national territorial development plan, and  lower level master plans 
were hardly supported from the state budget. So the only tool from the develop-
ment toolkit put into practice is that some rural communities were declared towns 
after 2001 (as mentioned above, there are 320 towns in Romania presently). 
After joining the EU, all EU funds became accessible for private and public initi-
atives in Romania, but it is hard to find any operational programme which used the 
regulatory and planning framework of territorial development. One may only hope 
that at least the regional development programming took the framework into ac-
count, so it is worth finding out if it did so or not. As stated in the regulatory frame-
work8 (Law no. 351/2001), there are four types of towns in Romania: 
 the capital: Bucharest (rank 0), 
 towns of national importance (rank 1), 
 towns of regional importance (rank 2), 
 other towns (rank 3). 
Normally the head office of a regional development agency is in the most sig-
nificant town of the region, so one may suspect that rank 1 towns are “capitals” of 
regions. In Romania there are eight regions, but in three out of eight the head office 
is placed in other towns: 
 Nord-Est: Piatra Neamt (rank 2), 
 Sud: Calarasi (rank 2), 
 Centru: Alba Iulia (rank 2). 
In the Romanian Regional Operational Programme (Programul operational 
regional 2007) there are three types of integrated urban development measures9 
(Government Decision no. 1149/2008): for growth poles, for urban development 
poles and for urban centres. Growth poles may match rank 1 municipalities, urban 
development poles rank 2 and the rest of the towns rank 3. But it is not designed 
this way. Only rank 1 urban settlements received funding as growth poles, and not 
all of them, because there is a single growth pole in each region. Oradea, Bacau, 
                                                                        
8 LEGE nr. 351 din 6 iulie 2001 privind aprobarea Planului de amenajare a teritoriului 
national – Sectiunea a IV-a Reteaua de localitati. 
9 HOTARARE nr. 1.149 din 18 septembrie 2008 privind modificarea si completarea Hotararii 
Guvernului nr. 998/2008  pentru desemnarea polilor nationali de crestere in care se 
realizeaza cu prioritate investitii din programele cu finantare comunitara si nationala. 
 László Csák 474 
Galati and Braila are rank 1 towns, but they received only urban development pole 
financing, together with some of the rank 2 towns. Rank 2 towns with a population 
over 100,000 received urban development pole funding, but not all of them: 
Botosani, Piatra Nemat, Buzau and Drobeta Turnu Severin have to compete with 
other smaller rank 2 and also rank 3 towns with a population over 10,000 for the 
funding earmarked for the so-called urban centres. The list of growth poles and 
urban development poles was actually not based on spatial analysis or some 
competitive selection of projects or strategies, but purely on a government 
decision (Government Decision no. 1149/2008). 
All in all, the territorial planning system is only partly applied as a regulatory 
framework and was totally neglected while working out the regional development 
of Romania for the 2007–2013 programming period, as shown in the above exam-
ple. It can be added that divergence from the territorial planning framework may 
be due to its outdatedness: it may have happened that authorities designed the 
regional breakdown of urban development funding based on new studies. The bad 
news is that for a decision like this authorities were supposed to carry out spatial 
analysis and refer to the framework that would not be applied – but this was not 
the case. 
Authentic Cohesion Policy: The Fifth Stage 
Regional disparities have grown constantly and significantly. If we want to take a 
deep insight into Romanian regional trends, it is better to use the NUTS 3 level, 
even if the regional (NUTS 2) data show more of the difficulties regional develop-
ment will face. The NUTS 2 level value of the ratio between the most and the less 
developed regions increased from 1.91 in 1997 to 3.95 in 2008 (Csák 2012), so it 
doubled in a decade. The ratio between the least developed NUTS 3 region (Vaslui) 
and Bucharest–Ilfov was 547 in 2010, expressed in Romanian leu per capita values 
(Figure 2). 
In 2000, there were only 15 counties below 75% of the national average, in 
2010 this increased to 21. One can observe a corridor of declining counties from 
northwest to southeast, and all counties on the bank of the river Danube have 
rather low GDP/capita figures, too. Out of the total 41, there are only 10 NUTS 3 
regions10 above 100% of the national average. 
                                                                        
10 The capital city (Bucharest) and the neigbouring county (Ilfov) are treated as a single unit 
of analysis in order to minimise the risk of statistical inaccuracy, because the commuting 
zone of Bucharest covers Ilfov county. 
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Figure 2. GDP/capita at NUTS 3 level in 2010 (Romanian leu per capita, %) 
Source: TEMPO-Online time series (2013), edited by the author and Hajnal Kakucs as part of 
a regional development analysis carried out by CDC Consulting SRL (Romania) in 2013. 
The trends have been worsening for all declining counties, and there are only 6 
of them having been able to change the 1997–2004 economic trend favourably by 
2010. This sounds great at first glance, but there were 12 counties well below their 
1997–2004 trend in 2010. The rest of the counties did not diverge from their 
trends, whether they were in a  declining or a growing period. 
Using data from 1997–2010, we have attempted to calculate the future trends  
in order to see the pattern for 2020, the end of the next programming period (see 
Figure 3). The GDP/capita of Bucharest–Ilfov will be ten times greater than that of  
Vaslui county, and as many as 25 counties will be below 75% of the national 
average. 
It can clearly be seen that conditions in the northwest–southeast corridor and 
also in the South are alarming: altogether nine counties are below 50%, while all 
the counties in the corridor are below 75%. There are few exceptions in the South, 
Craiova and Giurgiu: the first one has an economy boosted by the Ford investment, 
whereas the latter one is located at the only road transport corridor from Romania  
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Figure 3. GDP/capita at NUTS 3 level in 2020 (Romanian leu per capita, %) 
Source: TEMPO-Online time series (2013), edited by the author and Hajnal Kakucs as part of 
a regional development analysis carried out by CDC Consulting SRL (Romania) in 2013. 
to Bulgaria. Gorj and Arges counties are above 100% value, economy in the first 
one is mainly based on the mining and power generation sector, while in the latter 
one the Dacia automobile factory, owned by Renault, has been operating. 
There are only two other traditional poles in Romania, excluding Bucharest: 
Constanta with its ports at the Black Sea and Timisoara in the southwest of the 
country. Emerging industrial zones are in Cluj Napoca and Brasov. From Brasov to 
the West there are Sibiu, Alba, and Arad counties, all above 100% and situated at 
the same transportation axis connecting Romania to EU member states in the 
West. In this respect, it is worth mentioning that neighbouring counties of the 
poles (Bucharest, Timisoara, Cluj-Napoca, Brasov) did not benefit from their 
proximity to these poles. Actually, all these counties, and also Arad and Bihor in the 
West, had to suffer a kind of economic drain towards the poles. So these poles 
cannot be considered as the engines of regional development, even if they help 
NUTS 2 regions having better figures; however, simultaneously the non-pole areas 
have been going through a continuous “desertification”. 
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As mentioned, some NUTS 3 regions were able to change their trends, so it 
seems necessary to summarise the development potential for each of them. In 
order to analyse this, the following simple model will be used: 
 Counties with rank 1 and 0 towns together with their neighbouring counties 
are supposed to have better potential, so rank 1 and 0 are both marked 1, 
neighbours with road transport connection are marked 2, others receive 3. 
 The performance of research and development is a major factor in regional 
development, so Bucharest–Ilfov is marked 1, those with above 30% of the 
national average of R&D per capita are marked 2, others receive 3. 
 Counties with above 120% of the national GDP/capita value receive 1, their 
neighbours 2, others 3 (assuming that the mentioned polarisation effect can 
be annihilated). 
 Growth poles (Bucharest–Ilfov and Timis) receive mark 1, others with good 
increasing GDP/capita value are marked 2, others marked 3, based on the 
1995–2010 trend. 
Based on this simple model, the factors influencing regional growth potential 
are shown in Figures 4–7. 
The calculated potential values are ranging from 1 to 3: the lower the value, the 
better the potential. The growth potential marks are shown in Figure 8,  calculated 
by using an optimistic scenario (scenario 1), and in Figure 9, assuming that the 
above-mentioned negative neighbouring effects cannot be overcome (scenario 2). 
If we compare the patterns of scenario 1 and scenario 2, we can see that there is 
an urgent need to fight the polarisation or economic drain effect of the poles, 
otherwise the decline corridor and the Danube decline area will persist – which is 
clearly unwanted if a balanced spatial development in Romania is aimed at. On the 
basis of this model one can say that using the territorial development system of 
Romania, as stated in the law, will be  beneficial to rank 0 and 1 towns and also to 
their hinterland (neighbouring, mostly rural counties), but there is an urgent need 
for public intervention in order to tighten urban–rural linkages and for sound 
planning and wise management of the polarisation effect of poles and rank 1 
centres. 
Research and development are unlikely to contribute to growth as practised 
presently, with overwhelming public and public university based research activity 
(Csák 2012). The only good exception in this respect is Arges, where industrial 
private research is present and it does really serve the economy. Hence, private 
research activities and initiatives are supposed to be supported in order to use 
R&D funding in an efficient way in both the traditional academic poles of Romania 
(Bucharest, Iasi, Cluj-Napoca, Timisoara) and in the case of the newcomers like 
Brasov. 
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Figure 4. National territorial planning system Figure 5. Research and development 
 
  
Figure 6. Poles Figure 7. 1995–2010 trend 
 
  
Figure 8. Growth potential, scenario 1 Figure 9. Growth potential, scenario 2 
Source: Author’s elaboration.  
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So the present approach to development, as practised by the government, can 
be summarised as follows: 
 neglecting the law on territorial planning, 
 no awareness of the polarising poles. 
 no authentic planning, based on spatial trends, in the case of EU funds. 
Without a change in governmental approach to cohesion policy, the “desertifi-
cation” process will be unsupportable for most of the population. Unfavourable 
demographic changes may occur and the majority of the population will face the 
risk of poverty and no access to well-paid jobs – just contrary to the  EU 2020 goals 
(EC 2010). 
It may be added that the same story could have been told in 2005–2007 when 
planning for the present programming period, so Romania has wasted 7 years, and 
there is a risk that during the 2014–2020 period a similar thing will happen. There 
are three options for Romania: 
 option 1: maintaining status quo, 
 option 2: reforming regional development without any awareness of the 
problems, 
 option 3: changing approach and implementing a real cohesion policy. 
The first option, even if it is better than the second one, has already been put 
aside. There are regional reform debates in Romania, so a reformed structure will 
be in use during the next programming period. Modifying regions half a year be-
fore 2014, while negotiating the partnership contract with the EU sounds risky, but 
if there is a move towards realising option 3, the risks mentioned in this paper 
could be avoided. 
Let us recall that regional and territorial plans in Romania have not changed 
the trends since 1989. Our forecast for 2010 based on 1997–2004 data was quite 
correct, even if 18 counties diverged from the trend; however, as already men-
tioned, the pattern remained the same, just some counties replaced others. But 
what is the cause of this inefficiency of cohesion policy and territorial planning in 
Romania? The answer is twofold: 
 There is no funding with spatial approach: 
 ERFA programmes were planned without spatial consciousness; 
 member state intervention in the field had no spatial character at all. 
 There is no efficient governance structure for planning and development: 
 regional development agencies have the role of intermediate bodies of the 
regional development operational programme, with lack of skills and 
competencies in this field; so one cannot find any public body, agency or 
partnership at regional level that could be involved in the consultations;  
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 real spatial plans have only been made during the first and the second 
periods of Romanian territorial planning, with no consultation at all, so 
planning competencies are deficient. 
Conclusion 
Both funding and governance issues have to be solved at once, by introducing new 
means of planning for a real cohesion policy. First of all, the legal framework of 
territorial planning shall be put into practice by means of tailor-made funding and 
of spatial plans and strategies planned by using a collaborative approach. All CSF 
Funds11 (Regulation CSF 2012) have to be planned in line with territorial plans of 
different levels (national, regional, county and zonal), because the major aim of CSF 
Funds is not absorption, but contribution to cohesion in the member states and in 
the EU at the same time. A well designed national development framework and its 
application supported by  CSF Funds might be fruitful, but a simple translation of 
CSF objectives without any sign of spatial approach cannot be efficient or only by 
chance. 
The intensified failure of Romanian cohesion policy is caused by different 
factors, like the negation of the past marked by the very much criticised systemati-
sation, which, however, dominated the third period of Romanian territorial plan-
ning (1989–2000). But the seemingly spatial present period is deficient in this 
context, as we tried to demonstrate above. If the next programming period (2014–
2020) will not be planned with spatial consciousness, based on collaborative 
planning, using new governance structures and tailor-made funding, failure can be 
taken for granted12 and Romania is going to waste one more decade. 
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 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT, REGIONAL POLICY 
AND REGIONAL STUDIES  IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA 
Viacheslav Seliverstov 
Introduction 
After the collapse of the USSR in the early 1990s, the new Russian state started its 
operation among extremely difficult economic and political conditions. Radical 
economic and political reforms were needed for the modernisation of Russian 
federalism, and to lay down the bases of regional policy that, in fact, had never 
existed before in the Soviet era. A principle question was to reform all state-
operated systems simultaneously since economic modernisation could not be 
started on the basis of the previous political system and the inherited property 
relations, neither a new federal structure could be built on the remnants of the 
USSR quasi-federation, and without an effective regional policy. Finally, all such 
transformations implied a consolidated national budget. The process of transfor-
mation took place in two, clearly different phases: 
 in the 1990s, when the Russian state started its operation within its current 
boundaries, carrying out political and economic reforms of radical characters 
(the period of B. Eltsin’s presidency); and  
 in the 2000s, when the vertical structure of power strengthened together 
with Russia’s political and economic positions in the world (the period of V. 
Putin’s and D. Medvedev’s presidencies). 
The First Two Decades of Regional Development in the Russian Federation 
After the collapse of the USSR, in the 1990s business activity was concentrated 
mostly in big cities (mainly in Moscow and St. Petersburg), and the hydrocarbon-
producing regions (Tyumen Oblast and its autonomous districts). This increased 
regional disparities – raising the differences in gross regional product (GRP) and 
industrial production per capita 15–20-fold between certain subjects1 of the Rus-
sian Federation (RF). The adopted new taxation principles for large resource com-
                                                                        
1  Administrative territorial units of Russia are called “subjects of the Federation” in Russian 
constitutional language. 
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panies also worsened the situation, since such companies started to pay taxes at 
the place of their registration (mostly in Moscow), and not at the place of operation 
(Siberia and the Far East). As a result, the tax revenues of local governments in the 
eastern regions shrank. 
Other regions of the country were on the verge of subsistence. To prevent any 
separatist movement, President B. Eltsin launched a populist slogan – “take as 
much sovereignty as you can swallow” (this is the word for word translation of his 
statement made at the meeting in Kazan, the capital of the Republic of Tatarstan, in 
August 1990). As a result, on the one hand, local parliaments and legislative 
assemblies adopted constitutions, regional charters, and other statutory acts which 
contradicted the Russian Constitution and federal laws. On the other hand, finan-
cial decentralisation was not supported by taxation reforms that could have 
allowed regions and municipalities  increase their revenues. Federal support was 
granted according to political priorities but not to the principles of fiscal federal-
ism, and most part of it favoured such republics as Tatarstan and Bashkortostan. 
The federal programmes aimed at supporting other territories figured out only 5–
10% of federal support in best case.     
The doctrine “to curtail economic activity” in the Eastern parts of the country 
(Siberia and the Far East) appeared in this period, too, based on the idea of sup-
posedly high costs of living and infrastructure maintenance in these areas. Foreign 
experts’ assessments were involved to prove this thesis. A number of large RF 
subjects successful in the Soviet period saw depression because of slumps in 
industrial production, structural shifts, and the absence of defense investments. 
In the 1990s, economic and social difficulties especially severe in the North 
Caucasian republics were accompanied by mass unemployment in the country and 
fast islamisation in these republics. Separatist tendencies and secession slogans 
launched by the Chechen Republic led to the armed conflict in the Northern Cauca-
sus, and then to the formation of an enclave within the territory of Russia, 
acknowledged only by sharia laws but not by those of the Russian Federation.  
Thus by the turn of the century the country found itself on the brink of an eco-
nomic and political catastrophe, including unsustainable trends in regional 
development, too.  
In the 2000s, when President Putin came to power, the country undoubtedly 
took a turn towards a different, and much more stable economic development due 
to changes in the economic conditions (to a considerable degree due to a rise in oil 
and gas prices). This period began with “strengthening the vertical structure of 
power”, namely the division of Russia into eight districts led by the plenipotentiary 
representatives of the RF President, the centralisation of natural resource manage-
ment, and the delegation of a part of regional powers to the federal government. 
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The positive trends in this period include the followings: 
 intergovernmental fiscal relations have been stabilised, federal transfers 
have started to be allocated on a regular basis;   
 regional laws were brought into line with federal ones (in the 1990s, “re-
gional” parliaments and assemblies passed hundreds of laws, and munici-
palities thousands);  
 the federal government in co-operation with large business actors launched 
federal programmes to support a number of RF regions; in this period, the 
“presence” of private business became increasingly visible in several regions 
through their impacts on many aspects of regional life;   
 several RF regions successfully realised their own development models by 
taking advantage of their competitive advantages;2 
 teams of new managers came to power in the regions, who could solve not 
only tactical problems but also strategic ones;    
 in this period, Russia started the development of a new system of regional 
strategic planning – some federal districts, RF subjects, and large cities de-
veloped their economic strategies (the Siberian Federal District was the first 
among them); this has undoubtedly improved regional governance;  
 new institutions were built at the federal, regional, and local levels serving 
development (investment funds, special economic zones, technoparks, scien-
tific centres in certain towns, and industrial and logistic parks); and  
 the federal government launched a new development doctrine for the Rus-
sian North and Arctic to use the potentials and resources of these regions 
considered as territories of strategic importance. In 2013 the Development 
Strategy for the Arctic of the Russian Federation up to 2020 was adopted. 
The consequences of the global crisis of 2008–2009 included a relative reduc-
tion of regional disparities in Russia, as the developed regions proved to be most 
affected, and governmental support aimed at mitigating the impacts of the crisis 
mostly in depressed regions. In all, the geography of the crisis was rather clear. In 
the first and most difficult phase it hit the European part of Russia significantly, 
that is, regions specialised both in the production of less competitive products 
satisfying domestic demand, and resources also for domestic markets. Regions of 
                                                                        
2 For example, Novosibirsk Oblast being one of the developed regions of the USSR in the 
1960–1980s with its specialisation in engineering industry, then becoming a depressed 
region from the 1980s to the end of 1990s, has emerged as one of the dynamically 
developing regions of Russia since the first years of the new century, with a diversified 
economic structure led by innovation. This region effectively realised its own development 
model by taking advantage of its favorable geographical position and good R&D potential 
inherited from the Soviet era. 
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metals industry such as the Ural, Siberia, and Central- and North-West Russia saw 
hard days. Large cities experienced a crisis shock, too, followed by a huge drop 
mostly in the construction industry, and partly in the banking and service sectors. 
In the 2000s we could solve our major problems related to regional develop-
ment, however, the spatial development of the country has not been based on a 
strategy specifying the legislative priorities for long-term spatial development to 
ensure its sustainability. Neither there is a national urban planning pattern.3 No 
effective measures have been taken to the solve the problems of single-industry 
cities (mostly those where large facilities of defense or coal industries were lo-
cated), and no quality changes of institutions and natural resource management 
took place, so regions with resource-based economies had not enough financial 
and material background to carry out effective social and environmental policies. 
As the general economic trend in the country was favourable, the Russian 
government started supporting some regions and so-called “new points of 
growth”, but this meant mainly the support of the North Caucasisan republics 
(mostly the recovery of the Chechen economy) and some representative projects 
such as the Sochi Olympic Games4, the World Student Games in Kazan, or the APEC 
Summit in Vladivostok. Priorities actually required for improving Russian spatial 
development (such as the renewal of the transportation infrastructure in the East-
ern part of Russia) were left without proper governmental support. 
As a result, the development of large regions of strategic importance did not 
become a priority of spatial development policy. If we just take the example of 
Siberia, we can see that governmental policy requires co-ordination: till now the 
development of the region meant some actions not connected with each other, 
while federal investments in Siberia were ten times lower than those in repre-
sentative projects mentioned above. As regards the route to go, the society and the 
experts have different opinions about the proposal – rather sound in principle – to 
build new institutions for supporting eastern regions (such as the Public Develop-
ment Corporation for Siberia and the Far East). A dominant opinion is that such 
corporations would not serve the support of eastern regions, but the exploitation 
of natural resources in favour of the Centre, and some financial and industrial 
groups of big cities, which would raise corruption risks higher.      
However, a process of building an interregional innovation cluster (Novosibirsk 
Oblast – Tomsk Oblast – Krasnoyarsk Krai), the basis of which had been laid in the 
Soviet era, has started in spite of the difficult economic circumstances of the past 
decades including the impacts of the crisis, and it brought tangible benefits to these 
                                                                        
3 However, the RF Urban Development Code requires the Scheme of Territorial Planning as a 
main document of strategic planning in addition to the Socio-Economic Development 
Strategy. 
4 At present, Sochi’s Olympics costs are assessed to have reached $50 billion. 
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regions as the traditional resource specialisation of Siberia started to change. 
Within the framework of this cluster new institutions emerged (technoparks, spe-
cial economic zones, technological platforms, etc.), and this could be regarded as 
an important indicator of modernisation in the Siberian economy. Moreover, the 
influence of such institutions is higher in Southern Siberia than in Russia as a 
whole. In all probability, innovation in the Siberian economy together with the new 
oil and gas fields in Krasnoyarsk Krai and Irkutsk Oblast will maintain higher 
growth rates in the region compared to the RF average in the coming years.  
The Genesis of Russian Regional Policy 
In our opinion, taking into consideration the vast economic space of Russia and the 
strong disparities between its territories regarding both the availability and 
variety of natural resources and the levels of their industrial and social develop-
ment, a new regional policy should become one of the priorities of the Russian 
government. For a long period, spatial development of the country as well as socio-
economic policy have been given much less attention than deserved. In the Soviet 
era, they were replaced by a centralised distribution of the national productive 
forces. In the 1990s, deep in economic crisis, Russia could not have any regional 
policy since there were no financial and material resources for its realisation. 
Actually, Russian regions had to survive independently – in this period, various 
models of interregional barter and clearing of payments between local govern-
ments could be observed, giving at least some chance for federal subjects and cities 
to survive. In addition, at the turn of the century, the federal department respon-
sible for regional policy was dismissed. 
The 2000s saw a visible progress in the theory and practice of regional policy in 
the Russian Federation. Three simultaneous reforms were launched at the federal 
and regional levels – an administrative, a municipal, and a fiscal one. The harmoni-
sation of regional and federal law was almost completed. The financial resources of 
regional policy increased, and new forms, instruments, and institutions of this 
policy appeared in Russia (in addition to the federal target programmes aimed at 
regions). In the process of building regional policy institutions, the most important 
step was the reconstitution of the RF Ministry of Regional Development, and steps 
were taken also to improve the structure of subnational public administration 
entities. The development of programme documents on regional strategies notably 
intensified at the level of the federal districts and RF subjects; and finally, docu-
ments reflecting the legal principles and concepts of regional policy were elabo-
rated (such as the draft of the federal law Concerning the Basic Principles of Govern-
mental Regional Policy and the Procedure of Its Development and Implementation 
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and the Concept of the Socio-economic Development Strategy for Regions of the 
Russian Federation).  
In spite of all these important steps, regional policy in Russia gets much less 
attention than macro-economic and fiscal policies, reflected also in the volume of 
resources dedicated to its implementation. In fact, there is neither a legislative 
framework concerning regional policy nor a strategy of regional development for 
the country which would co-ordinate the different sub-strategies for macro-
regions, federal districts, and subjects of the Federation. As a result, regional 
disparities in the economic and political space of Russia have increased, and the 
federal subjects and cities are condemned to depend on federal support (as it is 
considered the only way to respond to regional challenges). All this led to an 
excessive and exaggerated competition between regions.  
The picture turned even worse by the implemented model of governmental 
regional policy chosen improperly, focusing only on the support of “locomotive 
regions”, and rejecting any effort to help the social and economic levels of regions 
converge. This approach (“polarised development” based on the governmental 
support of the “locomotive regions”) was declared the mainstream regional policy 
of the RF Ministry of Regional Development for many years. We believe, however, 
that regional policy should necessarily combine two priorities,  supporting both 
depressive regions and regional “points of growth”. 
By now, Russian regional policy has started to gain a new character, adopting 
world practices adjusted to the geographic characteristics and spatial development 
issues of Russia. Below, we list our recommendations related to further steps to be 
taken in the framework of regional policy:   
(1) The objectives of regional policy should be closely connected with those of 
improving Russian federalism, as in a federation regional policy has to fit in 
the whole federal model (e.g. related to issues of fiscal federalism and 
intergovernmental relations). The author’s research results came to the 
conclusion that Russia tries to imitate a model of competitive federalism 
instead of a co-operative one. 
(2) Even if regional policy is suggested to aim at certain regions (or groups of 
regions) in one respect or another, the assessment of the impacts of these 
actions on the rest RF subjects should be carried out. In other words, 
though any regional policy may be regarded as the “discrimination” of 
some regions, it should bring a positive overall effect to the system of 
regional co-operation,  and such “discrimination” should never be sus-
tained in the long term in order not to increase disparities artificially. 
(3) The regional policy of Russia should not be considered as the centre’s 
paternalistic policy towards the regions (even if the federal centre 
distributes financial subsidies for different territorial units). Regional 
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policy should enhance communication between the centre and the regions, 
and help create a system of horizontal co-operation, too. The development 
and implementation of an effective regional policy requires intensified 
processes of integration within the economic and legislative space of 
Russia, as well as new forms and mechanisms of regional interaction and 
co-operation between regions and the federal centre. First and foremost, 
intergovernmental relations (both vertical and horizontal ones) should 
acquire a new character, i.e. they should be based on the principles of 
equality and the consideration of mutual interests instead of the present 
experiences of subordination.  
(4) Russian regional policy should give up the practice of allocating federal 
support in exchange for political loyalty or ethnic stability; in addition, the 
limited financial resources of regional policy should not be dedicated to 
internationally representative super-projects mentioned above.  
(5) Regional policy should include a clear social dimension, incorporating the 
principles of justice and equality, but regional equalisation should not 
mean only the levelling of regional disparities since it is neither possible 
nor effective. Complex economic solutions are recommended to solve social 
problems, for a set of business projects to be implemented in certain 
regions cannot build the conditions for the development of regions and 
their social systems.  
(6) The improvement of regional policy should include strengthening its 
institutions. Special agencies (corporations) of regional development 
acting as institutions of regional policy on the regional and local levels 
could co-ordinate the interests of the authorities, business, and the public. 
The international practice of regional policy has proven the effectiveness of 
this approach.  
(7) Regional policy should fit in a broader nation-policy with due regard to the 
special characteristics of our national republics (such as those in the North 
Caucasus) and the autonomous regions (in Siberia and the Far East). 
(8) At present, unlike other policies, regional policy is especially closely linked 
with processes of democratisation and building an open society in Russia. 
Therefore, it should be based on public–private partnership and the 
institutions of civil society. We believe that changes in Russian regional 
policy will bring it closer to the EU cohesion policy, but this will require a 
new, co-operative model of federalism. 
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The Roots and Development of Russian Regional Studies 
The roots of regional studies in Russia date back to the Soviet era. Those days 
some of our scientific innovations represented the world standard, e.g. in the fields 
of the theory of regional production complexes and industrial hubs, the theory of 
regional co-operation, forecasting methods and models of regional development 
within the context of national economics. The studies of Soviet researchers focused 
generally on practical tasks (concentrating national production forces in Siberia, 
for instance), but they gave inputs also to the development of national strategic 
documents such as the General Plan of Allocation and Development of the Labour 
Forces in the USSR, the General Population Settlement Pattern, and contributed to 
regional planning. These papers were of interdisciplinary character (combining 
economics, economic geography, sociology, and urban planning). 
However, not all new ideas could be realised in practice, for the Soviet 
economic and decision-making system rejected certain innovations. Not even the 
term “regional policy” existed in the regional studies of those days. Most studies 
were based on the primacy of national economic interests, and therefore, regional 
social and environmental problems were not given emphasis. Neither modeling 
and forecasting regional development in the USSR was based on the thorough 
study of the financial aspects of long-term development and intergovernmental 
relationships. 
Some research results found before the collapse of the USSR, which could not 
be applied in the context of a centralised economy, gained new opportunity due to 
a certain level of independence granted to regions in post-Soviet Russia. For 
example, studies on the theory and models of regional interactions previously 
made by the Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering of the Siberian 
Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences (Novosibirsk) are in principle much 
more applicable in an economy where regions have certain independence, with 
own interests and freedom to form co-operations or coalitions.  
However, the central government did not provide Russian science and regional 
studies with sufficient financial support, showing no demand for special regional 
studies in the 1990s. Still, the research centres of the Russian Academy of Sciences 
(RAS), and universities in Moscow, St. Petersburg, Novosibirsk, Yekaterinburg, 
Khabarovsk managed to survive and adapt to the new economic and political 
reality, utilising the availability of international co-operation.5 
In the recent decade, many new problems were discussed in the framework of 
regional studies, focusing on the major problems of the present era. Main topics 
                                                                        
5 Leksin and Shvetsova (2000) present a comprehensive picture of regional studies in 
Russia in this period, highly appreciating those of the 1990s, in spite of the difficulties in 
financing. 
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include the regional disparities of post-Soviet Russian space; regional policies; 
social problems of Russian regions; regional diagnostics; regional and municipal 
governance; migration flows and the development of transport infrastructure in 
the context of regulatory problems related to spatial development; spatial struc-
ture of information society, etc. The most noticeable research results in this field 
were presented by members of the RAS, namely by А. Granberg and P. Minakir, 
Prof. V. Leksin, Prof. А. Shvetsov, Prof. N. Zubarevich, and others. A new series of 
regional studies on modeling spatial economic systems and on the theory of 
regional co-operation were carried out by the IEIE SB RAS under the supervision of 
А. Granberg, associate member of the RAS, V. Suslov, and Prof. S. Suspitsyn 
(Granberg – Suslov – Suspitsin 2007, Suspitsin 2010). Researches on the theory, 
methodology, and practice of strategic regional planning developed rapidly, too.6 
The peculiarity of all these works lay in their interdisciplinary character, inte-
grating the approaches of regional economics and new economic geography, eco-
nomic, social, ecologic, and scientific/engineering aspects of regional development, 
discussing issues of economic and institutional theories as well. 
In the 2000s, publications devoted to regional studies multiplied. Among them 
we could mention monographs (see, for example, Zubarevich 2007 and Shvetsov 
2010), periodicals such as Region: Economics and Sociology published by the 
Siberian Branch of the RAS in Novosibirsk (Editor-in-Chief: Prof. V. Seliverstov7); 
Spatial Economics published by the Far-East Branch of the RAS in Khabarovsk 
(Editor-in-Chief: P. Minakir, member of the RAS); Regional Economy published by 
the Ural Branch of the RAS in Yekaterinburg (Editor-in-Chief: А. Tatarkin, member 
of the RAS).  
Since 2010, the Pleiades Publishing Ltd. and the MAIK Nauka/Interperiodica 
have been publishing the journal Regional Research of Russia (in English, dis-
tributed by Springer, Editors-in-Chief are V. Kotlyakov and Prof. S. Artobolevsky, 
members of the RAS), which is a selection of articles from three Russian journals: 
The Bulletin of the Russian Academy of Sciences. Geographic series, The Bulletin of 
the Russian Geographical Society, and Region: Economics and Sociology. The foreign 
journal publishes those papers, which are supposed to be of foreign readers’ inte-
rest.8 
After the breakdown of the USSR, the position of Russian regional studies was 
consolidated by its scientific leader, А. Granberg, who initiated the programme 
Basic Research on Spatial Development of the Russian Federation: Interdisciplinary 
Synthesis, financed within the research framework launched by the Presidium of 
                                                                        
6 The author devoted two of his monographs to this problem (Seliverstov 2010, Seliverstov 
2013). 
7 Prof. Gyula Horváth is member of the editorial board. 
8 The author is Deputy Editor-in-Chief of Regional Research of Russia. 
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the RAS. The programme was implemented between 2009 and 2011, including 13 
different lines of research such as thespatial transformations of the society; spatial 
demography and social environment; evolution, modernisation, and new explora-
tion of economic space; fundamental problems of the united transport space; 
problems of building and developing Russian macro-regions and regional inte-
gration; scientific bases of the improved regional structure; building a system of 
regional planning, etc. 
Almost 20 research institutes of the Russian Academy of Sciences were 
involved, and they came to new and interesting scientific results related to the 
theory and practice of regional studies and spatial development.9 The author 
headed the project Building the Multi-Level System of Strategic Planning: Methodol-
ogy, Instruments, and Institutions (a case study for Siberia) within the framework of 
this programme. 
The death of А. Granberg (2010), the leader of Russian regional studies, weak-
ened the positions of this field of science, but not dramatically. Taking into account 
the importance of spatial aspects in the development of the Russian Federation, 
the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences adopted its resolution in 2011 
on launching a new series of research for the period 2012–2014, Modernization of 
Russia and Space: Natural Resources and Socio-Economic Potentials, co-ordinated 
by V. Kotlyakov, member of the RAS and Director of the Institute of Geography of 
the RAS. This programme allows the discussion of the new economic and geopoliti-
cal reality, including 7 lines of research such as the development of the economic 
space based on a modernisation strategy; development of Russia within the global 
and Eurasian space; or the institutional and legal aspects of the regulation of 
spatial development. The author is scientific supervisor of the programme, and 
manager of the project Public Administration and Regulation of the Spatial De-
velopment of Russia: from Strategic Planning to Strategic Governance. 
In all we can state that Russian regional studies are in progress, some of their 
achievements can be reckoned among the scientific breakthroughs of our age. 
Having seen the demand for regional studies in the recent decade due to the 
modernisation processes taken place in Russia, we believe that future interna-
tional projects on regional problems could bring further good results, as it 
happened within the frames of our10 co-operation with the Centre for Regional 
Studies, Hungarian Academy of Sciences. On the basis of the co-operation agree-
ment concluded we anticipate further results of our joint work. 
                                                                        
  9 About the results of this programme see Kotlyakov – Glezer – Treyvish (2012) and a 
monograph devoted to the same issue is to be published in the near future. 
10 The Institute of Economics and Industrial Engineering, SB, RAS. 
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 YUGOSLAV SUCCESSOR STATES: AFTER THE FAILURE 
OF THE SOCIALIST FEDERATION, INTO THE 
FEDERALISING EUROPEAN UNION?1 
Zoltán Hajdú 
Introduction 
Yugoslavia followed a specific development path rich in turns in the period fol-
lowing World War II. Until its disintegration in 1991, the country had contacts of 
varying content with both the West and the Soviet Union. The non-committed sta-
tus of Yugoslavia, its special internal economic and social policy representing a 
“third way”, with special socialist elements, created the minimum bases of co-
operation in both directions, except for some brief intervals. 
In its internal relations, structures similar to other socialist states were domi-
nant in many respects, but the birth of Yugoslav self-managing socialism endowed 
the country with unique features. Unlike most other socialist countries, Yugoslavia 
continuously remained open to the West in several respects. The conditions of 
organised emigration and mass employment abroad were gradually created. 
The country developed its relations to the European Economic Community 
(EEC) from the mid-1960s on. In economic relations, the EEC became the most 
important trade partner for Yugoslavia, and in the framework of these relations 
the country was given development resources as well.  
In the decades after 1945 Yugoslavia made continuous efforts to operate on 
constitutional grounds (for this purpose, four constitutions were approved: in 
1946, 1953, 1963 and 1974). At different times, the constitutional foundation of 
the federation was an important issue. A subject of continuous debates was the 
regulation of the constitutional situation and the rights of the federal level and the 
member republics, and the two provinces within Serbia (Kosovo and Voivodina). 
In practice, the will of Tito was enforced in almost all respects, and constitu-
tionality was only seemingly respected. The foundations of the integration of the 
country were, from the beginning, the communist party and the army. 
                                                                        
1 This research was supported by the FP7 Programme. Title of project is Bordering, Political 
Landscapes and Social Arenas: Potentials and Challenges of Evolving Border Concepts in a 
post-Cold War World  (EUBORDERSCAPES), GA Nr. 290775. 
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The reform of the Constitution in 1974 was actually an act of the Yugoslav po-
litical elite to prepare for the post-Tito era. The “system” worked quite well in 
Tito’s life, but after his death in May 1980 first operational malfunctions, then cri-
ses broke out, and finally the constitutional arrangement reached the phase of 
inoperability, and the member republics chose their own separate ways.  
In the history of Yugoslavia and the EEC a turning point was brought (in the 
opinion of both parties) by the Common Declaration approved in 1976 that deep-
ened their relations. 
The EEC was interested in keeping Yugoslavia in one for a long time, and made 
declarations on this. Still, in December 1991 an EEC member state, Germany, uni-
laterally recognised the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia, and as a consequence 
of this, in January 1992 the whole of the EEC recognised the independence of these 
two countries. (Which can also be interpreted as the escape of the two most ad-
vanced, most westernised countries with Roman Catholic majority from the un-
folding chaos of the Balkans.) 
The transforming European Union, redefining itself in many respects, played a 
significant role from 1992 on in supporting Croatia and Slovenia and in establish-
ing their international relations. In the transformation processes of the other ex-
Yugoslav states, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the EU failed to help these 
processes. It was the UNO, the NATO and the USA that became the major actors in 
solving the problems there. The EU contributed to stabilisation in the fields of fi-
nance and development.  
This brief analysis is an attempt to draw attention to the extremely complicated 
development of the European integration processes in the ex-Yugoslav member 
states. Slovenia, the most developed and most open of them, became member of the 
integration in the framework of a considerable enlargement wave in 2004, in fact, 
the country even met the criteria of introducing the Euro in a short time; Croatia will 
join the EU in the summer of 2013, so its integration took almost two decades. 
Even more complicated accession processes are expected in the future. The 
economic and institutional crisis phenomena of the European Union after 2008, 
the serious internal problems of some of the member states will not accelerate, but 
probably slow down the accession of the other ex-Yugoslav member republics. 
If the EU loses its attraction for some member states, for whatever reason, that 
will presumably affect some of the countries striving for accession. In the begin-
ning it occurred only in Serb journalists’ analyses that the EU “stepped on the path 
of Yugoslavia”, but now one can read about the necessity of a radical transfor-
mation of the EU, and in the worst case even its disintegration, even in large West-
ern newspapers and at the level of political evaluations. 
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The Relations between Yugoslavia and the EEC until 1991 
In 1965 Yugoslavia joined the GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), 
thereby creating the basic conditions for expanding its western relations. In the 
longer run membership was not simply about customs and tariffs; it was about 
getting closer to integration into the economic systems operating in Western 
Europe.  
In 1970 a trade agreement was made between the EEC and Yugoslavia for three 
years. The agreement allowed Yugoslavia to integrate into the economic devel-
opment of the six member countries of the community in an organised form. The 
expiring agreement was extended by a five-year framework agreement in 1973. 
The principle of most favoured nations was also applied. 
After 1974 ministerial level relations between the EEC and Yugoslavia became 
regular; also joint committees were set up in various fields for deepening the rela-
tions.Yugoslavia and the EEC signed the first comprehensive bilateral agreement in 
1976. (It was the first time that a Yugoslav prime minister in office made a visit to 
the EEC centre.) The agreement, in addition to the development of trade relations, 
also allowed co-operation in several other fields (specifying economic policy, im-
provement of the balance of trade, transportation, environment, labour issues, and 
also scientific and technical relations). 
These agreements greatly contributed to the EEC becoming a considerable fac-
tor in Yugoslavia in the development of trade relations, in fact, in the direction of 
the development of the economy. From the 1970s on Yugoslavia established spe-
cific, EEC dominated trade relations (in 1970, 33% of its exports went to the EEC 
and 40% of imports came from there). The socialist countries had a much lower 
proportion in the foreign trade of Yugoslavia. Although Yugoslavia also developed 
its relations to the Soviet Union and the COMECON (Council for Mutual Economic 
Assistance), these countries had only a secondary role in the foreign trade of 
Yugoslavia. 
In 1976, for the first time, the EEC gave Yugoslavia loan  for the development of 
areas specified in the bilateral relations. Approximately 60 million USD was ap-
proved by the EEC. In 1977 another loan was given to Yugoslavia for integrating 
the high voltage cables into those of Italy and Greece (Commission 1979).  
In 1978 Yugoslavia was given another loan for the construction of its motorway 
system. The objective was to establish connections to the motorways in Greece and 
Turkey, as the membership of Greece was already anticipated at the time. Yugosla-
via supported the accession of Greece to the EEC in the hope that its southern terri-
tories be developed by the new neighbourhood, which expectation partly came 
true later. 
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The most comprehensive impact of the EEC on the Yugoslav economy, society, 
families and individuals was through the reception of masses of guest workers 
(especially by the then Federal Republic of Germany after 1968). Although in vary-
ing proportions, all member republics sent guest workers to the EEC. (Within a 
short while, more than 1 million people showed up in the territory of the EEC for 
shorter or longer employment.) These experiences lead to growing skills, cultural 
impacts, and also prosperity through  remittances. 
On the whole, in the second half of the 1970s versatile relations, in fact, quasi 
strategic co-operations existed between the EEC and Yugoslavia. In the interna-
tional conditions of the time, Yugoslavia was the most democratic, most liberal 
socialist country for the leaders of the EEC (but a socialist country, anyway; this 
could not be neglected as it was also expressed in the name of the country). The 
political, economic and social elite of Yugoslavia and also society at large learned 
about  the internal relations and the rules of game in the EEC. In this respect Yugo-
slavia had an incomparable advantage over all other socialist countries. 
In 1981 – already after the death of Tito – 70% of the industrial goods produced 
in Yugoslavia were shipped to the western markets free of duty, on the ground of 
the trade agreement between the EEC and Yugoslavia. Nevertheless, the volume of 
trade between the two partners decreased by 15% between 1980 and 1985, due to 
the unfolding economic crisis in Yugoslavia. The trade deficit of the EEC to 
Yugoslavia decreased from 4 billion USD to 1 billion. (It was partly the con-
sequence of the Common Agricultural Policy that made Yugoslav agricultural and 
food products uncompetitive on the market of the Community.) 
In 1988 the EEC renewed the status of Yugoslavia as a special trade partner for 
another five years. Theoretically by this the more and more apparent crisis of 
Yugoslavia was given a potential “tension easing” tool and some help from outside 
to solve the problems (Mariotti 1993). 
The issue of full EEC membership was a matter of public talk, and also a topic of 
political debates from the late 1980s on. (It was promoted by Austria’s application 
for full membership status in 1989, while keeping its neutrality.) In Yugoslavia 
many thought that if it was possible for Austria to remain neutral as an EEC mem-
ber, then Yugoslavia too might have a chance to keep its non-obliged status (Tsaka-
loyannis 1981). 
As a member republic of Yugoslavia, Croatia (together with Slovenia) joined, as 
founding members, the activity of the Alpine-Adriatic Working Community in 
1978. Both member republics were active in developing co-operation. The elites of 
these member republics were thus integrated into another international network 
by this co-operation, and they acquired important skills about the operation of 
such systems. 
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Parallel to the deepening internal political and economic crisis of Yugoslavia, in 
January 1990 the League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) ceased to exist. Prime 
Minister Ante Markovic – a Croatian – who founded a party of his own (Union of 
Reform Forces) after the dissolution of the LCY and worked out a comprehensive 
reform programme, officially announced in 1990 that the achievement of full EEC 
membership was a priority goal. (An important consideration behind this an-
nouncement was to maintain and strengthen European relationships and to keep 
Yugoslavia together.) Markovic believed that it was EEC membership that could 
save Yugoslavia from disintegration and a civil war. 
The EEC itself was engaged in processing the impacts of German unification and 
its own organisational restructuring, as preparations for transforming the EEC into 
the European Union were already on the agenda. Thus neither the immediate 
accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden (that became full members in 1995 only), 
nor the candidate status for the economically and politically instable Yugoslavia 
was timely (Accetto 2007). 
The deepening and accelerating crisis that covered each field of life in Yugosla-
via made the consolidated development of relations impossible. The country car-
ried out a “violent self-liquidation” in which each republic had a substantial role, 
although of different magnitude. 
In the course of Yugoslavia’s disintegration the federal institutions could not 
use or could only use their constitutional competencies with limitations. The con-
flicting interests of the member republics gradually made the operation of the Yu-
goslavian prime minister and the federal government impossible (Mastny 1999). 
In December 1991 Germany and then in January 1992 the EEC too recognised 
the sovereignty of Croatia and Slovenia, contributing thereby to the self-liquidation 
of Yugoslavia and the international recognition of its disintegration (Aksoy 1994, 
Redeljic 2012). 
Characteristics of the Relationship between the EU and the Sovereign 
Yugoslav Successor States 
The main factor affecting the development of relationships between the EU and the 
newly sovereign Yugoslav successor states was the way events took place in the 
respective countries. The development of relations is basically an evaluation of 
these processes. Croatia and Slovenia gained their sovereignty at the same time, 
recognised by the EU, and the internal processes in these two most westernised ex-
member republics were basically different from those in other member republics 
(Rupnik 2011). 
Slovenia “got out of Yugoslavia” without any major damages and large indebt-
edness, the experience of its sovereignty was primarily used for developing rela-
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tions with the EU. The new state quickly settled its relations with its neighbours; it 
had a long lasting debate only with Croatia. More than a decade after gaining its 
guaranteed sovereignty, Slovenia acceded to the EU in 2004. (Besides EU member-
ship the country also gained membership in the NATO in the same year.) 
Croatia faced much more complicated internal problems when it gained sover-
eignty. It had serious material and demographic sacrifices when fighting for its 
sovereignty. The relations between Croatia and Serbia remained tense. The Croats 
in Bosnia had a complicated system of relations and they  also had violent fights in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina with both the Serbs and the Bosniaks (Trbovich 2008). 
President (1990–1999) Franjo Tudjman had the restoration of the territorial 
unity of the country as his primary goal, which was only achieved in 1998. Presi-
dent Tudjman considered the chance of EU accession as an important but only 
secondary issue coming after territorial unity and sovereignty. 
The relations between Croatia and the European Union were settled in almost 
all respects only after October 2001. The EU and Croatia signed the stabilisation 
and association agreement, which made Croatia a candidate country. Croatia sub-
mitted its request for accession in February 2003. The EU realised that the internal 
institutional structures of Croatia were hardly compatible with the established EU 
systems, and a separate programme was launched and financed for the elimination 
of the “gap”, the institutional differences between the two parties (Stiks 2006). 
Croatia participated in working out different Central European, Danubian and 
Mediterranean macro-regional development concepts. The completed materials of 
the programme called CADSES systematically analysed the characteristics of Croa-
tia (being a Danubian, Adriatic and Southeast European country at the same time), 
and its problematic issues and macro-regional structural challenges were inte-
grated into European spatial policy, planning and development. 
The Croats had to settle, for the sake of accession, their relations with  Slovenia. 
Although the two countries left the former Yugoslavia in co-operation, border 
debates and economic issues burdening their relationship were not easy to solve. 
Croatia – together with Albania – became a member of NATO in 2009. NATO 
membership is not a prerequisite of EU membership, but belonging to the alliance 
accelerated the EU accession processes. In the summer of 2013 Croatia can already 
participate as a full member in outlining regional policy. However, Croatia’s adap-
tation is laden with the present economic crisis, and Slovenia too seems to adapt to 
the changing structural circumstances with difficulties. 
In 2000 the EU offered West Balkan states the prospect of accession to the EU, 
and in the course of 2001–2008 the SAP (Stabilisation and Association Process) 
agreements had been concluded with practically all the countries concerned. Hav-
ing become the number one financial and partly also political actor not only in the 
issues of these countries among each other but also in their internal relations, the 
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EU presumably had to take this step. The EU and the NATO gradually “surrounded” 
the region. 
Without going into details of the accession processes and the various stages of 
the countries one by one, on the basis of the official “status definitions” of the EU 
we can say that in February 2013 Montenegro (a quiet member of the Euro zone) 
was already having  accession talks, Macedonia and Serbia were official candidate 
countries, while Bosnia and Herzegovina had associate member status. Kosovo, a 
complicated country also for the EU (five member states have still not recognised 
its sovereignty) is having preliminary negotiations. 
The relationship between Serbia and Kosovo has not been settled yet (as of 
spring of 2013). Both parties have specific long-term considerations for the devel-
opment of their relations. Serbia actually connects the settlement of relations to 
awarding full territorial autonomy to the Serbs living in the northern part of 
Kosovo. 
On the grounds of the present EU relations and the negotiation talks, the ques-
tion is which countries will join the EU of what structure, and under what internal 
conditions. Amidst the ever sharper economic, financial and institutional-opera-
tional crisis, the European Union wants to develop itself into a federation. Internal 
debates are expected about the characteristics of this federation. By far not all 
member states are interested in the creation and future operation of a genuine 
federal structure. The member republics of the former Yugoslavia may have a spe-
cific contribution to the interpretation of the actual content of federation. 
Summary 
The EEC and Yugoslavia had an intensively widening system of co-operation from 
the very beginning of the 1970s. The mutually advantageous relations were useful 
for both parties, but Yugoslavia did not manage to overcome either its interna-
tional embeddedness in the bipolar world or its internal ideological foundations 
and limits. 
The Yugoslav leadership started to seriously consider the possibility of EEC 
membership in 1990, at the time when the bipolar world was collapsing. The Euro-
pean partners at that time were mainly engaged in the reunification of Germany 
and the shaping of the European Union. The disintegration of Yugoslavia resulted 
in separate development paths in the former member states and their varied rela-
tions towards the EU. 
Slovenia rapidly and successfully managed to overcome the obstacles raised by 
European expectations, while Croatia had more difficulties. The rest of the succes-
sor states – at different stages of the accession process – are now making their way 
to be included in the future enlargements of the EU. The internal (economic, finan-
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cial and institutional) crises of the EU having started in 2008 will make the acces-
sion process more complicated than the earlier ones were. The EU must face the 
performance problems and adaptation difficulties of the states that became mem-
bers after 2004. 
The crises may challenge the dedication of countries even in the core area. The 
Euro-scepticism of Great Britain and a probable referendum may result in a new 
situation. We do not think that a real parallel can be drawn between the EU and the 
disintegration of Yugoslavia, neither do we believe that an observation and 
registration of the “stages of disintegration in Yugoslavia” should be made (“Will 
the EU end up like Yugoslavia?”). It is evident, on the other hand, that the solution 
of the crisis in the European Union requires fundamental changes. 
In our opinion, the uncertainties and contradictions of the federal state system 
and in the definition of the competencies and levels of decision-making all  con-
tributed to the disintegration processes in Yugoslavia. However, it was not 
primarily a crisis of the federal state system that led to disintegration; rather, it 
was the unfolding economic, social, political, ethnic etc. conflicts that were 
reflected in the federal structures. It was the special socialist way that failed first in 
Yugoslavia, and then its omnipresent effects made the functioning of the federal 
institutional system impossible. 
The disintegration of Yugoslavia has morals for the European Union as well: the 
integration has to find such a framework for dynamising and operating the econo-
my which is acceptable for the majority of the members, and in its development 
towards a federation, the EU must consider that a significant part of the new 
members will probably insists on their sovereignty.  
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 PROSPECTS OF CROATIAN REGIONS IN WESTERN 
BALKAN TERRITORIAL CO-OPERATION 
Marijana Sumpor – Irena Đokić – Gabrijela Žalac 
Introduction 
Cross-border co-operation (CBC) is an important part of European territorial co-
operation policy and an integral instrument for achieving the objectives of EU 
cohesion policy and in particular of territorial cohesion. As all the countries in the 
Western Balkan (WB) region have declared their wish to join the EU, naturally, the 
European enlargement and neighbourhood policy is extended to this region. This is 
the main basis for the initiation of CBC programmes among the member states and 
the neighbouring WB countries, and since 2007 programmes have been imple-
mented among non-EU member states, namely the candidate and the potential 
candidate countries within the WB.1 
It has been a difficult time for the new independent countries of the WB region. 
Very soon after a series of conflicts in the 1990s, new development co-operation 
opportunities arose when the  European Union regional co-operation programme 
commenced after the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit. Already in the context of CBC 
with member states, some WB countries gained their first experiences in CBC pro-
jects through the neighbourhood programme co-financed by the CARDS and Phare 
pre-accession funds.2 A more systematic regional approach has been introduced 
with the Integrated Pre-accession (IPA) Programme covering all the WB countries 
(Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Serbia, Macedonia) and also in-
cluding Albania, Turkey and Iceland (IPA countries). 
In this paper, we are going to focus on the experiences gained from the perspec-
tive of the Republic of Croatia. Specific regional and local level experiences in the 
CBC process from a region in the eastern part of the country, namely the Vukovar–
Sirmium County will be presented. This county is a NUTS 3 level region belonging 
                                                                        
1 In 2013 Croatia will become an EU member state. Montenegro, FYR Macedonia and Serbia 
have a candidate status, while Bosnia and Herzegovina remain in a potential candidate 
status. In 2008 Kosovo declared independence and aims to become an EU member state as 
well. 
2 CARDS – Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation; 
PHARE – Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies. 
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to the region of Continental Croatia which has had a NUTS 2 level status since Sep-
tember 2012 and borders with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). It be-
longs among the regions that were mostly affected by wars and is one of the eco-
nomically least developed regions according to 2010 regional GDP in Croatia (CBS 
2013). 
We shall deal with the following topics in this paper. First an assessment of CBC 
results in Croatia covered by the IPA programme 2007–2013 will be  presented. 
Then we shall examine to what extent CBC can be considered as a good oppor-
tunity for institutional capacity building in the WB region. The analysis of the Croa-
tian Vukovar–Sirmium County experiences in CBC projects with partners from the 
neighbouring countries, Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, will also be pre-
sented. Then we shall deal with the meaning of the concept of European territorial 
cohesion in the WB context; and also with the ways in which CBC contributes to 
the development of the regions and peoples that were in conflict in the 1990s. As 
CBC emphasises partnerships at project level, the benefits as well as obstacles of 
this kind of co-operation will be analysed too and conclusions be presented at the 
end of the paper. 
The European Concept of Territorial Cohesion in the Western Balkan Context 
Territorial cohesion as a new cohesion policy objective of the European Union is 
widely accepted as an important third development aspect, but its meaning is still 
differently understood when viewed from the perspectives of different member 
states. This is first of all due to the different spatial planning traditions and also to 
the fact that territorial or spatial development is still in the primary competence of 
the national and not the EU level. As a result of a long process of developing an 
adequate policy approach at the supranational level, territory or space in the EU 
context is viewed in a much broader and multi-dimensional sense overarching the 
administrative boundaries of territories and the development processes going on 
within and among them. Clearly, it is very hard to define regions and their bounda-
ries in a uniform and all-encompassing way. Depending on the purpose of govern-
ing and the nature of such divisions (e.g. administrative, natural, geographic, his-
torical, or religious), there can be subnational, supranational, transnational and/or 
cross-border regions.  
Since the 1990s significant efforts have been made by both scientific and re-
gional policy communities, in the frame of ESDP and ESPON, to broaden the under-
standing of development processes in a spatial context.3 Furthermore, in his report 
Barca (2009) emphasises the importance of placed-based policy and the role of the 
                                                                        
3 ESDP – European Spatial Development Perspective; ESPON – www.espon.eu. 
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EU in cross-border co-operation, as there are evident interdependencies and ex-
ternalities that can be better handled in an EU context. The most recent policy-
related processes can be linked to the Territorial Agenda of the European Union 
2020 (TA2020) adopted at the Informal Ministerial Meeting of Ministers respon-
sible for Spatial Planning and Territorial Development in Hungary in 2011 (IMMM 
2011). As emphasised in the background document for the TA2020 (Ministry of 
National Development and VÁTI 2011, p. 14) and in the Green Paper on Territorial 
Cohesion (EC 2008), the notion of territorial cohesion refers to multiple levels of 
governance and its integrative character. It is seen as a tool for building networks 
of functional areas. And what is even more important, it represents a change in 
spatial paradigm strengthening the interdependences of regions. 
The notion of “territory” was one of the key reasons for the split up of former 
Yugoslavia. Economic, social as well as territorial cohesion, though not named in 
that way, were integrated into the policy framework of “brotherhood and unity” of 
the former socialist system until 1990. In this sense, the policy objectives of the EU 
are very familiar to peoples in the WB, unfortunately having ended with a tragic 
break-up. Today the former republics, except Slovenia, are countries belonging to 
the WB region, and are all in the process of EU integration. In a historical perspec-
tive, CBC and territorial cohesion in the WB region is characterised by two contro-
versial features. The first one refers to a good basis for reviving old ties and 
relationships, since the WB countries once co-operated within the same state 
(Đokić – Sumpor 2011). The other one relates to the difficulties among peoples 
that only recently were in tragic conflict which cannot be easily overcome by a ra-
tionalist approach, whereas development depends to a large extent on trust and 
good social relations. In this respect, participatory planning can be considered as a 
useful approach, but it needs time, money and social competence. Since regional 
co-operation in the WB has been defined as a key policy priority of the EU (EC 
2005), CBC programmes have been implemented between the WB countries, 
funded by the IPA programme (component II).  
As already recognised in the Lisbon Treaty, cross-border territories often face 
several difficulties due to geographical obstacles, such as a mountain or rivers, and 
also other barriers like language, culture etc. that need to be surpassed by cross-
border information, education and training. Non-harmonised legislation and Euro-
pean legislation are implemented differently across borders. This hampers the 
mobility of labour and services. Also, EU sector policies are not always appropriate 
for the specific context of the cross-border regions (EC 2009). Such difficulties are 
faced by governments involved in such co-operation as programmes with EU 
members and IPA countries are bilateral. Institutional structures, processes and 
procedures differ for each programme, and though EU regulations are common, 
differences occur in implementation. As experiences across the WB differ due to 
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different levels of development, the following chapters present findings from a 
Croatian perspective. 
The Implementation of the IPA CBC Programmes in Croatia 
Croatia participates in eight CBC programmes within the IPA CBC Programme 
2007–2013. Therefrom six operational programmes are bilateral with neigh-
bouring countries, while the regional ones involve several countries in the Adriatic 
and South East Europe. All programmes are elaborated in accordance with the EU 
programming methodology, following standard steps in strategic planning, con-
taining strategic objectives, priorities and measures, defined implementation pro-
cedures and structures. Programmes are implemented through grant schemes and 
calls for project proposals (CfPs) with predefined financial allocations. 
Based on data presented in Table 1 and Figure 1, it is evident that the most 
active programmes and the corresponding numbers of projects are contracted 
with neighbouring EU members (85.6%), registering increase in the last two years. 
This development is due to Croatian partners’ experiences in CBC at all governance 
levels with EU neighbours (Slovenia, Hungary and Italy). As of January 2013, the 
total contracted amount is 75 million euro, almost 85% of which comes from IPA 
sources, while the remaining sum is co-financing by the project applicant and/or 
partners. 
Almost three quarters of all projects funded through seven (out of 16) calls for 
project proposals are linked with partners from EU member countries. The 
relatively weaker results with non-EU members can be interpreted as first steps in 
the re-establishment of cross-border relations with neighbours that used to belong 
to the same country, but where besides physical, also social and economic ties 
were damaged as a consequence of the war in the 1990s. Also, the funds for grant 
schemes with the WB countries were much lower than those allocated for co-
operation with EU member countries. 
There are also differences in size of projects in financial terms (see Table 2). 
Projects implemented with partners from EU member countries are generally 
larger and almost double in value. Depending on the overall value of the CBC pro-
grammes, the project minimum and maximum values are predetermined in the 
application guidelines. Since the programmes with the EU member states have 
larger overall budgets, the maximum values of the projects are higher than of those 
with non-EU member countries. These figures vary considerably among CBC grant 
schemes and CfPs as a result of differences in the nature, content and finally the 
budget of projects. The data quoted here are from an intensive period when many 
CfPs were opened to potential applicants, the number of projects tripled and the 
number of partners increased. It can be concluded that partnerships established 
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Figure 1. Distribution of projects by type of IPA CBC Operational Programme 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on data provided by Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Re-
gional Development and EU Funds, 2011 and 2013. 
Table 2.  Average size of projects per CBC programme groups 
 EUR 
Average size of projects (with EU member countries) 266,828.76 
Average size of projects (with non-EU member countries) 124,504.85 
Average size of projects (transnational programmes) 129,375.84 
Source: Authors’ calculation, 2013. 
during the first CfPs continued in the next ones, meaning that the overall number 
of partners has not changed considerably. 
Results obtained from other CBC programmes also show positive trends, espe-
cially the transnational programme South Eastern European Space (SEE) with four 
CfPs and considerable changes in all categories: increased number of projects, 
number of partners and total amount contracted. Partners may come from various 
regions according to the guide for applicants, while territorial eligibility for the 
location where projects can be implemented is specified in each CBC programme. 
Overall, CBC projects have been implemented in 18 counties. Most of them in the 
Osijek–Baranya County (75) followed by the Medjimurje County with 36 projects. 
The top four counties (Table 3) represent more than a half of all CBC projects, 
while the first seven counties carry three quarters of all CBC projects in Croatia. In 
the remaining 14 counties, a total of 78 CBC projects have been implemented, 
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which is almost the same number as in Osijek-Baranya County. Technical assis-
tance projects (9) have been carried out within three bilateral CBC programmes, 
i.e. Croatia – Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia – Montenegro and Croatia – Serbia. 
As can be seen in Table 4, projects funded from four CBC programmes have 
been implemented in the City of Zagreb, Istria and Dubrovnik–Neretva County. As 
each programme has specific institutional and administrative structures, as well as 
varying priorities and measures, implementation of the respective project 
management structures requires a certain level of flexibility and adaptability. Thus 
the personnel must have expertise in EU funded project management and also 
specific expertise in thematic fields addressed in individual CBC programmes. In 
two border region counties, Lika–Senj and Brod–Posavina, no CBC project has been  
implemented. It can only be assumed that applicants from these counties partici-
pated in CfPs, but were not successful. 
Table 3. Number of projects per county 
No. County Number of 
projects 
Share in total 
(%) 
Cumulative 
(%) 
1. Osijek–Baranya 75 23.73 23.73 
2. Međimurje 36 11.39 35.13 
3. Istria 31 9.81 44.94 
4. City of Zagreb 26 8.23 53.16 
5. Koprivnica–Križevci 26 8.23 61.39 
6. Primorje–Gorski kotar 25 7.91 69.30 
7. Dubrovnik–Neretva 19 6.01 75.32 
8. Virovitica–Podravina 17 5.38 80.70 
9. Vukovar–Sirmium 12 3.80 84.49 
10. Split-Dalmatia 11 3.48 87.97 
11. Varaždin 8 2.53 90.51 
12. Krapina–Zagorje 6 1.90 92.41 
13. Karlovac 5 1.58 93.99 
14. Zagreb (County) 5 1.58 95.57 
15. Sisak–Moslavina 4 1.27 96.84 
16. Zadar 4 1.27 98.10 
17. Šibenik–Knin 3 0.95 99.05 
18. Bjelovar–Bilogora 2 0.63 99.68 
19. Požega–Slavonia 1 0.32 100.00 
20. Brod–Posavina 0 0.00 100.00 
21. Lika–Senj 0 0.00 100.00 
 TOTAL 316 100.00 – 
 Tehnical assistance 9  –  – 
Source: Authors’ calculation, 2013. 
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Cross-border Co-operation in the Vukovar–Sirmium County (VSC) 
CBC is an integral part of EU regional policy aiming at economic, social and 
territorial cohesion to reduce the negative impacts of borders and differences in 
development levels of various European regions. The Vukovar–Sirmium County 
(VSC) Government recognised the importance of cross-border co-operation 
already in the pre-accession stage and it actively participated in the IPA 2007–
2013 programme. There were two rounds of calls for CBC project proposals in 
which the county participated and it intends to participate also in the third and 
final round in the second quarter of 2013. 
The first CfP within the IPA CBC programmes was released in March 2009. For 
the IPA CBC Programme Croatia–Serbia (CRO–SER) there were a total of 111 
applications, out of which 31 proposals related to VSC territory. VSC was partner in 
six projects and lead partner in one. For the IPA CBC programme Croatia–Bosnia 
and Herzegovina (CRO–BIH), the total number of submitted proposals was 103 out 
of which 12 is linked to VSC territory. VSC was partner in three projects, while in 
one project it was leader. The second CfP was released in June 2010. Out of 154 
submitted project proposals within the IPA CBC CRO–SER call there were 38 
applications from the territory of VSC. For the IPA CBC CRO–BIH there were 153 
project proposals, wherefrom 10 projects were submitted from partners in VSC. 
VSC had the lead partner function in 2 proposals. 
In Table 5 below, a selection of nine CBC projects from the 1st and 2nd CfP im-
plemented on VSC territory is presented. 
The experiences and findings regarding partnership creation, project prepara-
tion and project management in VSC are summarised below. 
Partnership – Challenges in the preparation of CBC projects are primarily re-
lated to finding adequate and reliable partners. “On-line forums” for partner search 
are helpful and important, but good partnerships were rather created through 
personal meetings, organised by the Joint Technical Secretariats (JTS). By defining 
a project idea that satisfies the needs of CBC partners, the functional lead partner 
takes overall responsibility for project implementation and proper budget execu-
tion, co-ordination of project preparation and implementation. Project teams 
harmonise their views and needs and co-ordinate activities in accordance with the 
differing statutory regulations applicable in each country. Also, geographic dis-
tance of partners represents technical problems in co-operation. This limiting 
factor is sometimes crucial, when finalising partnerships and harmonising the 
communication flows. Sometimes it is a key problem to find a partner that is truly 
interested in the project. 
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Human resources – Co-operation in cross-border projects is a particular 
challenge for all involved partners. The most common difficulty emerges in con-
nection with the human resources of the interested parties. Insufficiently skilled 
and educated personnel and the lack of practical experience are major obstacles in 
developing good and implementable project ideas.  
Project formulation and budget  – The main challenge for the project teams is to 
work out the activities, results and objectives that are the backbone of each 
project. Misunderstanding the project cycle often results in serious errors, for 
example, when preparing the project budget; project costs are recklessly calcu-
lated and unrealistically linked to the project activities. Many potential applicants 
for EU funds think that the most challenging part is to obtain funding, but those 
who have already obtained it know that the real problems come after the contract 
is signed. 
Beneficiaries – Project beneficiaries always have the best intentions during 
project preparation. But even the best prepared projects almost always face 
unforeseen situations and risks in implementation. Fund beneficiaries often find 
themselves in a situation that they did not spend all approved funds or that they 
must repay the funds that were not properly spent. The biggest problems occur in 
managing the project budget, the public procurement processes regulated by EU 
rules and in reporting on the implementation of the project. 
Implementation – Partners do not always understand the project implementa-
tion process, the interdependencies in project activities and the necessity of 
respecting deadlines. The negligence of one partner can endanger the entire pro-
ject. It is a further significant problem that project implementation monitoring 
bodies set up on the two CBC sides are not properly harmonised. It occurs that the 
project implementation report from one side of the border is accepted, while the 
same report from the other side gets rejected or clarifications are requested. 
Finally, it also happens that for the same joint project two completely different 
reports are produced. 
The project team – Its quality, expertise, and experience is of particular im-
portance. Regardless of project type or complexity, a good project team can con-
tribute to and must be responsible for successfully implementing the project by 
effectively controlling each phase of the implementation and by timely identifying 
possible errors or irregularities that could jeopardise the project. 
Conclusions 
In general, it can be concluded that EU CBC programmes positively influence the 
evolution of regional and local development practices. From the experiences of 
Vukovar–Sirmium County it is clear that with a well-developed strategy, a good 
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idea, sufficient knowledge and will, many projects can be co-financed from EU 
funds. It is important to strengthen human resources for effective project prepara-
tion and management, to achieve efficient project implementation. In Vukovar–
Sirmium County a number of individuals have developed project management 
skills through regular training and experience. 
In addition, experts and consultants involved in EU project preparation also 
gained knowledge, while further experiences were gathered by all those involved 
in the project implementation process. However, as awareness is rising only slowly 
since administrative procedures require new ways of thinking and working, this 
process is, like many others, evolutionary and so cannot be pushed, only fostered 
and skilfully facilitated. 
Positive results of CBC experiences in Croatia can also be seen in the transfer of 
institutional know-how toward the WB neighbours through co-operation in 
sustainable economic, social and environmental development. The EU accession 
process represents an opportunity for territorial cohesion in the WB region. This 
process is helped by territorial co-operation based on rules set by the EC and the 
responsible managing authorities. Of high importance are transparent procedures 
based on which better governance practices can evolve through co-operation in 
new institutional settings and territories. 
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